summoned to London where Romania was under discussion, and Melbourne was on leave in Italy.

A third interruption occurred when he was in Paris and Washington during 1946 (28 August-16 October). This time, the gap in his text is left blank. I have taken the liberty of filling in the interval with the Top Secret Report that Berry presented to the President of the United States in September 1946 in Washington.

Preceded by Mark Ethridge's Special Report on Soviet Tactics in Romania and Bulgaria of November-December 1945, and bracketed chronologically between George Kennan's Long Telegram of February 1946, which warned of the error of treating with the Soviet Union as if it shared common perspectives and goals with the United States, and Kennan's "X" article of July 1947, which presented a broad strategy for the United States to counter Soviet expansionism,[5] Berry's *Top Secret Report Romania*[6] is a significant marker of the beginning of the Cold War. In it, he presented President Harry Truman with solid documentation of Soviet methods at work in Romania, predicting their employment in the other foreign lands under Soviet military occupation. The report summarized step by step the points at which the policies of the United States had failed and the Soviets had gained ascendancy. It synthesized Berry's reports and observations in a conscious attempt to influence US foreign policy towards adopting a more protective attitude with regard to Romania.

I do not discuss the political developments witnessed by Berry. Nor do I discuss his personal perceptions against the general historical setting which, I judge, is most interesting. I have intentionally avoided entering into the lions' den of issues which not only require much more serious study but which are already ably addressed by a host of veteran Romanian, American, and other specialists.[7]

In the meantime, while omitting the foregoing, I offer the reader and historical researcher the coherent testimony of an astute eyewitness, commentator, and actor.

Berry himself had destined his *Romanian Diaries* for printing. One clear testimony to this intention consists of the cross-references he used between some chapters of his book-to-be. I have therefore kept methodological interventions to a minimum; for instance, in adopting the present spelling of the name of the country and its people, i.e. Romania, Romanian, and Romanians, and not Rumania, Rumanian, Rumanians, in the interest of uniformity in Berry's text and in the citations. Interventions in regard to missing diacritical marks have also been minimal. Names such as Sānātescu, Bodnāraş, Tātārescu, etc. remain in Berry's spelling in his text, but are given in the Romanian orthography in the notes. I have left Berry's otherwise incorrect spellings of personal names as they appear in the original text.

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[5] For the Ethridge Report see *Foreign Relations of the United States 1945*, Vol. V, 1967, pp. 627-631, 633-637; also *infra*, pp. 306-312. For Kennan's Long Telegram and his X Article see his *Memoirs*, 1967, pp. 271-297, 354-366 and 547-559.

[6] See *infra*, pp. 467-496.

[7] See *infra*, the bibliographic guide, pp. 683-685.

I have, however, divided the whole material into five chronological sections: I, *On Post in Romania*, begins with the day of Berry's arrival in Bucharest, November 9, 1944, and ends with June 14, 1945; II, *In and Out of Romania*, includes three subdivisions: 1. "While in Washington," June 18 to August 26, 1945; 2. "Resuming charge," in Bucharest, August 26-Sept. 13; and 3. "While in London," Sept. 14-26; III, *Back on Post*, extends from September 27, 1945 to August 28, 1946; IV, *In Paris and Washington*, is devoted exclusively to Berry's "Top Secret Report upon Romania" presented to President Harry S. Truman in September 1946. Here I have added a brief editor's note on the circumstances surrounding the drafting of this report; V, *Last Months in Bucharest*, covers the interval between October 16, 1946 and May 20, 1947.

Berry's *Diaries* provide the opportunity to understand the social and political milieu in which he operated as well as the extremely harsh historical circumstances in which Romania found herself — circumstances which let us hope will remain only historical.

Cornelia Bodea
Romanian Academy, Bucharest

Acknowledgments

I first stumbled across Berry's *Romanian Diaries* at Indiana University in Bloomington, Indiana, in April 1996 during a lecture-visit arranged by Dr. Maria Bucur at this most cherished campus — the first of the many American campuses which I had the privilege to visit over the past three decades as a Fulbright visiting-professor, researcher, and academic participant. It was during one of the last days of my sojourn at Bloomington, while undertaking research in the special Manuscript Collection and Rare Books Section of the University's library, that I 'discovered' the three bound volumes registered as *Rumanian Diaries* by Burton Y. Berry, along with a separate item entitled the "Top Secret" Report presented by Berry to the United States President. I gratefully acknowledge the Lilly Library for granting me permission to publish Berry's *Diaries* and to reproduce his picture on the frontispiece of this book.

My colleague and friend Dr. Paul E. Michelson, distinguished professor of History at Huntington College (Huntington, Indiana), was the first to share my discovery. He was to be of great and direct assistance as my liaison between Bucharest and Indiana University in Bloomington, his own Alma Mater. It is my pleasant duty to express all my gratitude for his willingness to bear a full share of the preparatory labors of production up to the last stage of print.

I met with similar understanding, help, and support from Professor Emeritus Charles Jelavich (Indiana University, Bloomington) and from Dr. Ernest H. Latham Jr. (Washington, DC). Gratitude is equally due to Grant Harris of the Library of Congress (Washington) for his interest and support.

I express all my appreciation for the oft-repeated academic support of Professor Radu R. Florescu (Boston College, Chestnut Hill, Massachusetts) and the late lamented Professor George Ursul of Emerson College at Boston († March 14, 1999) for enabling me to prolong several of my scholarly sojourns and researches in the Boston-Harvard area. To Dr. Paul D. Quinlan (Providence College, Providence, Rhode Island) I owe special thanks for the possibility of quoting the diary of Brigadier General Cortlandt V. R. Schuyler, still unpublished in its original English version. My research was encouraged by the generous hospitality of my two friends overseas, the late Sergiu Bujor, and Anna Nikolla-Bujor (New York, NY).

At home, in Bucharest, I am indebted to the Romanian National Archives, the Romanian Academy, and the librarians of the Romanian Academy Library for their support and encouragement. I gratefully acknowledge the enthusiastic efforts of my publisher for his special interest in this work, Dr. Kurt W. Treptow, director of the Center for Romanian Studies, and the hard work of his excellent staff: Viorica Rusu, Petronela Postolache, Mihaela Postolache, and Dana Ungureanu. In addition, I express my appreciation to Narcis Dorin Ion and Cristina Păiuşan for their assistance with the index. My acknowledgment also goes to those who took part in the technical side of the editorial operation, Diana Tatu, as well as the staff of the "Monitorul Oficial" Printing Office.

Dr. Gheorghe Buzatu, Dr. Ioan Chiper, Dr. Florin Constantiniu, and the American Dr. Larry L. Watts, all specialists on this period, provided valuable assistance through the exchange of their ideas, and access to their personal libraries. I underscore Dr. Watts for his promptitude in lending his expertise in reading the text, making commendable suggestions, and responding to my queries.

The authors and editors of the works included in the bibliographic guide confirm and expand upon Berry's testimony regarding events, ideas, and trends connected with Romania's destiny during this complex period.

C. B.

I

ON POST IN ROMANIA

1. 1944, November 9-December 31[1]

November 9 *Arrival at Bucharest*

At noon today[2] I arrived at the Popesti Airport at Bucharest. With me were clerk Simon Rad, who had been an OSS employee in Istanbul, and typists Nelson and Magnusson, who had been in the Consulate General there. Roy Melbourne came to the field to meet us. He and Charlie Hulick had come to Bucharest on October 29. With this staff the Mission shall begin work.

November 10 *First visits:*

Accompanied by Melbourne I called today at the Headquarters of the Allied Control Commission. General Vinogradov, the Chairman, and Rear Admiral Bogdenko, the Chief of Staff, received me cordially. The General chided me a bit for the lateness of my arrival upon the scene. He offered his assistance in securing accommodations, transportations, and other necessities.

I introduced Lieutenant Colonel McGlasson, the first member of the American delegation to the ACC to arrive in Bucharest. I explained his and my status. The General told Colonel McGlasson that he should expect

to receive a call next week to a meeting of the Commission at which he would have an opportunity to present in writing any inquiries he might have concerning the past work of the Commission.

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[1] Interval corresponding to "Post-armistice problems of occupation and control of Romania; setting up of Allied Control Commission. Cf. *Foreign Relations of the United States. Diplomatic Papers 1944*. Vol. IV *Europe*, 1966, pp. 233-289. (Hereinafter *FRUS*.)

[2] See *FRUS 1944*. IV, p. 242: Secretary of State, C. Hull, to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union, Harriman, 1944, Sept. 29.

November 11 *At the Romanian Foreign Ministry:*

This afternoon I called at the Foreign Office to pay my respects to the Foreign Minister, Mr. Visoianu, and to inform him of my status.[*]

on the Armistice Agreement...

He said that he warmly welcomed the arrival in Bucharest of a representative of the American Government. He then kept me for an hour describing Romania's present administrative and economic difficulties, particularly as these are affected by the application of the terms of the Armistice Agreement. He spoke without bitterness and even with considerable tolerance of the untraditional approach of the Soviet Command to local problems and of the spontaneous actions of some of the Soviet officers and soldiers. Again and again he said that his Government sincerely desired to fulfill the obligations assumed under the Armistice Agreement but that this might prove impossible if it were denied the means of fulfilling them.

The Minister said that his government had agreed to ensure free movement as required by military authorities, but it was incapable of this as in fact the control of all communications was in Soviet hands. It had agreed to compensate for losses caused the Soviet Union to the amount of fifty million dollars yearly for six years payable in oil products, grain, and other commodities. However, the means of producing oil products were being seized and transported from Romania, and grain next year would be lacking as only fifteen percent of the land normally planted with wheat had been sown this autumn. This was due in part to the fact that fuel for tractors was not transported and distributed on Soviet-controlled Romanian railways and in part to a fear born of experience among the peasants that their animals and tractors would be requisitioned by the

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[*] See *FRUS 1944*, IV, pp. 260-261: Berry to the Secretary of State, Telegram 3, Nov. 12, 1944.

Soviets if exposed. The Minister added that Deputy Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Vishinsky, had come to Romania, carrying a long verbal message for the King, for the purpose of arranging for the better execution of the terms of the Armistice.

On the way to the door the Minister stopped and once again emphasized the desire of the Romanian Government to fulfill conscientiously the terms of the Armistice, stressing the fact that the Government found no fault with the terms, but did object to the way in which they had been executed until the present time. It was also unable to understand some requests made by the Soviets in the name of the Armistice Commission which he said would be humorous if the situation were not so tragic. To illustrate his point the Minister drew from his pocket a request just received from the Soviets which, according to him, called for the immediate delivery of large quantities of silk of the finest quality for underwear for soldiers, cacao, and other articles not produced in the country or available in reserve stocks.

November 12 *Call on Air Vice-Marshal Stevenson*

With Colonel McGlasson I called on Air Vice-Marshal Stevenson, Chief of the British delegation to the ACC. I explained the nature of my Mission* and introduced Colonel McGlasson.

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* "The American political Mission opened in Bucharest on 29 October 1944... The Mission, after hard tugging with the Russians, was, like its British counterpart, to be independent of the Allied Control Commission administering the military armistice and to have the right of direct contact with Romanians and of communication with Washington. Its officials on their arrival carried into their local environment a picture of the war from the American standpoint in which they sought to place their experience." Cf. Dr. Roy M. Melbourne, "Witness to the Start of the Cold War: The View from Romania," in *The United States and Romania. American-Romanian Relations during the Twentieth Century*. Paul D. Quinlan Editor. Woodland Hills, California, 1988, p. 97.

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In the course of his remarks the Air Vice-Marshal referred to Romania as "the easterly bastion of the democracies" and implied that American and British interests require a similar approach to meet present problems. He mentioned the seizure of oil industry equipment by the Soviets from American and English properties as indicative of the nature of the problems that will arise. He attributed them to the lack of reliable information and organized effort for implementing the terms of the armistice.

On the organization of the Armistice Commission

The Vice Marshal then outlined a plan of organization for the Armistice Commission which he had submitted to London and to the British Embassy in Moscow with strong recommendations for its immediate adoption. He instructed his aide to give Colonel McGlasson a copy of the organization chart set up under his plan.

This calls for a commission under the chairmanship of Marshal Malinovsky. It suggests Rear Admiral Bogdenko and Colonel Sidorov as Assistants to the Chairman, and a Commissioners Committee composed of the Deputy Chairman, General Vinogradov, Air Vice-Marshal Stevenson, and the ranking American officer. Immediately under this Committee there is a Secretariat headed by Chief of Staff, General Vasiliev, with a Soviet aide and a British and American assistant. Immediately under the level of the Secretariat are five committees: Inspectorate, Liaison, Signals, Supply, and Information, each with a Soviet officer as chairman and each including at least one British and one American officer. Subordinate to this level are six subcommittees: Military, Naval, Air, Chief Economic Officers, Administrative, and Political. Each of these committees has a direct responsibility for the fulfillment of the pertinent clauses of the armistice. At a subordinate level are eleven additional subcommittees to deal with specific articles of the armistice, namely: oil, food and agriculture, transport, general trade and inquiries, finance and property, all under Article thirteen; POW, united nationals and displaced persons, civil administration, under Article seventeen; censors, war criminals, anti-Fascists under Article sixteen; and finally, the subcommittee on transport functioning under Article thirteen is designed as well to function under Articles three, seven, and nine. In addition to these control committees the chart foresees the appointment of regional representatives.

The British official personnel in Romania has been increased to provide representation on a scale provided by the Air Vice-Marshal's chart. I understand confidentially the official staff numbers now two hundred fifty and it may be further increased by some forty men. Apparently anticipating a reluctance to increase the American delegation to something like the size of the British, the Vice-Marshal suggested that each American official might serve on several committees. He stated that he considered our Soviet Allies "decent chaps" and felt that he could "sell them" upon his plan's practicability, particularly in view of a satisfactory conversation that he had just had with Deputy Commissar Vishinsky.

At the conclusion of our call the Air Vice-Marshal promised Colonel McGlasson every aid in commencing his operations and arranged to give him full paper details upon the British delegation's organizational plan.

Recommendations

In reporting the conversation to the Department I said that the stepping-up of the size of the American delegation on the ACC to anything like the size of the British delegation would certainly offend the Soviet authorities and at the same time mislead the Romanians into believing that we anticipate playing a greater role in this area than our natural interests really demand. I therefore recommended, irrespective of the plan of organization finally accepted, that the size of our military delegation be kept small and within it the officers be used only on those committees where they could most effectively promote American interests in this country.

November 14 *Conversation with A.I. Vishinsky*

Mr. Vishinsky asked me to call this afternoon at the Soviet Legation. At his suggestion Commander Wisner and Colonel McGlasson came along.

Mr. Vishinsky received us cordially and, speaking through his interpreter, said that he wished to welcome the arrival of the Americans in Romania where we could assist him in the task which he came to Romania to accomplish. In the broadest sense this was to see that the terms of the armistice were carried out, but the immediate object of his trip was to come to an agreement with the Romanians for the payment of the agreed indemnity. He desired to reach an agreement in principle for the full six year period and in detail for the first year. Unfortunately his negotiations had reached an impasse, having failed until now to reach an agreement on three points: the sort of merchandise to be delivered, the quantities, and the prices. The last point was proving the most troublesome as the Romanians insisted on calculating their values on the basis of present day inflated prices and the Soviet authorities insisted on using pre-war prices as the basis.

Mr. Vishinsky attributed the poor Romanian showing to (1) the attitude of Mr. Christu, the President of the Romanian delegation to the Armistice Commission, who constantly foresaw difficulties and created delays, (2) the attitude of the Romanian officers which is more inclined to political discussions than to work, and (3) the fact that the Romanian authorities have been very slow in cleaning the Fascist elements from the administration. He cited the example of the present Prefect of Police who was in office during the Antonescu regime, and said that if the Romanians did not take action soon, he would be obliged to present them with a list of officers to be dismissed.

In closing the conversation Mr. Vishinsky repeated that he wanted to keep the Americans informed of the developments of his conversations in order that we might assist him toward our common goal in Romania, the fulfillment of the terms of the armistice agreement.

November 15 *AVM Stevenson on the disturbances in the oil fields*

Air Vice-Marshal Stevenson called, accompanied by Colonel Masterson, his petroleum expert. The Colonel said that trouble had been fomenting in the oil fields for several weeks. It was his opinion that those who were responsible for making this trouble hoped to have the situation in their hands before the new government had been formed. In this they failed as the government had been quickly formed. The new government on the other hand felt that the disturbances would soon quiet down, but this has not proven the case.

On November eleventh the companies had agreed to an average wage increase of one hundred twenty-five percent but the new government, instead of accepting this agreement between the workers and the companies, approved a provisional decree granting an increase based on the wages existing in December 1940 of roughly one thousand percent. This government wage scale is about double that the workmen had themselves agreed to a few days before. However, today the workmen are not satisfied and demand in addition that the increase be made retroactive to September first, that an additional month's salary be paid each man as winter relief, that money be furnished each man for firewood, sixty percent of the cost of which is reimbursable by the man and forty percent by the company for which he works. To illustrate the extent of the government's increase the Colonel quoted these figures: value of monthly production, one milliard eight hundred million Lei; payroll cost of October, one milliard five hundred million Lei; monthly payroll cost as now seen, three milliard five hundred thousand Lei. (Figures for one British Oil Company.)

Colonel Masterson's further information

The Colonel said that the critical labor situation in the refineries was spreading to the fields. Men in some fields have turned out the company engineers. In others they recognize only men of their own choice. For example, Astra which refines one half of the total present output in Romania, is now managed by a field engineer and at Unirea the workmen recognize only a former chauffeur as manager. All senior officials are terrified and refuse to go to the refineries for fear of being arrested by the workmen.

The Colonel added that according to reports just received the loading of equipment by the Soviets was still continuing. In addition to despoiling the fields by the carring away of essential equipment, he deplored the ignorant use of valuable articles. He cited an instance where nine thousand feet of haliburton line was used as binding wire.

Stevenson's point of view

The Air Vice-Marshal summarized the situation in saying that it appeared to him that continued production was threatened by (1) a complete lack of supervision within the refineries, (2) the activities of some group who were fomenting trouble among the workmen, (3) the continued loading by the Soviets of equipment. He said that if production came to a standstill, it would then be too late to take remedial measures, but, as the situation was developing rapidly, he proposed to take those measures now. He would attempt to see General Vinogradov on the subject at the same time informing London and requesting the British Embassy in Moscow to make strong representations. He said the presence of Mr. Vishinsky offered an unique opportunity to express our points of view here while our Embassies in Moscow concentrate on Molotov.

Alexander Ionescu's opinion

After the Air Vice-Marshal and his aide left I asked Mr. Alexander Ionescu, the acting Director of Romano-Americana, to call. Mr. Ionescu said that the situation in the American fields was considerably better than generally throughout the industry. He admitted that the working men's wages had been grossly inadequate, and he thought that the increases agreed on November 11th were fully justified. He said that the loading of machinery by the Soviet authorities had not been recommenced from the Romano-Americana warehouses. In view of the fact that our interests are not directly affected and as the Air Vice-Marshal's statement may be an exaggeration, I telegraphed that I shall await the Department's instructions before bringing up the matter with Mr. Vishinsky.

November 15 *Dinner at Stevenson's residence*

Tonight at dinner at the AVM's residence Mr.Vishinsky said that there were plenty of indications that the Soviet armies would play a part in the defeat of Japan. General Vinogradov added to me, "We remember Port Arthur like you remember Pearl Harbor. We do not forget our enemies nor our friends."

November 16

With the King on "present conditions in Romania;"

The King arranged a private luncheon today at the Villa of Princess Elizabeth where he has been staying when in Bucharest since his Palace was bombed. He asked me to bring whomever I wished and so I sent word that I would bring Melbourne, Hulick, and Colonel McGlasson.

...in Transylvania;

After luncheon he asked me to go with him to his study "to provide me with some information concerning present conditions in Romania." He began with Transylvania, saying that the promise to return the greater part of Transylvania to Romania had been a strong incentive for the Romanians to fight the Nazis and the Hungarians. Lately Romanian enthusiasm had been cooled by the action of the Soviet authorities in obliging Romanian administrative officers and civilians to leave Transylvania. The King said that neither he nor his people understood the reason for this inasmuch as the battle line had moved far beyond the areas where the Romanians had reestablished civil administration.

situation in Moldavia;

Next he discussed Moldavia. He said that as the Soviet armies advanced into this province most Romanian civil servants had retired with the Romanian army. With the Soviet army came large numbers of people form Transnistria. They settled in the homes and on the land of some one hundred thousand people that the Soviets sent away. The new arrivals set up their own administration. After the Armistice the King had sent to Moldavia prefects and other local officials, but without exception these had either been arrested or sent back. The result is that there is no centralized administration existing in the province. The King fears the consequence of this situation. He says the new settlers are intriguing against the State. The old population is so terrified that it dares not react to these intrigues in accordance with its sentiments. His informers say that the situation may develop to the point where a small minority purporting to speak in the name of the people will demand that Moldavia either declare its independence or attach itself to the USSR.

local political situation.
local Communists;

Turning to the local political situation the King said the local Communists were trying to make him nominate an officer as Minister of War that would be completely unacceptable to the army. Until now he had resisted, but he had not really made up his mind whether he would yield to the Communists and appoint General Rascanu or appoint an honest man of his own choice and likely be faced with a crisis provoked by the withdrawal from the government of the Communists and perhaps the Socialists. He said that the Communists in the country numbered not more than one hundred thousand, and it would be a simple matter to deal with this small minority if it were not for two factors, first, the likelihood that local Soviet officials would show their strong displeasure, and secondly, the possibility that the Communists would resist with arms. Of course, the Communists are the only political group that is armed. A small number were armed to assist on the twenty-third of August, the others have been armed secretly since with confiscated German equipment. They had agreed to disarm within six days after the formation of the new government, but they have not kept their agreement. Although forcible disarmament of them is desired by all parties, it is difficult during a Soviet occupation.

other disturbing elements

He added that another disturbing element in the country was the eighty thousand Soviet deserters. An element that would have to be counted upon in the future would come from the workers that would gravitate to the cities upon the closing of many factories throughout the country through the inability of the management to meet increased wage demands or furnish the necessary raw materials to keep the factories operating.

The King's conclusions...

The King said that the Soviets complained that the armistice terms were not being fulfilled, and in some particulars they had reason to complain. However, his reports showed that the Romanian Government had made available vast resources to the Soviets, perhaps enough to meet the reparation requirements for the first year. He said that he foresaw a slowing-down of future deliveries until and unless authority over communications was returned to the Romanians. He called my attention to the fact that one main railway line had been widened to the Soviet gauge and as a result Romanian rolling stock could not be used on this line. He said that every railroad station had its group of Soviet officials whose orders often were contradictory. To illustrate the resulting confusion he said that beginning today there is only sufficient cereals in the capital to last five days though there is an abundant stock of cereals nearby. Trains had been loaded with cereals and started for Bucharest, but Soviet officials along the right of way had diverted them. Under such conditions it is impossible to ensure the necessary deliveries for the Romanian population and equally impossible to make reparation deliveries to the Soviet authorities.

November 17 *Meeting between the British & Soviet representatives*

I have just seen the minutes drawn up by the aides of the AVM following a meeting between the AVM, Mr. Vishinsky, and General Vinogradov where the removal of oil equipment was debated. The principal discussion developed around the question of the title to the equipment. The British argued that they as well as the Soviets are fighting to reestablish their rights. As their armies advance and liberate territories their commercial interests, which have been working under duress for the Germans during the period of occupation and therefore for such time were a part of the German war economy, again become free and must be reestablished as British interests in accordance with treaty rights agreed among United Nations. The parts and machinery which are the property of the companies must be considered British property and should not be moved without previous British agreement. The Commissioner formally requested that loading be stopped and that what had been sent away be returned.

Mr.Vishinsky stated that it was established that the Germans brought pipe to Romania in exchange for oil they had received. The oil produced was used to fight against the United Nations, and the British companies that had helped the enemy were traitorous and should be branded as war criminals. Moreover, the pipe, parts, and equipment that had been delivered by the Germans in exchange for oil should be considered as war trophies. As no progress was made each party registered his complete disagreement with the point of view of the other on the question of title, and the discussion was terminated.

Throughout the discussion the problem of maintaining production was introduced from time to time. Both groups proclaimed the desirability of producing more oil than when the Germans were in Romania. The British said that the removal of the parts would result in the decline and in some instances a stoppage of production. Mr.Vishinsky on the other hand claimed there was still an adequate supply of pipe and parts to meet the industry's needs for a year and a half. As on this topic too the point of view of the two groups was in complete variance, the AVM suggested a joint committee of investigation.

November 21 *Japanese nationals in Romania*

This morning I called upon the Foreign Minister following the receipt of the Department's telegraphic instructions to suggest that the Romanian Government may desire to turn over to the United States for custody the fourteen Japanese nationals in Romania. I informed him that the Japanese would be suitably accommodated in Italy pending satisfactory arrangements for their repatriation.

The Minister replied that if the American Government insisted, he would turn over to us the fourteen Japanese now held here. He asked us in coming to a decision to bear in mind two considerations: One) Such procedure would prevent the return of several key men, notably Edmond Ciuntu, a Romanian citizen who took refuge in Japan during the Antonescu regime, whom the Romanian Government wishes to appoint as Minister to Moscow when he is released. Two) It would invalidate the Romanian argument for the return of German and Hungarian diplomats that were arrested in Bucharest by Soviet authorities and transported to Soviet Russia.

Romanian armed forces.
Soviet troops to be stationed in Romania!

Later in the same conversation with the Foreign Minister he said that his government was concerned over two announcements of the Soviet High

Command: one, that the Romanian armed forces in Romania must henceforth be limited to three divisions of peace strength (five thousand men each) and two, that three Soviet divisions will be stationed in Romania, in main industrial areas, one near Bucharest, a second near Ploesti, and a third near Timisoara.

The Romanians believe that the presence of the Soviet troops will increase the audacity of the local Communists and that the weak and thinly spread Romanian forces will be unable to check the disorders the local Communists create. Pessimistically they interpret these two announcements as two further steps toward the point where the Soviet authorities will say that the Romanian Government is unable to maintain order throughout the country and insist upon replacing it by a purely puppet government or a direct Soviet control.

November 22 *News from Constantza: 1. Soviet officials. 2. Local Communists*

The Swedish Minister, Patrik de Reutersward, told me that his Consul from Constantza had just arrived in Bucharest. He reported to the Minister that: One) Soviet officials have examined shipping records in the Consul's office to determine the amount of German imports through the port of Constantza during the war. They say that all such imports came from Russia and therefore the Romanian Government must compensate the Soviets for them regardless of whether or not they were reshipped abroad. Two) A third of the town has been evacuated by the Romanians in order to make place for Soviet officials who are bringing their families to Constantza. They are creating a naval port and arsenal and give every indication that they have come to stay. Three) Local Communists arrested the constitutionally appointed Mayor. The Minister of Interior instructed Romanian troops to release the Mayor and return him to the seat of his authority. Soviet officials informed the Romanian officers that their troops were not to leave their barracks. To see that they did not, Soviet troops armed with machine guns surrounded the barracks. The new Mayor designated by the local Communists remains in office.

Vishinsky on the Soviet removals of Romanian oil equipment as "war booty;"

By appointment I called upon Mr.Vishinsky and presented to him the Department's point of view* on the problem created by the action of the Soviet authorities in removing some twenty-three thousand tons of tubes, parts, turbines, and other equipment from the warehouses of various oil companies in Romania.

Mr.Vishinsky listened intently to my statement. When I finished he replied that he agreed that the quick rehabilitation of the Romanian oil industry was important. He said that the Soviet Command had removed only equipment that was in excess to the needs of the Romanian industry and so the removals would not retard the rehabilitation of the industry. He added that the Baku and Maicop fields were in great need of equipment and that the shipment there of Romanian equipment would serve our common effort.

Mr.Vishinsky argued that the equipment sent to Russia was not purchased by the oil companies prior to the war. It was all German equipment sent to Romania during the war, not as payment for Romanian oil, but for reshipment to the Soviet fields as soon as they were captured by the Germans. Under such circumstances the Soviet Command regarded the equipment as war booty.

I said that I understood that the tubes and equipment in warehouses of the American Company could in no sense be called war booty.

Mr.Vishinsky answered that there might be room for discussion on the question of title if one took the formal point of view. But he preferred a broader point of view. He suggested that the amount of equipment was so small that it might be written off as a minor lend lease shipment.

To this I said that the point at issue was not the value of the equipment taken away but the designation of the property of an American company as war booty and the removal of such property without the prior consent of the American Government.

In concluding the discussion of the topic Mr.Vishinsky said that he could not agree as the Soviet authorities held the equipment to be war booty, but he was in agreement that the Romanian oil industry should be quickly rehabilitated and he could assure me that the necessary parts were in stock for at least a year. He said finally that he would inform Moscow immediately of the State Department's interest in reviewing the whole question.

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* *FRUS 1944*, IV, pp. 263-264; Berry to the Secretary of State. Telegram 9, Nov. 23.

"Soviet — Romanian negotiations regarding reparation payments"

Having completed this part of our discussion Mr.Vishinsky turned to a discussion of the status of the Soviet-Romanian negotiations regarding reparation payments. He stated that in general, satisfactory progress had been achieved since his arrival, particularly with reference to the quantities of oil, grains, timber, and cattle desired by the Soviet Union. He was optimistic that an agreement would be signed within a few days. He informed me that some difficulties were being encountered with respect to the quantities of machinery desired by the Soviet Government and their request for seventeen million dollars of shipping over a six year period as part of the three hundred million dollars reparation.

In answer to my query he stated he was satisfied that Romanian transportation facilities were in a position to make scheduled deliveries of material, since it was planned to use the Danube, sending shipments to Constantza, Odessa, and Nikolaiev for the rehabilitation of the Crimea and Southern Ukraine. He also expressed his confidence that within several months they could draw upon Germany to ease the transportation problem.

November 23 *On Romanian representatives to Washington & London*

Meeting the Foreign Minister yesterday he took the occasion to say that political representatives from America, England, France, Belgium, and Holland had either reached Bucharest or were on their way here. He said that he would like very much to send representatives to Washington and London. If they would be received, he would give each the same title as that borne by the representative of Washington and London here. He would choose his representatives from among Romanians who have been in Romania throughout the war and are thus better informed concerning present conditions than those who have resided abroad the past few years.

Romanians' request for using the US pouch and codes

In passing this information on to the Department, I suggested that it may wish to bear in mind that the Romanians will likely follow this soon with a request for the privilege of transmitting instructions to their representative by our pouch and codes. At the present time, of course, the Romanian Government is able to telegraph abroad only in clear. It has no pouch service. If we were to grant such facilities, I believe we would encounter an immediate and strong Soviet reaction as they suspect the Romanians of trying to stir up trouble between the Soviets and the Western Allies.

November 27[*]

"Soviets had recommenced loading tubes..."

The manager of Romano-Americana reported yesterday noon that the Soviets that morning had recommenced loading tubes from the company's warehouse at Baicoi Field.

General Schuyler[**] immediately sent an officer to Ploesti to investigate. Late last night he reported that the loading had started as we were informed and was continuing.

Protest to the Soviet authorities

The General and I agreed that the situation required an immediate protest to the Soviet authorities. Mr. Vishinsky, according to the Soviet Legation, was out of town for several days, but an appointment previously made for Schuyler to make his initial call on Vinogradov gave the needed opportunity.

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[*] See *FRUS 1944*, IV, p. 266: Berry to the Secretary of State. Telegram 33, Nov. 27.

[**] "General Schuyler arrived Bucharest November 25. The following day his office learned that Soviets had begun to remove property from Romano-Americana Oil Company..." (*FRUS 1944*, IV, p. 267: The Chargé in the Soviet Union, Kennan, to the Secretary of State. Telegram 4552, Nov. 28; also pp. 271-272: The US Political Advisor, Allied Force Headquarters, Kirk, to the Secretary of State. Telegram 1559, Caserta, Nov. 30).

After the usual exchange of pleasantries Schuyler presented the American point of view, following closely my statement to Vishinsky. He asked that the loading be stopped and that the material that had been loaded be returned.

Vinogradov replied to Schuyler with much the same arguments as Vishinsky had replied to me. He insisted that there was enough equipment on hand for operation for one year. He said that he did not have the authority to stop the loading. Schuyler then requested him to halt the equipment at some central point and hold it until the matter was cleared with Moscow, but this Vinogradov declined to do. He only agreed to inform Moscow of the conversation.

November 28 *D. Brătianu — I. Maniu grievances and suggestions*

One of my first callers this morning was Dinu Bratianu, President of the National Liberal Party. He told me that in accord with Julius Maniu, President of the National Peasant Party, they had decided to withdraw the support of their parties from the Sanatescu Government.

Mr. Bratianu said that Sanatescu had proved to be a weak and vacillating Prime Minister. Under his regime disorders were increasing, and the political and economic structure of the country was rapidly deteriorating. Mr. Bratianu enumerated his grievances against Sanatescu: his failure to keep his word and disarm the Romanian Communists as agreed within five days after the formation of the present Government; his tolerance of the disorders in factories caused by irresponsible persons; his acquiescence to the situation existing in Timisoara, Galatz, and Constantza where Romanian Communists ousted at pistol point the constitutionally appointed authorities and replaced them with men of their own choice; his failure to stand his ground when the Soviet authorities ejected the Romanian administration from Transylvania; his acquiescence to the practical isolation of Moldavia; his failure to solve the communication problem; his permitting evidence of the non-fulfillment of the armistice terms to accumulate.

Mr. Bratianu expects to suggest to the King that the present government be replaced by a government of technicians headed by General Radescu, the present Chief of Staff. He said that the alternative would be a government of politicians led by Mr. Maniu and himself, but such a solution seemed impracticable as both he and Maniu had recently been attacked on the Moscow radio and accused of sabotaging the Armistice. He added that the chances of survival for many months of a government of technicians were slight, but he thought that it would serve a useful purpose until the Soviets set up their own government.

On this point Mr. Bratianu, like most Romanians I have met, affirmed that the Soviets planned to take over Romania. He marshalled the usual evidence adding only one new fact: the Soviets had informed the Romanians that the Bucharest police must be reduced to seven hundred men; the Romanian gendarmerie to fourteen thousand men; and each of the three divisions of the army in Romania to three thousand five hundred men. Obviously these forces cannot maintain public order unless the armed bands are disbanded and the Soviet troops throughout the land give their full cooperation in the maintenance of order.

The Bratianu-Maniu decision now places the King in a position where he must decide either to struggle along a little longer with the present government or replace it by a government of technicians. His military aide said at noon that the Communist demonstration that was scheduled for this afternoon would be an important factor in determining the decision.

November 29* *Negotiations between Vishinsky and the representatives of the Romanian Govt*

The difficulties encountered in the negotiations between Mr.Vishinsky and the representatives of the Romanian Government have aided materially in keeping the Romanian political pot boiling. Very briefly summarized, the negotiations have developed in the following manner:

In his first interview with Mr. Savel Radulescu, the new President of the Romanian Commission for the Application of the Armistice Agreement, which interview occurred in an atmosphere that Radulescu has described as "threatening," Mr.Vishinsky demanded that within two days Romania accept 1938 as base year for determining reparations prices.Vishinsky presented a delivery schedule covering six years for commodities, livestock, and machinery. Radulescu stated the Romanian view that the indemnity fixed by the armistice meant payments at current world prices. He and other Romanian officials claimed acceptance of the Russian proposal meant increasing the indemnity threefold and that many requested quantity deliveries, notably livestock, were impossible to fulfill. Vishinsky's reply was to refuse to discuss any pending question until 1938 price principle was accepted.

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* Cf. *FRUS 1944*. IV, pp. 268-269: Berry to the Secretary of State. Telegram 36, Nov. 29.

The evening of November 24, Vishinsky was verbally informed of Romanian acceptance of 1938 as price basis but of Romanian reservations to sign a reparations schedule embodying quantity deliveries it considered impossible. A formal note was delivered on November 27.

The Vishinsky talks are considered significant locally for (1) they by-passed the Allied Control Commission replacing it by direct Soviet-Romanian negotiations and (2) they deepened Romanian gloom and increased apprehension for the future because of the use of a method of negotiation which Foreign Minister Visoianu described to me as "negotiation by ultimatum."

November 29[*] *Vinogradov's Note to Prime Minister Sănătescu*

The Romanian public is becoming increasingly uneasy over reports of the withdrawal of the Romanian civilian administration from Northern Transylvania. There is a growing feeling among the people that the Soviets are preventing the reparation of the injustice done to Romania by the Vienna Award. The Government has permitted no documents to be published but according to those that were shown me confidentially this morning in the Foreign Office, General Vinogradov on November 12, acting in the name of the Allied Control Commission, addressed a letter to Prime Minister Sanatescu. After reviewing in his letter the activities of a Romanian volunteer regiment of gendarmes operating in Transylvania, the General in substance stated: (1) the installation of Romanian administrative officials in Transylvania is forbidden; (2) the volunteer regiment of gendarmes operating in Transylvania must be disbanded, the men removed from Transylvania, and the commander court-martialed, charged with instigation against the Red Army; and (3) if the request is not fully satisfied by November 17, the Red Army will undertake the disbanding of the regiment.

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[*] Cf. *FRUS 1944*, IV, pp. 269-270; Telegram 37, Nov. 29.

"Romanian reply to the above Note"

The Romanian reply to the above Note was delivered November 19 and stated to General Vinogradov: (1) all Romanian authorities had been withdrawn from Northern Transylvania and (2) the volunteer regiment was disbanded, the men removed from Transylvania, and the commander, who was not affiliated with the Romanian military or civil authorities, would be tried by the military. The remainder of the reply was a legal argument on Romania's right to administer Northern Transylvania until the formal peace and emphasized Romanian administration had been established openly and in cooperation with the Soviet military. It closed asking for an indication when this administration could be restored.

The Berry — Maniu meeting, at length:

Rica Georgescu arranged for Mr. Maniu and me to meet at his home. I took Hulick with me as he speaks German well and German is Mr. Maniu's second language. To Mr. Maniu I expressed appreciation for his message to the President on the occasion of the liberation of Cluj and remained to listen to him trace at considerable length his political career and fight for the principles of democracy, and finally outline his views regarding the present political crisis.

Mr. Maniu stressed what he considered the flagrant disregard of the spirit and letter of the Armistice terms by the Soviet authorities. In addition to the arguments of Bratianu, Mr. Maniu was very concerned about the heavy losses of the Romanian army, which he attributed to the failure of the Soviets to provide the promised equipment such as tanks and anti-tank guns. During the first month of fighting on the Transylvanian front he stated the Romanians had lost 1,600 officers killed, 1,400 sub-officers killed, and 61,000 soldiers killed, wounded, and captured. As another grave concern he referred to the impending financial ruin of Romania which he felt had been greatly accelerated by the Soviet imposed ruble-lei-leva rate of exchange reported in Melbourne's message of November 2, reporting interviews with Christu.

Mr. Maniu attributed the present crisis to two incidents, namely: the failure of the Sanatescu Government to appoint a Minister of War other than the Communist candidate, General Rascanu, and the failure to force the disarming of the Romanian Communists as previously agreed upon. He explained that the National Peasant and Liberal parties had demanded of the Sanatescu Government the immediate disarming of all Communists and the immediate removal of all Communist officials who had installed themselves by force in administrative positions throughout the country. If these demands were not carried out within twenty-four hours, the Cabinet would vote for the dismissal of the Sanatescu Government to be replaced by government of technicians.

According to Mr. Maniu there were three possibilities with respect to the composition of a new government. The first, a Communist government, he dismissed as impossible since it would have neither the support of National Peasant or Liberal parties nor, in fact, the sanction of the King. The second, a government of politicians, led by Bratianu and him, he dismissed as impossible because of Soviet antagonism. As a seasoned political warrior he claimed that he personally was unaffected by the Soviet criticism, but he realized he was *persona non grata* with the Soviet authorities and did not wish therefore to provoke them. He stated that he had always favored a government of technicians, the third choice, as opposed to a government of political parties, the failure of which he had predicted. He ascribed three main tasks to be performed by a government of technicians: a) maintain order in the country, b) carry out Armistice conditions, and c) continue the war against the Axis.

Mr. Maniu told me he would not participate in the government of technicians, but that members of his party would be in it. He emphatically stated that neither he nor his party had any intention of withdrawing from the political scene but would continue the fight for a free, independent and democratic Romania.

Describing his constant effort to keep in close contact with the Governments of the United States and Great Britain so that he could be guided accordingly, he stated with feeling that he now found himself in an impossible position vis-a-vis his party and the Romanian people. On the basis of the preliminary armistice terms agreed upon in Cairo by his emissaries and representatives of the Three Allied Powers, he had assumed the responsibility of assuring the King, the Army, and the people that Romanian sovereignty and independence, both economic and political, were guaranteed by the Allies. Instead, he claimed, the Cairo armistice terms were abandoned in Moscow; subsequently, the terms of the harsher armistice signed in Moscow have been disregarded by the Soviet authorities; instead of being allowed to administer Romanian territory as specified in the Armistice two thirds of the country was under the jurisdiction of the Soviet authorities; instead of an Allied Control Commission with Great Britain and the United States participating, the latter Governments had delayed the arrival of their representatives allowing the Soviets alone to administer the application of the Armistice for three months; and finally after the arrival of the British and American representatives, the latter had remained in the background leaving the initiative in the hands of the Soviets. Emphasizing his great personal responsibility before the people and his party, Mr. Maniu wished to know if and when we would play an active part and when a truly Allied Control Commission would be constituted.

November 30 *Former residents of Bessarabia and Northern-Bucovina forcibly sent away*

Today I learned from Foreign Office officials and other responsible Romanian sources that Soviet authorities in Romania are forcibly sending away trainloads of former residents of Bessarabia and Northern Bucovina.

My informants say that these people are all unwilling to move. There have been several suicides among them. The Romanian Government has discussed the question with the Soviets without the least success, and Maniu was rebuffed on sending a memorandum on the subject to Vishinsky.

Romanians argue there is a clear distinction between Paragraphs one and two of Article Five of the Armistice. They say they are obliged to turn over to the Soviets only persons forcibly brought to Romania, and this cannot include refugees who came here on their own volition and who by international law have the right of option. The Soviets on the other hand claim as their nationals all who were in Bessarabia or Northern Bucovina in June 1940.

The action of the Soviet authorities has created consternation among the groups of people directly affected and confusion among the whole population of the districts concerned. It has contributed to the uneasiness prevailing throughout the country and results in undermining the authority of the Romanian system of government.

"The King sent his Marshal of Court to say..."

The King[*] sent his Marshal of the Court[**] to say to me that the King had decided upon a new government and that it would likely be formed within the next twenty-four hours. The government would be a government of technicians. It would be formed to (1) maintain order, (2) discharge the obligations assumed by the country under the terms of the Armistice, and (3) carry on the fight against the Hungarians and Nazis.

The Marshal said that it was likely that the local Communists would react violently to the formation of a government of technicians. They might even attempt a coup d'état. If they had the cooperation of the Soviet authorities, a coup d'état would succeed. In such a case, he asked, what would happen to the King? Would the Americans offer him hospitality?

I turned off the question by saying that I felt the Marshal was thinking in a much too pessimistic vein and that tomorrow morning, after a good night's sleep, he would likely laugh at his own question. I would appreciate, however, instructions upon the point he raised as the question may be asked again under more urgent circumstances when I could not turn it off without a definite reply.[***]

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[*] Cf. *FRUS 1944*, IV, pp. 270-271: Berry to the Secretary of State. Telegram 40, Nov. 30.

[**] Dimitrie Negel

[***] "No record of reply found in Department files" (*FRUS 1944*, IV, p. 271, note).

Marshal Malinovsky in Bucharest

I understand that Marshal Malinovsky,[1] who personally commands the Second Ukrainian Army before Budapest and is at the same time the President of the Allied Control Commission for Romania, is secretly in Bucharest.

Over the ACC formal constitution

As the ACC has never formally been constituted, I have suggested to General Schuyler that this might be the time to press for its formal constitution.

At present the Soviet Command issues instructions to the Romanian Authorities in the name of the ACC. Thus we share in the responsibility for these instructions, but we have not shared in the drafting of them.

December 1 *Le Rougetel's excitement...*

Last evening my British colleague, Mr. Le Rougetel, came to see me in a state of considerable excitement. He said that he has reported to his government that unless the British and American governments very soon persuade the Soviets to desist in their efforts to Communize Romania, we will be too late and the experiment now being worked out in Romania will be repeated elsewhere in a more perfect form and on a larger scale.

Stevenson came around to Le Rougetel's point of view

Last evening Air Vice Marshal Stevenson, who some days ago said that he was about the only man in his Mission who believed in the sincerity of the Soviet statement that they did not desire to intervene in Romanian internal affairs, came around to Mr. Le Rougetel's point of view.

The change was brought about by a conversation yesterday afternoon between the AVM and General Vinogradov who said that he had received one, and Mr. Vishinsky another, group of delegates from the large Communist demonstration that took place earlier in the day.

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[1] Cf. *FRUS 1944*, IV, p. 271: Berry to the Secretary of State. Telegram 41, Nov. 30.

The General, according to the AVM, pointed out to the delegates that in many factories workers had asked the dismissal of the Chief of Police as well as the Minister of Interior and he seemed to imply his approval of the action requested. He said too that the workers were in a better position than the Government to know where the valuables were hidden that should be returned to the Soviet Command under Article 12 of the Armistice. Here he seemed to imply that the workers should take appropriate action.

To the AVM this meant that Vinogradov was intervening in the internal political affairs of Romania. He suggested to General Schuyler and me that the Soviets may have been playing a very skillful game, telling that their only interest in Romania is seeing the fulfillment of the terms of the armistice, while all the time quietly preparing to sweep away the democratic government and install a puppet Communist government with the aid of the Red Army.

Berry's conclusions and suggestions

The example given today by the AVM is the first indication I have had from a trustworthy source of contact on a high level between the Soviets and the Romanian Communists. Of contact on a lower level which may or may not have been directed by high authorities, there are several examples as, for instance, the replacement of the civil authorities in Constantza. But irrespective of the lack of evidence of correlation, there undoubtedly is an impression, that amounts to a conviction, among Romanians generally that the Soviets intend to bring about a dissolution of the Romanian state.

It is possible that this impression unless checked will bring about the change foreseen by the AVM independently of any directing force from Moscow. As such an event would retard indefinitely the reestablishment of our former commercial and political interests in Romania and cast doubts on our sincerity, as well as that of our Allies, in signing the armistice, I suggest that it is desirable at the earliest possible moment to dissipate this impression. I am convinced that this can be done only on the highest levels by some form of joint declaration implemented by, (1) returning to Romania control of the communication system of the country,

(2) reestablishing of Romanian civil authorities generally, and (3) regularizing the matter of requisitions.

December 3 *Resignation of General Sănătescu*

General Sanatescu has handed the King his resignation and that of his Government. It was accepted. General Radescu was asked to form a new political government and failing that a government of technicians.

Generals Sanatescu and Nicolescu last evening informed the King that a section of the army led by themselves was not favorable to a government of technicians. They feared that such a government, concentrating too much authority in the crown, would open the King personally to direct attack.*

December 7** *General Rădescu's Government program*

General Radescu has announced the formation of his Government. He is Prime Minister and Minister of Interior. General Negulescu is War Minister and General Stanescu is Under-Secretary of Interior for National Security. The portfolio of General Damaceanu for Liaison with the Allies and Application of the Armistice has been dropped. To give the National Peasant Party the vote lost by relinquishing the Interior Ministry post it is planned to add an additional ministry without portfolio. Otherwise the cabinet of the second Sanatescu Government remains intact.

A government program was announced to which all participants subscribed at the first cabinet meeting. It includes reestablishing order, maintaining production and factory discipline, observance of the Armistice agreement, disarming members of all party organizations (the Communists alone had not disarmed), weeding out state administrative personnel of Fascist elements, abrogating all racial laws and prosecution of war criminals.

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* Berry's letter to the Secretary of State, dated Bucharest, Dec. 4, No. 21 is not included in his *Diary*. It reported "upon the attitude of the Soviet authorities, both military and civil, towards the ACC" (*FRUS 1944*. IV, pp. 275-277).

** See *FRUS 1944*. IV, p. 277: Berry to Secretary of State. Telegram 49. Dec. 7

Generally local people believe[*] that the formation of the Radescu Government, and the agreement by the government on a program, constitutes a victory, at least temporary, over the National Democratic Front composed of the Left parties. Responsible sources claim that Soviet pressure caused the Left suddenly to enter a Radescu Government after first refusing to participate. On this point it is of interest that one report states that at a large official reception Tuesday evening at the Soviet Legation, Deputy Commissar Vishinsky in the course of an agreeable conversation with General Radescu complimented him on virtually solving the political crisis by forming a government of all political parties.

December 8 *Maniu's position:*

In discussing with me last evening the survival possibilities of the Radescu Government, as compared with the government of technicians, Mr. Maniu said that this question would be clarified very shortly by the government itself. Several incidents had just occurred that called for immediate and energetic remedial action. If the Government took such action it would likely survive. If not, he would not hesitate to expose the Communists who had signed a written agreement of adherence to the Radescu Government program and, if necessary, again demonstrate the strength of the National Peasant and Liberal parties by forcing the resignation of the present government.

The action in Greece he characterized as encouraging, adding that he was confident the Radescu Government would succeed provided the United States and Great Britain supported it vis-à-vis the Soviet authorities, who, he felt, had definitely been encouraging the local Communists in their attempts to spread disorder and unrest throughout Romania.

December 9 *Statement to be transmitted*
to the British F.O.

Mr. Le Rougetel tells me[**] that a few days ago Mr. Maniu said to him that if the British Government wished that Romania cast her lot with the

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[*] Compare to *FRUS 1944*, IV, p. 278: Berry to the Secretary of State. Telegram 50, Dec. 7.

[**] *FRUS 1944*, IV, pp. 279-280: Berry to the Secretary of State. Telegram 52, Dec. 9.

Soviets rather than with the Anglo-Saxon powers, in case a decision became necessary, he would quite understand the position but he would be grateful to receive an indication to that effect. In transmitting this statement to the British Foreign Office, Mr. Le Rougetel said that he was convinced that Mr. Maniu was genuinely seeking guidance and suggested that this inquiry might be used as a peg upon which to convey a message to Mr. Maniu.

Maniu developed the same thought to Berry:

Last evening with me Mr. Maniu developed more fully the same thought. He said that if he had known that the Soviets were to be given a free hand in the application of the Armistice terms, he would not have advised the King to sign the Armistice. He argued that his pressure and the Romanian action which resulted from it had actually advanced the front from the Focsani-Galatz line, which might have been held a long time, to the very gates of Budapest.

... the Soviet Russia and the democratic powers...

He told of an approach made to him by Mr. Molotov a year ago regarding the future relationship between Romania and the Soviet Union and explained that because of his loyalty to the democratic powers, he had not accepted this approach. He was convinced at that time that the democratic powers would preserve an independent and sovereign Romania. Everything today, however, indicated that this was not the intention of those powers. On the contrary it appeared that Soviet Russia was deliberately planning to Communize Romania while the democratic powers silently watched. To support his point he cited such examples as the installing of Hungarian Communists in administrative positions in Northern Transylvania; the steadily advancing Soviet colonizing of Constantza; and the recent request of Malinovsky that the whole of the four Romanian counties in Transylvania which were divided between Romania and Hungary by the Vienna Dictate be turned over to Soviet and Hungarian administration.

With considerable emotion Mr. Maniu asked if America and Great Britain wished Romania to become a part of the Soviet Union. "If so," he said, "please advise me accordingly, for this can be easily arranged, and even today, late as it is, I can arrange it to the better advantage to Romania than can the Romanian Communists." Then he repeated that if it were our intention to abandon Romania, we owed him the obligation of telling him so and he owed the Romanian people the obligation of securing the best possible terms for them.

"I told Mr. Maniu..."

I told Mr. Maniu that as far as I knew the statement made by Mr. Molotov last spring and the Articles of the Armistice indicated that the three principal Allies expected Romania to be an independent and sovereign state.

In my telegram to the Department[*] I said that Mr. Maniu has stood out boldly as a champion of pro-Allied action and sentiment in Romania even during the dark days of the Antonescu dictatorship. He has an enormous political following in the country, and I believe the respect in which all Romanians hold him eclipses that held for any other Romanian. Because of what he has been and what he is, it seems important that he be preserved from slipping into sharing the general conviction that the dissolution of the Romanian state is now in progress.

December 10[**] *An hour's talk with the King at Sinaia*

After luncheon today with the King at Sinaia, I had an hour's talk. The King was pleased that Mr. Vishinsky had left in a favorable frame of mind and was relieved that the government crisis had passed without popular disturbance.

The King said that when Mr. Vishinsky made his farewell visit he had said that when he came to Romania a month ago he was dissatisfied with the Romanian efforts to fulfill the terms of the Armistice; that during his stay here he had been able to correct many impressions; and that now at the time of his departure he was pleased with the Romanian action in fulfilling the Armistice terms.

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[*] Compare to the above report, p. 280.

[**] See *FRUS 1944*, IV, pp. 280-281: Berry to the Secretary of State. Telegram 54, Dec. 12. Repeated to Moscow.

Mr. Vishinsky said that the Soviet Government supported King Michael. It had no desire to see Romania become a Communistic state, but it did desire a neighbor which was friendly. Finally Mr. Vishinsky said that his government was very satisfied with the new Romanian Government and that a government of technicians would have been "impossible."

The King told me that the tone of this interview was on a much more pleasant plane than the first which was accompanied with scowls and thinly veiled menaces. He said that Mr. Vishinsky congratulated him upon his handling of the government crisis, and he had high hopes that affairs would now settle down as he understood that Mr. Vishinsky had talked to some of the more viperous Communists and had advised them against stirring up trouble.

The King was optimistic upon the chances of the new government's maintaining order. He said that the Prime Minister had shown himself firm and had taken immediate action to rectify a situation that might have grown troublesome. He said that the local Communists have taken quite a different attitude in the last few days, and that he felt that their bluff had been called since they had learned from conversations with Mr. Vishinsky that they could not have the support of the Red Army and since they had seen from the firm action of the Prime Minister that he was ready for a showdown.

December 11 *The letter from General Vinogradov to AVM Stevenson*

The Soviet Authorities understanding of their position on the ACC was set forth in a letter, dated December 3rd, from General Vinogradov, Deputy Chairman, addressed to Air Vice-Marshal Stevenson, British member of the ACC. There follows the text of the letter:

"Having acquainted myself with the scheme which you gave me for the organization of the Allied Control Commission, I have to inform you that I find the scheme unacceptable.

The suggested collective method of management not only of the Mission as a whole but of each of its departments is impracticable and would prove a great hindrance to the work of the Mission.

During the negotiations in Moscow, Section 18 of the Armistice agreement with Romania, it was intended that the Allied Control

Commission in this country should be built on the same pattern as the Allied Control Commission in Italy.

As is known, in Italy the executive role belongs to the Anglo-American Command.

The Soviet representatives do not take part in the administration of the departments, with the exception of the department dealing with the tracing of Allied citizens in Italy.

The Soviet representative in the Allied Control Commission has the right to be informed of the work of the Commission and hands his suggestions to the Deputy Chairman of the Commission.

In accordance with Section 18 of the Armistice agreement with Romania the executive work of the Allied Control Commission belongs to the Soviet Command.

The British representative will enjoy all those rights which are enjoyed by the Soviet representative in Italy, that is to say the right to receive information of the work of the ACC and to hand in his suggestions to the Deputy Chairman of the Commission.

On the part of the Soviet Government there is no objection if the situation warrants it to a special British representative being attached to the Administrative Department of the Commission to work in tracing British citizens in order to repatriate them."

December 12* *Le Rougetel's optimism and... pessimism*

Mr. Le Rougetel has informed me that he and the Air Vice-Marshal have changed their point of view from that held at the end of last month. They now feel that the formation of the new Romanian Government was a triumph for the conservative forces of the country and therefore that the danger of the Soviets Communizing Romania is now past.

The Air Vice-Marshal is still convinced that Mr. Vishinsky came here to do the same type of job that he did in the Baltic states. But when Mr. Vishinsky discovered that conditions were different, the Air Vice-Marshal believes that Moscow ordered what he describes as "a Russian backdown."

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* Cf. *FRUS 1944*, IV, p. 282: Berry to the Secretary of State. Telegram 58, Dec. 12. Repeated to Moscow.

It seems to me that the British here were unduly pessimistic a fortnight ago about the situation in Romania. When the full measure of their pessimism was found unjustified, they swung equally violently to optimism. Extreme pessimism is ruled out by the lack of substantial evidence that the Soviets are planning a change in the Romanian state. Extreme optimism is unwarranted as all of the basic elements for a clash of interests which were present at the end of the last month are equally present today.

Accordingly, I have not changed my basic opinion but I believe that the surface tension has been eased by the deparature of Mr. Vishinsky and the formation of a new political government.

December 14 *About the so-called Soviet "deserters"*

I have been seeking clarification of the report that there are eightythousand Soviet deserters in Romania. The report is not misleading if one understands the difference between the Soviet and our own idea of deserters.

To the Soviets the deserters are stragglers or small groups of men who have become separated voluntarily or involuntarily from their units as they advanced through Romania. They are chiefly in Moldavia where in villages they requisition what is necessary to meet their needs and terrorize the local people who are unable to distinguish them and regular army groups.

The loose organization of the Soviet army in Romania and the low degree of discipline among the soldiers make it possible for such people to exist for many weeks before any action is taken about them. Then the Soviet authorities consider them more in the sense of men absent without leave than deserters.

December 15 *The Japanese in Romania!*

If it is the intention to use the Japanese in Romania as counters in some future exchange, Mr. Le Rougetel and I believe that it will be useful to consider in principle and practice the consequence of such a plan. First, from the local angle at least, it is important to remember that Romania has its rights. Second, it is important to consider the Soviet reaction.

It is important to bear in mind that in the execution of the armistice terms, Romania is occupied and dominated by the armies of the USSR, a member of the United Nations which has full diplomatic relations with Japan. It might be undesirable to suggest to the Soviet authorities the Department's plan in view of this situation. At the same time if we should take action and transport the Japanese to Italy while the Swedes are seeking to arrange an exchange in Russia, Mr. Le Rougetel and I believe that we would invite complications that would far outweigh the material advantage that fifteen additional Japanese might give us in an Anglo-American exchange pool.

December 17 *General Schuyler on American newspaper correspondents*

On December 5 General Schuyler requested in writing a meeting with General Vinogradov for the purpose of securing a decision from the ACC on several matters of interest to the American authorities. Among these was the establishment of a general policy to permit entry into Romania of American newspaper correspondents.

A meeting took place on December 12. There General Schuyler stated that the American authorities desired to establish a procedure under which properly accredited American newspaper correspondents may come to Romania.

General Vinogradov replied that the ACC does not desire to establish policies regarding this matter at this time. He pointed out that the representative of the TASS agency is the only Russian correspondent in Romania. He said that the United States press is also represented by one man here. He suggested, when appropriate, the names of American correspondents with statements of the agencies they represent should be presented to the political section of the ACC which will study each case and then announce its decision.

December 18[*] — *The Radescu Government's orders*

The Radescu Government in Cabinet session has decided to order the arrest of all ministers and under-secretaries that served as Cabinet members between December, 1937, and August 23, 1944.

Those to be arrested are placed in two categories:

One) Those that served between 1937 until the Gigurtu Government in June, 1940, will be tried as persons responsible for preparing Romania for war at the side of Germany. There are 32 former ministers and 28 former under-secretaries in this group.

Two) Those that served from June, 1940, until the coup d'état are designated as war criminals and will be charged according to international law as later determined.

This step of the Radescu Government is considered significant of its intention to execute as far as possible the terms of the Armistice.

December 20 — *Further details regarding Radescu's orders*

A delegation of Cabinet ministers has just been sent into Moldavia with Soviet consent to reestablish Romanian authority. Today it is expected that prefects will be installed at Botosani and Dorohoi and later in the week at Iasi and Galatz.

General Radescu ordered the self-appointed Prefect of Constantza to report to him in Bucharest, which he did yesterday. The Prefect's manner was most docile and subservient when General Radescu ordered him to reestablish within eight days the situation preceding the prefect's personal coup d'état.

There are reports that Left wing workers may attempt some type of demonstration in Bucharest during the holiday season. To meet this General Radescu and his staff have made plans to camp in their offices from where they are prepared to take appropriate action in pursuance of the government's announced program to maintain order.

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[*] Cf. *FRUS 1944* IV, pp. 282-83: Berry to the Secretary of State. Telegram 66, Dec. 18. Repeated to Moscow. Also Secretary of State to Harriman, the Ambassador in the Soviet Union, Telegram 2848, Dec. 18: *ibidem*, pp. 283-288.

December 21 *The confidential aide of General Radescu on war criminals*

Further details regarding the Government's plan to try war criminals and those considered responsible for Romania's entry into the war on the side of Germany have been given me by the confidential aide of General Radescu.

He stated that the legal basis for these trials will be derived from the old constitution, which was suspended in February 1938, and restored on August 23, 1944. The trials will be premised upon the fact that all acts of the Government between the aforementioned dates are illegal.

In preparing its list of Romanian war criminals the Government has inquired informally whether there are Romanians now within the country that the American Government may consider as active agents of the Axis of collaborators for the purpose of adding the names of such persons to the Romanian list.

December 22 *Joseph Levy,* New York Times *correspondent*

The Soviet Political Section of the Allied Control Commission advised me today that the application for entry into Romania of Joseph Levy, *New York Times* correspondent, has been refused. The application was disapproved because in the opinion of the Soviet Political Section the dispatches written by Levy after his visit to Romania several months ago had not been objective. As an example they cited a statement of Levy's to the effect that "the Left circles in Romania were cooperating with Fascists." The Soviet authorities considered this to be absolutely untrue.

December 23 *"Materials requisitioned by the Red Army"*

The Director of Romano-Americana [Alexandru Ionescu] has provided me with detailed statements showing materials requisitioned by the Red Army. Attached to the statements are a number of invoices showing the origin of the goods and the date of purchase. The director tells me that he is unable to furnish copies of all invoices as the company's papers were disbursed and partly destroyed by air raids. Nevertheless, he has provided a sufficient quantity to show clearly that the material taken was not, as claimed by Mr. Vishinsky, German equipment sent to Romania for reshipment to the Soviet oil fields. Inasmuch as it is unlikely that the question of title to the equipment removed will be thrashed out in Bucharest, I shall send this material to Moscow.[*]

The Soviet High Command has presented an order to the Romanian Government in the name of the ACC which requests that it be reimbursed in goods from Romania for the pengo war currency printed and disbursed by the Red Army to the Romanian troops fighting with them on Hungarian soil. The Romanian reply argues that such a demand cannot be based upon the armistice since the expenses are being incurred upon foreign territory, and Romania should not be penalized because its troops are fighting beside the Soviet Army in Hungary.

The question of former residents of Bessarabia. —
A written response from Vinogradov

The Foreign Minister informed me today that the question of the return of former residents of Bessarabia has reached an acute stage.

Soviet commanders throughout Romania have received orders to transport to Bessarabia all persons who were resident there in June 1940. Foreign Minister Visoianu in an interview with General Vinogradov asked, for humanitarian reasons, that the execution of this order be postponed until the case once again was presented to Moscow.

Vinogradov is requesting further instructions, but in the meantime suggested to Visoianu that each person affected should submit an individual application to remain, giving reasons. Visoianu replied that this would be useless since fear would prevent people making applications. Meanwhile, the collection of these persons continues including students, government officials, and teachers. Visoianu said that four hundred persons have been forcibly removed from Craiova and hundreds from other sections of the country.

Visoianu earnestly suggests that, for humanitarian reasons, the American Government as an Armistice participant may wish to suggest to the Soviet Government that the former Bessarabians now in Romania be given the right of option.

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[*] Cf. *FRUS 1944*, IV, p. 289: Stettinius, the Secretary of State, to Berry. Telegram 41, Washington, Dec. 29.

At the beginning of this month General Schuyler, after consultation with me, suggested to General Vinogradov that the transfer of these persons be delayed until the American Government could study the problem, but a written response from Vinogradov stated the question was solely of concern to the Soviet Union and Romania.

December 30 *General Rădescu's statements to the press*

The Prime Minister, General Radescu, today made a press conference statement that will appear tomorrow expressing his satisfaction with his "Government of National Union" and internal developments, such as maintenance of order, renewal of central administration in Moldavia, and the political party truce.

Speaking to Romanian journalists Radescu said the resolution to execute Armistice terms was insufficient and "our Allies" should understand and assist in fulfilling the obligations the country has undertaken. Such overwhelming quantities of material and industrial products have been taken that the country will be in the dangerous position of being incapable of satisfying demands. This also will be true if some of the country's modest industrial equipment and means of production are taken. He stated "even God himself cannot take anything from where there is no longer anything."

For foreign correspondents the General emphasized Romania's continuing military contribution of fourteen divisions at a time when "we are not yet in the decisive phase of military operations in Europe." He asked for Allied aid in solving the country's transport problem, saying that any weakening of Romania's economic or military capacity also weakened the Allies. "We ought therefore in 1945 to cease to be the conquered of 1944, in order to become by right that which we are in fact since August 23: the artisans of a common victory."

December 31 *Exploding rumors...*

The ministerial delegation sent to Moldavia to restore order and reestablish the Romanian state administration has returned after satisfactorily accomplishing its mission. It exploded many rumors of anarchy, separatism, and illegal property distribution widely heard in Bucharest.

Minorities Minister Vladescu Racoasa publicly declared that the commission found the province orderly and the people wishing to establish contact with the authorities in Bucharest, by whom they considered themselves abandoned. He also said that the province was suffering acutely form the lack of communications, medicines and, in some districts, food.

Racoasa urged that the central Government respect the wishes of provincial public opinion and that Bucharest send to the province no administrative elements that would be unwelcome. He praised the impartial attitude and reconstruction assistance of the Soviet military authorities as extended to the officials chosed by the local population.

General Rădescu asked to withdraw his statements...

The Soviet censor refused to pass the Prime Minister's statements to the press.

General Vinogradov called on General Radescu later and asked him to withdraw the parts of his statements referring to the execution of the armistice. At the same time the National Democratic Front, composed of the Left parties, passed a condemnatory resolution. In the face of this opposition General Radescu entirely withdrew his statements.

The Foreign Minister told me that the statements had been issued by the Prime Minister without consulting any Cabinet member. He added that the majority of the Cabinet admired the Prime Minister's frankness but thought that his action showed poor political foresight.

2. 1945,* January 1-June, 14

January 3 *Protests to the Soviet authorities against dismantling the Malaxa mils*

The Soviet authorities recently began dismantling the Malaxa steel tube and rolling mills for shipment to Russia under Article Eleven of the Armistice agreement. The mills affected are a rolling mill for manufacturing fourteen inch tubes and a smaller but more modern mill for manufacturing six inch tubes.

Repeated protests to Soviet order by General Radescu, Prime Minister, and Mr. Radulescu, President of the Romanian Armistice Commission, have argued that the mills are essential to the Romanian economy and that the moving operation would render the installations useless for virtually a year. In view of the importance of the plants which manufactures tubes for the oil industry as well as for railway locomotives, General Radescu hoped and expected to be able to retain the six inch plant and to satisfy the Soviets by relinquishing the fourteen inch plant.

The realization that neither plant could be saved for Romania is said to have contributed substantially to the Government's decision to issue his statements to the foreign and domestic press.

The Romanian Government in a note dated December 22 and addressed to the President (Soviet) of the ACC declines all responsibility if, because of the lack of tubes, the production of the oil companies will not fulfill the provisions promised. The note includes the suggestion that a neutral expert of world-wide reputation be chosen in agreement with the Soviets to estimate values for the two plants placed by the Romanians tentatively at eleven million dollars.

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* Year covering the "Efforts by the United States to assure the establishment and maintenance of Democratic Government in Romania" and "Concern of the United States over the removal by the Soviet Union of American-owned oil equipment in Romania," according *Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers 1945*. Vol. V (*Europe*). Washington, 1967, pp. 464-666.

Local state of mind...

Locally it is thought that the Romanian Government is making out too good a case for the Malaxa plants which were foisted on the country by King Carol and Malaxa and kept in operation by a ridiculously high tariff. They work with imported billets of poor quality and are not considered by disinterested people as an economic necessity for the country. Some people believe that the Soviets can assist Romanian economy more by returning the tubes and machines taken from the oil industry than by keeping the Malaxa plant here to manufacture new but inferior tubes. On the other hand the Soviet timing undoubtedly is poor. It takes the plants out of production when most needed and releases some 8,600 workers who cannot be absorbed elsewhere. These workers are reported to be showing this dissatisfaction by abandoning the Left political parties and enrolling in the National Peasant Party.

January 4

The Moscow negotiations with the Hungarian Provisional Government

In conversation with the Foreign Minister he stated that the Romanian Government was vitally interested in the Moscow negotiations with the Hungarian Provisional Government. He recalled that Romania was also at war with Hungary and was represented on the Budapest front with 14 divisions. He said that he thought that this fact should earn for Romania a more active role in the negotiations than that of a simple observer.

Some responsible Romanians feel, said Mr. Visoianu, that to divide Romania and Hungary the Soviets intend "to sing the same song" with Transylvania as the theme as did the Germans. The Nazis of course used Transylvania as bait to both countries to increase the war effort of each against Russia.

Romanians fear for Northern Transylvania...

Now some Romanians fear that Northern Transylvania will be given to the country "most Left" politically. Their fears are increased by a reported recent speech at Cluj by a Count Teleki in which he suggested, in accord with the Soviet authorities, an Hungarian administration for Northern Transylvania at Cluj with Hungarian control of police, gendarmerie, and railways.

January 5 *The Soviet policy of deportation*

Obviously deeply disturbed, the Foreign Minister told me that General Vinogradov in the name of the Allied Control Commission has demanded of the Prime Minister that the Romanian Government prepare lists by January 15 of Romanian nationals of German race, both men and women, between the ages of 16 and 40, in order that they may be transported to the Soviet Union.

The Soviet authorities at the same time requested five thousand railway cars for the transport of these persons.

The Romanian Government has protested vigorously against this proposal as being completely outside of the Armistice terms, but it realizes it may be forced to give the demanded lists in view of the Soviet contention that the German minority is engaged in extensive espionage and is hindering the Russian war effort. The Government's suggestion that those Romanian nationals of German race believed by the Soviets to be dangerous be interned has been ignored.

Today the Prime Minister sent me a message confirming these statements and adding that the status of the Hungarian minority is uncertain pending the outcome of the armistice talks between the Provisional Hungarian Government and the Soviets.

This latest request appears to be the culminating point of a policy of deportation that the Soviets have applied to Romania. It was first manifested in demands for the return of former residents of Bessarabia and Northern Bucovina who were living there in June 1940. These deportations, including thousands of persons unwilling to return, have continued despite the Romanian Government's spirited protests. A recent radio Moscow broadcast said that 36,000 people had returned to Bessarabia from Romania and that thousands more were "waiting" to return.

Next the application touched those persons, regardless of origin, who stated their "desire" to migrate to the Soviet Union and concurrently the White Russians in Romania. This office was confidentially informed that toward the end of December the Soviet authorities presented to the chief of the secret police a list of 28 Romanian nationals of Russian origin that they wished to take. These persons have been arrested and have disappeared. Reportedly they did not participate in political activity. Romanians naturally view this first White Russian list as a forerunner of others.

Finally the application of the policy touches the physically vigorous elements among the Romanian Saxons and Swabians who have lived here for centuries. These people of German stock are of great economic importance to Romania. Thus, quite aside from the humanitarian feelings that the threated deportation arouses, the Romanian Government foresees a grave dislocation in the country's economic life by the removal of some three hundred thousand citizens. Additionally, it fears that if it complies with this latest Soviet demand, it will sound the death knell of Romanian internal authority.

"A step in a larger Soviet plan to bring about the dissolution of the Romanian state"

In Bucharest even thoughtful people believe that the policy of deportation is a step in a larger Soviet plan to bring about the dissolution of the Romanian state. They are convinced that what is happening in Romania forecasts future population movements from Germany and other Central European countries to the Soviet Union, with consequences for those countries similar to what is expected in Romania.

From many Romanians I have been sent appeals on behalf of Romanian nationals forced to return to Bessarabia. Similar pleas on behalf of White Russians are now coming to me. It is inevitable that I will be deluged with petitions from some of the hundreds of thousands of persons that will be affected if the declared Soviet intention to transport the youthful section of the German minority materializes.

The US Government in Romanian eyes if large scale deportations are permited...

From the beginning of the Bessarabian deportations the pleaders uniformily have based their hopes upon American political ideals of justice and freedom. They assume that what is being done in Romania in the name of the Allied Control Comission is being done upon agreement among the Soviet, British, and American authorities. In view of this I believe that, as an Armistice signatory, the American Government cannot escape its share of censure in Romanian eyes if large scale deportations are permitted to continue.

January 6 *Definition of "war booty" in Romania...*

The definition of war booty in Romania looms large among the problems that must be ironed out with the Soviets.

Since the taking of the equipment from the American, British, and other oil companies in Romania, the most striking example of the Soviets use of the war booty formula as applied to foreign companies was in the taking of the Ruat 100 octane Alkylation-Isomerisation plant of Astra Romana.

General Vinogradov informed Air Vice-Marshal Stevenson on December 19 that the plant would be dismantled and moved to the Soviet Union. The Air Vice-Marshal, protesting vigorously that he could not accept the request from either the legal or the practical point of view, asked for and received a delay of a few days before the execution of the order.

I understand that in Moscow the British used this interval to lodge a strong protest in which they argued that the moving of the plant would be detrimental to the war effort as such would take it out of operation for a period of at least 18 months.

Yesterday General Vinogradov told General Schuyler that the Soviet authorities had decided to return the parts taken from the Ruat plant, reconstruct what had been dismantled, and finish what construction had never been made in order that the plant might be used in our war effort.

General Vinogradov explained that this was being done out of deference to the British statement that if moved, the use of the plant would be lost for at least 18 months. The General said that the Soviets maintained their legal position that the plant was war booty and, as they were leaving it in Romania, they would insist that the Romanian Government pay an equivalent value to the Soviet Government which sum would not be counted as a part of the reparation payments.

January 7 *Romanian concern over reparation payments*

Negotiations for reparation payments under Article Eleven of the Armistice agreement have reached the point where it is expected that the protocol will be signed within the next few days.

Romanian officials express concern over three clauses which the Soviets have introduced in the final draft: one, that deliveries will not be credited to the Romanian account until arrival at destination in the USSR; two, that deliveries will be checked by a Soviet commission; and three, that five percent will be added to Romanian obligations for late deliveries.

January 8 *An interview with the Romanian Prime Minister at his request...*

At his request I had an interview this morning with the Prime Minister, who discussed various Romanian topics that are grouped under the following three headings:

Administration – Administrative matters are improving. The country's prefects have been appointed on an inter-party consultation basis and some self-appointed mediocre officials were confirmed as a necessary expedient to establish the national authority principle. A commissioner is to be appointed for Moldavia and is to remain there supervising the entire administration. An administrative purge law satisfactory to the Premier and affecting Fascist elements is expected in a week. An equitable law will be evolved to try the few hundred persons classed as war criminals and as responsible for Romania's pro-Axis policy.

Politics – General Radescu felt that cooperation among Cabinet members was developing. Thus he was deliberately withholding a request for the members to sign his program since he was gaining his objectives without creating needless controversy. Mr. Maniu, although not a Cabinet member, was his main difficulty and was proving "very hard" to deal with on domestic political questions. The Premier still intends to give the National Peasant Party its promised additional Cabinet seat at a propitious time although "the cabinet already is twice the needed size." He frankly admitted no political party trend could be estimated until the communal elections now scheduled for early March.

Allied Control Commission – The General read a confidential report received yesterday of a Bucharest meeting of key Russian officers presided over by a high-ranking General of the secret police who arrived that day from Moscow. This officer emphasized that it was Stalin's wish that Romania be not stripped as some Soviet enthusiasts were doing as it was important to keep Romania calm and productive both for Soviet interests in Romania and Soviet relations with the other United Nations.

The Prime Minister believes the transport problem if solved would be the decisive factor in Romania's ability to execute the Armistice. He regarded as hopeful the most recent Soviet gesture in returning 2,500 freight cars to the Government. He said an agreement on Article eleven will be signed very shortly between the Soviet and Romanian governments.

General Rădescu, Vișoianu, and Savel Rădulescu called on Vinogradov

The Prime Minister, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and President of the Romanian Armistice Commission called on General Vinogradov to present the Romanian point of view upon the deportation of Saxons, Swabians, and other Germans of Romanian nationality.

Vinogradov replied to them that the action contemplated is not a mass transfer of population but rather a labor draft of able-bodied persons for work in Russia to increase the war effort. He said the transfer was temporary and that the transferees would have the right of corresponding with their families in Romania. He told the delegates that the transfer from Romania would be done with the full agreement of the United States and Great Britain and that similar transfers will be undertaken in Yugoslavia, Hungary, and Bulgaria.

The President of the Romanian Armistice Commission, Mr. Radulescu, later called on General Schuyler and asked him to verify or contradict

General Vinogradov's statement that the United States was in agreement with the plan. I understand General Schuyler has asked for urgent instructions.

January 10 *Vişoianu on labor mobilization and deportation*

The Foreign Minister informed me that the Soviet authorities are inflexible in their original demands for labor mobilization and transport to Russia of Romanians of German descent. He stated that the Romanian Government has decided to protest on several grounds: one) humanitarian, two) disruption of internal economy, and three) as beyond the scope of the Armistice.

The Minister pointed out that there are already 130 thousand Romanian soldiers working in Russia that were made prisoners between August 23 and September 12. He added the Romanian man-power is being strained to meet the needs of its fourteen divisions fighting in Hungary, to maintain war production, and to fulfill the Armistice, and he energetically stated in conclusion that if these deportations were permitted, it would be physically impossible for Romania to execute the Armistice terms.

January 12 *The US Government rejects "deportation;" proposes "prisoners of war"*

General Schuyler called on General Vinogradov and informed him that our government did not see any justification under the terms of the Armistice for the proposed Soviet action in deporting the German inhabitants of Romania to the Soviet Union, except perhaps in the case of those Germans who, because of their service in the German Armed Forces, may be prisoners of war. Others may have been deprived of their Romanian citizenship but under the Armistice they are subject to internment as German citizens, not to deportation.

The General went on to say that our government recognizes that the Soviet High Command must be the judge of the danger to the Allied Military Operations represented by actual or threatened sabotage and espionage on the part of those Germans. The Soviet High Command of course must provide for the security of its lines and supplies and can require the Romanian Government to take necessary measures to this end. However, since there is no provision in the Armistice to justify the deportation to Russia of inhabitants of Romania, our government does not see how the proposed orders to the Romanian Government could be properly issued in the name of the Allied Control Commission.

General Schuyler said that the United States Government had no prior knowledge whatever of this project, to which consequently the agreement of this government could not be given, and that this government is unwilling to consider the decision of the Commission as in any way involving this government either in its responsibilities and rights under the Armistice with Romania, or in regard to the general question of transfers of population; and if the orders are issued in the name of the ACC, the American Government would be obliged to make its position clear to the Soviet and British governments, and also to the Romanian Government.

As orders were issued in the name of the ACC, General Schuyler asked General Vinogradov that the deportations now in progress be halted until such time as a discussion of the matter can be had by the respective governments in Washington and Moscow. General Vinogradov replied that the deportations would not be halted but that the point of view of the American Government would be communicated at once to Moscow.

In view of the foregoing, I expect to inform Mr. Visoianu today of the position of the American Government.

January 14 *Soviet answers to the above US points*

Answers by General Vinogradov to questions proposed by General Schuyler:

(1) The ACC does not propose to credit the value of any materials requisitioned under Article ten of the Armistice agreement to the payment of the fixed indemnity specified in Article eleven. Nor will the Soviet authorities limit their requisitioning under Article ten to the needs of Soviet forces on Romanian soil. They take the position that requisitioning may take place under Article ten to meet the needs of any Russian army passing through Romania to the front, regardless of whether this entails

the transportation into Hungary or elsewhere of the materials required. They point out that any other construction would penalize these armies for their success. It is the Soviet view that these armies have liberated Romania and will continue to assure its safety by extending the front beyond the country's borders, and that therefore Romania should continue to subsist them.

(2) The machinery, commodities, et cetera, which have been removed from Romania fall into the following categories:

(a) Commodities which the Romanian Government has been directed to provide as maintenance for Russian armies. These items are supplied under Article ten and are not credited as reparations payments.

(b) Commodities requisitioned by Soviet field commanders for maintenance of their troops. These items likewise are not credited as reparation payments. All such field requisitioning has now been ordered stopped. Henceforth lists of commodities needed from Romania for troop maintenance will be compiled in Moscow, based on known needs of the armies north of the Romanian border. These lists will be then furnished to the ACC for forwarding to the Romanian Government with appropriate instructions. General Vinogradov states that as the tide of battle moves steadily farther from Romania's boundaries, maintenance requirements to be supplied from Romania may be expected to decrease considerably.

(c) Machinery and commodities brought to Romania from Russia during the course of the war prior to August 23, 1944. These items are being returned to Russia under Article twelve and will not be credited as reparation payments.

(d) Machinery and certain other equipment of German origin found in Romania. Many of these items have been or are being removed to Russia as legitimate war booty. Included in this category are the casings, piping, and oil machinery removed from various oil companies. These items will not be credited as reparation payments. In general, such items of German origin are considered subject to removal unless it can be shown to the satisfaction of the Russians that the equipment was bought and paid for prior to commencement of the war or that its removal would seriously disrupt the internal economy of the nation.

(e) Machinery and equipment mutually agreed upon as part of the reparation payments. In some cases this involves entire factories, in others various individual items of machinery or equipment. Determination of amount to be credited as reparation payment requires a separate investigation in each case.

(3) The 1938 prices for commodities required of Romania under Article eleven were fixed in terms of American dollars, and no conversion in terms of lei is involved. However, before deciding definitely on 1938 prices the actual exchange value of the American dollar during 1938 was carefully investigated on the basis of available newspaper exchange quotations at different intervals of the year. It was found that the value of the American dollar during 1938 averaged almost exactly thirty-five dollars for one ounce of gold, which was the basis stipulated by Annex "D" of the Armistice. US 1938 export prices of various commodities constituted the basic yardstick. However, in a number of instances prices finally determined for commodities were arrived at by a separate "bargaining" process in each case. The following are some examples:

(a) Oil Products. Romanians wished to consider oil products on the basis of certain 1938 prices at Constantza, which prices ranged as high as $114 per ton for sixty octane gasoline. The Russians suggested 1938 prices of Gulf Company oil products, f.o.b. American ports. A compromise was finally reached between these two extremes.

(b) Horses. The Romanians produced figures to show sales of horses in Romania in 1938 at a very high price. However, on investigation it was found that these sales involved blooded horses. Russians suggested prices for horses in various parts of Russia in 1938, but later agreed that these were too low. Records were finally found of certain horse sales in the United States in 1938, and these figures were finally agreed to.

(c) River Boats. River craft to be furnished as reparation payments ranged from ten to fifty years in age. Obviously prices of new craft in 1938 did not apply. Fortunately a pamphlet was discovered which had been prepared and published by an Austrian Danube River expert in 1939, probably for German use, in which all existing river craft were evaluated as of that date. Romanians and Russians both agreed that these prices were reasonable for use in determining reparation values.

Oil prices were obtained by taking the sum of the average quotations for 1938, f.o.b. Gulf of Mexico, and the average quotations for 1938, f.o.b. Constantza, for corresponding products and then dividing by two in each following case. The actual prices arrived at by this means are: airplane gasoline American dollars per metric ton 37.19; automobile gasoline 18.28; kerosene 14.26; diesel oil 12.43; mazout 6.58; paraffin 67.79; petroleum coke 15.60; and crude oil 10.50.

(4) The Soviet authorities regard the question of reparation obligations as a matter to be settled by the Allied Armistice Control Commission for Romania. In the operation of this Commission, however, American and British representatives have not to date participated, in the actual solution of reparation problems or in the solution of any other problems arising from the execution of the armistice terms. It is understood to be the intention of the Chairman of the Armistice Commission to keep American and British members fully informed of the progress being made in all categories, but not to authorize their participation in an executive capacity. The attitude of the Chairman of the Commission on this point is clearly set forth in his reply to a suggestion from the British Commissioner on December 2, 1944.

January 15 *D. Brătianu's letter of protest on deportations*

Dinu Bratianu as head of the Liberal Party sent a letter of protest on deportations to the Premier giving substantially the same views as the government note.

He added that the action contradicts an official Soviet declaration on the date of signing the Armistice stating that no work deportations would be made to Russia. He also suggested that the government secure American and British counter signatures to the ACC demand.

Excepting the Liberals, the other political parties have made no protest. The National Democratic Front is giving lip-service approval to the Soviet action. The Communist Minorities Minister actually proposed to the Cabinet that other minorities be handed over to the Soviets for like treatment. The Peasant Party is silent and Maniu, although strongly disapproving of the deportations has advised the Premier that this question at this time "is not worth a cabinet crisis."

Romanian reaction to the deportation is one of fear for the future. The public, while recognizing the majority of Saxons and Swabians were pro-Nazi, considers other classes of deportations may follow. Since there is strict Soviet press censorship, deportations have not been discussed in the press excepting by *Viitorul*, the Liberal Party paper, which was indirectly critical of the action.

January 17

The protocol of reparation payments by Romania under Article eleven of the Armistice agreement was signed at midnight.

January 22

"Hungarians make better Communists than Romanians do..." ...Gen. Rădescu's points:

The Prime Minister said that the Soviet authorities were including many ethnic Romanians along with the German minority in making deportations. Because this is particularly true in Northern Transylvania, General Radescu expressed the fear that it may signify a Soviet plan to install Hungarians there as "Hungarians make better Communists than Romanians do." The General explained that he had sought unsuccessfully to exclude women from deportation even going so far as to suggest that the required number of workers might be reached by including all men of the German minority between the ages of 17 and 50.

The signature of the protocol implementing Article eleven of the Armistice has thus far failed to justify the hopes of Romanian officials for a change in official Soviet attitude toward the Romanian transportation problem as well as toward other internal problems which are pressing for solution.

The Prime Minister's forecast for calm sailing for his cabinet is not justified by another source who states that Anna Pauker and Communications Minister Gheorghiu-Dej lately returned from Moscow, reported to a closed meeting of Romanian Communist leaders that the time has come for a Left government to take over in Romania.

They said that such a government must not interfere with the internal economy of the country, existing banking institutions, or the position of the King. As soon as the new government is installed, the Soviet Government will accord the Romanian Government the status of an ally and take the opportunity to return to Romania (1) the Romanian prisoners of war now in the Soviet Union, (2) the control of the Romanian transportation system, and (3) the administration of Northern Transylvania.

The Foreign Minister just informed me that from today the former Japanese officials here will be controlled as I had requested.

January 23 *The Foreign Minister Vişoianu on a forthcoming political crisis*

Foreign Minister Visoianu told me that late information indicated that the Romanian Communists intend within the next few days to create a political crisis.

The crisis will be provoked by the National Democratic Front publishing a platform calling for the immediate enactment of an agrarian reformation law and withdrawing previously expressed statements in favor of the nationalization of industries and banks. The local Communists made their decision upon receiving information brought from Moscow by Anna Panker and Gheorghiu-Dej.

Mr. Visoianu commented that this information contradicts previous Russian assurances that the situation would be eased for Romania and important questions, such as the return of Northern Transylvania to Romanian administration, would be discussed after the signing of the protocol for reparations. When he told General Vinogradov that he was ready to discuss these vital new matters, the General merely agreed to cable Moscow that the Romanians desired to talk about other things.

It is yet too early to tell whether the latest move on the part of the Romanian Communists means more than that they are attempting to gain greater power by using their traditional squeeze-play methods. There are some indications that the Soviet Government, provoked by events in Greece, which locally are interpreted as a British decision to back Rightist elements in the Balkans, has decided to back Leftist elements in Romania.

January 24

The head of the Economic Section of the British Military Mission states that no further equipment has been removed by the Soviet authorities from the Romanian oil industry since January 6.

Suggestion for "a tripartite commission of experts..."

It seems to me that a tripartite commission of experts set up to study the situation in the Romanian oil industry, and to make suggestions, should be able to perform a valuable service. It should: one, be the means of permitting the oil industry to overcome many of the crippling administrative difficulties of the past and present, such as relieving the congestion of tank cars and preventing the widening of related railway lines; two, be able to provide a continuity of general administrative planning in view of the fact that the Soviet authorities frequently change their personnel and each new man learns from the beginning; and three, because of the direct American interest in the Romanian oil industry, offer a solid basis for cooperation of American, British, and Soviet experts, thus creating a precedent that may be useful in other areas and in this area in other affairs.

Gheorghiu-Dej at the railway workers conference

Mr. Gheorghiu-Dej spoke to the January two session of the railway workers conference in favor of capital and labor working together for the common war effort. He shelved the Communist program of nationalization of banks and basic industries but advocated agrarian reform "by the most prudent means."

January 25 *Greek and Belgian representatives could not yet come to Romania*

At a meeting with General Vinogradov on January 19 General Schuyler supported Air Vice-Marshal Stevenson's request that Greek and Belgian representatives be authorized to enter Romania.

General Vinogradov stated that Mr. Vishinsky, when in Bucharest, had told the Romanian Foreign Minister that consideration would not be given to the inauguration of diplomatic relations between Romania and the smaller nations until full diplomatic relations had been established with the larger nations. In view of this the General said that representatives of the Greek and Belgian governments could not come now to Romania.

January 26 *"Change in the Government is needed..."*

A responsible source stated that a National Democratic Front manifesto is expected shortly to follow closely the statement of Communications Minister Gheorghiu-Dej. This policy declaration will further state that a change in the Government is needed. Justice Minister Patrascanu, heading the moderate Communist wing, and other political components of the National Democratic Front apparently are unable to prevent issuance of the declaration. Gheorghiu-Dej is reported today as stating "the Government must be changed."

January 29 *The Program of the NDF:*

Scanteia, official organ of the Romanian Communist Party, published today the government program of the National Democratic Front, consisting of following points:

1. Participation in war on side of United Nations with maximum effort.

2. Scrupulous fulfillment of Armistice conditions as one basis for obtaining confidence and friendship of United Nations particularly Soviet Union.

3. Establishment of sincere and durable friendly relations with all democratic nations especially Soviet Union.

4. Creation of democratic and fraternal policy toward minorities, a policy which will assure the return of Northern Transylvania separated today from rest of country through chauvinistic and reactionary policy of Fascist elements in Government since August 1944.

5. Establishing commercial trade with all democratic countries especially Soviet Union.

6. Immediate agrarian reform including confiscation of land belonging to war criminals, landowners who left with Germans and sabotages of agrarian production; confiscation of estates exceeding fifty hectars except those of church and ecclesiastical orders; creation of reserve of five percent of confiscated land to be given by State to peasants in regions without sufficient land; creation of pool of farm machinery to be rented at low prices to peasants; and price of confiscated land given to peasant to

be fixed at sum equal to value of one year's harvest to be paid in ten annual installments.

7. Elimination of all Fascist elements from public service including severe measures against speculators.

8. Raising of economic, cultural, and sanitary level of all workers.

9. Reorganization of army in democratic spirit, assuring return of prisoners of war in Russia.

10. Arrest of all war criminals and complete liquidation of legionnaires and neo-fascists.

"Through this policy Romania will be changed from a conquered nation to one of equality with all democratic nations, independent and sovereign."

January 30 *With the Romanian Foreign Minister about the former Japanese officials in Romania*

Yesterday afternoon in conversation with the Foreign Minister I expressed the Department's suspicion that the considerable amount of baggage which the former Japanese officials in Romania propose to carry away with them might contain strategic materials, secret archives, or even possibly loot turned over by the Germans to their ally, the Japanese, for custody.

I told the Foreign Minister that the American Government did not plan to raise an objection to the departure of the Japanese but in view of the very lax control exercised over their movement until recently, I felt that the Romanian Government had its clear responsibilities. There was the definite responsibility under Article eight of the Armistice agreement that German property was not included in the baggage of the Japanese officials and a moral responsibility to prevent the departure of material that would aid our enemies.

The Foreign Minister indicated that as the Japanese officials would leave by plane and their British baggage would follow by train, he expected to find an opportunity to determine that there was nothing in the shipment which would justify the American Government in lodging a complaint against the Romanian Government.

The Government-prepared list of war criminals

Last evening General Radescu presented this Government-prepared list to his Cabinet, which unanimously approved the immediate arrest of war criminals. The list has not yet been published, but it includes former Horia Sima and Antonescu Cabinet members, some generals, and others known as collaborationists.

National Peasant Party Cabinet members protested that too few politically important men guilty of preparing the collaboration with Nazi Germany were on the list, meaning among others, of course, former Premier George Tatarescu.

Gheorghiu-Dej received by the King

In connection with the efforts of the Romanian Communists to replace the present coalition government by a government more to the Left, Marshal of the Court Negel informed me last evening that when Communications Minister Gheorghiu-Dej on his return from Moscow was received by the King, he stated that he had not seen the Soviet leaders but "had gained the impression" that a Leftist government would be more successful in securing for Romania 1) co-belligerency status, 2) return of Romanian prisoners of war, 3) Northern Transylvania, and 4) economic assistance in executing the Armistice.

Foreign Minister Visoianu reminded me last evening that these same four subjects were given by him to the Soviet Government immediately upon the signature of the Article eleven protocol on January 16 as matters he wished to discuss. He thought it significant that they were proclaimed by Gheorghiu-Dej on his return as possible only under a Leftist government.

January 31 *The Romanian Patriarch invited to Moscow*

Foreign Minister Visoianu told me that the Soviet Government had invited the Romanian Patriarch to Moscow to attend the ceremonies connected with the election of the Russian Patriarch. Because of his great age, his uncertain health, and the winter season, the patriarch declined personally but agreed to send a delegate who was authorized "to assist but not to participate at the election ceremonies."

February 1 *The political crisis temporarily postponed*

The threatened political crisis which many observers expected to break out in an acute form at the end of the congress of the Romanian General Confederation of Labor has not materialized. The preparation of the crisis developed in accordance with the Communist plan, but when the time for action came, the Communists were disappointed one) in not being able to break the Maniu-Bratianu alliance and two) by the lack of unanimity within the ranks of their own National Democratic Front. Apparently under these circumstances the Communists decided that they were too weak at this time to force out the Radescu Government and replace it by one of their own making.

February 6 *Again "campaigning for an exclusive NDF government"*

The National Democratic Front, spearheaded by Romanian Communists, is again campaigning for an exclusive NDF government.

In bringing about the suppression of all press opposition the Communists are making use of the printers union. This organization refuses to permit its members to print newspapers that carry articles from National Liberal or National Peasant Party sources justifying the programs of anti-NDF parties. By this means *Dreptatea*, the last Bucharest National Peasant Party Paper, was eliminated. The National Peasant and National Liberal parties' answers to the NDF program have not been printed and are therefore generally unknown.

General Rascanu, associated with the Communists, wearing his uniform, addressed a NDF demonstration on February 4, thereby violating army regulations, but he is not expected to be disciplined.

February 7 *Executions in Bulgaria; political forebodings in Romania*

The news of the execution in Bulgaria of the three former regents and twenty-two former Cabinet ministers has profoundly affected public opinion in Romania.

The Communists are jubilant and urge that Romania speedily follow the example set by its neighbor.

The leaders of the historic parties, increasingly apprehensive for the future, are maneuvering to maintain their position. They fear that the Left may secure the control of the government in one of the flare-ups of the chronic Romanian political crisis and proceed immediately to rash acts.

A readjustment of Cabinet posts would give the Left parties a majority in the Government. The effect of this on the war criminal problem would be to upset the equilibrium of a recent decree granting an equal voice to the Left and to the Historic Parties in the appointment of judges. If the Left parties secure the authority, all observers believe that they will seize the opportunity to eliminate their opponents from the political scene, and once this movement had started, it may easily engulf the staunchest friends of democracy in Romania, such as the royal family and Mr. Maniu.

With such forebodings in mind Mr. Visoianu told me last evening that he had argued in vain in cabinet meetings that the Romanian Government's responsibility did not extend at this time beyond taking and maintaining in custody those persons suspected of committing crimes against the United Nations. He said that when the United Nations had defined war crimes, it would be time enough for the Romanians to bring to trial all persons charged with such crimes. If the Department holds this view, I would like to be authorized so to inform the Foreign Minister. I believe that a timely statement may go a long way toward preventing abuses in Romania which if they occur, we may long regret.

February 8 *Problems of national scope as viewed by Maniu*

Mr. Maniu, I hear, has written from Sibiu to his party members in official position that (1) the matter of co-belligerent status, (2) the repatriation of Romanian prisoners of war, and (3) the return of Northern Transylvania, are problems of national scope and should not be complicated by making them subjects of local politics.

February 9 *Premonitions and apprehensions...*

General Radescu said that he felt that "Something is in the air." In his conversation with Soviet officials he had gained the impression that Moscow did not desire a minority (National Democratic Front) government in Romania. On the other hand the local Communists are continuing to agitate for such a government. Moreover, they are being supported by some Soviet officials in Bucharest who encourage their manifestations and simultaneously reduce the Government's capacity to maintain order, most recently by requesting him to hand over Romania's only tank regiment which is stationed at Bucharest and prior to this by reducing the police to insignificant numbers and then refusing them the right to use their arms.

The General said that he is informed that the local Communists fear that the conference of the President, Marshal Stalin, and Mr. Churchill will prepare the way for (1) the return of Transylvania to Romania, (2) the repatriation of the Romanian soldiers taken by the Soviets between the day the King ordered non-resistance to the Soviets and the signing of the Armistice (this is between August 23 and September 12), and (3) the recognition of Romania's contribution to the United Nations' cause by the granting of co-belligerent status.

The General concluded by saying that the Romanian Communists know that they must seize power before any of these three nationally-desired objectives are obtained, for if they are not in power when obtained they will lose their chance of gaining the support of the Romanian peasants. He finished, "You must understand my apprehension. The Soviets have reduced my police forces and taken away their right to use arms. The Romanian Communists know that I am no longer in a position to maintain order."

February 11 *Events from February 9 to 11...*

On February 9 General Radescu discovered that secret caches of arms and ammunition had been collected by Petre Groza, Vice-President of the Council of Ministers and leader of the Plowmen's Front, who, with General Stanescu, Under-Secretary of the Interior, planned to use this equipment for a coup d'etat to place a NDF government headed by Groza in power.

The Premier, greatly indignant, called leaders of the Communists, Socialists, and Syndicates, revealed the plot, and demanded the immediate resignations of Groza and Stanescu. The consulted leaders told General Radescu that they earnestly desired the continuation of the Government and persuaded him to assent to an unlimited vacation for Groza and indefinite sick leave for General Stanescu.

General Radescu decided a cabinet reorganization was imperative because of (one) the above development, (two) continuing difficulties with the printers in press censorship, and (three) Left press demands for a NDF government, immediate agrarian reform, and criticism of Peasant Party Cabinet members.

To give his basic position to the country before any cabinet reorganization the Premier arranged to make a radio broadcast speech from a public hall on February 11. On the previous evening Communist supporters packed the designated hall and to assure a representative audience, Radescu hastily made a change to another hall.

The Premier's speech did not appear in any paper since the printers refused to print it, but the broadcast reached that part of the country still having radios. The Communist press criticized Radescu's action in changing halls and adopted a personally hostile attitude.

General Radescu at 1 p.m. today made a radio speech explaining the need to move to another hall in order to address all parties, criticized the printers for not publishing his speech, stated that he worked for all parties and that when the people did not want him he would resign.

Today the Premier's aide reports that General Radescu intends to see General Vinogradov, deputy chairman of the ACC, to gain clarification of the Soviet attitude toward his Government. He also is scheduled to see Maniu and other party leaders to discuss a cabinet reorganization.

February 14 *Attitudes, interpretations, hopes*

The Government's friends saw evidence of a moderating Communist attitude toward Radescu and his Government in the fact that permission was given for the afternoon papers of February 12 to print the texts of General Radescu's two speeches.

The Government's enemies saw evidence of a weakening Radescu Government in its failure to stop preparations for the public NDF demonstration being organized for February 13 contrary to Radescu's announced policy prohibiting week-day demonstrations.

General Radescu following his talk with General Vinogradov appeared satisfied that the Soviet authorities would not give direct support to any NDF attempt at a coup. The Prime Minister believed that these authorities realized that a coup would result in reduced Romanian production and internal unrest prejudicial to the war effort.

February 13: "No incidents occurred"

On February 13 Messrs. Maniu and Dinu Bratianu called on General Radescu and asked that the Historic Parties be permitted to hold a counter demonstration simultaneously with the NDF demonstration. The General, admitting the equal rights of all parties, said that in such an event he would have to put troops into the streets to maintain order. Hearing this the NDF leaders, reportedly feeling that their demonstrators would take flight upon the sight of troops, offered to guarantee an orderly demonstration provided the Prime Minister would dissuade Messrs. Maniu and Bratianu from carrying through their plans.

Hence, according to schedule, yesterday afternoon an orderly parade of an estimated 30,000 persons, some drafted from factories and workshops and others paid 300 lei each for their attendance, carrying flags and NDF slogans, marched through the principal streets of Bucharest. No incidents occurred.

Romanian sources generally consider that the Government has been strengthened by the events of the past few days. General Radescu himself is very pleased. He sent me word that there will be no more demonstrations but that there will be a reshuffle of the Cabinet in a few days with new men from both the NDF and the Historic Parties taking part in the Government. He believes the Romanian Communists have lost great prestige by the failure of their tactics in recent weeks.

On the other hand, General Schuyler in a long talk this evening with Mr. Pavlov and Admiral Bogdenko,[*] who substituted for General Vinogradov, gained a very different impression of the government's chances of survival and of the attitude of the Soviet authorities toward it.

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[*] According to Schuyler, *Diary* (Ms. p. 29), the two hours meeting with Admiral Bogdenko and Mr. Pavlov, took place on 14 Feb. 1945. – On Feb. 18 Schuyler had lunch with the King and Queen. He was the only guest. "Mr. Berry had been invited but was unable to attend because he was expecting momentarily to leave for Istanbul." After lunch the King and Queen took Schuyler into their private study and talked to him for an hour about the seriousness of the situation for them."

February 19 *Movement to annex Maramures Prefecture to the Soviet Ukrainian Republic*

The Romanian Government is greatly concerned by apparent Soviet sponsorship of a movement to annex Maramures Prefecture to the Soviet Ukrainian Republic. This district is in Northern Transylvania and thus completely under Soviet control.

Local circles consider the Maramures annexation question to be a test case possibly to be followed by similar proposals for other districts in Northern Transylvania and Moldavia.

The Foreign Office has a copy of a newspaper called *Poporul* dated February 1, published in the prefecture and dedicated to this annexation aim. It knows of a petition carrying five thousand signatures favoring annexation although it states that these were secured by dubious means. Another petition of 70 thousand signatures opposing annexation is said to be on its way to Bucharest.

The press and the Soviet censorship

Viitorul, National Liberal Party Bucharest paper, was suppressed Saturday February 17 by Soviet authorities in the name of the ACC for printing material contrary to the Armistice agreement.

Since Tuesday when the printers union refused to print the Premier's speech, a one-sheet edition of *Viitorul* had been published by volunteers. On Wednesday the editor dismissed leading union employees for refusing to print the paper. The ACC action on Saturday was based on the publication of the text of a postal card sent by a peasant from the Iasi district to the leader of the National Peasant Party. The Soviets charged that the postal card contained a cipher message. Romanian investigation showed that in the published text initials were used where full names appeared in the postal card. The Soviet censor refused to admit this explanation pointing out that in other places in the same paper a series of single letters were used to convey a code message, citing following Air Vice Marshal Stevensons's name, CBE, DSO, and MC.[*]

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[*] Commander (of the Order) of the British Empire; Distinguished Service Order; Military Cross.

Mr. Visoianu was greatly disturbed over the problem of the press. He asked how people in the country were to be informed, how the country was to hold a free election, if all newspapers save those belonging to the Left were suppressed? He claimed that the situation today was far worse than during the Antonescu regime. The Soviet authorities, he said, are mixing directly in Romanian affairs and this is leading directly to the destruction of the Romanian State. The silencing of the newspapers of the historic parties and the sustaining of the papers of the Left parties amount, Mr. Visoianu said, to a form of communization by force and this means the destruction of the State.

February 20[*] *General Schuyler's analysis of the Romanian Political situation*

General Schuyler has transmitted an analysis of the Romanian political situation viewed from his experience on the ACC.[**] This statement attempts to review the situation from the Romanian point of view and to indicate the direction in which the present trends are carrying the nation.

This Mission started its work during a period of Romanian moral depression. People were dissatisfied but being unable by their constructive efforts to dispel their dissatisfaction they blamed the government. Popular discontent provoked a political crisis and the resignation of the second Sanatescu Government.

During the political crisis Mr. Vishinsky came to Romania and then opened a period described now by Romanians as the period of preparation for future events. Visa applications from foreign correspondents were ignored. Conservative newspapers throughout the land were suspended or suppressed. Mr. Maniu was attacked increasingly by the Soviet radio and Bucharest Left press. Romanian deliveries under Articles seven, ten, eleven, and twelve of the Armistice agreement began to be a burden of which every man bore a part. Romanian police, gendarmerie, and army were drastically reduced in strength. Bessarabians, Saxons, and Swabians were deported.

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[*] Cf. *FRUS 1944*. IV, pp. 470-472: Berry to the Secretary of State. Telegram 128, Feb. 19.

[**] "I got off a long radio this morning setting forth specifically the various Russian actions during my two and one half months here which, when considered altogether, indicate quite clearly the ultimate Russian objective" (Schuyler, *Diary*. Ms. pp. 37-38).

Next came the period of Soviet covert help to the National Democratic Front. Romanian Communist leaders were invited to Moscow; other Left leaders were received by high Soviet officials in Bucharest. Workers' delegations were received by the (Soviet) ACC. Ample funds, newsprint, and transportation were provided to the Left press. Communist Party leaders, even those participating in the present government, were emboldened to attack publicly the Government. Mr. Maniu and other leaders who opposed the NDF were called Fascists. Apathetic street demonstrations, hostile to the Government, were described by Soviet officials as vibrant manifestations of the will of the people.

And now, according to Romanians, the final phase, that of Soviet overt help to the NDF, is swiftly drawing to its conclusion. They point out that Soviet officers have said that General Radescu no longer has the backing of the people; that only a truly democratic government will be acceptable; that the NDF represents the true feelings of the people. The Romanians believe the stage is being set for a minority government in Bucharest and that such a government will not prevent the country from disintegrating. They mention the report that the district of Maramures desires to join the Soviet Union. They believe that the rest of Northern Transylvania, where there is no Romanian administration, will follow at the proper time. Then Moldavia.

They say that the ACC is an instrument used by the Soviet authorities to destroy the Romanian State; that the Anglo-Americans have not taken the initiative in helping them solve any of their vital problems (control of the transportation system, the return of Northern Transylvania, the return of prisoners of war, co-belligerent status) the solutions of which are so essential to the moral rehabilitation of the nation.

Every thinking Romanian sees the necessity of a foreign policy based upon friendly relations with the Soviet Union. But nearly all Romanians want their own form of government. They believe this impossible because of Soviet distrust of any Romanian Government that is not a Communist-dominated government.

The leaders who sponsored armistice discussions in Cairo with Allied representatives are baffled over the apparent Anglo-American indifference to the manner in which the Armistice is being executed. They believe that the Government's capacity of maintaining order is being drastically undermined, and that where in the past the local Communists have failed through weakness in the future they will not be permitted to fail. They have convinced themselves that they are now living through the final months of their country's existence.

February 21 *Stormy elections for new union officials: the Malaxa plant incident*

Discontented with union management, workers in several factories this week have held elections for new union officials. These have resulted in striking defeats for the Communist candidates.

On February 19 elections began in the Malaxa plant near Bucharest, largest industrial establishment in Romania. The vote, until interrupted on February 20 by a clash of workers after which the plant's Communist committee was confined, is reported by the newspaper *Ardealul* today as being 4,500 for independent, National Peasant, and National Liberal Party candidates and seven hundred for the Communists.

Communist papers say the Malaxa voting was interrupted by picked railway workers and others storming the factory entrance "to rescue the Communist minority." Other sources privately state it was an attempt to break up the balloting by using armed workers. Shooting ensued on both sides with one man killed and twelve wounded including the Communist head of the General Workers Confederation, Gheorghe Apostol. Communications Minister Gheorgiu-Dej, Communist leader of the Railway Workers Syndicate, also accompanied the raiding party.

The incident has brought the present Romanian political crisis to a decisive point. The Communist paper *Scanteia* ends a highly provocative article with "Let us answer with ten blows to one blow of the Fascists."

The NDF communique published this afternoon blames Premier General Radescu and Maniu for the Malaxa plant incident.

It brands as dictatorial a decree of General Radescu suppressing yesterday the three under-secretaryships of the Interior as his solution to the intransigent attitudes of General Stanescu and Teohari Georgescu. It requests the dismissal of Radescu and declares the NDF is "ready to assume the responsibility of governing Romania."

One report today states the Communists are preparing an armed demonstration for February 24, as they claim they must be armed for protection.

Political aftermath

The Malaxa incident disrupted negotiations for political concessions to the NDF to save the coalition government. Yesterday General Radescu and the Peasant and Liberal parties proposed, for the purpose of restoring order and until free elections are held, that half of the country's prefects and mayors be NDF men asking in return public and official NDF adherence to the essential points of the government program.

The NDF agrarian reform program was to be accepted in principle but subject to fuller discussion by all political factors of the country. Certain Peasant and Liberal Cabinet members strongly criticized by the NDF would have been replaced by others from the same parties.

February 23 *The situation according to the Prime Minister Rădescu*

The Prime Minister told me this afternoon that "the situation is difficult but not grave." He said that he had authorized the public reunion which the NDF had called for tomorrow but he hoped to have it restricted to the National Square. Present plans call for demonstrations at that square, at the palace, and at the Ministry of Interior.

The Prime Minister said that he would not interfere with street demonstrations although they are illegal and harmful to the war effort. However, if the demonstrators tried to force their way into government buildings, he would receive them with bayonets and bullets.

General Radescu said that early next week he will submit the resignation of his cabinet and then reform it with different personalities but preserving the same proportion of party representation.

The Prime Minister felt that the Communists were steadily losing ground and therefore the next few days would see the climax of their activities unless "the Soviets have decided to put the NDF in power irrespective of the fact that it represents a microscopic minority."

Other sources less optimistic

Other sources are less optimistic that tomorrow's demonstrations will pass without a major clash. The King said yesterday that the Communists have arms for twenty thousand men, and the British Secret Service informs me that three truck loads of Communist arms came to the city last night.

Thus if the NDF has decided to make its bid for power by violence the timing, in view of the press campaign against the old parties and the friendly attitude of Soviet officials, would appear never to be better than now. Moreover, in a few days the NDF may be weakened by the announcement of the Socialist Party of its own program distinct from the program of the NDF. This program, which I understand has been voted by the Executive Committee, will call for freedom of the press, immediate but legal agrarian reform, no further demonstrations or strikes, immediate communal elections, and prefects chosen by ministerial authority.

February 24 *"Soviet support of the NDF"*

Evidence accumulates of Soviet support of the NDF. Yesterday airplanes scattered NDF leaflets over Bucharest. Last night Soviet army trucks were used for the same purpose. Today fifty cars of the Russian-controlled railway administration carried here two thousand workers from Ploesti and Targoviste.

Urgent requests made separately by Air Vice-Marshal Stevenson and General Schuyler for a joint ACC meeting this morning were refused in the name of General Vinogradov. Later I learned that General Vinogradov and Mr. Pavlov had left Bucharest for Moscow.*

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* For more details see *FRUS 1945*, V, pp. 482-484: Joseph C. Grew, Acting Secretary of State to Harriman, the Ambassador in the Soviet Union. Telegram 440, Washington Feb. 27. Sent to Moscow; repeated to Bucharest, London, and Caserta as telegrams 92, 1503, and 176, respectively.

The Government's position

The Government has prepared quietly for disturbances in the course of the NDF demonstration this afternoon. Premier Radescu is remaining at the Interior Ministry. Troops are stationed at strategic points. At Radescu's request Maniu cancelled a Peasant Party counter demonstration for this afternoon. However, the new Socialist program published this morning has acted as a damper on NDF spirit.

All shops and factories are closed. A crowd of some twenty thousand demonstrators and spectators is assembled at the National Square. Until this hour (5:00 o'clock) no firing has been heard and no acts of violence reported.

February 25* *Demonstrations & "provocateurs"*

By five o'clock an estimated twenty thousand persons had marched in three columns with flags, slogans, and pictures from the National Square to the Palace Square. The crowd was quiet, orderly, curious, and expectant. At five seventeen an exuberant Soviet officer seeing a column approaching with the Red flag at its head expressed his joy by firing his revolver in the air. The palace guards and those at the nearby Ministry of Interior reacted to the sound of shooting with several bursts of machine gun fire over the heads of the crowd. Within a few seconds the entire assembly had dispersed or sought safety by assuming a prone position. There was one casualty, a man who died of heart failure.

When no firing was heard for several minutes a large part of the crowd reassembled. Communist Minister Patrascanu made an address saying "They have shot without shame the peoples masses. Those who ordered this, those who carried the order out, those who are really responsible will pay with their heads. General Radescu must go. An NDF government must come for it alone is capable of weeding out the Fascists. Death to the Fascists."

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* Cf. *FRUS 1945* V, pp. 480-482: Berry to the Secretary of State. Telegram 137, Feb. 25. Repeated to Moscow.

General Moshvitan[*] in the name of the Soviet Command and the ACC at five forty instructed the Romanian City Commander to take steps at once to restore order, adding that if no reply was received by six o'clock he would be compelled to intervene. The Romanian Commander said that he would do all within his power to restore order.

At eight forty-five a group of a few hundred National Peasant Party sympathizers while passing the palace singing the national anthem and manifesting for King and Government were fired upon with automatic weapons from a passing car. Two of the demonstrators were killed and eleven wounded.

General Rădescu & the acting Vice-Chairman of the ACC

At ten o'clock the Prime Minister addressed the nation by radio. He stated that a handful of individuals, headed by two foreigners, Anna Pauker and Luca the Hungarian, were attempting to subdue through terror. He told of reports of violent attacks by the agents of these people on public buildings at Craiova, Caracal, and Brasov and of his efforts to prevent disturbances in the capital. He concluded by calling on Romanians to face the danger that he had exposed.

At one o'clock this morning Admiral Bogdenko, acting Vice-Chairman of the ACC, called the Prime Minister to Soviet headquarters and asked (one) why he had spoken over the radio without prior Soviet approval of his speech and (two) why he had used the names of Pauker and Luca. General Radescu replied that (one) he was attacked personally and violently in the Left press being labeled "Fascist dictator," and he felt that he was entitled to reply by radio as that was the only means open to him since the typesetters had consistently refused to print his speeches and (two) he mentioned the names of Pauker and Luca in order to avoid naming the Romanian Communist Party as the provoker of civil disturbances.

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[*] The Russian area Commandant Gen. S. Moskvitin.

Tension between General Radescu & the National Democratic Front brought to an open clash

This morning's Communist paper *Scanteia* carried the headline "Executioner Radescu Yesterday Organized a Bloody Massacre in the Palace Square." It then describes how a demonstration of six hundred thousand peaceful and disciplined people were attacked by machine gun fire, identifying the act as a part of a Nazi plan to bring disorder behind the Red Army front. It says that Radescu and his band must be removed and sent before the Tribunal of the People to account for the massacre of the nation.

The same paper carried a telegram addressed to the King signed by five ministers and three under-secretaries. The telegram says that assassins Radescu, Nicolescu, and Maniu having killed and wounded citizens have compromised the Crown and tried to annihilate the Act of August 23. The signers thus "protest against the assassination of peaceful people and demand the immediate dismissal of the Government led by the executioner Radescu and the arrest of the people guilty and responsible for the massacre of February 24."

The events of the past twenty-four hours have closed the negotiations which were quietly going on to reform the present coalition government. These events have brought to a crisis the tension between General Radescu and the NDF which became public knowledge during the Prime Minister's speech at the Aro Theater. The events show that a minority with the use of tactics that have proven successful elsewhere is persisting in its efforts to gain control of the Government. However, as General Radescu has refused to yield, an open clash was brought about between him and the leaders of this minority.

They are now seeking his dismissal by appealing to the King. He will not resign and as he is still supported by a majority of the cabinet, the King may decide not to dismiss him. As the Left ministers also refused to resign, it is expected locally that the violent element may resort to assassination unless Moscow directs a change in the program. Significantly, the demonstrations and tension of the last few days have noticeably weakened the position of the Left parties with the country. There is no enthusiasm shown by the people for either the cause or the methods, even the demonstrators themselves being heard frequently to express disgust. But as the Government's position with the people improves the violent element of the Communist Party increases its demands, distorts facts, and levels charges.

February 27 *Steps to dismissal...*

Today and tomorrow the King plans to receive separately the eight ministers who by telegraph urged the dismissal of General Radescu.

The Prime Minister believed last night that he would be unable to reform the government. He expected to give his resignation Friday or Saturday although not until having once more addressed the nation by radio.

The Foreign Minister told me last evening that he was convinced that Moscow had counseled the Romanian Communists to adopt a restrained attitude until General Vinogradov and Mr. Pavlov return with new instructions.

All political parties are using the interval to consolidate their positions, deluging the public with protests and communiques published by hand bills and newspapers.

The Mission's position

After a thorough discussion and complete agreement with members of this staff and General Schuyler, I have written the latter suggesting the implementation locally of the spirit of the Yalta Declaration of Liberated Europe through joint decision and action by the three members of the ACC.

Following closely the wording of the Department's instruction I wrote 1) that we think the most suitable means of affording a representative administration in Romania in the present period is by a coalition government representing all political groups and social classes. We, therefore, would not desire to see an exclusively National Peasant or an exclusively National Democratic Front government and we would particularly deplore the use or display of force or any political chicanery to bring anyone group into power. 2) Attempts to affect administrative changes by disorderly means or by the use of force or intimidation should not be tolerated. On the other hand, encouragement should be given any endeavors looking to the establishment of procedures whereby local and general elections may be held on the basis of free and secret ballot or other democratic means. 3) No political groups whether Communist, Democratic, or Royalist should be permitted to remain in the possession of arms. All instruments of force should properly be left at the disposition of the governmental authorities, every care being exercised to ensure that these authorities have at their disposal adequate forces and equipment to maintain internal order.

Dissociations from General Rădescu's actions

The late morning papers carried a declaration signed by General Rascanu and five other generals, two colonels, and one major in the active service and one reserve officer stating that in view of the Prime Minister's public declarations they wished to disassociate themselves from the actions and declarations of General Radescu as being prejudicial to the army and to the country.

At noon the General Staff, basing itself on a law prohibiting army personnel from engaging in political activities, submitted for the King's signature a royal decree retiring the ten officers who had signed and published the aforementioned statement. The King signed but the decree, I am told, will not be published in the official monitor, and therefore will lack legality, because of the censorship of the typesetters.

Vishinsky's audience with the King

Mr. Vishinsky arrived in Bucharest late this afternoon and requested an audience with the King "between nine and ten this evening." He was received as requested by the King with Foreign Minister Visoianu present.

Reading from a paper Mr. Vishinsky said that General Radescu's government had shown itself incapable of maintaining order. Manifestations in factories and streets, statements of army leaders and in the press proved this. Therefore, in the name of the Soviet Government, which was unwilling to interfere in Romanian internal affairs but which had the responsibility of seeing that order was maintained behind the front, he asked that the Radescu Government be dismissed immediately.

He suggested that it be replaced with the shortest possible delay by a government based on "the truly democratic forces of the country."

Informing the Department at Washington...

As it is apparently the plan to bring into being a puppet government and as the success of the plan depends upon speed I suggest the Department may wish to translate its principles into action in Moscow with a minimum delay. Early tomorrow I shall see the Foreign Minister and give him the information this morning sent General Vinogradov through General Schuyler.

February 28 *Information obtained, via Știrbey, from I. Schraer*

Prince Stirbey informed me that Mr. Szaer,* the Communist leader with whom he had collaborated as a member of the coalition opposition prior to his departure to Cairo, told him that the Communists were very much more fully armed than people generally suspected and that a catastrophe for the nation was imminent if quick action on the part of real patriots were not taken.

Szaer admitted that dissention existed between the extreme and moderate factions of the Communists. He felt that the moderates could dominate the NDF, forcing support of the coalition government headed by Stirbey or Visoianu until a general peace and/or free elections.

Most interesting was Szaer's frank revelation of Communist political methods in obtaining their objectives: (One) He said that the Communists know that Romania has more than fulfilled the requirements of the Armistice, but the making of accusations to the contrary against the government is a potent weapon in their political arsenal. (Two) He admitted that Radescu was an able and honest patriot, adding that the Communists have deliberately compromised him in the eyes of the public. He said that they had shouted "murderer" at Radescu so constantly that he himself looking into a mirror wondered if he were looking at a murderer. (Three) He boasted that the Communists know that the army did not shoot into the mass of demonstrators on February 24 but they possess and used their power to make the country believe that the army had.

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* A misspelling for I. Schraer. Cf. also Schuyler, *Diary*, Ms. p. 401: "Mr. Szaer, an old line Communist now holding an important Government position, but who does not agree with the completely Russian policies of Ana Pauker and her friends."

Additional information on Vishinsky's call at the Palace

This morning the Foreign Minister confirmed personally the information sent to me last night concerning Mr. Vishinsky's call at the Palace. I asked him to make such amplification as he could on Mr. Vishinsky's reference to "the truly democratic forces of the country."

The Foreign Minister quoted Mr. Vishinsky as saying that the new government which is to be based upon these forces must have a cohesion that the present government has not had. This cohesion can be acquired by building the government around an organic nucleus and supporting such with able personalities who are not directly affiliated with political parties such as, for example, Mr. Vishinsky stated, Mr. Visoianu.

The Foreign Minister interpreted this as meaning that Mr. Vishinsky wished to see the new government built around a NDF core which would be supported by a few neutrals and several dissident members of the Historical Parties such as Tatarescu of the Liberals and Lupu of the National Peasants.

I gave the Foreign Minister the information concerning the American Government's point of view as I had planned.

"Efforts to be received by Mr. Vishinsky"

Throughout the day I have made efforts to be received by Mr. Vishinsky but as I am informed that he is occupied I have written him[8] saying that I desired to call when he was free and in the meantime I wished to bring to his attention some general views of the American Government upon political problems in Romania.

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[8] See *FRUS 1945*, V, pp. 486-487: The American Representative in Romania (Berry) to the Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union (Vyshinsky), letter dated Bucharest, February 28, 1945; James F. Byrnes, *Speaking Frankly*, New York, and London, 1947, p. 51: "Burton Berry, our political representative in Bucharest, informed Vyshinsky in writing of the American point of view."

I followed this with a statement using identical language to that used by General Schuyler in his letter to General Vinogradov and by me personally to Foreign Minister Visoianu.

Berry's forementioned letter to Vyshinski has been published in *Vostocnaja Europa v dokumentah rossiiskih arhivov 1944-1953*, Vol, I. Doc. Nr. 48, in a Russian translation. This was retranslated from the same Russian version into Romanian (See *Misiunile lui A. I. Visinski în România. Documente secrete*, Bucureşti, 1997, Doc. 39, p. 132). For the sake of accuracy, the original American form runs as follows:

"Bucharest, February 28, 1945.

Dear Mr. Vyshinsky: I was informed that you had arrived in Bucharest yesterday and I had hoped to be able to see you today to greet you and pass on to you information that I have received concerning the attitude of the American Government upon certain political problems in Romania. As I understand that you are occupied and will be unable to see me today, I am taking this means to bring to your attention this information, reserving for a later date the pleasure of welcoming you personally upon your return to Bucharest.

According to instructions I have received from the American Government, my Government is of the opinion that:

1. A coalition government representing all political groups and social classes is the most suitable means of effecting a representative administration in Romania at this present time. Until the people have had the opportunity to express their will in free elections, the American Government would not desire to see an exclusively National Peasant or exclusively National Democratic Front government, and we would particularly deplore the use or display of force or any political chicanery to bring any group into power.

2. Attempts to bring about administrative changes by disorderly means or by the use of force or intimidation should not be tolerated. On the other hand, encouragement should be given any endeavor looking to the establishment of proceduress whereby local and general elections may be held on the basis of free and secret ballot or other democratic means.

3. No political group or organization should be permitted to remain in the possession of arms. All instruments of force should be at the disposition of the governmental authorities. Every care should exercised to ensure that these authorities have at their disposal adequate forces and equipment to maintain internal order.

Your very sincerly, *Burton Y. Berry*."

Thus General Schuyler and I, having both informed the Soviets of the American viewpoint before informing the Romanian authorities, feel that we can now properly state our points of view where they will do the most good among Romanians.

A new Vishinsky audience with the King

Late in the day I learned[1] that during the luncheon hour Mr. Vishinsky demanded an audience with the King for three-thirty.

According to the Foreign Minister, who was present, Mr. Vishinsky began the interview by asking the King's decision on the suggestion made last evening that the Radescu Government be replaced. The King answered that he had communicated this information to General Radescu and that he had started his consultation among party leaders for the purpose of choosing a Prime Minister designate.

Mr. Vishinsky said that such an answer was unsatisfactory. Rising and looking at his wrist watch he said, "You have just two hours and five minutes to make it known to the public that General Radescu has been dismissed. By eight o'clock you must inform the public of the name of his successor."

At this point Mr. Visoianu said that the King was a constitutional monarch and as such he had to proceed in a constitutional manner. The King could not select a Prime Minister but could only consult party leaders and then follow their advice in charging someone to attempt to form a government.

Mr. Vishinsky replied that he did not wish to be interrupted by Mr. Visoianu, not having come to hear Mr. Visoianu's ideas. He proceeded to say that General Radescu had continued protecting Fascists and, by retiring a group of ten officers yesterday under royal decree had performed an unfriendly act toward the Soviets. This decree must be annulled immediately.

Mr. Visoianu told me that the King acceded to this request after which Mr. Vishinsky abruptly left the room banging the door as he went.

According to Mr. Visoianu the King will announce at eight o'clock that he has asked Prince Stirbey to form a government. Prince Stirbey will accept.

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[1] Cf. *FRUS 1945*, V. pp. 487-488: Berry to the Secretary of State. Telegram 146, Feb. 28. Repeated to Mocow as 28.

March 1 *Russian censor's interference*

The communiqué prepared by Mr. Visoianu announcing that Prince Stirbey had been asked to form a government was suppressed last night by the Russian censor.

I am told this morning that the NDF has refused to participate in a government which they do not control.

Events of the last few hours indicate that the way is being prepared rapidly for Groza or some other Left personality to form a purely Left or Left-dominated government.

"Soviet authorities acting in the name of the ACC"

Yesterday the Soviet authorities acting in the name of the ACC informed the Romanian Government that they would take over anti-aircraft batteries; that the police force existing on February 20 was reduced by 50 per cent effective March 2; that automatic weapons must be removed immediately from buildings in Bucharest; that all arms from certain named units must be turned in at once; that a regiment stationed in Bucharest be sent immediately to the front; and that certain named units must be disbanded by March 1.

Romanian sentries have been withdrawn from public buildings excepting the Palace. I am informed that the General Staff has been occupied by Soviet troops. Soviet patrols and tanks have been very much in evidence in Bucharest streets and Soviet airplanes have been constantly over the city.

Yesterday Romanians believed that these measures were taken as means of intimidation but today, when it was learned that Anna Pauker had proposed to the Communist Executive Committee the establishment of a provisional government without consulting the King, Romanians saw that there was a practical reason for such measures.

I am continuing my efforts for a meeting with Mr. Vishinsky to reaffirm the American Government's views. Mr. Vishinsky, however, is not yet accessible.

Interview with Vishinsky

Mr. Vishinsky asked me to call[*] at six this evening. At the interview I reaffirmed the views set forth in my letter to him adding a statement regarding press matters, the necessity for taking measures promptly to ensure the freedom of the press in Romania and the importance of permitting American correspondents to come here.

Mr. Vishinsky replied that there was very little difference in the points of view of the Soviet and American governments and there was even less since the Yalta Conference.

In answering my question as to whether a new Prime Minister had been selected he said that the King would make the choice after consultation with party leaders. I said I assumed that the party leaders would designate their own party candidates to serve in the government and Mr. Vishinsky replied that there were several cliques in the older parties that were Fascist and of course representatives from such groups would be out of place in a government bound to fight Fascism.

When I said that until elections were held it seemed desirable to maintain the same proportion of representation in the government, a proportion which had been agreed upon by party leaders, he said that this could not be maintained as each party made preposterous claims but that the important point was not representation upon a quantity but upon a quality basis. He said that we might differ upon the definition of a coalition government but to him it meant representatives who thought similarly, chosen from several parties.

Upon the question of disarming of political groups he said that this situation was brought about by Radescu's failure and correcting it would be the duty of the new government.

My general impression from the meeting was that of a confirmation of the reports I have recently forwarded to the Department. Mr. Vishinsky is acting under direct instructions. He hopes to succeed saving the appearance of constitutional procedure, but if necessary he will sacrifice that for a speedy solution.

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[*] *FRUS 1945*, V, pp. 489-490: Berry to the Secretary of State. Telegram 150, March 1. Repeated to Moscow as 33.

Dr. Groza & G. Tătărescu have the confidence of the Soviet Union

I am authoritatively informed that Mr. Vishinsky told the King this evening at ten o'clock that the person who has the confidence of the government of the USSR for forming a Romanian Government is Dr. Groza; that he believes Dr. Groza can unite the sentiments of the truly democratic elements of other parties; and that he believes that Mr. Tatarescu, being a patriot and a democrat, as Vice-President will undertake a policy of friendship with the USSR.

March 2* *Groza, "the Soviet choice..."*

At three o'clock yesterday afternoon Prince Stirbey informed the King that he could not form a government. Shortly afterwards Mr. Vishinsky sent him word that Groza was the Soviet choice. Nevertheless the King proceeded to consult party leaders. Maniu was absolutely opposed to a Groza Government. Bratianu in view of the Soviet desire was willing to accept Groza provided the historic parties were equitably represented in such a government. Petrescu was willing under similar circumstances. The Communists of course were pleased with Groza but they desire an entirely NDF government.

At ten o'clock last evening the King was informed personally by Mr. Vishinsky of Soviet wishes. At that interview Mr. Vishinsky's manner was firm but not brutal. Romanians attribute this to my visit and that of the British representative to Mr. Vishinsky in the afternoon. Perhaps these had some effect, although I believe that Mr. Vishinsky will carry through his program until Moscow alters his instructions.

This morning the King plans to consult Tatarescu, Lupu, and Mihalache and afternoon to give Groza a limited mandate for the formation of a government. He will tell Groza of the Soviet desire that Tatarescu be made vice president, then proceed in the normal way to inform him of the opinions of party leaders. He will instruct Groza to form a government "broadly representative of all democratic elements in all parties."

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* *FRUS 1945*, V, pp. 492-493: Berry to the Secretary of State. Telegram 154, March 2. Repeated to Moscow as 35.

Throughout the crisis the King has proceeded as a constitutional monarch. The pressure upon him for a contrary action has been tremendous. This Mission informally has been able to extend some encouragement to him and has stressed the importance of proceeding constitutionally, but in the absence of explicit instructions I believe it would be a mistake to suggest that he delay, beyond the schedule indicated, meeting the Soviet demand.

Instructions received from the Department

After returning from my interview with Mr. Vishinsky last evening I received a telegram from the Department saying that the Department had instructed Ambassador Harriman to see that the American Government wishes to see political developments as they affect the form of government in Romania taking an orderly course under the ACC. He was to say that if events should develop along contrary lines we think there should be full consultation among the three principal Allies as contemplated in the Crimea Declaration on Liberated Europe. I was directed to inform Mr. Vishinsky of the substance of the Department's wishes and of the fact that Mr. Harriman was yesterday authorized to make further representations at Moscow.

Being anxious to slow Mr. Vishinsky's tempo and temper his actions by any justifiable means, I used the receipt as a reason for writing him* at ten thirty last evening, following closely in my letter the ideas expressed in the second paragraph of those instructions.

The new Deputy Chairman of the ACC

Colonel General Susaikov has replaced Lt. General Vinogradov as Deputy Chairman of the ACC.

The events of the afternoon proceeded according to the schedule which I transmitted to Washington yesterday.

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* See *FRUS 1945*, V, p. 490: The letter of the American Representative (Berry) to the Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union (Vishinsky), dated March 1.

March 3 *The Russian censor again...*

The language used by the King in giving Dr. Petre Groza the mandate to form the government is "I charge you to form a government of large democratic concentration with the help of all parties in normal proportion so that it might result in a complete understanding and to assure a government of order and productive labor."

The Russian censor modified considerably the official communiqué before permitting it to appear.

The King and Dr. Groza's Cabinet

At two thirty this afternoon Groza informed the King of his proposed cabinet of thirty three men. In addition to a president and vice president there are nineteen ministers, eleven under secretaries, and one minister without portfolio. Four places are occupied by Tatarescu men, two by unknown dissidents of the National Peasant Party, four by Socialists, and twenty-three by other members of the NDF.

As such a government would represent only a small minority of the country, the King asked Groza to attempt to reform a cabinet along the lines of the mandate.

Marjoribanks, my British colleague, has sent word to the King that the British Government hopes that he will not take any irrevocable step as consultations are going on between the American and British governments.

I asked that I be informed if Ambassador Harriman has made further representations and that I be instructed urgently of further action the Department wishes taken as the time in which we can expect to take effective action is rapidly drawing to an end.

March 4

The first consequences of the action of the Soviet authorities in disarming the Romanians begin to be apparent.

The newspapers this morning report that two hundred prisoners "succeeded under awkward conditions" in making their escape from the central prison Friday night.

The Foreign Minister informed me yesterday that the Japanese had taken advantage of the removal of sentries before their places of internment and that the interned Hungarian officials had made an official call at the Soviet Legation where they had been told that they were free.

March 5 *"The NDF held the majority of Cabinet posts"*

In the course of the day the leaders of the National Peasant and National Liberal parties stated that they would not enter a government in which the NDF held the majority of Cabinet posts. Dr. Groza is now attempting to arrange a cabinet where one-half the places will be held by the NDF and one-half by the Historic Parties.

Small groups of demonstrators assembled at several principal squares this afternoon. The picture of the King and slogans including his name were noticeably lacking.

A group of two hundred delegates from the trade unions called at the Palace this afternoon to inform the King that they wanted immediately a Groza Government.

The US Government's views

General Schuyler asked for an ACC meeting at which he again outlined our government's views. General Susaikov replied with statements similar to those Mr. Vishinsky made to me.

The NDF has called another demonstration for tomorrow at 2:00 p.m. I am told that it is keeping its more militant members on the alert.

I am informed that the King has told those near to him that he feels he cannot change the charge given to Groza since it was based upon his consultation with all party leaders. Therefore, if a cabinet cannot be formed he will again consult leaders with the idea of surrendering his prerogatives.

March 6

Vishinsky's instructions confirmed by Moscow...

Replying to my letters of February 28 and March 1, Mr. Vishinsky addressed me a letter on March 5 informing me that the contents of my letters were transmitted to the Soviet Government. He said:[*]

"As for the essence of the questions touched upon in these letters, I should like to remind you that in my conversation with you on February 28, I presented to you the point of view of the Soviet Government according to which in the new Romanian Government there should be represented all the truly democratic forces of Romania and that such a government should be able to assure in Romania, which is in the rear of the Red Army, order and tranquillity, and likewise to assure the honorable and conscientious fulfillment of the conditions of the Armistice agreement. In addition to this, I consider it necessary to draw your attention to the fact that the Crimea Conference demands the uprooting of the last traces of Nazism and Fascism, which should constitute likewise the extremely important task of the new Romanian Government.

"In connection with points two and three of your letter, the principles expressed in them, as is obvious, cannot call forth any objections."

What "local Communists call 'Fascist' and we 'democratic'"

From this letter I infer that Vishinsky has had his instructions confirmed by Moscow. It seems clear that he plans to install a government that is wholly of predominantly NDF. It seems clear too that one of the first tasks of such a government will be the purging of those elements which local Communists call "Fascist" and we "democratic." According to handbills that are now being distributed, among such elements are men as Maniu, Bratianu, and Radescu.

"To save such people" – like Maniu – "it is not too early to begin..."

If our Government officially desires to extend a hand to save such people, and particularly Mr. Maniu who during the entire German period was the symbol of resistance, it is not too early to begin its efforts.

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[*] *Ibidem*, p. 500.

Late last evening the King summoned Maniu, from a sick bed, Mihalache, and Bebe Bratianu to the Palace and asked them to make every effort to find a formula under which they would participate in a coalition government with Groza as Prime Minister. I understand the Queen took part in the discussion reminding the group that a King of France had put on a red hat but that had not saved him from the scaffold. In the presence of pressure from both the King and the Queen the Peasant and Liberal leaders agreed to go into a Groza Government in which they would hold half the ministries.

An hour later Groza confirmed to the King his agreement in principle to a government where one-half the ministerial posts were to be held by the NDF and one-half by the historic parties.

General Rascanu and a delegation from the ARLUS (Romanian Friends of Russia) still later called on the King and asked the immediate formation of a Groza government.

This morning the National Peasant Executive Committee met in Mr. Maniu's sick room. Responding to his request the Committee voted that their party participate in the proposed coalition government. This decision was communicated immediately to the King.

Soon thereafter Groza came to the Palace and informed the King that the NDF would not accept a government in which one-half the ministries were held by the historic parties. Thereupon the Peasant Party refused to participate in the Groza Government and the Liberals when consulted by Groza preferred to join their strength with the Peasants than become an impotent minority in an NDF government.

Groza asked the King for authorization, in order to calm public opinion, to announce at two o'clock on the radio that a government had been formed. The King did not approve this, but authorized an announcement that a government would be formed within the course of the day. The radio announced that a government had been formed by Groza and the details would be given later.

At three o'clock there was an orderly demonstration of an estimated fifty thousand unenthusiastic people before the royal palace. By five o'clock the demonstrators had disbanded and started to return to their homes.

The Groza Government...

At six, handbills were distributed announcing the formation of a government of democratic concentration headed by Groza. Listed also are seventeen ministers of whom thirteen are NDF members, three dissident Liberals of the Tatarescu group, including of course Tatarescu, one dissident National Peasant and one non-party member, General Rascanu, of an extreme Left view point. There are twelve under-secretaries of whom five are NDF members, five non-party men, one dissident National Peasant, and one dissident Liberal. At seven the Cabinet was to be sworn in and at nine Mr. Vishinsky and Marshal Malinovsky were to be received by the King.

The Groza Government is a legal government in the sense that the King gave Groza a mandate to form a government and accepted the government which was presented. How much pressure was applied on the King is yet unknown to me though I hope to hear his own story tomorrow.

The government as constituted cannot be said to be representative of the country. Therefore, in some quarters it is maintained that it is not a legal government but one in which Mr. Vishinsky named the Prime Minister and Vice-President and the local Communist leaders named the other members of the Government.

A government quite contrary to the Department's principles

In view of the methods used to bring this government into being, which are quite contrary to the Department's principles as outlined in recent telegrams to this Mission and to Moscow, I have asked for urgent instructions as to the attitude the Department wishes this Mission to take toward the Groza Government.

Retiring Prime Minister Radescu soon after the radio announcement of the formation of the Groza Government took refuge in the British Legation. I understand that the local British officials have been authorized to give him asylum.

March 7 *Misleading statements...*

Scanteia, official Communist newspaper, published today communique of NDF to effect that during consultations for formation of a new government Groza had offered National Peasant and Liberal parties two to three ministerial posts each to representatives of their parties chosen by them and that his offer had been rejected.

The foregoing statement is completely misleading since, according to most reliable information and a privately distributed communique of the National Peasant Party, Groza informed National Peasant and Liberal Party leaders, after NDF refused a 50-50 arrangement, that he was willing to accept a few of their representatives selected by him and not the party chiefs, to participate in his government simply as observers without portfolios.

"Two hours with the King and Queen-mother..."

This afternoon I passed two hours with the King and Queen-mother hearing their account of the events of the last eight days.*

The King confirmed the facts which I reported of the arrival in Bucharest of Mr. Vishinsky and his first call at the palace.

The King said that he was under the impression that Prince Stirbey was pleased when he did not succeed in forming a government. He confirmed point by point the information supplied in my telegram, and when it was time for me to go he took me to his study to point out the plaster that was cracked around the door frame when Mr. Vishinsky terminated so brusquely his second interview by banging the door of the King's study.

At Mr. Vishinsky's third audience he informed the King that he had been sent to Romania by Marshal Stalin to convey a special message. The King's phraseology describing the message was very similar to that reported by me. He added the interesting statement that Mr. Vishinsky had said to him that the American and British representatives had called that day (March 1) at the Soviet Legation and had made inquiries about the formation of the new government, but he had denied any knowledge of who would head the government. Mr. Vishinsky said that he informed the King of this as a proof of the Soviet Government's confidence in the King and he asked that the King respond with equal confidence in the Soviet Government.

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* See *FRUS 1945*, V, pp. 502-505; Berry to the Secretary of State. Telegram 179, March 7.

Since Stirbey, a neutral, had failed and Vishinsky had nominated Groza in the name of the Soviet Government, the King felt that he must charge Groza with the formation of a government. However, because of Groza's small following in the country, the King limited his mandate by the language reported by me. Because of its unrepresentative character the King refused to accept the first cabinet presented by Groza and recommenced discussions among the party leaders for the purpose of finding another Prime Minister designate. At this stage Mr. Vishinsky sent word that the cancellation of the Groza mandate would be considered by the Soviet Government as a hostile act. From that time, Saturday evening, until a cabinet was formed, Tuesday afternoon, the King said to his way of thinking he had to decide only one question, whether to get out or stay.

I said that it had been authoritatively reported to me that he had decided on Monday not to accept a Groza minority government and I inquired what factors caused him to change his mind. He replied that Monday evening two reports were brought to him, one from Vishinsky saying that unless the King had accepted a Groza Government by the following afternoon, Vishinsky could not be responsible for the continuance of Romania as an independent state, and the other brought by Groza saying that the Soviets had promised great improvement in relations between the Soviet Union and Romania upon the formation of an NDF government. He mentioned specifically the return of the control of the transportation system, the return of Northern Transylvania, and an application of the terms of the Armistice with greater tolerance. The King summoned the leaders of the historic parties late Monday night. Both he and the Queen-mother appealed to them to put aside party politics and throw their full strength into helping the country in this emergency. They agreed.

The following morning each party made stipulations and the result was no agreement could be made between the NDF and the Historic Parties. Some of his close advisors, such as Visoianu and Savel Radulescu, then urged the King to abdicate. The Queen urged a regency. Others such as the Marshal of the Court and the Patriarch urged him to stay on. Tuesday noon he again summoned Maniu and Bratianu. Bratianu came speaking for himself and Maniu who was bedfast. The King explained his predicament and asked Bratianu's advice as the eldest statesman of the country. Bratianu said that the King should not desert the country.

The King took "one of the risks of the profession and decided to stay"

In describing his thinking the King said he decided if he abdicated it would be hailed in some quarters abroad as a magnificent gesture for a principle, but the Romanian people would be no better off. If he stayed, and "ate some humble pie" he might be able to do something for his people. He said he was not afraid of the Russians as when he acted on August 23 he knew the Russians would occupy Romania, but he was not so sure of the Romanian Communists. Nevertheless, he took "one of the risks of the profession and decided to stay."

I inquired if the public demonstrations and parades had helped him to make his decision. He replied that he did not know about what was going on in the streets as he was so busy with conferences within the Palace.

The unexpected arrival of Marshal Malinovsky Tuesday morning the King took to be a sort of a confirmation of Vishinsky's threat. He thought the Marshal had come to preserve order while the NDF installed a Groza Government by popular acclamation.

At this point the Queen asked why I had not given them an indication as to whom the American Government preferred as Prime Minister. I said that I had sent the King word of our desire for a coalition government broadly representative of all political groups and social classes but that I could not suggest any personality as that would be interpreted as putting our finger into the Romanian political broth. The King replied "Why should you hesitate to put your finger in the broth when you know that your Ally has put his hand down my throat."

Tuesday afternoon the Groza Government was formed and in the evening it was sworn in. An hour later Mr. Vishinsky and Marshal Malinovsky had an audience with the King. Malinovsky read a brief critical lecture to the King to the effect that order must be preserved, that full concentration could not be given to front line activities if there were unrest behind the lines, that the Romanian Government had failed in the past and that it was not going to be permitted to fail in the future. At this audience Mr.

Vishinsky was less dogmatic but the manner and conversation of both officials left no doubt in the King's mind that they had planned to install a Groza Government.

When I touched upon the future, the King said that both Groza and Tatarescu had given their word that they would not start political recriminations. But he said, "I don't know whether or not Anna Pauker will approve those promises."

March 10 *"... to return Northern Transylvania..."*

All Romanian newspapers of today's date give prominence to an exchange of telegrams between Premier Groza and Marshal Stalin in which the former in his telegram of March 8 requests the Soviet Government to return Northern Transylvania to Romanian Administration and the latter in his telegram of March 9 informs Groza that the Soviet Government has decided to approve the Romanian Government's request in accordance with the Armistice Convention of September 12, 1944, on the basis that Romania will respect the rights of nationalities and maintain order.

March 13 *The Pengö military currency...*

General Schuyler informs me that the Soviet authorities still insist that the value of Pengo military currency issued in Hungary to Romanian troops must be repaid in goods by Romania.

The Romanian Commission for Execution of the Armistice has not accepted the Soviet position. The Romanians maintain that the amount of pengo paid to Romanian troops represents a war claim against the Hungarian Government. It expressed this point of view in a letter dated December 19, 1944, to the ACC, a copy of which will be forwarded under separate cover, stating at the same time that the Romanian Government was prepared of course to bear its proportionate share of any expense incurred by the Soviet High Command in connection with the issuance of pengo military currency.

In view of General Schuyler's information, I have requested him to record with the ACC the Department's views on this matter.

March 16*

Romanian political events of the past three weeks placed in relation to the general scheme of events in Romania since the Soviet armies occupied the country give additional clarity to the definition of present Soviet projects and future plans.

The Groza Cabinet program in the near future:

In the near future the Groza Cabinet, according to both private and public declarations of several ministers, will proceed to the (one) expropriation of all estates of farm land in excess of fifty hectares and distribution of expropriated lands to the peasants; (two) strengthening of relations by every means between Romania and the Soviet Union, including a mutual assistance pact; and (three) purging from the military and civilian services all non-democratic (that is non-NDF) elements.

Program of the local Communist Party

Concurrently it is expected that other forces which were set in motion by the Communists during the tenure of General Radescu will continue their activities unchecked. These forces find expression through (one) vigilance committees which preserve order in place of the now inadequate police and gendarmerie, (two) peasant committees that expropriate and distribute land without legal authority, and (three) workmen's committees which demand a voice, and sometimes a dominant voice, in the management of every industry. The program of these forces, as nearly as I have been able to learn, is the program of the local Communist Party. It includes a complete agrarian reform, destruction of the National Peasant and National Liberal parties, elimination of foreign trade excepting with the Soviet Union, dissolution of the banking institutions, and disappearance of the Monarchy.

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* Cf. *FRUS 1945*. V, pp. 514-515: Berry to the Secretary of State. Telegram 193, March 16. Repeated to Moscow as 53 and Caserta as 34.

N.B.: The following *paraphrased* telegram transmitted by the US Ambassador in Moscow, A.W. Harriman, was inserted by Berry between the Ms. pages 83 and 84, correponding to the *Diary's* date of March 16. It reads as follows:

"*Telegram received. Date: March 16th.*

Paraphrase. American Representative – Bucharest.

The political telegrams which you have transmitted to the Department and repeated to this Embassy have been of great value and interest to us. Please continue to forward us your telegrams. They are particularly important in view of the request we have made to the Soviet Government for early consultations in Moscow on the Romanian political situation. *Harriman*."

Soviet Government's pressure in Romania

In Romania the Soviet Government now can exert pressure as required directly on the government, on the government through the ACC, or on the government through the people. Both Groza and Tatarescu personally are so compromised by past activities that they are likely to act as willing servants. Should, however, they rebel it would be a simple matter as Mr. Vishinsky told Mr. Petrescu only last evening, in speaking of Vice President Tatarescu, "to uncover the record and act accordingly." And conditions throughout the country, which already are running toward anarchy, would make it possible at such time to set up by popular demand a Communist state.

Lack of encouragement from the United Nations...

The forestalling of such an event is the chief preoccupation of nearly all Romanian leaders. As an Armistice signatory it is our concern too. At one stage it seemed that it would be possible for the Romanians themselves to arrest the communization movement and bring about the moral rehabilitation of the nation. For this they needed a little encouragement from the United Nations such as the granting of co-belligerency, the return of the control of the communication system, and the return of administrative direction of the whole country.

The time has now passed when such inducements will prove effective. In fact it is by no means certain that the forces set in motion can be controlled, but if they are, it will be through an immediate examination of the situation in Romania on the highest level among the Allies in the spirit of the published Declaration of Yalta, such an examination to be followed at once by a setting-up in Romania of a truly tripartite commission under a revised ACC.[*]

March 21[**] *Concerning the resumption of trade between the US and Romania*

This Mission lately has received several inquiries concerning the resumption of trade between the United States and Romania. As this subject must be coming increasingly before the Department the following is presented as background for the Department's discussion with American exporters.

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[*] A report — Telegram No. 190, March 15, 1945 — which described a conversation of Berry with Iuliu Maniu, the leader of the Romanian National Peasant Party, was not printed. Neither was it mentioned by Berry in his *Diary*. Reference to it is made in Telegram No. 164 of the Acting Secretary of State, Joseph C. Grew, to Berry, Washington, March 29, 1945, as follows: "The Department presumes that Maniu already knows the main points of our general attitude on Romania as set forth in Deptel 90, February 24. In any future conversations which you or General Schuyler may have with him or other political leaders you may say also that during the Armistice period our policy is based upon the Armistice agreement and upon the Crimea Declaration on Liberated Europe, and that we do not desire to intervene in Romanian affairs except as may be necessary under the terms of those two agreements. Their attention may also be called to the Department's public statement of March 15 to the effect that we believe certain aspects of the political situation in Romania at the present time require consultation among the three principal Allies.
We cannot, of course, undertake to answer all question which Maniu has raised regarding our policy, but you may say that our present desire to see all significant political groups represented in an interim Romanian Government, pending elections, is based on our belief that the Romanian people should be given the opportunity to choose freely the form of government they desire and not on any policy of supporting particular groups or of preventing the introduction of any particular political or social system.
American representatives cannot of course assume the responsibility of advising Maniu or other leaders on the decisions they themselves must make regarding their position as political leaders or the future of their party organizations" (*FRUS 1945*, V, pp. 525-526).

The above mentioned Maniu -- Berry interview was repeatedly referred to at Maniu's trial (September 1947), by Vasile Serdici, one of Maniu's interpreters. See *Teroarea. Documente ale procesului Iuliu Maniu, Ion Mihalache*, 1999, pp. 128-129.

[**] Cf. *FRUS 1945*, V, pp. 519-520: Berry to the Secretary of State, Telegram 205, March 21. Repeated to Moscow as 54.

From a strictly Romanian point of view, a desire could not be stronger for American trade. The Romanian change-over from the Axis camp has created psychologically an immense demand for American goods. At the same time exhaustion of stocks during four years of war has created a large physical demand for the same products. But, neutralizing these demands are the heavy burdens placed recently on Romanian economy by the obligation to meet reparation payments under Article eleven of the Armistice Agreement. In addition, since early last autumn, very heavy demands have been made upon the economy under the authority of Article ten and still heavier demands are now being made under Article twelve.

In spite of the foregoing, it might be possible to look for a reopening of American trade on a small scale if it were not for the political considerations. These considerations seem to indicate that Russia plans to dominate Romanian economic life.

Some Romanian officials have been told that any goods remaining after the conditions of the Armistice have been satisfied will be absorbed by the Soviet Union under a commercial exchange agreement. These officials recall that the Romanian trade delegation which went to Turkey was ordered by the Soviet authorities to return when the success of the Mission seemed likely.

Many Romanian businessmen believe that it is the plan of the Soviet Government to bring about a paralysis of the Romanian economic life by increasing the demands under the Armistice to a point where Romania will be unable to fulfill the terms of the agreement. They point out that this would fit into the overall Soviet plan to level the economy of the frontier states to at least that of the Soviet Union. They recall that the Romanian Communists desire to see eliminated all foreign trade except that with the Soviet Union.

Romanian political leaders, as I have frequently reported, are quite convinced that the Soviet Government is planning for the dissolution of the Romanian State. These men openly say that when Romania cannot fulfill the terms of the Armistice, the Armistice agreement will be denounced by Russia, and the Armistice and Romania will disappear together. This point of view is gaining adherents as heavier and heavier Russian demands become known.

A pessimistic conclusion

It is the considered opinion of this Mission that American manufacturers and exporters should not be encouraged to look forward to a resumption of trade unless the American Government is prepared to take a sufficiently firm stand with the Soviet Government as to bring about an understanding whereby Americans and Soviets will have equal opportunity in Romania. As Ambassador Harriman has pointed out, the taking of such a stand will bring us squarely up against the long range Soviet plans for Eastern Europe. These plans as they are unfolding in Romania indicate that there are no present opportunities for trade and that eventually Americans can expect to be in no better position to take advantage of trade opportunities than they are in the Soviet Union.

March 22 *The US arguments for holding tripartite consultations on the situation in Romania*

Signs are apparent of NDF concern over the Department's announcement that the United States Government has asked the Governments of Russia and Great Britain to hold consultations in the spirit of the Yalta Decisions on the situation in Romania as they do not think that the present Romanian Government is representative of all democratic forces in Romania.

The ascendancy of the Communists in the government is becoming more apparent daily, but they are awaiting the Soviet reaction to the American statement before accelerating their program.

The Groza Government is meeting difficulties over an agrarian reform bill since the Communists press for confiscation of large estates while Tatarescu claims he was assured prior to entry into the cabinet that there would be established a scale of compensation.

Tatarescu by his attitude is already in disfavor with the local Communists who are said to be considering replacing him with Dr. Lupu.

Dr. Lupu, however, during two days of harmonious sessions of the permanent delegation of the Peasant Party meeting on March 17 and 18, spoke praising Mr. Maniu and stated that he would accept no political combination unless the party approved. It was agreed that Maniu should not resign his post as chief of the party. However, Mr. Maniu for health reasons shortly will take two months leave from his duties. This would permit the Mihalache-Lupu-Popovici triumvirate to act as an interim executive committee.

Negotiations for merging Tatarescu's group into the National Liberals are said to be progressing through mutual connections in the Romanian National Bank, which if successful would mean the capture of the Liberal Party by the NDF.

March 23 *The agrarian reform...*

Last evening the King told me that the agrarian reform law would be announced soon. He said that within the Cabinet Tatarescu had fought a losing battle to compensate the land owners. The King said that in giving his assent to the law he hoped to forestall the bringing about of the reform by extra-legal means.

The newspapers today published the text of the law. In summary it expropriates the land and agrarian properties belonging to seven named categories of persons and any land exceeding fifty hectares belonging to private individuals. The land thus acquired by the State will be assigned peasants in five hectares lots.

Businessmen interviewed criticized the King for violating Article 19 of the Constitution which forbids land expropriation without just compensation and for failing to stand on the agreement made by political leaders after August 23 to restore the Constitution.

Full press censorship

Full press censorship now operates through the newly-organized Propaganda Ministry headed by Constantinescu-Iasi, a Communist Party member listed in the Cabinet as representing the Patriotic Union.

The present Secretary General and propaganda Director were prominent in the same ministry under the Antonescu regime. Local sources consider these men subject to special direction of a Communist Party representative placed in the Ministry.

The new Ministry employs identical press direction techniques of the Antonescu dictatorship. Every morning agents of each Bucharest paper must report to the press office, where they receive orders how to comment on events and what dispatches to publish. If the daily official press line is not followed, a paper is threatened with suppression.

Timpul on March 21 was suspended for a week for publishing that the General Confederation of Labor and Civil Servants Union expected to propose to the Justice Ministry that urban property expropriations follow the planned agrarian reform. The unions denied the report, but private circles stated that it was not unfounded. However, *Timpul*'s suspension was announced for publishing material "calculated to cause alarm and unrest among the public."

Yesterday the suppression was announced of nine provincial publications affiliated with the National Peasant Party "for their Fascist attitude." One informant claimed that these were the party's last provincial journals.

March 26 *Eliminating the bourgeois class…*

A usually well-informed Romanian told me that some high Russian officials with whom he is in contact frankly admit that they are out to eliminate the bourgeois class from the Romanian social structure. The Russians say that the bourgeoisie as a class are reactionary and therefore natural enemies of the Soviet Union. As such they must be eliminated. The first step in this program was the agrarian reform which deprives land owners of capital and income. The second will be an acceleration of the present tendency toward currency inflation, therefore impoverishing the bond holders. Next will be the nationalization of the banks and certain industries.

Simultaneously the members of the same class are being threatened for other reasons. Political commissars have been appointed by the Minister of the Interior to sit with the highest police official in every district. Several thousand persons have been arrested during the past few nights, actually because of their political views but in theory because of their Fascist inclinations. Twenty-one generals and one admiral were retired yesterday. Thus while eliminating the bourgeois class the Soviets are furthering the decomposition of the State administrations.

March 27 *Wide-spread purge of the Polish colony in Romania*

I was informed last evening by Mr. Swiderski, head of the Commission for Polish Relief in Romania, that during the past three days more than thirty Polish citizens had been arrested by Soviet authorities assisted by Romanian police.

Mr. Swiderski stated that in addition to his Chief Assistant eleven other officials of the Relief Commission, some of them key men in the provinces, had been arrested.

According to Swiderski, Josif Olszewski, an unofficial representative of the Lublin Government, arrived in Bucharest some days ago and delivered an address to members of the Polish colony assembled in Bucharest. Swiderski reports that although Olszewski exercised moderation in his speech he did not fail to make some pointed remarks concerning the need for organizing the Polish colony here along new lines in keeping with the political concepts of the Lublin Government.

Swiderski is alarmed, probably not without reason, and feels that Olszewski backed with instructions from Lublin and Moscow has probably started what may become a wide-spread purge of the Polish colony in Romania of elements considered by Moscow and Lublin as reactionary and "Fascist." He considers this to be the first step for preparing a Polish organization here acceptable to Lublin.

Swiderski foresees plans to disorganize the Relief Commission which still has considerable funds at its disposal. Although he expressed the hope that this Mission could prevent the arrest and/or deportation of members of the Relief Commission I did not encourage him.

March 28 *The budget...*

Today's papers announce a draft budget of 815 milliard; the retiring of a third batch of high army officers bringing the total in the past week to 52 generals; the arrest by vigilance committees at Sibiu, without formal warrants, of high police officials and former ex-Prime Minister Vaida Voevod, the latter charged with responsibility for Labor troubles in 1933.

March 31 *Savel Rădulescu's resignation*

Savel Radulescu, the Chairman of the Romanian Commission for the Execution of the Armistice Agreement, told me that he had handed to the Prime Minister his written resignation.

When asked the reason for his action he said that there were two: first, the impossibility of working with an "imbecile such as Groza" and second, the fact that the present government, due to its preoccupation on other matters, cannot give proper attention to the execution of the Armistice agreement.

April 1 *Refused authorization... to pass through Romania*

My British colleague told me that the Soviet Charge d'Affaires in London informed the Czech Government a few hours before the scheduled departure of the ship that the Soviet authorities had refused authorization to the diplomatic corps bound for Czechoslovakia to pass through Romania. A garbled message from the Department had delayed my action in requesting authority from the Romanian Government for the American diplomats to pass through Romania. Fortunately, therefore, I received the news from my British colleague before I had taken action with the Romanians.

Had a request been made of the Romanian authorities and had it later been learned that our Soviet Ally had refused transit permission through Romania this would have been interpreted locally as a sign of the weakness of our position with our Ally resulting in a loss of prestige in Romania for the American Government.

Prestige replaced by disillusionment...

It seems to me very important in view of our long-range objectives to maintain the prestige of our government at a high level with the Romanians and particularly during the present critical period when in the minds of most of them hope is being replaced by disillusionment. I realize that in some matters where decisions must be made at the highest levels, such as the implementation of the Crimea Conference, little toward this can be accomplished directly by this Mission. However, in other matters which do not need to reach such a high level for a decision but where the approval of the Soviets is essential to the carrying through of the project, such as for example, the present subject or that of bringing ships into Constantza, it will strengthen our position if approval of the Soviets is secured before this Mission is instructed to take up the matter with the Romanian authorities.

April 2

The Communists, the King, and the Constitution's amendment

A series of recent events indicate that the Communists are maneuvering to bring about a constitutional crisis in the near future. There follows a resume of these:

A resume of recent events:

Shortly after I saw the King on March 22, the Minister of Justice presented the Agrarian Reform Decree. The King signed stating that in his opinion the decree was unconstitutional, and that by the first case brought before the courts, it would be so held. A few hours later the Prime Minister and the Minister of Justice presented for the King's signature a decree amending the constitution to authorize (one) the confiscation by the State of rural holdings without compensation and (two) the death penalty when prescribed in the future by law. The King declined to sign giving as his reason the fact that he is bound by the constitution to consent to its amendment only when assembled Parliament by a vote of two-thirds of its members approves the draft amendment.

On March 31 the Minister of the Interior secured cabinet approval of a decree authorizing the death penalty for unlicensed persons carrying firearms or for membership in pro-Fascist organizations. When the Minister presented the decrees, the King declined to sign stating that he considered the Minister of Justice the proper agent to prepare and present such a decree. He held the decrees for further consideration.

Also on March 31 the Cabinet approved a decree presented by the Minister of Justice of a sweeping and drastic nature for the arrest of war criminals. The King refused to be rushed into signing this but said that he would give consideration to it when he receives the opinions of the Court of Cassation, the Legislative Council, and the chiefs of the political parties who cooperated with him on August 23. The Minister of Justice is reported to have threatened to permit the publication of the decree if the King did not shortly sign.

After studying the texts of the decrees and particularly the method used in presenting them, I have come to the conclusion that the Communists are jockeying for position before springing a constitutional crisis. They would like to have in their hands evidence with which to confront the people proving that the King had not been responsive to the public will. At the same time they hesitate to join issue directly with him. Perhaps they feel that he remains too great a moral force to be lightly cast aside. Perhaps too they hope, after he has refused to sign a number of decrees, that they can maneuver him into calling for a general election. Such a course would be a national tragedy as the minority government using terrorist methods, with the Red Army ever prominent in the foreground, could manufacture the majority desired.

The members of the King's household are deeply concerned over his ability to continue much longer as a constitutional monarch. They recall that when the King acted on August 23 he had the army beside him and the nation behind him. Today, with the army demobilized and the majority of its leaders arrested or retired, with the nation in ignorance through the strict Soviet control of communications, radio, and press, and with little prospect of help from the outside, the King stands almost alone. Therefore, they fear with the development of the processes reported on March 16, that forcible action may be taken against the King if he persists in maintaining his constitutional position. I believe that he shares this point of view. He left today for his country place near Deva, where there is no telephone, expecting to be gone until Monday. Before he left I understand that he remarked that the Groza Government had been in office four weeks today which should have been ample time for the great powers to start consultations in accordance with the Yalta Agreement if such is their intention.

April 4 *Prime Minister Groza powerless to intervene*

Prime Minister Groza recently complained to several intimate friends that he now plays only a secondary role in the government. He stated that he is not consulted upon projected decrees nor upon the current series of arrests. Several of Groza's trusted employees in his own Government office have been arrested recently with the Prime Minister powerless to intervene. However, Groza claims that he is capable of retarding some extreme measures and that at any price he will prevent Maniu's arrest in view of the protection he received through Maniu during the Antonescu regime.

Sharing the apprehensions of Groza and his Plowmen's Front at the dictatorial tactics of the Communists is Titel Petrescu, head of the Socialists. Petrescu is convinced that the close collaboration between the Romanian Communists and the Russians simply means that the former only execute Soviet instructions. He and his party, now prisoners of the NDF, strongly disapprove of the Agrarian Reform Law and the attempts by workers committees to run industrial plants, stating that these measures are bringing economic chaos to the country. Petrescu maintains the current arrests are made simply to spread terror in bourgeois circles.

The dissident Liberals have expressed their dissatisfaction with the deteriorating economic situation through the resignation Finance Minister Alimanesteanu. The position of Tatarescu, himself, is not clear. One source states that the Communist Party has "discovered his record" and has sent it to Moscow for study before beginning a hostile press campaign. However, other informants state that he has received authorization to go to Moscow to sign a pact along the lines of the recent Soviet-Czech pact and that upon his return he will replace Groza.

April 5 *A two hour conversation with I. Maniu at Schuyler's home*

The Department is correct in presuming that Mr. Maniu knows the main points of the American Government's attitude concerning Romania.*

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* Berry refers to Telegram No. 164 of the Acting Secretary of State, Grew, dated March 29, 1945, quoted *supra*, p. 108.

Nevertheless, yesterday afternoon in meeting Mr. Maniu by appointment at General Schuyler's home* I took the occasion to review once again our attitude.

In the course of the two hour conversation Mr. Maniu stressed his point that all conversations that he had had with the United Nations prior to the Romanian Armistice were based on the premise that Romania would be a sovereign state. However, he saw the recent action taken by Mr. Vishinsky in the name of the Soviet Government as a direct infringement upon Romanian sovereignty. Moreover, the Soviet authorities through their control of the Romanian press and radio, and the Romanian Communists through their positions in key government departments, are daily restricting further the sovereignty of the State. Their mutual object is to communize Romanian public opinion. When this is sufficiently advanced the Government, Mr. Maniu believes, by terror and corruption will arrange to register a victory through popular elections and soon after this victory will vote the annexation of Romania to the Soviet Union.

Mr. Maniu said that his whole being revolted against this process, he assumed too that it was nearly as repugnant to the Americans who had signed the Armistice and had since so often spoken of a sovereign and independent Romania. His party certainly will fight for the country but probably not with him as its president. He told how he had been regarded by the Soviet press and radio as a great friend of the Soviet Union until he gave a newspaper interview in which he was quoted as opposing the incorporation of Romania in the Soviet Union. Thereafter, he has been regarded by them as a reactionary and a Fascist. He explained that he has not changed towards the officials of the Soviet Union, although they have changed towards him. He recognizes the need for friendly relations between Romania and the Soviet Union. At the same time, he is not a Communist. The vast majority of the Romanian people are not Communists. He does not wish to see Romania become a part of the Soviet Union. The vast majority of the Romanian people wish an independent Romania.

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* Schuyler, *Diary* (Ms. pp. 119-121). Under the same 5 April 1945 (Ms. pp. 121-122) Schuyler added: "Today at Mr. Bratianu's request, I invited him to tea, together with Mr. Berry." In Berry's *Diary* there is no mention about this second meeting. Maybe because, according to Schuyler "He (Bratianu) gave us very little information we did not already possess..."

Forcing the Soviets to respect their engagements...

Mr. Maniu said that he desired to resign the presidency of the Peasants Party: first, because he was tired and second, because he could not continue when the United Nations were not respecting the engagement which he had assured the Romanian people that they would respect, that is Romanian sovereignty. He hoped that the time is near when the United Nations would return to the respect for their word and at such a time he felt that it would be possible, if the day were not too long delayed, to straighten out the political situation within Romania. He suggested that the communization process could be defeated by an offensive from three sources: (One) the King, who will be only too glad to dismiss the Groza Government at the earliest possible moment; (Two) Romanian public opinion, which can be prepared to play its role as it was prepared during the dictatorships of King Carol and Marshal Antonescu as well as during the German occupation; and (Three) American and British diplomatic action in Moscow, which shall have as its objective the forcing of the Soviets to respect their engagements. Mr. Maniu concluded that the first two sources will be ineffective without the third.

April 6 *Entry of John Paul Boncour into Romania...*

At the request of General Eisenhower, General Schuyler some three weeks ago asked clearance of the ACC for entry into Romania of John Paul Boncour, the Representative of the Provisional French Government. In an unusually short time the clearance was granted.

Last evening General Schuyler received a communication from the ACC stating that the entry of John Paul Boncour into Romania at this time is considered premature.

At the Foreign Office a member of the Mission staff was told that the entry of Mr. Boncour was going to be disapproved by the Soviet authorities as he was considered too conservative.

April 7 *Edouard Palin forced to leave...*

The Finnish Minister, Edouard Palin, together with his staff, according to reliable information, was forced to leave Bucharest abruptly by the Soviet authorities on the night of April 4, having been given only twenty hours notice. According to reports Mr. Palin informed the Soviet authorities that he had been ordered to Finland but that he had not planned to travel via Soviet Russia. In reply he received curt instructions that arrangements for his departure by train via Soviet Russia had been made and he should be prepared to leave at the appointed hour.

The position of the King & the Yalta Provisions

In the course of the day, Prince Stirbey, Mr. Savel Radulescu, and Mr. Visoianu called for the purpose of ascertaining if there were any news from Moscow on developments following the delivery of the United States note asking for the consultations upon Romanian problems. The Department will recall that these three men were consulted by the King frequently during the crises preceding the formation of the Groza Government. They will certainly be called for consultations upon the King's return from Deva Monday.

In each case my visitor stated that the King would have to make a decision in the near future as to whether to sign or refuse to sign the decrees the Government had presented to him. It was the view of each visitor that if there was no willingness among the Yalta powers to engage in consultations upon the Romanian problem, the King had better get out now with clean hands rather than stay by signing these unconstitutional decrees, only to be forced out eventually.

As I have received in the past three weeks no encouraging information of developments in Moscow, I felt I was not in a position to make any statement beyond that already known to my visitors, namely that the United States on March 14 had made in Moscow a formal request for consultation upon the Romanian problem.

April 11 *The Romanian exit visas...*

Air Vice-Marshal Stevenson on February 10 and General Schuyler on February 28 took up formally with the Soviet authorities of the ACC the question of Romanian exit visas for the personnel of the Special Division of the Swiss Legation.

The Swiss Legation through the Romanian Foreign Office had previously requested exit visas from the ACC.

Both Stevenson and Schuyler have continued to press the Soviet authorities periodically for a favorable decision. However, even though the Soviets were advised of the Swiss Government's desire to have the Swiss personnel leave on the Drottingholm, which I understand is scheduled to leave within a week, the joint efforts of the Air Vice Marshal and General Schuyler have been of no avail. The Soviet authorities will give no reason for the delay in issuing exit visas.

Le Rougetel and I wrote Mr. Pavlov last evening requesting that the exit visas for the Swiss personnel be granted. Before taking this action we discussed the matter and decided it would be more effective if we acted separately but simultaneously rather than jointly.

April 12 *Concerning postal and telegraphic communications. – The letter of General Susaikov*

When, on March 30th, the resumption of the postal and telegraphic communications with Romania was reported in the radio bulletin, the Mission informed the Director of the Romanian Post and Telegraph of the resumption of postal and telegraphic communications for informational and non-transactional messages. A copy of this letter, as a routine measure, was forwarded to General Schuyler and by General Schuyler to the Deputy Chairman of the ACC.[*]

The Deputy Chairman, General Susaikov, under date of April 11 wrote General Schuyler:

"The ACC at the present time considers premature the establishing of postal-telegraph and radio communications between Romania and other countries for information and private correspondence.

Instructions concerning the interdiction of such communications have been given to the Romanian Minister of Communications.

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[*] Cf. *FRUS 1945*, V, pp. 531-532: Berry to the Secretary or State, Telegram 264, April 12. Repeated to Moscow as 74. The letter of Gen. Susaikov under date of 11 April 1945 to Schuyler is not mentioned in the latter's *Diary*.

I cannot understand why such an important and big question as the reestablishment of international communications was brought up by Mr. Berry before agencies of the Romanian Government without the sanction of the Allied Control Commission."

A similar letter was sent by General Susaikov to the local British authorities.

An instruction to General Susaikov such as Ambassador Harriman requested on March 21, would be most useful, even at this late date, first, in getting communications started again and second, in restoring our lagging prestige with the Romanians. As mentioned on April 2nd it is in our interest that the Romanians not be given many illustrations of our being pushed around by Soviet authorities.

Dissensions within the NDF

First signs of the disintegration of the NDF are beginning to appear. Titel Petrescu, Socialist leader, has made it clear that immediately upon the cessation of hostilities in Europe his party intends to declare publicly its own program as distinct from the NDF. The Communists yesterday at a public meeting reacted to this announcement by deciding upon an intense propaganda drive to gain party members.

The Tudor Vladimirescu Division

The Tudor Vladimirescu Division organized by the Soviet Union from Romanian war prisoners, and now under the command of General Cambrea, has been withdrawn from the front and has arrived at Bucharest, its now duty station. Local circles believe it will be utilized when needed as an instrument of political pressure.

April 13 *Hostility & dissatisfaction...*

Secretary General Stoica of the Foreign Office stated confidentially today that the Foreign Office is receiving most disquieting reports of the growing peasant hostility throughout the country towards the Russians.

He attributes this to Soviet requisition tactics and to the indiscriminate arrests being made by the Communist organized Civil Guards.

The Chief Foreign Office difficulties with the Soviet Union revolve around the problem of making a commercial agreement between the two countries. Foreign Minister Tatarescu is now reluctant to go to Moscow unless he can return with a satisfactory commercial agreement as a failure to secure such would lower his prestige and perhaps force his retirement from the Government.

The commercial agreement Romanians have in mind would arrange for an exchange of Romanian lumber and certain chemicals such as caustic soda for Soviet cotton, metals, and minerals. Romanians, however, understand that the Soviets will insist upon the introduction into the agreement of another aspect involving what they call "economic cooperation" which means a Soviet financial investment in the Romanian economy.

The Communist press towards the United States & Great Britain

The past few days have witnessed a growing coolness in the Communist press towards the United States and Great Britain. *Graiul Nou*, *Scanteia*, *Romania Libera*, and even the Socialist *Libertatea* have published articles explaining the Anglo-American advance into Germany as due to lack of resistance since German troops are concentrated against the Russians.

Scanteia today published an article critical of American administrative methods in occupied Germany. The author Ilya Ehrenburg describing the difference between the two fronts said "We are not conquering Vienna with cameras." *Libertatea* criticized the window display of a local cafe showing a Western Front map of Anglo-American military advances stating "It represents only an insignificant fragment of the day's news."

Locally Romanians are interpreting these signs as evidence of growing discord among the great Allies since every newspaper article before publication must be approved by the Communist-dominated Propaganda Ministry and even its position in the paper specified.

April 12 *The death of President Roosevelt*

Entire press today mourned the death of President Roosevelt. It was the leading story in the Romanian press which headlined the news and supplemented it with editorials of tribute, biographical sketches, and pictures. Because of the time factor in the receipt of the news most newspapers had to make over their front pages and others will carry stories tomorrow. Representative excerpts follow:

Universul: "The history of the US and the history of the world will place President Roosevelt among the most distinguished men. Even today his compatriots rank him in the illustrious company of his great forefathers, Washington, Jefferson, and Lincoln."

Timpul: "Fearful, tragic news comes to us from across the ocean: Roosevelt has died. He has died just when his troops are about to enter the outskirts of Berlin and are on the point of meeting the Soviet troops in the capital of the shattered Reich. He has died like a prophet of the Lord on the edge of the Promised Land. We must swear to him that we shall do all within our power to win the peace he could not live to see."

Romania Libera: "Roosevelt is already being judged by history for what he has succeeded in doing working with all his power for the good of mankind and of each citizen of the world. His life's work, the total destruction of Hitlerism will be perfected as a last tribute of the whole world to one of its foremost leaders."

Semnalul: Under the heading "The Greatest American of Our Epoch has Died" referred to the president as "one of the greatest and noblest representatives of humanity in history. He will be blessed by all future generations. The great General has fallen facing the enemy."

L'IndependanceRoumaine, French language organ of the National Liberal Party printed two front page eulogies, one by Constantin Bratianu, President of the party.

The other two important dailies, *Jurnalul* and *Libertatea* did not appear today.

Scanteia, which goes to press early carried no editorial but printed front page announcement and news story on back page.

April 14 *Romanian press on the death of the United States President (cont.)*

Romanian press today continued to devote major part of its space to death of President Roosevelt. Most papers gave their front pages exclusively to the story, together with editorial tributes; biographical accounts and pictures of Roosevelt; also profiles and pictures of President Truman. Most of the background material is of OWI[*] origin. Black boxes enclosed the front pages of several papers. Signed editorial tributes were written by publishers and editors. It was impressive press display and Romanians say an unprecedented one.

All newspapers published the messages of the King and Prime Minister to Mrs. Roosevelt.

Government announced day of national mourning on fifteenth when all theaters, cinemas, concerts, etc. close. Numerous societies holding tributary ceremonies.

Few additional press editorial excerpts:

Semnalul: "He left very deep mark on future of American people and all peoples of world... What this man succeeded in doing in less than four years shall never be forgotten... This must be our grateful memory of Franklin Roosevelt. Let us be as he wanted us to be and let us at least partially arrive where he wanted us to arrive."

Scanteia: "The sacrifice of the President shall not be in vain. Today when the armies of the United Nations... when the British and American soldiers from the West and the Soviet soldiers from the East advance with lightning speed into Germany... In all corners of the world millions of men enjoy the freedom for which Roosevelt fought and died. This is the supreme homage that can be paid to a hero of liberty."

Jurnalul de Dimineata: "The death of President Roosevelt brings mourning not only to the United States but to all free countries, to all freed countries, and to all freedom-loving countries also."

Universul: "The Commander-in-Chief of the American Armies has fallen while on active duty at the post of command, the most illustrious victim of this war, laden with responsibilities, exhausted with work, confident of victory, and sure of the triumph of reason, justice, peace, and democracy. He vanquished prejudices and old ideas. He foresaw the future with the lucidity of a great statesman."

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[*] Office of War Information.

April 15 *The Armistice conditions and the extravagant Soviet demands . . .*

The Soviet authorities in the name of the ACC recently sent a note to the Groza Government charging it with "a completely unsatisfactory execution of the Armistice conditions." The tone of the note is harsher than that sent last fall to the Sanatescu Government.

Thoughtful Romanians are depressed by the recent extravagant Soviet demands for 100,000 carloads of wheat and 80,000 head of cattle believing this clearly shows the Soviets intend to grant no amelioration of the armistice conditions to the present Government.

Soviet officials are dissatisfied with the slow development of the program to eliminate former German collaborationists and legionaires from the public administration. Little has been done on this question except in the Interior Ministry and in the broadcasting station personnel. Soviet officials are also dissatisfied with the slow pace of investigations by the People's Tribunal. Meanwhile, Soviet personal relations with Premier Groza are deteriorating.

Under the Groza Government the Romanian public is experiencing growing economic chaos, rapidly rising prices, and political disillusionment brought about by the action of the Romanian Communists.

Thus, for differing reasons the Groza Government is falling into disfavor with both the Soviet authorities and the Romanian public.

April 16 *Still on the death of President Roosevelt*

After three days Romanian press continues to devote space to death of President Roosevelt. Hundreds of stories have appeared in the newspapers representing all shades of political opinion. Numerous eulogies have been broadcast over radio. It has been an impressive display of national mourning. Newspaper clippings being sent to Department and OWI under separate covers. Typical headlines: "Mankind in Mourning." "Roosevelt, the Democrat." "Great Hero Has Gone." "Testament of Roosevelt." "Roosevelt of the World." "Friend of the People."

Newspapers now beginning to turn to President Truman. There have been many stories, sketches, and pictures of President Truman already printed. His statement that United States policy unchanged given prominent display all papers.

Several requiem ceremonies held Sunday which was officially proclaimed by Government day of national mourning. Two rival organizations of friends of the United States joined hands to sponsor memorial ceremony Sunday which attended by overflow crowd. Eulogies read by presidents of societies. Members of Government, led by Tatarescu, and members of foreign diplomatic corps attended. Churches all denominations held special services. Members of Mission staff and United States military officers attended various major functions informally.

April 17 *ACC Deputy Chairman Susaikov...*

Premier Groza, accompanied by Deputy ACC Chairman Susaikov, spoke yesterday to the Tudor Vladimirescu Division revealing that the division would be distributed among other Romanian army units to which they will bring the idea of "true democracy" and where they will serve as officers and instructors. The grades and officer ranks of the division have been determined by the Soviet authorities.

and the Japanese diplomats, in Romania

On April 3, General Schuyler requested a meeting with Colonel-General Susaikov sending with his request, as is customary, an agenda. Included in the agenda for discussion was the subject of the Japanese diplomats in Romania.

If an adequate Romanian guard were impossible, General Schuyler expected to request that, until all Japanese officials leave Romania, the British and American Military missions here be authorized to maintain a strict guard over such officials, to confine them to their quarters and to control completely their activities.

A meeting was scheduled for April 5. In the meantime General Susaikov expressed his irritation over the evacuation of the American aviators by postponing the meeting and refusing to set any future date for a meeting. The matter has been pressed persistently by General Schuyler without any result.

I again took up the matter vigorously with the Foreign Office. The Secretary General said there was a guard on duty, but he admitted that the Japanese came and went at their own pleasure. He said that he would do his best to remedy the situation, but he implied what I already knew that the Foreign Office under the present government is impotent to take action unless desired by the Communist Party. On this score, moreover, disquieting reports have been given me by the OSS of fraternization between Soviet and Japanese officials.

April 18 *I. Ehrenburg considered a "Fascist..."*

Replying to General Schuyler's protest against the publication in Romania of offensive Ehrenburg articles, General Vinogradov said that he considered Ehrenburg a "Fascist" and that certainly everything would be done to correct the local impression made by his articles.

Today a *Pravda* article by Alexandrov criticizing the views of Ehrenburg appears in full in *Scanteia, Jurnalul de Dimineata*, and *Timpul*. Monday the chief Soviet censor had refused to allow the publication of the Alexandrov article.

Locally the instance is considered as another example of the well-known Soviet technique of creating suspicion and then, after the damage is done, disavowing the source.

April 19 *Shipment to Russia...*

About April 1 Russians loaded at the Unirea refinery (British) in Ploesti four freight cars with 6 inch casing and one with steel totalling about 80 tons for shipment to Russia. Upon complaint by the owners the Russians insisted on their showing proof that the material, which had been purchased in Germany, had been paid for. Unirea claimed the material was furnished against a credit for air raid damages which had been set up by the Germans through an agreement with the Romanian Government. At the time this apparently satisfied the Russians, but the cars were not unloaded. Recently, they reopened the question of ownership and yesterday it was reported that the cars were being made up into a train for shipment.

At a meeting today between the British representatives in ACC and Russians, the British took the attitude that the payment question was minor and that the major point was that this was going against the promise that had been given that no more material would be taken. The Russians said if this were true then of course it would not be taken. It was left that the British were to furnish proof of the promise. Another point made by the British was that the material was badly needed here and in view of the mutual agreement as to the importance of the oil industry in Romania, this factor alone should be sufficient to prevent the seizure.

The Russians stated they would hold up the shipment pending further study.

Deliveries of oil products in metric tons during March according to Romanian figures were: first, For Reparations Account, 275,552 tons; second, For War Use, 30,993 tons; third, For Internal Consumption, 140,398 tons; total, 446,943 tons.

April 21 *In view of a Romanian — Soviet commercial accord*

Romanian Commercial delegation will leave April 23 for Moscow to negotiate a Romanian-Soviet commercial accord. Finance Minister Durma belonging to the Tatarescu Party heads the mission assisted by the Minister for Petroleum and Mines, Mr. Ionescu, a Socialist, the Communist Under-secretary of Agriculture, Mr. Agiu, and the Secretary General of the National Economy Ministry, Mr. Solacolu who belongs to the Tatarescu Party. There will be approximately ten other economic technicians accompanying them.

The lines of the planned agreement are expected to follow those indicated here on April 13. Soviet participated in the Romanian petroleum industry and Romanian banking reportedly may result from the conference.

Inflation...

From the Director of the National Bank I learned that the Romanian bank note circulation has been doubled since January 1. He said that at the present time the putting into circulation of new notes is limited only by the capacity of the presses to turn them out.

Arrangements are now being completed to print 10 and 20 thousand lei bank notes which are scheduled to appear on July 1.

April 22[*] *Conversation with the King on the difficulties of his own position:*

Last evening the King asked me to come and see him. He said he wished to tell me of some of the thoughts running through his mind.

the War Criminal Decree Law;

The King began the conversation by saying he had signed the War Criminal Decree Law Friday night. He said that he signed only after fighting a three weeks' battle with the Government during which time he succeeded in eliminating from the text of the law the most objectionable features. The chief improvements he obtained in the recast text are: the death penalty is authorized in the case of war criminals only; the right of appeal from a people's court to a regularly constituted court is permitted; Article 18, which gave people's courts power to try persons accused of disturbing the present political order, is entirely eliminated; and finally the validity of the law runs only to September 1.

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[*] *FRUS 1945*, V, pp. 536-539: Berry to the Secretary of State. Telegram 295, April 22. Repeated to Moscow as 87.

"to discredit and then eliminate him..."

The King told me he was convinced that Ana Pauker and the more radical members of the Romanian Communist Party were out to discredit and then eliminate him. He said that lately they inaugurated a whispering campaign urging the return of his father. Of course, they have no use for Carol, but Carol would be more easily discredited and hence more easily eliminated than he. The King said he was bombarded by requests from the Communist members of the Government to perform unconstitutional acts. In a single day Patrascanu had presented for signature two unconstitutional decree laws, and Teohari Georgescu, two more. The King felt that such draft laws were presented as a maneuver in order to build up evidence that he was not responsive to the public will. Moreover, after studying the texts of all laws recently presented by Communist ministers he had come to the conclusion that they had all been drafted by the same hand, perhaps by a member of the Executive Committee of their party.

The King's "relations with Russian officials..."

As his relations with the Romanian Comunists have deteriorated the King said his relations with the Russian officials have improved. Recently General Susaikov, dropping his glum and foreboding manner, invited him to visit a Russian airfield. There he was wined, dined, and toasted in an atmosphere of good fellowship. When asked if he would enjoy seeing a film, the best local cinema was emptied for his and his mother's comfort. General Susaikov yesterday at a Palace luncheon arose seven times and proposed toasts to the King and the Romanian nation. On the same occasion the Queen was assured that the resources of the Soviet Union were at her command. The King contrasted this sudden shift from austerity to friendliness toward him with the attitude of the Russians toward Romania. He said that the Russians were making larger and harsher demands under Articles 10, 11, and 12 of the Armistice. He told me that Russian troops which had withdrawn from certain sections of Romania had stripped the land of every valuable before leaving, even dismantling the Romanian wooden barracks they had used and taking door and window frames from the stone barracks.

The King's Conclusion: "America had lost all interest in Romania and Yalta"

The King concluded his conversation by saying that he hoped the Great Powers soon would take some action in the spirit of Yalta concerning Romania. He said that he suspected America had lost all interest in Romania and Yalta. If there is to be action he said, it must now be initiated from the outside as the Romanian problem, since the Vishinsky Government was imposed, is no longer an internal problem but an international problem. He stated that as the country's economic and financial situation were rapidly deteriorating, action must be taken in the next few weeks or the opportunity for action will have definitely passed.

A fragile American encouragement...

Fortunately yesterday I received from the Department a resume of a telegram sent by President Roosevelt in reply to a telegram from Mr. Churchill[*] and I was able to assure the King that, far from having lost interest in Romania,[**] we were desirous of engaging in talks with our Allies in order to fulfill the responsibilities we had taken. I considered that I was justified in adding that, while appreciating the difficulties of the King's position, it was gratifying to hear directly from him how he is working for the preservation of democratic processes in Romania, thereby fulfilling the responsibilities which his people expect of him. Although the King seemed to take courage from these words, we must admit to ourselves that the encouragement that comes from words expressed in Bucharest at a time when action is desired in Moscow forms but a fragile bulwark for resisting the pressure of powerful groups.

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[*] Cf. *FRUS, 1945*, V, p. 531: The British Prime Minister (Churchill) to President Roosevelt. (London), 11 April 1945. Telegram 942, Romania; and p. 536: The Secretary of State, Stettinius, to Berry. Telegram 197, Washington, April 21, 1945.

[**] The Secretary of State argued, *inter alia*, that: "President Roosevelt received through OSS channels, a personal letter from King Mihai dated Jannuary 24, 1945... It is not deemed advisable to make a formal rely to the King's letter, particularly in view of the tone and contents of accompaying memorandum, at a time when we are seeking to reach a common ground with the Soviet Government in dealing with the Romanian situation. We do not wish, however, by ignoring the King's letter, to strengthen any impression he may have that in the United States there is no understanding of the Romanian problem. You are accordingly authorized to say to the King that you have been directed to inform him that President Roosevelt received his letter, and that this government is in sympathy with the desire of Romania to regain its place among the peace-loving independent nations of the world. You should avoid any expression of views on the memorandum, merely saying, if the question is raised, that the document has been referred to the Department for study." *Ibidem*, as *supra*.

April 24[*] *Therefore, planning "a coup with the tacit consent of the King..."*

From several sources recently I have received indirectly indications that a number of Romanians are forming[**] themselves into a loosely grouped organization for the purpose of resisting present trends in the country.

They appear to feel that Romania is now being governed by the Communist Party and as a consequence the country's finances and economics are on the brink of disaster. They think that there is anarchy in the governmental administration throughout the country and chaos in the economic life. They believe that they must assume the personal risk involved in order to give a turn to the events that are shaping the destiny of their country.

I understand that the men who are thinking along these lines are in many cases the same as those who engineered and carried through the coup of August 23. The plan, I gather, is to stage a second coup with the tacit consent of the King.

... would be "inviting disaster"

It is difficult to believe that I and Mr. Le Rougetel, with whom I have compared notes, have indications of what is in the minds of some of the country's leading citizens without this same knowledge being available to the Soviet authorities who have working for them a large group of men whose full time is taken in learning and reporting what is being thought and done in Romania. Of course, a group planning and working toward the end indicated, if their plans were suspected by the NKVD, would be placing themselves directly into the hands of the Communist Party which at an appropriate moment could denounce and eliminate them. A group thus branded would be a means for completely discrediting the Monarch and for removing from the Romanian political scene many people whose thoughts and plans for Romania closely parallel our own.

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[*] Cf. *FRUS 1945*. V, pp. 539-540: Berry to the Secretary of State. Telegram 301, April 24.

[**] Berry's message was received in garbled form by the State Department. The printed text in *FRUS 1945*. V, p. 539, reads erroneously: "forcing (forging?)."

Should any person whom I believe to be one of this group approach me and inform me, or even hint to me, of what they are planning, I should take the occasion to tell him that he is inviting disaster.

To bring about a change in the Government by forceful means would certainly be considered by the Soviet authorities as disturbing order behind their lines of communication. Under such circumstances America could hardly do otherwise than support the action that the Soviets might take to eliminate such a condition. Therefore, the Romanians who by passive resistance or active conflict might try to bring about a change in the Government would only succeed by their actions in eliminating from the Romanian political scene a group that it is essential to preserve for the purpose of registering its convictions in the ballot box and for supporting locally the action that the Three Great Powers in consultation may decide to take toward Romania.

The writer's dilemma

I feel that this is the only course that is open to me, as to give a willing ear to such proposals would make me a conspirator and to listen silently without protest would make me an accomplice. If the Department holds a different view, please instruct me urgently.

April 25 *Material shipped to Russia...*

The eighty tons of material mentioned here on April 18, together with 250 tons belonging to other companies were shipped from Ploesti April 19.*

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* See above on April 19 (*Shipment to Russia...*).

Much of this belonged to Colombia and Concordia, French and Belgian companies respectively, whose capital stock was garnered by Germans. The British Acting Commissioner protested to General Vinogradov on April 21 against the seizure and shipment. None of the material belongs to Romano-Americana, but Walters learned today that seventeen tons of 6-inch line pipe were taken from Romano Americana in February and 688 kilograms of spare parts for Krupp trucks on April 9. The Romano-Americana material as well as all material in question had not yet been cleared through the customs and in the case of Romano at least had not actually been paid for. Romano had not brought the matter to the Mission's attention as they considered it really was not their property. Their direct intervention to the ACC had no effect. Romano still has in customs 9 boxes totalling 660 kilograms miscellaneous spare parts and accessories for which ACC has rejected requests for release.

While in the case of Romano there may be some grounds for questioning ownership this point is of secondary importance. The material is all badly needed for the war effort and for the spare parts the value is greatly out of proportion to the weight. It is difficult to reconcile the lifting of this material with the statement reported in Moscow's cable, that the Soviet Government recognizes the needs of the Romanian oil industry and in compliance with the wishes of the United States Government had ordered that no more material be shipped to Russia.

April 27 *"Condolences received on the death of President Roosevelt"*

The Department is correct in assuming that I have appropriately and informally expressed the appreciation of our Government for condolences received on the death of President Roosevelt.

I have personally expressed my appreciation to the King, to Mr. Maniu, at the Foreign Office, and to many prominent citizens.

In the three days following the announcement of the death of President Roosevelt I received from local persons 66 letters and telegrams of condolences and 92 visiting cards. They all have been acknowledged. During the same three days 528 persons called at the Mission to express their condolences and placed their signatures in a book which was opened for that purpose. To 478 of these persons, that is, all those whose signatures were legible and whose addresses were ascertainable, I have sent black bordered visiting cards with suitable notation.

May 1 *C. Demetrescu and N. Oancea, Romanian Foreign Office officials arrested*

On April 28 the Interior Ministry summarily arrested two Foreign Office officials, Camil Demetrescu, who is Deputy Chief of the Code Section, and Nicolae Oancea, Chief Secretary of the Foreign Office Secretary General. The men were questioned regarding three million Swiss gold francs originally kept by the Foreign Office under Mihai Antonescu for non-accountable expenditures. This fund is now on deposit at the Romanian National Bank in the name of the Foreign Office. The Interior Minister insists that this money should be turned over to him as having been held originally by Mihai Antonescu.

The same day 8 Foreign Office officials of ministerial rank, headed by Secretary General Stoica, addressed a letter of protest to the Foreign Minister concerning the arbitrary nature of the arrests which were made without first registering the complaint with the Foreign Minister. Tatarescu, in view of his growing uncertain governmental position, reportedly made only feeble representations to the Interior Minister. On April 30 Oancea was released for a few hours and then was re-arrested.

Demetrescu and Oancea were key men in transmitting code messages to Ankara and Cairo in the months preceding the August 23 coup d'etat, and Foreign Office officials fear this is the real reason for their detention. They consider that the present regime wishes to compromise all those involved in the preliminaries leading to the Armistice. Because of this, many confidential documents which bear upon those negotiations are now being removed from the Foreign Office.

In addition to the attempt to cut off the Foreign Office's source of confidential expenditures, last evening it was learned that the Communication's Minister has issued strict verbal instructions to the telegraph authorities to transmit no incoming or outgoing Foreign Ministry telegrams.

Both the Communications and Interior Ministers are Communists, and the above actions are considered to represent their party's policy. Also the Foreign Office contains influential men of bourgeois party sympathies who have connections abroad, and it is felt the current measures are bent toward chastening opposition elements in that Ministry.

May 5 *"People's Court would begin war criminal trials..."*

It is officially announced that the People's Court would begin war criminal trials on May 14 of a first group of 46 persons to include 21 officers and non-commissioned officers. Included are three generals, Calotescu, Macici, and Trestioreanu.

The composition on the nine-member tribunal has been announced as consisting of two judges appointed by the Justice Minister, one each from the Bucharest Court of Appeals and the Ilfov Court, while seven will be chosen by lot from lists submitted by the seven political groups in the NDF Government.

May 7 *The question of exit visas for the Ritter group*

Following the sending of my letter to Mr. Pavlov I called on him accompanied by General Schuyler to discuss generally the question of clearances. At the end of our conversation I took up question of exit visas for the personnel of the Special Division of Swiss Legation. Mr. Pavlov indicated that although this matter was very much before him he was not in position to indicate when a decision would be reached.

On May 3 Colonel Jadwin discussed with General Vinogradov the question of exit visas for Mr. Ritter and his staff. General Vinogradov stated that the applications were still under consideration but that he could not give any encouragement regarding an early decision. General Vinogradov indicated there was a special reason for the delay in the case of Mr. Ritter. Thus both Mr. Pavlov and General Vinogradov have hinted that there is some political reason for delay in granting visas to the Ritter Group.

In this connection the Department may be aware that Mrs. Ritter was born in Russia and during her residence in Bucharest has had active charitable interests among Polish and other groups. I believe she has not always used sound judgment in her activities and statements, although I know of no activity on her part that could be said to be inimicable to the interests of the war effort of the United Nations. Ritter himself apparently has maintained a carefully considered professional attitude toward all groups.

Under the circumstances I do not believe it will be of any avail to press this matter further locally and have informed Colonel Jadwin accordingly. It is quite apparent that the final decision rests in Moscow, and the Department after consultations with the British may wish to take up the matter through the Embassy there. I have discussed this subject with my British colleague. He believes nothing can be done on this level. In fact, he asked my help in securing clearance for a file clerk for his Legation. He has not been able to secure clearance for a single civilian employee. He contrasted his position with mine as I have secured clearance from the Russians and arranged the arrival of seventeen American and three Greek employees of this Mission.

Removal of former Prime Minister Rădescu
from the British Mission...

Former Prime Minister Radescu is scheduled to leave the British Mission tonight at nine o'clock and return to his domicile.

Foreign Minister Tatarescu at the request of Mr. Le Rougetel stated in writing that General Radescu upon leaving the British Mission would enjoy the same security as that enjoyed by all Romanian citizens. General Susaikov declined to give British officials a letter upon Radescu's safety similar to that he had given General Schuyler concerning Maniu. However, he verbally stated that General Radescu ran no exceptional danger in returning to his home.

The British, therefore, wearying of their guest and believing that their rather feeble assurances were as strong as any they would be able to secure, decided to act, hoping that the removal of Radescu from the Mission would remove an obstacle to the improvement of their relations with both Soviet and Romanian officials.

With Mr. Le Rougetel I reexamined this morning the question as to whether it would be desirable for me to take any action with the Romanian officials and ask General Schuyler's office to take a similar action with the Soviet officials. Mr. Le Rougetel and I both feel that any American action at this time would serve only to accentuate the weakness of the British position. As an untimely action might be the means of bringing about exactly the opposite result from that which we desire to obtain, we agreed that for the present it was desirable for this Mission to take no action.

May 13

Romanian life "dominated by a holiday spirit"

All aspects of Romanian life during the past fortnight have been dominated by a holiday spirit. An industrial workers rest day on May 1 established the public good humor which spread throughout the land during the Pre-Easter government holidays on the 4th and 5th, Easter on the 6th, and the Post-Easter holidays on the 7th and 8th; was intensified by the announcement on the 9th of VE-Day,* and reached its climax on the 10th with the Romanian Independence Day, and supplementary holiday on the 11th.

Thus within the space of a few days a devout peasantry solemnized the Easter Feast, a highly sensitive intellectual class learning that its long cherished dream of the end of hostilities had become a reality rejoiced in V-Day celebrations, and the nation as a whole on Independence Day acknowledged its deep affection for the young King, its gratitude for his having delivered the country with only minor wounds from the German domination, and expressed its hope for an equally easy and quick delivery from the Russians.

With an atmosphere generated by these events it is perhaps only normal that incongruous happenings should be widely reported. In Sibiu Mr. Maniu optimistically addressed his party followers, promising that soon all would be right in Romania, meaning of course that the Anglo-Americans would force out the unrepresentative Groza Government. In Bucharest, Mr. Groza assured all that would listen that his government now was firmly established. People seeing published photographs of American officers of the ACC, guests of General

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* Victory in Europe-Day – May 9 1945 – for the Allies in World War II.

Susaikov, fraternizing with other guests, Romanian Cabinet members, spread the rumor that the American Government had given its blessing to the present Romanian Government.

Victory in Europe-Day festivities...

Under Government inspiration, VE-Day festivities throughout the land were celebrated as Russian V-Day. Yet stray American soldiers walking in Bucharest were swept off their feet, raised to the shoulders of Romanian men, and carried in triumph and honor through the streets. When an official American car went to the Palace on Independence Day, the flag was loudly cheered by a crowd of spectators waiting to have a glimpse of the King. And when he appeared he was greeted by an enthusiastic demonstration which to my knowledge was the only unprompted, uncontrolled Bucharest public manifestation in many months. Earlier battalions of workers with raised arms and clenched fists paraded before the King, and a young man who shouted lustily "Long Live King Michael" was arrested by a government official for his "provocative attitude." A property owner well known to one of the officers of the Mission remarked that as the war was now won, Romania would get a loan from America, pay off reparations with one check, and be rid of the Russians.

But disillusionment... will likely follow...

Thus, while the dream of the end of the war is a reality the Romanian people are not thinking realistically. The nation is experiencing an emotional release. Each man believes that from now on things will be right, as he interprets right. American prestige is high, higher than any member of this Mission has ever known it. But disillusionment, foreshadowed by the opening of the war criminal trials next week and the stiffening Soviet attitude for deliveries under Article 12, will likely follow rapidly. When it comes American prestige may be expected to slump. I believe that the slump can be prevented or cushioned by our Government publicly taking steps to assume the full share of the responsibility we undertook at Yalta; by shifting from a passive to an active role on the ACC, perhaps, too, by stressing, as the Department originally planned, less our military interest in Romania, and more our economic and political interests.

This program of course must be worked out on the Washington-Moscow level and then, to reap the full benefits, it must be implemented in Bucharest for the post-hostilities life of the Armistice Control Commission by an equal sharing of authority with our Soviet (and British) Allies as experience here has shown that a multilateral agreement that is interpreted and applied unilaterally creates rather than eliminates discord.

May 15

On the ninth the Marshal of the Court,[*] under instructions from the King, called at this Mission and expressed the King's congratulations upon victory in Europe. A suitable reply was made at the time.

The Marshal called at the British Mission, made similar remarks, and then upon General Susaikov of the ACC.

Sunday, General Susaikov, referring to the Marshal's visit on Wednesday, said that the Soviet Government desired to receive a statement of congratulations written in the King's own hand. To this an appropriate reply would be made and both letters given considerable publicity.

Yesterday the King sent the Marshal to inform me of this development in order that I might understand the reasons why he had addressed a letter to President Kalinin without addressing a similar letter to the chiefs of the other United Nations.

General Susaikov on "the activities of the present Romanian Government"

I am reliably informed that General Susaikov in conversation Sunday with a high Romanian official said that the Soviet authorities were very pleased from a political point of view with the activities of the present Romanian Government. However, they were not pleased with the activities of the Historic parties which, while making declarations of collaboration, were leaning on other relations, and working in another direction. Such activities he said were not beneficial to Romania.

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[*] Dimitrie Negel.

From the economic standpoint, which is of equal importance with the political, according to the General, the Soviet authorities were less well satisfied with the activities of the Government. The Government is permitting arrangements to be made, and transactions concluded, which will place Romania in a position of losing its economic independence. He said that one needed only to examine the recent issues of the *Monitor Official* to understand what he meant.

(Recent issues have contained notices of the founding of numerous companies which the General apparently suspects are founded with Anglo-American capital.)

The General continued that it is only natural to begin to make plans for the exploitation with Soviet capital of Romanian forests, mines, and petroleum. He suggested that the Soviets might buy into the Resita Company, headed by Max Ausnit. The General said that Mr. Ausnit was slyly working to foment trouble, for example, on Independence Day he had paid the workers a gratituity of twenty percent, whereas he gave his salaried employees a gratuity of one hundred percent. The General added "We know with what capital Ausnit works."

The General concluded his conversation with the well-worn Russian propaganda theme that, although Romania is a conquered country, it has been treated gently by the Russian army, as humanitarianism is the watch-word of that army. Thus, he illustrated, seed has been given the Romanian peasants, tractors have been given them, wheat has been given in order that the population may have bread, and in spite of the fact that a commercial convention has not yet been signed by Romania and the Soviet Union, an advance of cotton has been given that the textile mills of Romania may continue to work.*

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* The following text has been inserted between the Ms. pages 116-117, corresponding the date of May 17:

"May 17th Paraphrase. American Representative Bucharest.

The officers in Moscow wish to express their appreciation for the helpful and illuminating series of telegrams you have repeated to us in recent months with respect to the general course of events in Romania. We wish to send particular congratulations upon your message of May 13th which has made a deep impression on all of us. Personal for Berry from Kennan.

Kennan."

The Romanian people's "attachement to the King"

I have been told by a usually reliable person that Mr. Vishinsky is expected to head a small mission to Romania in a fortnight. His principal mission will be to draw the King more thoroughly into the Russian orbit of activity.

Lately there have been numerous indications of the Romanian people's strong attachment to the King, which fact may have decided the Soviet authorities to make the best of a bad situation by trying to attain through him their short range objectives.

The King himself told me yesterday that the evidences of his popularity with the peasantry are a source of embarrassment to him. He said that he had observed that wherever the Russians are, popular feelings are channeled and controlled. However, in spite of their control of the press and radio, the Soviets have not been able to control the feelings of the Romanian masses, and the consequences of this failure he viewed with mixed feelings.

May 17[*] *Romanian — Soviet economic agreements:*

The Romanian economic delegation has returned from Moscow having signed two agreements there dating from May 8. The first is a one year trade agreement and the second agreement covers a five year period of economic collaboration. Full details will follow by pouch.

Agreement No. 1

Under agreement No. one the Russians are to deliver the following quantities in metric tons: 25,000 of semi-manufactured steel, 6,000 of cast iron, 1,000 copper, 100 tin, 10 antimony, 4 cobalt, 70,000 anthracite coal, and 50,000 coke. Other products will include carbon electrodes, electric power cables, ball bearings, filters, and chemicals such as potassium chloride, phosphorus, and sulphur. 40,000 tons of raw cotton from Russia are to be spun in Romanian mills, of which 20,000 tons are to be returned to Russia as thread. Other products include tea, gum arabic, vegetable oil, cotton seeds, cigarette paper, and even quantities of rubber, which will be the object of a special agreement.

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[*] Cf. also *FRUS 1945*. V, pp. 544-545: Berry to the Secretary of State. Telegram 345, May 17. Repeated to Moscow as 97.

Romania is to deliver 267,800 tons of petroleum products including 100,000 of motor gasoline, 10,000 kerosene, 50,000 fuel oil, 45,000 gas oil, and 39,000 lubricants. The delivery of gasoline and kerosene is dependent on the discontinuance of deliveries of these products for account of Article 10 of the Armistice agreement. Other products include 250,000 cubic meters of timber, one million square meters of window glass, 50,000 tons of cement, 10,000 tons of tar paper, and quantities of carbon black and soda.

Agreement No. 2

In agreement No. two, Romania was told that it could expect no agricultural assistance, but Russia renounced its demand under Article 12 of the Armistice for 2,000 additional tractors. A prospectus was outlined to be implemented within two months by a Russian economic commission to be sent to Bucharest which provides for Soviet participation in all phases of Romanian industry and transport. A Romanian-Soviet oil company will be organized on equal shares. The agreement states that this company is to have preferential rights in securing oil exploration concessions. Similar joint companies are to be organized for heavy industry, lumbering, river, Black Sea and aerial navigation. A Soviet-Romanian Bank also is planned to finance the execution of the two agreements.

Officials of the Romanian Delegation state that they received every consideration in Moscow, and that they were assured the Soviet Union did not desire a preferential economic position in Romania over American and British interests, but merely equal rights. The delegation was encouraged to consider prospects for quick additional trade agreements with Poland, Bulgaria, Finland, and Hungary. The Russians refused to discuss prospects of Romanian trade with Turkey and the Near East and said that Romania could surely receive all its needs from the Soviet Union and the States previously named.

Appreciations and critics of the two agreements

Competent Romanian economists state agreement No. one is not as bad as Romanians originally feared, but that it virtually monopolizes all potential Romanian exports, leaving the country without the possibility of exchanging commodities with other countries. They realistically regard Soviet assurances of equal national treatment under agreement No. two as impossible. With one joint Soviet Government and Romanian company operating in each field, preferential treatment is sure to result. Also, the equality theory was abandoned in the agreement evolved for the joint oil company since it is to receive preferential exploratory rights.

The strongest critics of the agreements stress their essentially political implications as a Russian attempt to monopolize Romanian markets and to restrict its trade to states in a Soviet dominated economic zone. An impression some members of the delegation received was that of Soviet desire for haste in securing actual operation of the two agreements within the shortest possible time.

May 26

"It is important to show... that all windows do not neccesarily face Moscow..."

This Mission characterizes as a timely and wise decision the Department's willingness to entertain proposals from the Bulgarian and Hungarian governments to send representatives to the United States so that those governments might, through their own officials in Washington, have access to the American authorities as well as to represent unofficially and informally Bulgarian and Hungarian interests in the United States.

The Soviet authorities throughout this area have been using many means to consolidate their position and the positions of the local people who think as they do. One of these, the acceptance of a Bulgarian representative in Moscow, locally gave a considerable lift to Bulgarian prestige and by implying that a similar action under certain circumstances might be taken for Romania, strengthened the position of those Romanians who work for closer relations with the Soviet Union.

For our government to watch inactively the development of the Soviet position in the Balkans without indicating that we, too, had an interest here, would discourage all local democratic elements and make the work of our

Missions more difficult and perhaps, at a later date, even impossible. It seems to me important, therefore, to show local people that all windows do not necessarily face Moscow. One of the most effective ways of accomplishing this is accepting their own representatives in our capital.

The acceptance of a representative
of the Groza Government...

Whereas I would have favored for Romania under the Radescu or Sanatescu governments an attitude similar to that being manifested to Bulgaria and Hungary, I believe that the acceptance by our Government of a representative of the Groza Government would be interpreted in Bucharest as our unqualified surrender to the Soviet interpretation of the Yalta Agreement. I am sure that the Department appreciates how disastrous such an event would be to our present and future interests in Romania.

May 27

Stelian Popescu...
"on the list of those to be tried..."

Despite the fact that the directors of *Universul*, the leading Romanian neutral newspaper, are reported to have given half a billion lei to the Communist Party to prevent the owner, Stelian Popescu, now residing in Switzerland, from being charged as one responsible for the country's disaster, his name has appeared on the list of those to be tried. It is expected, in the event that the People's Court judges him guilty, that his *Universul* holdings will be confiscated by the state.

Regardless of Mr. Popescu's possible guilt, locally it is expected that his designation in this category is not influenced so much by this as by the desire of the extreme Left to gain control of the *Universul* publishing plant, which is the finest in Bucharest. At the present time the 3 most widely read newspapers *Universul*, *Jurnalul de Dimineata*, and *Semnalul* are published in this plant. If the plant should be taken local authorities will supervise the printing done there and this will mark the end of the nominally free press as then every newspaper perforce will actively support extreme Left views.

May 29 *"The Soviet authorities have made demands for rolling stock."... Reactions and interpretations*

Reports going around Bucharest, and perhaps reaching the outside world, that the Soviet authorities are seizing tank cars belonging to Romano-Americana and other oil companies, painting out identification marks and sending the cars away, originate in the fact that recently the Soviet authorities have made demands for rolling stock. As it is the policy of the Groza Government to meet willingly any Soviet demand some railway cars owned by the State but leased to private companies and operated in their names have been requisitioned.

Last evening a member of the Romanian Armistice Commission confirmed that the Soviet authorities had asked for the delivery of 15,000 Romanian freight and tank cars, an estimated half of the county's rolling stock, as war booty "because the cars had been used by the Germans while they were here." This official added that such an interpretation of Article 7 of course could extend to nearly every article of economic value in the country.

At a meeting last night of all representatives of the concerned Romanian Government departments and the Romanian Armistice Control Commission latest Soviet demands under the Armistice were discussed. In addition to the request for rolling stock, as just mentioned, demands made under Article 12 have increased to a point where if fulfilled, as requested, by August 1 they will cost the Romanian Government 1,000 billion lei. Currency in circulation today is about 6,000 billion lei.

Romanian Communist Party members participating in the meeting are said to have enlarged upon "the generous Armistice terms" and to have alleged that some domestic groups were sabotaging their fulfillment. They also argued that the peasants and workers were bearing a disproportionate share of the Armistice burden. Other people foreseeing, that the rapidly swelling inflation will run its course and in so doing pauperize the commercial and professional classes, maintain that the Soviet authorities are using the economic Articles of the Armistice agreement for political purposes.

June 1 *The war criminal trials. The King "had commuted the death sentences"*

Today a communique announced that the King, at the request of the Government, had commuted the death sentences of the 29 war criminals to life imprisonment at hard labor.

Following the convictions by the People's Court on May 22 there was a delay in executing the sentences until the Court of Cassation decided two points, namely the right of the condemned to appeal and the constitutionality of the law. The Court rejected the appeal on May 29 and upheld the law on May 31.

Meanwhile public opinion was antagonized at the farcical judicial nature of the trials during which there was a flagrant disregard of all legal procedure. The Communist Justice Minister himself realized that these tactics had served more to alienate the public than to gain favor for the NDF Government. Hence he, and other moderates from the Left, joined with the conservative forces, the Church, and the King to exert pressure for a commutation of all or part of the death sentences.

Conversations on this commutation between Premier Groza, the Justice Minister, and the Soviet officials resulted in a decision being received from Moscow yesterday afternoon to the effect that the Soviet Government would not object if the NDF Government commuted the death penalty in these cases. The Government then formulated the necessary decree, which the King signed immediately.

June 2 *Cars belonging to Romano-Americana taken by Soviet authorities...*

Four tank cars recently taken by Soviet authorities are the property of Romano-Americana. General Schuyler therefore today wrote to General Susaikov asking that these cars be returned and that steps be taken that no further cars belonging to Romano-Americana be taken.

June 3 *Ion Lugosianu's resignation... as editor and director of* Universul

Ion Lugosianu has resigned as editor and director of *Universul* following a manifestation of the plant's printers which asked death for Stelian Popescu, dismissal for Lugosianu (son-in-law of Popescu), and continuation of the newspaper under a committee acceptable to the workers.

Informed newspaper circles say that Lugosianu resigned immediately when requested in order to prevent the use of his name when he would be unable to control the paper's policy. It is interesting to report a remark made a few days ago by George Marcovescu [Macovescu], General Secretary of the Press Department of the Ministry of Propaganda, who said that *Jurnalul* and *Semnalul* soon would die.

June 4 *"The second group tried by the People's Court"*

The People's Court imposed sentences on 14 journalists tried for collaboration with the Axis. This is the second group tried by the People's Court. Seven of the defendants were sentenced in absentia. Appeals for all have been filed. The death penalty was prescribed for 2 absentees, Pamfil Seicaru and Grigore Manoilescu. Eight defendants, including Stelian Popescu, were given life imprisonment, 3 were given 20-year sentences, and 1 was imprisoned from 1 to 2 years. The property of all those sentenced was confiscated. Varying periods of loss of civil rights were imposed.

It is expected that the third group which will be tried by the People's Court will consist of those responsible for managing Jewish affairs during the Antonescu regime.

June 5 *"Romanian grain crops... in 1945..."*

In this preliminary estimate of Romanian grain crops to be harvested in 1945 references are made to the present effective area of the country which is 48 judets or districts comprising 19,525,000 hectares as compared with 29,504,900 hectares prior to 1940 and to 8,578,000 hectares of cultivated land as compared with 13,662,000 hectares. The reduction includes Bessarabia 4,442,200 hectares; Southern Dobruja 770,000 hectares, Northern Bukovina 543,400 hectares, and Northern Transylvania, presently coming under Romanian control but for which no estimates are now available, 4,224,300 hectares. A special report on Northern Transylvania will be dispatched upon Whipple's return from a scheduled survey there during the next fortnight.

Our considered estimates of acreages and production of fall sown grains for the above stated surface area in thousands of hectares and thousands of metric tons respectively are wheat 1,700 and 1,700; rye 80 and 72;

barley 30 and 27. Fall plantings were sharply reduced in the Banat, Crisana, and parts of Moldavia because of military operations and populations movement from these regions but nearly normal acreages were sown in the remaining regions. A dry spring potentially reduced yields but moderate to fairly abundant rainfall has fallen during the last 10 days throughout the country and the heads are long and grains plump though the straw is shorter than usual.

Spring plantings were delayed because of disorganization following unsystematic land reform; collection of farm machinery, still unavailable for agricultural use; important reductions in working animals and cold, dry weather. However, great progress was made during the second half of May and the following acreages were sown by June 1st in thousands of hectares wheat 45, rye 3, barley 525, oats 600, maize 2,400. The first hoeing of maize has been completed and the stand is average or better. Much land is unplanted in the Banat, the Iasi-Campulung-Radauti districts of Moldavia, and the Turda-Cluj districts of Southern Transylvania.

These estimates have been agreed upon with a British agricultural official attached to the British Mission hero and the British are sending a similar wire to London for use by the Food Conference there. A complete grain report including appraisal of the supply position and estimates of acreage and production during wartime years follows by pouch.

June 7 *"Heavy demands made by Soviet officials under Article 12"*

On March 21 I informed the Department in a general sense of the possibilities of Romanian trade with the United States and other areas. What follows supplements that information. This office informally suggested to certain Romanian officials that it would be interested to receive careful studies showing the amounts and types of commodities Romania would have available for export after considering the country's Armistice obligations and the products to be used in the then pending Commercial Accord with the Soviet Union.

Until the commercial agreement with Russia was signed it was understandably impossible for Romanian officials to elaborate such studies, but when the terms were learned in mid-May a complicating factor emerged in the extremely heavy demands made by Soviet officials under Article 12 of the Armistice which have virtually eliminated any export surpluses. At present the Government is seeking to rationalize deliveries under this Article over a long period of time, and confidently hopes for an early settlement. However, this has deferred any official studies by the Foreign Office and other Government Departments, including the newly organized Office for Foreign Trade in the National Economy Ministry, to estimate Romania's foreign trade possibilities with other countries.

In view of the country's Armistice and Soviet trade obligations, the director of the Foreign Trade Office has orally stated that it may be possible for a very small quantity of petroleum products and some dried beans and peas to be made available for export. However, the country is experiencing a shortage of seeds and hides and skins, while lumber and glass are in great demand by the Soviet Union. The Commercial accord with the Soviet Union has allocated sufficient cotton for domestic textile operations.

It may plainly be seen that the possibilities of Romanian-American trade are decidedly limited and uncertain. Responsible local economists, including the Economic Chief of the British Military Mission, are reluctantly concluding that it is a Soviet policy to permit Romania little if any trade with countries outside the Russian orbit unless this trade can be controlled by the Soviet Union.

June 12 *A meeting Maniu — Schuyler — Berry... which lasted three hours...*

Mr. Maniu recently* told me that he quietly was working now as closely with Mr. Titel Petrescu as he was working openly with Mr. Bratianu.

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* *I. e. June* Cf. 6 Schuyler, *Diary*, Wednesday, 6 June 1945 (Ms. pp. 180-181). See also Schuyler's Telegram to the War Department, dated 8 June 1945 (*FRUS 1945*. V, pp. 553-554).

Following is a brief outline of the discussion as drafted by General Schuyler: "Wednesday, 6 June 1945. Mr. Berry and I had a meeting with Mr. Maniu this evening. Conference lasted three hours. Maniu spent a good deal of time outlining the seriousness of the present situation for Romania and emphasizing particularly the danger which threatens the nation as a result of the recent collaboration agreement with Russia. He pointed out that now in all important economic fields there will be

He explained that Mr. Petrescu was finding it increasingly difficult to work with the communists and desired to break with them at the first opportunity. When the break occurs he is prepared to cooperate openly with Mr. Maniu and his party.

Mr. Maniu said that he realized that Russia would have to save her face in Romania by supporting the present Vishinsky imposed Government until such time as the three great Allies agree that a change is desirable.

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a government-sponsored company in which the Russians have a fifty percent interest and which, because of its favored position, will be able shortly to throttle all private composition. He says this is a pernicious arrangement and will certainly result in the introduction of the communist economic system throughout Romania in which private enterprise will shortly disappear.

Without revealing his actual plans, Maniu hinted strongly that his party was now ready to take action by demanding the dissolution of the present government, provided only that they could be assured of backing from the United States and Great Britain. He said that Petrescu, leader of the Socialists, was ready at any time to withdraw from the National Democratic Front, thereby provoking a crisis. He said Petrescu could bring with him the entire Socialist Party with the exception of a small handful of extreme Left sympathizers. He said also that he was sure he could persuade the King to call for dissolution of the Government at any time.

We pointed out to Maniu that we could not, of course, state officially to him the attitude of our Government toward any such move, but that we could state clearly that in our opinion Russia would be entirely justified in using strong measures to put down any attempts against the Government involving actual revolt or armed conflict. We told him that the US Government does not consider the present Romanian Government representative of the people of Romania and that the matter is by no means considered closed. We said we fully expected an agreement on Romania and on other nations in Europe would be reached in the not too distant future, probably by personal conferences between the three heads of the major Allied States, and we felt that any trouble which in the meanwhile might be stirred up in Romania would actually be harmful rather than helpful to that Nation's cause. Maniu was much disappointed and said he would not think of causing any trouble unless he felt sure of definite backing from the United States and Great Britain" (Schuyler, *Diary* Ms. pp. 180-181).

In his original telegram transmitted to the War Department (Telegram M 1065, Bucharest, 8 June 1945) General Schuyler was more direct. For example, he referred to the government as "Russian Quislings" and warned that "Russia will shortly be in control of all of Romania's chief industries and the entire economic structure of the state will become Communized..." (*FRUS 1945*. V, pp. 553-554).

He added that it was sometimes difficult to restrain the more vivacious spirits of his Party from anticipating this agreement and provoking immediately a crisis.

Mr. Maniu said that he thought 90% of the socialist leaders and party members would follow Mr. Petrescu when he called for a break with the NDF Government.

Mr. Petrescu yesterday confirmed to a member of my staff his understanding with Mr. Maniu, indicating though that future events would determine whether this understanding would develop from the discussion to the action plane.

The National Peasants, the Socialists, and the National Liberals represent an overwhelming majority of the Romanian electorate.

June 13 *"Some impressions... gained or confirmed by a direct contact with the country"*

In a series of brief trips during the past five weeks I have traveled, accompanied by one officer or another, more than three thousand miles over Romanian roads. Some impressions, which may be of use to the Department at this time, gained or confirmed by this direct contact with the country are hereinafter summarized.*

"The enthusiasm for the King..."

The enthusiasm for the King dwarfs that for any other personality. He has measured up to the Romanian ideal of a King. The people do not expect him to interfere in the normal processes of government but when events reach a stage critical for the nation they do expect him to assume leadership. They feel that he did just that on August 23rd and that he will do it again when and if necessary.

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* Cf. *FRUS 1945*, V, pp. 555-556: Berry to the Secretary of State, June 14, 1945, Telegram 410.

The Groza Government and the Communist Party

The Groza Government is accepted, like the Russian Army of occupation, as something that events beyond the control of the people have imposed upon Romania. As yet it has limited authority in the provinces. It is, however, replacing career administrative officials and therefore extending its hold over the administration of the country. If this process continues some months the Communist Party, representing perhaps five percent of the people, will have had the time to integrate its members into the majority of key positions in provincial administrations. At present, however, the situation is well described by the words of a Russian Commandant, "Gypsies and various *plugars* (ploughman's front agitators) are walking about everywhere, seizing land, agricultural implements and machinery, and the crop without any consideration at all for the law."

The people…

The peasantry generally has taken a passive attitude toward the agrarian reform law. Peasants are distrustful of gifts. They recall that the property of the Jews was given to the Romanians who, after a few years' possession, were obliged to return it. Only when government agents threaten a village that people will be imported from neighboring villages to take up the land of adjoining estates have villagers shown any alacrity in occupying large estates.

I saw no evidence of suffering from hunger. Indeed it appears that Romania will raise this year ample food for its needs. Whether or not there will be suffering next winter will, of course, depend upon the successful solution of the transportation problem and the tapering off of Soviet requisitioning of foodstuffs.

In the railyards at Iasi I saw Russia-bound train-loads of livestock, factory machinery, household furnishings, and scrap metal. I was told that 150,000 Russian-bound troops passed through Focsani in the past ten days. On the road paralleling the railroad between Fagaras and Brasov, I saw Soviet sentries every 200 meters so placed to prevent the escape of homeward bound Soviet soldiers. Romanians, recalling the looting by Soviet deserters as the armies swept westward, fear the return of what they described as "a plague of a million locusts."

"When will the Russians leave?"

In nearly every conversation, Romanians inquired "When will the Russians leave?" They all know that the presence of the Soviet Army is maintaining a Leftist government in power. Many also realize that the presence of a Soviet Army provides the most potent anti-communistic propaganda. As a result, the real strength of the Communist Party in Romania, in contrast to the bluster of its leaders in Bucharest, has diminished. The realization of this may have influenced the Soviet authorities, now that a Soviet-Romanian trade agreement has been signed, to consider moderating their demands under the Armistice. But reports of this changed attitude are received with reserve by Romanians as the change may only be a tactical move and in any event the Soviet authorities can, through their puppet NDF Government or under the Trade Agreement, obtain by legal means what they formerly obtained through direct pressure.

June 14[*] *Introducing Roy Melbourne to A.P. Pavlov...*

I called upon Mr. Pavlov[**] to tell him of the receipt of my orders and to present Melbourne who will carry on in my absence. In the course of our conversation I said that at home I expected to be asked questions concerning events in Romania and such questions I felt I could answer satisfactorily but I might be asked, too, about future projects and on such I would appreciate his views.

Mr. Pavlov said that the primary interest of his government was in security. From Romania several great invasions had been launched which had done incalculable damage to Russian life and property. Naturally, therefore, the Soviet Union would take whatever steps were necessary to see that history did not repeat itself. Thus, Soviet action in Romania had been largely dictated by the compelling need for security. He added that a secondary interest of the Soviet Government in Romania was in the stability of a Romanian Government that was friendly to the Soviet Union.

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[*] *Ibid.*, pp. 557-558. June 14, 1945. Telegram, 411. Repeated to Moscow as 109.

[**] Alexei Pavlovich Pavlov, Political Adviser to the Chairman of the ACC for Romania, Marshal Malinovsky (*ibid.*).

The present Government was much more cooperative than the former governments and, being representative of democratic forces of the country, offered greater stability than any recent government.

The American attitude towards the Groza Government, and "upon the situation of Romania"

He then asked me concerning the American attitude towards the present government. I answered that our Ambassador in Moscow on March fourteen had made a formal request for consultations with the Soviet and British governments upon the situation of Romania, adding that it was my understanding that President Truman in a recent telegram to Marshal Stalin had made reference to this request. Mr. Pavlov indicated that this was not new information but stressed again the necessity for security for the Soviet Union.

To this I replied that it seemed to me that recent military events in Europe pretty well precluded the idea of an European aggression against the Soviet Union and as far as Romania itself was concerned I felt that the Romanian people fully realized the importance of maintaining a policy of sincere friendship towards the Soviet Union. In fact, it seemed to me that the need for Soviet's friendship was sufficiently appreciated that it would be confirmed by any freely-chosen Romanian government.

I added, as the conversation was progressing in a frank and friendly manner, that Soviet action in Romania had more than local significance as the American press and people, having little accurate news of Romania because correspondents were not freely admitted and freely permitted to send out their news stories, were not very understanding when a government was installed under circumstances such as was the present Government, particularly as that event occurred so soon after the publication of the Yalta Communique. It seemed to me, therefore, in the interests of worldwide cooperation, that it is desirable that the three great powers consult on the Romanian situation. Mr. Pavlov indicated that such reasons in the past had been pushed into the background by the compelling necessity of winning the war and establishing the security of the Soviet frontiers.

Conclusions...

If the attitude of Soviet officials in Romania in the past few days is a fair barometer of the attitude of the Soviet officials in Moscow, it seems to me that our point of view on the Romanian situation, when discussed on the Moscow level, will have now a better reception than at any time in the past few months.

II

IN AND OUT OF ROMANIA

1. While in Washington,[*] 1945 June 18-August 26

June 18

I left Bucharest today[**] under orders to report to Washington for the purpose of assisting in the preparation of the work for the Potsdam Conference. Melbourne will be in charge in my absence.

June 21 *Russian troops throughout Romania*

The Mission reported that the Romanian authorities have been notified by the Red Army that in the next few months large numbers of Russian troops will be quartered throughout Romania for indefinite periods as they await transport to the Soviet Union. Estimates of the number of troops involved range from 500,000 to more than a million and allegedly they will include large portions of the armies of Marshals Tolboukin and Malinovski.

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[*] This period has been covered by Burton Y. Berry according to the US Mission's reports while he was in Washington "for the purpose of assisting in the preparation of the work for the Potsdam Conference." In the meantime the Mission messages had been worked out by Roy M. Melbourne, second ranking Foreign Service Officer in the American Political Mission in Romania, as acting American representative. It should be mentioned that consequently many of Melbourne's reports not printed in the *FRUS Diplomatic Papers*, viz. *The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), 1945*, Vol. I-II, and in *FRUS 1945*, V (*Europe*), are available in the following Berry, *Diary* pages.

[*] From Schuyler, *Diary* (Ms. p. 195): "Yesterday [16 June 1945] Mr. Berry and I, with several members of our respective staffs, were invited to Sinaia to luncheon with the King and Queen... Mr. Berry arrived a little early and had a personal conference with the King in connection with his expected departure for the United States on Monday (*18 June*).

In general the Russian troops are to be quartered along the Danube and in the Wallachian Plain while other contingents will proceed through Southern Transylvania to Brasov and Buzau. To provide supplementary quarters the Romanian General Staff has received orders to withdraw its troops from barracks in Wallachia and to keep only token Romanian forces there.

First reports of the passage of these Soviet troops show that they are being disarmed in the staging centers and are being divested of all valuables before being permitted to proceed to Russia.

Locally the quartering of these troops is considered an important reason for General Susaikov's protest to the Romanian Government concerning non-fulfillment of the Armistice which prevents the Government from objecting against the maintenance of these troops under Article 10 of the Armistice. It is also believed that by quartering their troops temporarily in Romania the Russians seek to avoid internal unrest in the Soviet Union. It is pointed out that food will be available here for the troops while arrangements are perfected for their gradual return to the Soviet Union.

A heavy drain upon Romania this summer is expected as a result of the above policy. Romanian officials and the public are drawing pointed parallels between the presence of these troops and a slowly moving army of locusts since they claim the Red Army will engage in extensive spot requisitions in addition to the large formal demands that will be made upon the Romanian Government.

July 2 — *Increasing and direct attacks against Maniu and his National Peasant Party*

The campaign against Julius Maniu is unabated in the NDF press and official speeches. National Peasants, including a close friend of Mr. Danila Pop, have been arrested by the Interior Ministry charged with circulating leaflets critical of the Groza Government. Mr. Maniu and his party have protested verbally and in writing their innocence. On the evening of June 29 the National Peasant headquarters in Bucharest was raided by the police, all party records were seized, and persons in the club were arrested. Peasant Party officials state arrests of its members continue throughout the country, while the number actually held is difficult to estimate since some are released after a few days.

Two sources close to Mr. Maniu confirm that he cut short badly needed rest to return to Bucharest for party conferences and that he has received full assurances of support from every faction for his present policy of patient inaction. At a conference with Mr. Bratianu of the National Liberals the latter also agreed to maintain his accustomed cooperation with the National Peasants.

Despite rumors to the contrary several responsible reports show that Soviet officials are not making conciliatory or decoy overtures to prominent National Peasant and National Liberal Party officials in the hope of attracting them to support the NDF Government or a revised nominally broadened regime. During the recently completed sessions of the Plowmen's Front Congress, Premier Groza as head of that party assailed "the corrupt Historical Parties" and other speakers bitterly criticized Mr. Maniu. Yesterday at the opening session of the Tatarescu or dissident National Liberal Party conference, Mr. George Tatarescu directly attacked Mr. Maniu and Mr. Bratianu, head of the real National Liberal organization.

It appears clear that the Peasant Party is being subjected to increasing and direct attacks which are forecast by thoughtful sources as having the aim of declaring the party a pro-Fascist organization and of furnishing the pretext for launching a more vigorous persecution of its members.

July 3 *Interview General Răşcanu – I.V. Stalin*

Several responsible sources report that War Minister Rascanu on his recent return from Moscow states that he had a long interview with Marshal Stalin in which the latter had highly praised the fighting qualities of the Romanian Army and agreed to fix its future size at 16 divisions and 1 motorized brigade equipped by the Soviet Union. Stalin reportedly approved Rascanu's program of reorganizing the Romanian Army on the Soviet model. No time limit was specified for the return of Romanian war prisoners, although Stalin allegedly stated their repatriation would begin shortly.

Marshal Stalin reportedly agreed that four rest areas for the Red Army in Romania are too great a strain for the country and that only two of the selected districts in the southern half of Romania will be used by Russian troops.

Two of the above sources claim Stalin assured the War Minister that by July 15 he would grant Romania the status of an ally and would agree to the assignment of Romanian diplomatic representation abroad.

Only one source states Stalin indicated that Soviet demands under Article 12 of the Armistice would be adjusted by a protocol running for six years similar to that now operating under Article 11.

July 3 *The political groups of the National Democratic Front:*

The NDF, seeking to show that the political groups comprising it have national political strength and organization, timed a series of party congresses of three of the seven ostensible political groups with the Government.

The Plowmen's Front, of which Premier Groza is the head, held a three-day congress through June 24 to 27. The Patriotic Union, a Communist satellite, having on its executive committee the Propaganda, Health, Creeds, an Nationalities Ministers, started its three-day sessions June 30, while the dissident or Tatarescu National Liberal Congress began on July 1.

Ample funds, purportedly supplied by the Government, were available to bring delegates to Bucharest from all sections of the country free of charge. Plowmen's Front delegates were picked on a quota basis for each village, and difficulties were reported in securing sufficient numbers to make the trip, with the result that one reliable source claims many Bucharest factory workers were dressed in peasant costume to attend the congress. Responsible reports claim that enthusiasm and attendance did not mark the congress as a great success despite the presence of the Premier and party officials, who were outnumbered by speakers from the other NDF factions.

The Patriotic Union, to justify holding a party congress, claimed that it was an important underground organization during the Antonescu regime, but in reality its sessions received small public attention.

Mr. Tatarescu dominated the opening session of the Dissident Liberals after calling the conference in his capacity as Secretary General of the National Liberal Party in 1936, and despite his recent formal expulsion by that party. After a speech declaring his party's platform, he was acclaimed by the conference as head of the National Liberal Party, and by this means attempted to capture the name of that organization. After this step he urged the "dissident Liberals" of Mr. Bratianu to join the party and relinquish their "lost illusions."

Speeches made during the three political conferences have common themes of strong opposition to the alleged fascist leadership of the historic National Peasant and National Liberal parties, urged a continued struggle against fascism and full support of the NDF, and sought to convince the country of the influence of these NDF groups.

"this parade of NDF factions..."

Some local sources regard this parade of NDF factions as window dressing to justify Soviet claims of the vitality and popular approval of the NDF, which would be aided by the capture of the National Liberal Party label by Tatarescu and would serve to emphasize the isolation of the National Peasants.

July 4 *Stalin's appreciation of King Michael*

General Susaikov on his return from Moscow informed the King that Marshal Stalin expressed his appreciation of the King's role at the time of the coup d'etat on August 23 and shortly desires to present him with one of the highest Soviet decorations. Because of the King's interest in aviation he is sending him two Soviet trainer or pursuit planes.

Politically this development indicates that the Soviet Government, satisfied with the course of its control in Romania, apparently is interested in maintaining the monarchy and seeking the goodwill of the King.

July 5

Congratulations for the United States Independence Day...

Yesterday the King sent the Marshal of the Court to offer his congratulations to President Truman on the occasion of Independence Day and to express his hope for a speedy American victory in the Pacific. Although no official government representative appeared, the Premier, the Foreign Minister, and the National Economy Minister sent cards. Mr. Julius Maniu personally left his card and Mr. Dinu Bratianu also sent a representative for the same purpose.

The Society of Friends of the United States

Later in the morning at a concert given by the Society of Friends of the United States several Cabinet members attended headed by Premier Groza and Foreign Minister Tatarescu. This was only revealed shortly beforehand. As a practical matter in order to avoid disrupting plans of the Society both General Schuyler and Melbourne agreed that the former would not attend, but that Melbourne would be present, since Romanians considered General Schuyler the senior American official now here.

General Schuyler and Melbourne both agreed that as time goes by it is becoming increasingly difficult for American representatives here to avoid official contact with Government ministers. Although the American attitude in the light of the Yalta Declaration undoubtedly has been beneficial as a brake upon the government, yet we consider the difficulties of the local American position will be augmented manifold if continued after the impending conference at Potsdam.

July 6

Unfavorable reaction vs. the embargo on 1945 crops...

A decree placing an embargo on 1945 crops of wheat, rye, barley, and oats, was issued on June 22 by the Supply Department, which has just been placed directly under the Minister President. The decree provides that these cereals may be bought from producers only by the State through local associations of the Central Union of Cooperative Societies.

Members of the present Government are making many speeches and issuing press statements designed to overcome the widespread apprehension and unfavorable reaction of producer and consumer alike. Large-scale hoarding of cereals is apparent and the dietary pattern of peasants in the Old Kingdom has changed radically, white bread being consumed widely rather than maize. Peasants have apparently no confidence in the present paper money and consumer goods are in very short supply. The Ploughmen's Front Congress just concluded stressed the need of honoring the Armistice obligations and of turning in the grain, animals, and other products required.

The decree promises remunerative prices; requires an as yet unspecified percentage of the grain to be turned in within 10 days after harvest and promises that bonuses in money and consumer goods will be given in partial payment, specifically mentioning cotton goods, farm implements, and salt. In a desperate effort to secure grain for scheduled armistice delivery quotas the Supply Department has further endeavored to secure cereals of the 1944 crops, still hoarded in important quantities. To make such deliveries possible the Supply Department promises specifically that peasants who deliver wheat, barley, or oats before July 20, 1945 will receive 50 percent of the value of the delivered cereals in cotton; 30 percent of the value of maize from the 1944 crop delivered before August 20, 1945 and 25 percent of the value of cattle, horses, sheep, and pigs, date of delivery unspecified. The source of the cotton required to compensate for any large deliveries of grain or animals is not readily apparent as most of the cotton being received or to be received from Russia is earmarked for spinning and re-export to Russia and only negligible quantities of Romanian cotton grown prior to 1945 are available.

Situation progressively deteriorating...
because of the influx of the Red Army...

The already unfavorable situation has been further complicated and is progressively deteriorating through the recent public announcement that Russian troops, privately estimated at over a million, returning from the front will rest in Romania for several months. The Deputy Chairman of the Romanian Armistice Commission has entreated the population of Romania to display its gratitude stating "nothing should be refused to the Red Army during its halt in this country because nothing is valuable enough to repay what Romania owes it for her very liberty and existence."

Article 10 has been widened to include the support of these troops. A new demand for immediate delivery of 50,000 metric tons of white flour and 5,000 of fat has been made in addition to already scheduled deliveries of 485,198 tons of grain of which 161,324 tons were delivered by March 1 and 1,093,683 head of livestock of which 500,555 head have been delivered. The peasants fear that this influx of troops will accelerate the previous irregular requisitioning of grain and livestock by unit commanders and individual soldiers estimated at about 135,000 tons of grain, large quantities of forage and fruit, 600,000 head of animals, and large quantities of poultry and eggs. Many valuable breeding animals have been taken from experimental stations and state farms for slaughter despite strict orders not to enter the premises posted at the entrance of each station by Russian district commanders.

Personal observations confirm report that many peasants have disposed of their stocks of pigs and poultry prior to the billeting of Soviet troops. This estimate of the situation is of course conservative when compared with alarmist reports circulated by political groups outside the present government. These rumors have considerable influence particularly upon the peasants.

Under Article 11, 250,000 tons of wheat and 224,000 tons of other cereals and 105,000 head of livestock are to be turned over to the Russians as reparations while Article 12 calls for restitution of 216,070 tons of wheat and 858,605 tons of other cereals as well as 307,259 head of livestock.

Altogether nearly 800,000 metric tons of wheat is called for (672,132 tons of wheat and 50,000 tons of white flour plus 42,000 tons taken without authorization) excluding additional quantities of the now arriving troops and the probable acceleration of unauthorized taking by local units. The probable 1945 wheat crop for residual Romania is 1,700,000 metric tons and the estimated carry over from the 1944 crop, largely peasant-hoarded, is 300,000 metric tons. A critically short supply for the non-farming population of about 3,500,000 is indicated and continued peasant hoarding by about 10 million peasantry and inadequate transportation will accentuate the short supply situation.

Stocks of maize and other bread grains potentially available for the urban population will also be reduced drastically.

July 7 *"A several hour private conversation with Premier Groza:"*

A responsible and politically informed source has reported to Melbourne a several hour private conversation with Premier Groza.

Groza began by stating that he had sent a letter to Moscow via General Rascanu expressing concern at the economic deterioration of Romania and the impending quartering of 4 Soviet Armies here. Mr. Vishinsky allegedly discussed the matter with Stalin who agreed to all the points reported on July 3. Additionally the Premier had the impression that very shortly Romanian payments under Armistice Article 10 would cease. He was greatly pleased at the prospect of political representation abroad, claimed that it was beneficial for the country to have a sizeable army that could serve as a valuable national instrument regardless of the source of its equipment and expected the return of Romanian war prisoners from Russia within 2 months.

The Russians were believed by Groza to be giving his views more consideration as exemplified by the apparent results of the Rascanu mission. He expressed every confidence in his ability to maintain these relations for the benefit of Romania's interests. Tactically he explained he agreed to every Russian demand and then through actual operation sought to secure concessions and benefits.

Groza said he would continue with the program of economic collaboration established by the commercial accords signed in Moscow. He felt that he could retain the economic independence of the country and favored Romanian Government participation in joint Soviet-Romanian companies as part of an overall economic plan so the state could watch the Russians and "educate" them.

The Premier expects within the next 3 weeks to go to Moscow and expressed the view that during conferences there and shortly afterwards the bulk of Romania's political and economic problems would be adjusted.

objections and optimism...

He stated that some Communist Cabinet ministers ignored his objections to their acts, that twice he had called the 2 dominant Romanian

Communists, Ana Paucker and Laszlo Luca, to protest and that he had received only reassurances. He admitted his distaste for Communism, said the party had some cooperative men but that he was awaiting his return from Moscow when he felt he could take a stronger attitude toward Paucker and Luca.

Mr. Groza professed to be unable to understand Anglo-American policy toward his government saying they had not understood how he was actually working for their interests and that of Romania. He declared he favored a broadening of the Government "even taking in Maniu" and felt this could be possible within the next few weeks. If the National Peasants participated in this plan he presumed Tatarescu, whom he dislikes, would be dropped from the cabinet.

Following a revised cabinet with himself as Romania's Premier, Groza said he favored relaxation of censorship and assembly regulations. The revised government would organize national elections on the basis of a predetermined slate of candidates proportionately allocated to the participating parties in the Government.

He dismissed the idea that the return of former King Carol to France indicated a Soviet wish for his eventual return to Romania despite the fears of other Romanian politicians on the subject.

Dominant impressions of the interview were Groza's outspoken belief that he had full confidence of the Russians, that the country's position was improving, and that through him the bulk of its problems would be on the road to solution within the next several weeks.

July 8 *A Soviet economic delegation in Bucharest*

A Soviet economic delegation headed by Mr. Alexie Dimitrievici, Deputy Commissar for Foreign Trade, arrived in Bucharest at the end of June. Although purportedly here to discuss the whole problem of Romanian-Soviet economic collaboration, to date, so far as is known, the discussions have centered upon the organization of a joint Romanian-Soviet oil company. Shortly discussions will begin upon a joint air and waterway transport concern.

Although Melbourne is informed that agreement has not yet been reached upon the joint oil company, he has just received from a highly reliable source a copy of the Soviet proposals for the creation of the Soviet-Romanian petroleum company and a copy of a critique prepared by the Romanian oil industry for the Government pointing out the dangers inherent in the Soviet proposals. These documents will be transmitted by despatch.

Soviet proposals:

According to the Soviet proposals, the Soviet-Romanian petroleum company will be created by the governments of the USSR and Romania on an equal basis, with a capital of 5 billion Lei, the shares of the company to be paid by the participating parties within 3 years. The only contributions to be made by the Soviet Government would consist of (1) a transfer to the proposed company of all of the shares of Romanian petroleum companies which formerly belonged to the Germans and installations and (2) tubing necessary for petroleum exploitation at average prices of 1939. The Romanian Government on the other hand would obligate itself to the following contributions in behalf of the proposed company: (1) the shares of Romanian oil companies belonging to the State and those of companies in which German capital participated; (2) a 60-year concession for new oil areas to be decided upon jointly while additionally the Romanian Government would grant the company the right to explore and exploit other areas not defined; (3) transfer to the company of 50% of the crude oil accruing to the State annually as revenue on the production of other oil companies on the price basis of 1939, the difference between this price basis and the actual selling price to be transferred to the reserve fund of the company; (4) the new company will be granted the right to build and own pipe lines on Romanian territory; and (5) the State would obligate itself to sell to the company all surplus crude oil to which it is entitled after meeting its obligations for payment of its share of capital of the future company.

Lastly, according to Soviet proposals both governments would participate equally in the administration of the company, the president to be a Romanian, the vice-president a Russian, the director general a Russian and the assistant director general a Romanian.

The Romanian oil industry's critique

The critique prepared by the Romanian oil industry points out in substance (1) the glaring inequality of the contributions made by the participating governments; (2) the inadvisability and risk to the Romanian State in participating as a shareholder in an oil company, particularly if organized in the manner proposed by the Soviets, which would subject private Romanian and foreign petroleum companies here to completely discriminatory treatment; (3) the questionable legality under Armistice Article 13 of the Russian contribution of shares of Romanian oil companies which belonged to the Germans, including the assets of "Columbia" and "Concordia," of predominantly French and Belgian capital, which only under duress during German occupation were seized and forcibly made German companies; and (4) doubts whether the Romanian State may legally dispose of the shares of private Romanian oil companies or of those shares of German companies owned by private Romanian citizens or individuals of other countries.

In connection with the petroleum companies "Columbia" and "Concordia" Melbourne has just received from the French Political Representative copies of his notes of July 6, and July 7 addressed to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Mr. Pavlov of the Soviet Legation respectively, in which he explains that his Government considers null and void the cession of shares of Romanian petroleum companies transferred by their French owners to the Germans under pressure of the enemy and the pseudo-Govemment of Vichy. He states that under Armistice Article 13 France expects the Romanian Government, with the support of the ACC, to restore all the legal rights of France and its nationals in these countries.

July 8 *Soviet Order of Victory awarded to the King...*

Yesterday the King expressed to Melbourne* his bewilderment in being awarded the Soviet Order of Victory by Marshal Stalin and in being given

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* Cf. *FRUS. The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference)*, I, pp. 402-403: Melbourne to Acting Secretary of State. Telegram 457. Secret. Bucharest, July 8, 1945.

2 airplanes by the Russians since his past experience has been that the Russians have most realistic motives for their actions. He plainly distrusts these sudden gestures of amiability.

Rumors have spread that the permission to grant Romania 16 army divisions was accompanied by the signature of a Romanian-Soviet military pact, but the King stated that he had been told this was not the case.

At present in common with the bulk of Romanians the King expressed hopes that the impending Potsdam Conference would give a reasonable interpretation to the Yalta Declaration and secure a truly representative government for Romania.

July 12 *General Susaikov on the creation of a Soviet-Romanian Petroleum Company*

In connection with negotiations relative creation Soviet-Romanian Petroleum company Melbourne has just received from reliable source copy of letter dated July 3 addressed to Prime Minister Groza by General Susaikov as Deputy President of ACC which in English translation reads as follows:[*]

"This is to bring to your knowledge that the shares of the Romanian petroleum societies which belonged to the Germans, enumerated in the annexed table, pass into the patrimony of the Soviet Union as partial compensation for damages caused to the USSR by Germany.

In view of this, please take the necessary measures on behalf of the Romanian Government to turn over the rights to the abovementioned shares to the Government of the USSR which has charged the association 'UCR Petrol' to take over these shares."

Following is annexed list of companies followed by lei value of shares:

Buna Speranta — 59,100,000; Explora — 59,100,000; IRDP — 115,500,000; Columbia — 325,000,000; Concordia — 755,800,000; Meotica Romana — 1,300,000; Petrol Block — 285,500,000; Sardep — 43,300,000; Sarpetrol — 34,900,000; Transpetrol — 4,500,000; Continental — 100,000,000.

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[*] Cf. *FRUS. The Conference of Berlin*, I, p. 561: Melbourne to the Acting Secretary of State. Telegram nr. 465. Secret US Urgent. July 12, 1945.

It was previously reported that during discussions Cruticov informed Tatarescu it had been agreed upon at Yalta that USSR should have undisputed disposition over shares of all German interests in Romanian petroleum companies including "Concordia and Columbia," but, it will be noted, no mention is made of this in Susaikov's letter.

July 13 *Violation of the Armistice Article 8*

Soviet officials in Romania in their negotiations for a joint Russian-Romanian oil company apparently are proceeding in violation of Armistice Article 8.

General Schuyler's considerations

General Schuyler proposed on July 12 to inquire of the ACC regarding reports he received that companies really belonging to members of the United Nations and acquired by the Germans through duress are being utilized for purposes of these negotiations and to raise the point that such action involving the armistice terms if true might justifiably be considered as necessitating the approval of the American and British components of the Commission.

Both General Schuyler and Melbourne are doubtful whether the Soviet executive of the ACC will recognize this contention in view of General Susaikov's attitude upon the joint company negotiations in his conversation with General Schuyler transmitted by this Mission's despatch 383, June 25, entitled "Notes on the Conference between the Deputy Chairman of the ACC and General Schuyler on June 21."

The delicacy of the situation is apparent in that these joint company negotiations are progressing under the second economic agreement signed in Moscow on May 8, the text of which has never been published and which was transmitted with this Mission's despatch 316, May 18, entitled "Texts of the Economic Agreements Concluded by Romania and the Soviet Union." The joint oil company discussions are not yet complete but it is doubtful if the final terms will be officially published for a considerable time.

In view of the above considerations which would form a precedent for manifesting interest in successive joint companies involving every phase of Romania's economy the Department's instructions are urgently requested if in this and successive instances it desires this Mission formally to request the Foreign Office for full particulars regarding the results of these negotiations.

July 13 *"Soviet Armistice demands... remain unchanged"**

Several responsible sources confirm that Soviet Armistice demands actually remain unchanged despite reported statements of War Minister Rascanu and Premier Groza. Not only has there been no official time extension for fulfillment of Article 12, but Soviet requests under Article 10 just presented or the third quarter of 1945 somewhat exceed in actual value the requirements for the second quarter. Thus, Articles 11 and 12 are not being used to defray the upkeep of newly arriving Soviet troops.

Business circles are greatly depressed by, in addition to other Communist pressures, the real threat of an extensive capital levy under the guise of equalizing the Armistice burden and relieving the peasants and workers. Vice-Chairman Oeriu of the Romanian Armistice Commission is the foremost advocate of the measure and is considered the instrument of the Romanian Communist Central Committee. The project has split the cabinet, with Premier Groza reportedly opposed. Finance Minister Durma depressed by the economic outlook has submitted his resignation, suggesting that Mr. Oeriu bear as Finance Minister the responsibility for his own schemes.

The Soviet assurance that it would reequip a sizeable Romanian army is regarded by some as a gesture of military policy to indicate that Romanian troops would be beside Russia if additional pressure is necessary upon Turkey over the straits question. Similarly, the award of the Victory Order decoration to the King is held to show him to the world as a complete Soviet ally.

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* See *FRUS*. *The Conference of Berlin*, I, pp. 411-413: Melbourne to Grew, the Acting Secretary of State. Telegram No. 469 Secret, US Urgent, Bucharest, July 13, 1945.

The dissident Liberals & the official Liberal Party

While a strong official campaign continues* against the Peasant and Liberal Party leaders, Maniu and Bratianu, the dissident Liberals of Tatarescu have sought to capture the official Liberal Party, and so-called dissident Peasants in the NDF are organizing for a congress purporting to represent the National Peasant Party.

Over the above picture of realities the Russians are believed by responsible observers to be attempting to smudge a short-term propaganda impression for both the Romanian public and abroad that all aspects of relations with Romania are improving. Soviet desires have been sponsored through wide diffusion of War Minister Rascanu's statements concerning "generous" armistice concessions, the announcement of the altruistic Soviet intention to equip a sizeable Romanian army, press reports of speeches by Marshal Tolbukhin and General Susaikov insisting upon the generosity of the Red Army, and the Soviet wish to establish friendly relations with the Romanian people, and finally through hailing the decoration awarded the King as an expression of Soviet willingness to cooperate with a monarchy.

Every effort is made to show that a popular and liberty-loving regime exists in Romania with strong bourgeois support in the National Liberal Party of Mr. Tatarescu and the impending conference of a group purporting to represent the National Peasants. Publicity was given to the compromised Mr. Tatarescu, who during his party congress was allowed to declare that he was not a communist and opposed a communist doctrine for Romania.

Soviet desire to introduce confusion...

Local observers consider the sole reason for the striking differences between the realistic subject and the happy portrait described above is based upon a Soviet desire to introduce a certain confusion into the present and future prospects of the Romanian situation at a time when this may be discussed at the Potsdam Conference.

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* In *FRUS. The Conference of Berlin* I, p. 412, footnote 3 reads as follows: "There is a garble at this point in the original:" Viz "campaign... in use."

July 18 *The main points of the Soviet – Romanian Petroleum Company:*

It is reported that the convention regarding the formation of the Soviet-Romanian petroleum company was signed July 17. The final copy of the convention is not yet available but the main points are: (1) Romania is to be represented by the Creditul Minier and Redeventa and eventually other companies. The Government will not be a shareholder. (Note. It is not clear what the Government is to receive as compensation for royalties and properties given to the company.) (2) The Company will have the same rights as those granted to companies having Romanian capital as defined in the petroleum law. (3) The Russian contribution to the company will be as reported on July 8. The eleven companies making up Russia's contribution include IRDP, Colombia, Concordia, Petrol Block, and Continental as the most important. (4) The Romanian contribution differs appreciably from that reported on July 8 and will include (A) shares or assets of Creditul Minier, Redeventa, and other Romanian companies eventually to be included. (B) 50% of the proven areas which will become available to the Romanian Government as a result of extension of present producing areas. (C) 50% of Romanian state crude oil royalties until such time as the contributions of the two parties become equal. In connection with the latter point, Melbourne is informed that a confidential protocol has been signed whereby the Romanian Government agrees to furnish 75% of the royalty rather than 50% for a period of three years.

The rights of the company are (A) privilege of obtaining concessions on the basis of present laws, the only special consideration being that in the case of similar offers for certain properties, the company will be given preference. (B) The right to build pipe lines is limited to connecting the producing fields with the refineries and does not include the right to build pipe lines for export or marketing.

July 18 *Formal ceremony to present the King with the Soviet Order of Victory...*

An emissary of the King has stated to Melbourne that it is planned in a formal ceremony tomorrow, July 19, to present the King with the Soviet Order of Victory. The presentation is to be made by Marshal Tolbukhin at noon in the Bucharest Royal Palace and high-ranking Soviet and Romanian officers and all members of the Government are to be present.

The King will make a brief reply to Marshal Tolbukhin. Following the presentation there will be a luncheon for approximately 100 people and at 5 p.m. at Baneasa Airport the King will be presented with two Russian airplanes.

Soviet officials frankly told the King's household in making arrangements for the presentation that it had political importance since through the King the Soviet Union recognized Romania's wartime role. Consequently, the Russians were insistent that every member of the government should be present.

Premier Groza has stated that the King should make a second speech to the crowds before the Palace which would be broadcast. The King is opposed to this because he feels it would be made a portion of a NDF political program, but Groza insists that if no speech is made he himself must speak in the name of the King. Negotiations are now fixing the final procedure.

"Obvious political tactics"

The King wished to make clear that these obvious political tactics seeking to show solidarity between him and the NDF at the time of the Potsdam Conference do not have his sympathy and that his participation is motivated solely by courtesy toward the Soviet Union in receiving its military award.

July 19 *Secret meeting Groza — Bodnăraş — Tito*

Two responsible sources state that Premier Groza under Soviet auspices and accompanied by Mr. Bodnaras Communist Secretary General of the Premier's office made a secret trip between July 12 and 16 to meet Marshal Tito at Varsatz, over the Yugoslav border. Both sources confirm that on his return Groza appeared greatly disturbed.

One of the above sources states that at the meeting Tito outlined Yugoslav territorial claims upon the Romanian Banat in an emphatic manner. This information regarding Yugoslav territorial ambitions agrees with recent reports received of Serbian agitation in Timisoara and other Banat districts.

As a result of the meeting Foreign Minister Tatarescu is stated to have privately emphasized the vital need for Romania to cling to the Soviet Union by granting every concession, since Russia was the only great power able to maintain Romania's territorial integrity.

July 19 *Melbourne's conclusions relative to Romanian economic concessions*

Every informed source that Melbourne[1] has consulted believes that the NDF Government in its current joint Soviet-Romanian Company negotiations involving oil, marine and river transport, banking, and other matters are conceding economic concessions greater than present circumstances and available information of Soviet pressure would appear to warrant. Instead of employing classic Romanian delay tactics, particularly in view of the Potsdam Conference, the political faction of Mr. Tatarescu which is charged with the current economic negotiations has given ground with more than common rapidity and ineptness.

After careful consideration of all local factors Melbourne can only conclude that the above phenomenon is based upon calculations of Mr. Tatarescu and his group concerning their political future at a time when the country's own immediate fate may be decided at Potsdam. They fear possible recognition of the Anglo-American interpretation of the Yalta Agreement and personal pressure that may force the temporary eclipse of the Tatarescu faction. Accordingly by playing the Soviet game at this critical time, by claiming Anglo-American helplessness to safeguard the country's territorial integrity, Tatarescu and his group may hope to maintain their present political importance.

July 20 *Regarding the transfer of former German-owned oil and bank shares...*

Decree Law No. 573 regarding transfer of former German-owned oil and bank shares to Soviets was published July 19. The law provides 1) for the transfer of petroleum shares to "Obiedinenie Uerneft" and bank shares to "Prombank." 2) Prime Minister to advise companies to transfer shares. 3)

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[1] *FRUS. The Conference of Berlin*, II, pp. 696-697; Telegram 481. Secret. Bucharest, July 19, 1945.

Companies to effect transfer within 15 days and issue provisional certificates to the Russian companies. 4) Holders of shares are obligated to deposit them with the Prime Minister within 15 days. 5) Consultative Commission to be formed, made up of the Secretary General of the Ministerial Council, Councilor of the Court of Appeals, and delegate of the Ministry of Mines and Oil will examine requests and decide by majority vote without being required to give reasons. 6) Penalty for the managers of companies not making transfers or for holders of shares not depositing same is imprisonment from one to five years without allowance for exceptional circumstances.

Oil company shares to be transferred include 51% of Concordia, 28% of Colombia, 61% of Petrolbloc, and varying percentages in 8 other companies.

Bank shares to be transferred include 92% of Banca Comerciala Romana, 90% of Societatea Bancara Romana, and varying percentages in 6 other banks.

July 22* *The opposition's demonstrations coincident with the Potsdam Conference:*

Coincident with the opening of the Potsdam Conference** all National Peasant and National Liberal Party leaders except Dinu Bratianu who was unavoidably absent met with Prince Stirbey on July 17 and decided upon a political program to demonstrate locally and abroad that organized opposition to the NDF is an effective force and to forestall during the conference a sudden Soviet-inspired token reshuffle of the present cabinet. This decision reversed the previous opposition policy of quiescence until the Potsdam results were known and from available indications was deliberately taken without informing the Anglo-Americans as a question of internal politics. Later it was learned that Julius Maniu said: "This policy should be taken in such a manner as to avoid any grounds for suspicion that the program had prior approval of the Anglo-Americans."

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* *FRUS. The Conference of Berlin*, II, pp. 699-701: Melbourne to the Acting Secretary of State. Telegram 491 Secret Priority, July 22, 1945.

** The Berlin (Potsdam) Tripartite Conference lasted from July 17 to August 2, 1945.

Maniu's speech

Mr. Maniu opened the political offensive on July 18 with a speech to university students who were leaving for their vacations. The speech was not published but was later extensively distributed. A summary will be sent later. Maniu explained the democratic principles of his party and stated categorically "The Government must go. The country must no longer tolerate dictatorial governments imposed from abroad. We want a freely elected parliament, we want a government which is morally and politically capable of holding free elections." That evening several hundred Peasant Party supporters demonstrated briefly for the King and Maniu in the Palace Square. No police opposition was encountered.

Dinu Brătianu

Dinu Bratianu the evening of July 20 addressed about seven hundred members of the National Liberal Youth organization at the party club. His speech, the text of which will be forwarded later, is reported as being stronger than Maniu's in condemnation of the NDF government and in calling for a change. Following the speech the Liberal Youth proceeded to the Palace Square, shouted for the King, Bratianu, Maniu, and liberty and paraded through the streets drawing encouraging applause from the spectators. At the dispersal point the demonstrators were met by Red Army trucks filled with Romanian Communists. According to a Liberal source a brief struggle resulted in thirty-two Liberals being arrested and two being injured.

Titel Petrescu

The Socialist leader Titel Petrescu is stated to be willing to collaborate with the present democratic opposition in a new cabinet while others in his party, conscious of its growing strength despite recent attacks from Moscow, have allegedly informed the Communists they want an equal place with the latter in a revised NDF government.

Restive political groups...

Other NDF political groups are restive. Some Communists openly are blaming prominent Central Committee members for party errors and one prominent official is quoted as saying the present government cannot continue since it does not enjoy the confidence of the King or the people. Mrs. Ana Paucker this week again reportedly failed to induce Dr. Lupu to head his wing of the National Peasants into a new camouflage government.

Premier Groza on July 20 conferred with Plowmen's Front leaders upon the disturbed situation and later reportedly told one source that the Russians would not consider any government except with himself as Premier.

July 19 Mr. Tatarescu and his group also consulted over the former's alleged failure to secure Communist assent to a plan revising the government, making Tatarescu Premier and giving his faction a more prominent place so that the Russians could state to the Anglo-Americans that there is a bourgeois democratic cabinet.

All signs point to a continuance of present opposition tactics with the leaders openly expressing confidence that at Potsdam Romania's political problems will be solved in accord with the Yalta Agreement. NDF factions obviously expecting cabinet changes and fearing shifts detrimental to their respective groups consult and await the outcome of the Potsdam Conference as conclusive for their political future.

July 23 *The King on the Groza — Tito secret meeting*

The King has confirmed the meeting between Premier Groza and Marshal Tito and has stated that Groza only told him of this upon his insistence. After cautioning the King not even to notify his own entourage Groza merely said that the meeting had discussed territorial matters and in his usual egotistic and optimistic vein alleged that he had been able to arrange everything and avoid difficulties for Romania.

Confronted with such a vague explanation, supported by the secrecy aspects of the meeting, the King's suspicions and fears have been heightened over possible decisions reached.

July 23 *Disruption... and permission*

The morning of July 22 a meeting of about 500 of the National Liberal Youth was held in the party club and was attended by the party leader Dinu Bratianu and by 3 former Cabinet ministers Messrs. Fotino, Romniceanu, and Danielopolu. An hour before the meeting the block area was cordoned by gendarmes and when the meeting was to begin a joint group of Romanian gendarmes and Soviet NKVD men entered the premises followed by a battalion of Romanian troops ostensibly to search for a concealed Iron Guardist. The meeting was concluded and the residence cards of each person there were minutely inspected for flaws and validity despite an Interior Ministry announcement published that day extending the validity period for old residence cards until August 6 because of administrative difficulties in issuing new ones. Some 40 persons were arrested and only released that evening on the personal intervention of Dinu Bratianu.

Liberals point out that their party has never been expressly forbidden by the NDF from holding meetings, that their club has never been closed by the Government, and contrast their disrupted meeting with one simultaneously held in a nearby public park by the Hungarian organization in Romania called Madosz which was permitted to hold a commemorative celebration for the Hungarian revolutionary poet Alexandre Petofi.

It is apparent NDF and Soviet officials have determined to adopt measures to forestall official demonstrations of internal political opposition. Local observers thus consider that the open oppositionist campaign during the Potsdam Conference will now subside.

July 24* *Maniu's remarks:*

Yesterday evening in an interview requested by Mr. Julius Maniu he stated that to demonstrate its existence the political opposition last week had engaged in small-scale activities that also were needed for party morale. These activities had been limited in order not to impede considered decisions upon Romania at the Potsdam Conference, since the opposition wished to avoid what it considered to be the unhappy example of Poland in taking unilateral action.

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* See *FRUS. The Conference of Berlin*. II, pp. 714-715: Melbourne to the Acting Secretary of State. Telegram 498, Secret. Bucharest, July 24, 1945.

Despite what Maniu maintained to be intimidating or provocative tactics by the NDF and Soviet officials who sought to disrupt party meetings the National Peasants were remaining calm as they awaited results at Potsdam which they expected would implement the Yalta Declaration.

Maniu stated he had counseled his party that the United States and Great Britain if they wished could secure Soviet acquiescence to a democratic interpretation of Yalta. He remarked that he considered such an act necessary for America to translate its enunciated principles into acts or have its influence irreparably damaged in this area.

In considering measures to implement the Yalta Declaration, Maniu expressed his belief in the impossibility of adequate tri-partite ACC supervision of national elections. He expressed his preference for a non-political technicians' government to conduct the elections, or, failing this, a democratic coalition government truly representative of party political strength in Romania. He considered the National Peasants could confidently expect an overwhelming electoral majority with free elections and suggested in a coalition government that the party be given the War, Interior, and Propaganda Ministries, since it would be to its interest to conduct the elections in an unbiased manner with an inevitable large National Peasant majority emerging with the responsibility of government.

"Maniu significantly stated"

If the Groza Government is retained or mere minor changes decided at Potsdam, Maniu significantly stated that his party will organize energetic country-wide opposition, including demonstrations, against the NDF Government. In measured words he said that for such intensified action he was certain of support from the dissatisfied Romanian Peasants who would unite with townspeople to defend the country's democratic traditions.

Maniu again repeated his fundamental promise that he is not anti-Russian, since he views events in the light of political forces rather than emotionally. He flatly said the country would be foolish to adopt an opposition course to the Soviet Union, but that his party could never approve of an incompetent Communist minority governing Romania.

August 2 *For a joint Romanian — Soviet airline company...*

Romanian — Soviet negotiations for the formation of a joint airline company are progressing in an atmosphere of complete secrecy as directed by Communications Undersecretary Maurer.

The single Romanian aviation company LARES, almost completely government-owned and under Air Ministry supervision, presented at least a month ago a study for the organization of the joint company, which was entirely rejected by the Communications Ministry since it provided for the eventual participation of other foreign capital.

No LARES representative is being consulted upon the pending negotiations which are expected to be completed shortly. However, it appears that Romania will be obliged to furnish existing airport facilities, ground equipment, and personnel. This may include approximately 16 LARES planes of assorted models and the president of LARES expects the Russians to supply to the new company 15 transport planes of the Douglas model they are licensed to manufacture.

One source reports a conflict between the Romanian Air and Communications Ministries over the latter's desire to control all airport ground installations and to secure a monopoly for all Romanian airports for the proposed new joint company called TARS.

The president of LARES reports that his program for internal routes emanating from Bucharest apparently is being accepted for eventual operations of the new company. From Bucharest there would be four routes: 1. Timisoara-Arad; 2. Sibiu-Cluj; 3. Galati-Iasi; 4. Constanza. It is even alleged by another source that four international routes are planned, namely: 1. Sofia-Salonica; 2. Odessa; 3. Vienna-Prague; 4. Cernauti-Warsaw. LARES' president states his belief that routes to Istanbul, Cairo, and Italy which his company had proposed have been rejected.

With no other alternative in view steps are being taken to liquidate LARES that are expected to be completed within a few weeks.

August 3 *A joint Soviet — Romanian Bank ...*

Reliable reports state that in negotiations for a joint Soviet — Romanian bank the Russians demanded 51% of the stock of the Romanian Credit

Bank, the majority of which stock is said to be owned by and administered for former King Carol. Finance Minister Durma told Melbourne yesterday that the difference has now been settled by conceding 30% of the Credit Bank stock to the Russians. He further added that he has refused to become personally involved in the joint bank negotiations because of possible future partiality accusations in view of his banking connections. He did expect that very shortly the joint Soviet – Romanian Bank protocol would be signed.

August 7 *... Resumption USSR – Romanian diplomatic relations*

Today's papers report resumption of diplomatic relations between the USSR and Romania.

General Susaikov, in name of USSR Government, informed Prime Minister Groza yesterday at six o'clock "that the Soviet Government, considering active participation of Romania in battle against Hitlerist Germany on side of Allies, beginning August 26, 1944, and in view of loyal execution of Armistice obligations on part of Romania, desires to reestablish diplomatic relations with Romania and to propose an exchange of ministers plenipotentiary."

Prime Minister Groza accepted Susaikov's communication "in name of the Government of democratic concentration" and expressed pleasure of people in this sincere gesture of appreciation for Romania's contribution in battle against Germany and loyal fulfillment of the Armistice terms.

August 7* *Between the King and the Russian support...*

The Potsdam Declaration has caused all Romanian political elements to consider the next few weeks as crucial since they believe before the Allied Foreign Ministers meet definite action must be taken to consolidate or to overthrow the Groza Government. While the opposition looks to the King to assume the initiative in instituting a change, the government continues to enjoy and solicit Russian support.

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* Cf. *FRUS 1945*, V, pp. 562-564: Melbourne to the Secretary of State, Byrnes. Telegram 533, Bucharest, August 7. Repeated to Moscow as 147.

The National Peasant, National Liberal, and Socialist Party leaders have now confirmed to Melbourne that they are united in working for a speedy overthrow of the NDF Government. The Socialist leader Titel Petrescu has explained to Melbourne that his party, although nominally an NDF member, finds it impossible to continue its participation in the Communist-dominated Government.

Originally the opposition decided to request the King this week to dismiss the Groza Government and to organize another comprising these three parties and the Communists. This would revive the original coalition responsible for the coup d'etat of August 23 and would place technicians in ministerial posts in the provisional government that would organize national elections.

"In the light of the Potsdam Declaration..."

However, opposition circles today discussed with approval a new plan whereby they would request the King to call the tri-partite chiefs of the ACC to a meeting to inquire of each, in the light of the Potsdam Declaration, whether he was satisfied with the present govemment or desired the King to effect changes. It is reported probable that his more subtle technique may be the course urged upon the King.

The King, the Allied Missions – The Groza Government, the Communist Party

The King is placed in a position strongly resembling the one he occupied preceding the formation of the NDF Government. It is believed he will refuse to take action upon the original opposition plan without approval of the Russians, who imposed the NDF Government, and without gaining Anglo-American support, but his attitude toward the new plan is not yet known. It is thought he would make preliminary inquiries of the Allied Missions before addressing a formal approach. Accordingly the Department may wish to indicate its views for the guidance of this Mission and General Schuyler.

The Groza Government was cheered following the Potsdam Declaration by the Soviet announcement of resumption of diplomatic relations with Romania, which was interpreted by the King and political opposition as a clear intention to reinforce the present regime and to make possible the accrediting of an NDF representative to attend the London Peace Treaty sessions of the Allied Foreign Ministers.

Premier Groza and Foreign Minister Tatarescu, to consolidate their positions, are making arrangements to proceed to Moscow separately or together. Tatarescu has even addressed a formal note to the Soviet authorities stating that he "awaits proposals from the Russians" to conclude a mutual defense pact.

The Communist-dominated Groza Government retains and uses the great weapon of political power to bind itself to the Russians by speedily forming joint Russo-Romanian companies for every phase of the country's economy, by seeking to grant without question or study every Russian economic demand under the Armistice, and by filling the country's administration with Communist Party supporters, who continue large scale arrests to intimidate the opposition.

Planning national election in September

The Government is further reported to be planning a rush national election in September with hand picked candidates to forestall any attempts by a new regime to organize free elections. This would defeat opposition plans to revise the electoral law which they feel would necessitate four or five months' delay and which would give a new government time to adjust internal administration sufficiently to assure a free election.

It is apparent the present regime's policy is to create an insupportable position for any future "recognized democratic government" as provided by the Potsdam Declaration with which peace treaties may be concluded. The opposition considers this month to be its last great opportunity for the predictable future to change what balanced Romanians reluctantly call a "government of traitors" for a regime that would seek to uphold the principles of democracy and national integrity.

In conclusion

Unless significant governmental changes are made shortly by Allied agreement thoughtful observers feel that all hope for implementing the American position, as elaborated by the Department on February 24, will be irretrievably lost. The Groza Government will continue by default and expressed American political desires for Romania will be buried beneath Soviet initiative.

August 9 *Awaiting "an official Allied interpretation..."*

All opposition leaders are awaiting as a vital and urgent factor for Romania's independence an official Allied interpretation that the Groza Government under the Potsdam Declaration is not considered a "recognized democratic government." From available evidence the King would request the resignation of the NDF Cabinet if he were certain this was the case, while the Socialists for the same cause are withholding their resignations from the Cabinet, which would precipitate a normal constitutional crisis and permit the King to request the formation of a new government. Meanwhile responsible Romanian circles are aware that the Allied missions have no information beyond the Potsdam Declaration itself.

Maniu's views

Maniu in an interview requested by him last evening gave his views and indicated his proposed course of action. He said that the opposition and the NDF are negotiating for a governmental change but that the latter steadfastly maintains that the Potsdam Declaration recognizes its regime and it needs not resign to be replaced by a broader based cabinet. He further stated that both sides actually realize the Declaration phrase "recognized democratic governments" would be superfluous if the Romanian, Hungarian, and Bulgarian governments were all considered satisfactory. Nevertheless Maniu feared Groza and Tatarescu were seeking with Soviet aid to name a delegation for the London Peace Treaty Conference that would immediately begin drafting peace terms with the Russians prior to the formal conference. Accordingly he emphasized the all-important time factor in gaining an Allied clarifying statement as to the NDF regime.

Maniu, D. Brătianu, T. Petrescu,
the American Mission and... the King

Maniu stated it had been arranged for himself, Dinu Bratianu, and Titel Petrescu separately to see the King in the evening of August 10th. From available information the three leaders will adopt the following course pending Allied information as to the status of the Groza Cabinet. Dinu Bratianu indicated in an interview yesterday with General Schuyler and Melbourne that his recommendations could not be energetic. Following two conferences with Petrescu yesterday, Maniu expressed his belief, which Melbourne also shares, that the former also will play for time.

Maniu himself said he intended to recommend to the King that the latter request the resignation of the Groza Cabinet and form another satisfactory to the three Armistice signatories. He anticipated the King's refusal to take action in view of the present uncertainty and stated that another alternative might be the organization of country-wide demonstrations requesting a government change. However, he felt that it might serve as a pretext for the Government and Red Army to impose strong repressive measures, call the demonstrators "Fascists" and assure the continuance in power of the NDF. It is Melbourne's impression that Maniu too for the moment will defer definitive party action.

August 11 *Maniu — Brătianu received by the King*

Last evening the King received Maniu and Bratianu for informational political discussions. The tenseness and significance of the meetings were materially lessened as the result of President Truman's speech commenting upon the Potsdam Declaration.[*]

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[*] The following are the relevant parts of President Truman's 9 August speech to the American people on the Potsdam Conference results, as pointed out by Roy Melbourne: "At Yalta the three governments agreed to assume a common responsibility in helping to reestablish in the liberated and satellite nations of Europe governments broadly representative of democratic elements in the population. That responsibility still stands. We all recognize it as a joint responsibility of the three govts.... Romania, Bulgaria, and Hungary are not to be spheres of influence of any one power... The Control Commissions are to get the international family, they are the joint concern of all of us... The three govts agreed at Berlin that the Allied press would enjoy full freedom from now on to report to the world upon all developments in Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Finland" (Cf. Dr. Roy M. Melbourne, "Witness to the Start of the Cold War: The View from Romania," in *The United States and Romania*, Paul D. Quinlan, Editor, 1988, p. 100).

Maniu and Bratianu, as well as Petrescu, are expressing tempered optimism that the Armistice signatories shortly will declare the present Groza Government unacceptable as not within the meaning of the agreed governmental definition at Potsdam.

August 14 *"The general purport of the Department's instructions"*

Since the King is the constitutional center of any efforts by the Romanians themselves to change the present government, last evening, in answer to his questions, Melbourne gave the general purport of the Department's instructions* to the King's most trusted constitutional adviser, former

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* Cf. *FRUS 1945*. V, pp. 565-566: Byrnes, Secretary of State to the Acting American Representative in Romania, Melbourne. Telegram 416, August 11. Sent to Bucharest, repeated to London and Moscow as telegrams 6818 and 1803 respectively.

It reads as follows:

"Soviet Embassy on Aug. 6 informed Dept. of Soviet Govt's decision to establish diplomatic relations with Romania. This decision, while it is in conformity with Potsdam agreement (Section X of Communique), was taken on the initiative of the Soviet Govt alone and does not imply uniformity of attitudes of three Allied Govts toward Groza regime.

Preparation of peace treaty for Romania by Council of Foreign Ministers, in accordance with Section X of Potsdam Communique, need not be delayed by absence of diplomatic relations between Romania and one or more of Allied Govts concerned. Potsdam agreement provides that treaty will be concluded with a 'recognized democratic govt.'

Dept hopes that political situation in Romania will develop in such a way as to permit this Govt. also to establish diplomatic relations with Romania. In view of unrepresentative character of Groza Govt however Dept does not contemplate taking such a step at present time. Our attitude of reserve toward Groza Govt. was made clear to Soviet and British Govts, as well as to Romanians, at time it was installed. Subsequent events have merely served to confirm this opinion.

In your contacts with Romanian officials and political leaders you should be guided by Dept's views as set forth in Deptels 90 February 24, 157 March 27 and in present tel. Should opposition leaders approach you (reurtels 533 Aug. 7 and 539 Aug. 9), you may be guided in your statements by the consideration that it is not our purpose to discourage such leaders in their attempts to secure freedom of expression for all democratic groups or to present their case to the Romanian people and to world

Foreign Minister Visoianu. In an interview with the King today, in reply to his queries, Melbourne likewise will give the tenor of the Department's of August 11.

The chances for pursuing a Constitutional government change

The Romanians themselves see their only hope in changing the present regime is to maintain a strictly constitutional line. The optimum method to permit the King to act would be for the Socialists to resign from the NDF Cabinet, while a more delicate method would have the King unilaterally to request the resignation of the Cabinet as not being a "recognized democratic government." The most improvable solution now would be the voluntary cession by the NDF of some Cabinet posts to the political opposition. Country-wide demonstrations by the opposition are considered impossible as almost certainly bringing bloodshed and intervention by the Soviet High Command.

It is impossible for the opposition parties to present their desire for a more representative government to the Romanian people and to the world because of local censorship and Government ownership of all printing plants, and because no foreign correspondents have yet been cleared for entry. General Schuyler and Melbourne anticipated a further period of delay after the entry of correspondents until the unequivocal right is established with local Soviet censorship for free transmission of news dispatches.

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opinion for a more representative govt. Without replying directly to questions which may be put to your govt's attitude toward a particular plan of action, you may let it be known in general terms that this Govt hopes to see established in Romania, through the efforts of the Romanians themselves, and if necessary with the assistance of the three Allied govts as provided in the Crimea Declaration on Liberated Europe, a more representative regime, and that the US Govt looks forward to the establishment of diplomatic relations with a Romanian Govt in which all important democratic parties are represented or which issues from free elections.

In such conversations as you may have you may refer to relevant parts of President's report to the nation Aug 9 (*Radio Bulletin* 190). Note that with reference to press correspondents (see Section X of Potsdam Communique) the President said "The three Govts agreed at Berlin that the Allied press would enjoy full freedom from now on to report to the world upon all developments in Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Finland.""

General Susaikov, acting head of the ACC, is expected daily to return from Moscow with full Soviet political instructions and General Schuyler and Melbourne agree that the chances for pursuing a constitutional government change would be greater if the Romanians decided to proceed promptly.

The great practical difficulty foreseen is whether Groza actually will resign if the Socialists leave the Government or if the King requests the Cabinet's resignation. It is considered possible that the Premier, despite the constitution, will agree only if the Russians consent. Thus it might be necessary for the crisis to proceed to the point where unconstitutional factors clearly emerge, necessitating the King's recourse to the 3 Allied governments to form a more representative regime as provided by the Yalta Declaration.

August 14 *Melbourne, the King, and "the Department's general attitude toward Romania"*

At Melbourne's interview today with the King* he informed him of the Department's general attitude toward Romania. In answers to questions he was made acquainted with the Department's confirmed reserve toward the Groza Government in view of its unrepresentative character. He was further told that the Potsdam Agreement provided that the peace treaty would be concluded with a "recognized democratic government" and that the Department did not contemplate establishing diplomatic relations with Romania at this time. Reference was made to the Department's expressed political wishes for Romania as given in Department's of February 24 and significant portions of the President's speech of August 9 were invoked to show the unchanged nature of the American position.

Melbourne told the King that his Government hoped, through purely Romanian efforts, to see a more representative regime established here with which it could resume diplomatic relations. With the timing and method of any possible efforts completely in Romanian hands, it was hoped that any eventual changes would include all important democratic parties or those issuing from free elections. Only if necessary, would the

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***FRUS 1945*, V, pp. 566-567: Melbourne to the Secretary of State (Byrnes). Telegram 553, Bucharest, Aug. 14, 1945. Repeated to Moscow as 153.

Department wish the three Allied governments to assist as provided in the Yalta Declaration.

The King expressed gratification at the American position and stated his personal intention to follow constitutional lines if and when responsible Romanian political forces united in urging and formulating a more representative regime. He further asked Melbourne to present the American views to the responsible opposition leaders, that they might request audiences of him to discuss eventual Romanian tactics. This request thus coincides with the fact that these leaders have been in virtual daily contact with this Mission for further clarification of the Potsdam Declaration and the President's speech.

Further meetings

Tonight Melbourne expects to see Mr. Julius Maniu and tomorrow Dinu Bratianu and Titel Petrescu, as well as Prince Stirbey, whom the King wishes to know the American attitude.

If the Romanians wish to institute changes in the present regime to one comprising all important democratic parties, Melbourne considers it may be expedient to inform a responsible Communist representative, such as Lucretiu Patrascanu, at an early date of the Department's attitude as an elaboration of the President's speech, to state that the American Government does not contemplate renewing diplomatic relations with the present regime and to emphasize that the peace treaty will be signed with a "recognized democratic government."

It should be mentioned that Melbourne is maintaining close liaison with General Schuyler on developments, as well as with the British Mission.

August 15 *Interview Melbourne — Maniu*

Last evening Melbourne saw Mr. Julius Maniu, to whom he repeated the Department's position as reported on August 11th. In doing so, he followed the same outline used in explaining the Department's attitude to the King. Mr. Maniu said that he would consult promptly with other party leaders and the King to arrive at a uniform course of action in an effort to organize a more representative government of all important democratic parties. He stated that he realized the delicate and complicated problem confronting Romanian politicians in assuming the initiative in making a governmental change.

For example Mr. Maniu feels that the Groza Government probably would not resign unless ordered by the Russians despite any retirement of the Socialists from the Cabinet. Likewise, he claims there are potential difficulties with Communist extremists, notably Interior Minister Teohari Georgescu, who reportedly has said he would cling to his position by force. Then, too, the NDF might strike at the opposition through repressive measures.

Melbourne – Maniu and Prince Stirbey

Both Maniu and Prince Stirbey, whom Melbourne saw this morning, were pleased with the frank statement of the American Government's view of the Groza Cabinet and its decision only to renew diplomatic relations with a more representative regime and to conclude a peace treaty with a "recognized democratic government." They saw this as directly weakening the Groza Regime.

Mr. Bratianu and Mr. Petrescu are out of town on party affairs and will return tomorrow morning, for which time they have requested interviews.

Melbourne's American View

Melbourne expects to give to other responsible officials and political leaders the American view that (1) the present regime is unrepresentative and consequently no resumption of diplomatic relations with it is contemplated; (2) the peace treaty is only to be concluded with a "recognized democratic government." To Messrs. Bratianu and Petrescu, considered as opposition leaders, Melbourne will give the additional information that the United States looks forward to establishing diplomatic relations with a more representative regime established by the efforts of the Romanians themselves and only if necessary, through the aid of the armistice signatories as agreed in the Yalta Declaration.

August 16 *Separate interviews with D. Brătianu, T. Petrescu, and Ştirbey*

This morning in separate interviews with Messrs. Bratianu and Petrescu, Melbourne verbally outlined the Department's attitude toward Romania, as reported on August 11. Both party leaders expressed their great satisfaction at the American position and indicated that various means were being discussed to form a more representative government. Bratianu and Petrescu did mention their surprise that the British Government had not yet issued a similar or complementary instruction. Petrescu indicated that his position in securing support for a specific action from his party would be greatly strengthened if he could give assurances that the American view was supported by the British Labor Government.

Both men appeared undecided whether a common political action would evolve before or after the anniversary of the coup d'etat on August 23. However, they are aware, as is this Mission, that Government plans are afoot to change the ceremonies from a joint celebration in the name of the King and the army, to an NDF political demonstration of purported support for its regime. This last factor may decide opposition leaders to adopt a course of action prior to that time.

Prince Stirbey had inquired whether Melbourne would object to receiving a Romanian Communist official in order that the party could learn officially the American position that (1) the present regime is unrepresentative and no resumption of diplomatic relations with it are contemplated and (2) that a peace treaty is to be concluded only with a "recognized democratic government." Melbourne replied that he had no objection to receiving such an official to refer to the Potsdam Declaration, President Truman's speech, and the two specific points herein mentioned. However, Melbourne learned this evening from Prince Stirbey the striking fact that he had been informed the Communists were unable to send such an official since it was necessary first to gain Moscow's approval.

Ştirbey's plan & Maniu's suggestion

Following political conferences throughout the day, Prince Stirbey tonight outlined a plan advanced by himself which had been tentatively approved by Messrs. Maniu, Bratianu, and Petrescu that may be subject to change. The King is being asked to call a conference of the leaders of the four parties who contributed to the coup d'etat of last August and which were represented in the democratic concentration government prior to the installation of the NDF regime. This means Lucretiu Patrascanu would represent the Communists. At Mr. Maniu's suggestion it was decided to request the King to invite Premier Groza to strengthen the effect of the councils decisions.

To invite Premier Groza at a council presided by the King...

At the council the King would ask the five participants, among other questions, whether they believed the present Cabinet could secure a peace treaty and the reestablishment of diplomatic relations with all three Allied Powers. On receiving a negative reply the King then would inquire whether in their considered judgment, the government thus could successfully operate without detriment to the country. A majority of the participants would give a negative opinion and the King then formally would ask Groza for his Government's resignation. The issue thus would be posed to the Groza Government if it would continue in power despite a formal request for its resignation from the constitutional head of the State.

Comment upon the above plan and others to resolve the political crisis will follow later.

August 18 *Requesting the resignation of the Groza Government*

The King's secretary* tonight told Melbourne of the constitutional plan the King has decided to follow tomorrow in requesting the resignation of the Groza Government. He would follow closely the customary Romanian constitutional procedure in first calling Premier Groza at 9 a.m. to discuss the serious problems confronting his government and to notify him that he was asking the four party leaders individually for their views. The Peasant and Liberal parties have not been declared illegal organizations by the NDF and, although not members of the Government, are important domestic political forces the King constitutionally would consult upon a Cabinet change. Patrascanu, Petrescu, Maniu, and Bratianu would be called in that order and by noon the King, after receiving the formal opinions of three of his four consultants that the government must be changed, would call Premier Groza to ask for his Cabinet's resignation.

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* Mircea Ionnițiu (Johnny).

The King wished to initiate the above procedure this afternoon by calling for Premier Groza in view of the fact that Patrascanu and Petrescu were scheduled for interview early in the evening, but Groza was then in conference with ACC Soviet officials.

Pătrăşcanu's short talk with the King

Patrascanu, in his short talk with the King this evening, presumably under instructions, changed his tone from his last interview and sought to belittle the effect of the American position of no resumption of diplomatic relations with the present unrepresentative regime and a treaty of peace only with a "recognized democratic government." He said Romania need have no concert over the American attitude since Russia eventually would secure Anglo-American recognition for the NDF Government and Russia would adequately safeguard Romanian interests in any peace treaty negotiations.

Titel Petrescu's position

Petrescu informed the King that he still favored the resignation of the present Government, and even mentioned that he hoped something could be done before August 20 when an NDF political meeting was scheduled. He evidently did not wish to be forced into an open break with the Communists at that meeting while the King's position toward the Government was still undefined.

If Russian intervention takes place, perhaps in the name of the ACC, the King and his advisers hope that it will be at a clearly defined stage in the orderly constitutional process outlined above. In view of his country's position under the Armistice, the King would only interrupt his consultations upon receiving an unmistakably unilateral Soviet demand.

Following the King's intentions...

Later the King, as constitutional head of the State, would call Deputy ACC Chairman Susaikov and present him with a document invoking the Yalta Declaration providing for consultation of the 3 Allied governments to assure a representative democratic regime. Identical notes would be handed to the American and British ACC representatives to communicate to their governments.

"Speed was necessary..."

The King's Secretary repeated the belief of the King's advisers that speed was necessary for the plan to be effective. He admitted a snag could be encountered if Groza did not initially present himself tomorrow morning, but said it was felt that if Groza did not appear for his second requested interview, it would be considered as an indication that the latter politically feared to come.

The King's advisers were concerned with the possibility of the Government or the Russians suddenly beginning arrests or other repressive measures, but they were determined to proceed in the fashion described. If any repressive actions were begun, they hoped they would not be made before the morning consultations.

At the conclusion of the conversation Melbourne thanked him for being notified of the King's intentions and simply stated that they would be reported to his government.

August 19 *Groza's position...*

At one p.m. the King's confidential Secretary stated to Melbourne that Premier Groza had appeared shortly after nine a.m. at the palace in accordance with the procedure outlined on August 18. The King in notifying Groza that he would initiate individual conferences with party leaders to discuss the advisability of changing the government said that he considered it necessary in view of the expressed American attitude toward the Groza Government and since a peace treaty would only be concluded with a "recognized democratic regime." The King added that the serious domestic problems confronting the Cabinet also were important factors inducing him to this action in view of information he had received from responsible sources.

Groza replied that his government actually was never stronger and had entire Soviet support. He added that the question of American recognition of his regime was of little significance and that the Soviet Union would eventually secure Anglo-American agreement to a peace treaty that would protect Romanian interests. He reportedly attempted to misinterpret facts by telling the King that he considered the views outlined by Melbourne to the Secretary General of the Foreign Office as being communicated to him "through minor officials" and that they were merely Melbourne's personal views. He omitted saying that the Secretary General, as the second ranking Foreign Office Official, had specifically requested information, when it should be available for his government, as to the American attitude toward his regime, and that this view was fully explained.

To the King he repeated his remarks, as reported on August 18, that Romania had no need to conclude a peace treaty in view of arrangements made with its neighbors and pending with Poland and the Soviet Union. Further, he and Tatarescu, on Russian invitation, were leaving this week for Moscow.

Russians... greatly displeased

Foreign Minister Tatarescu stated this morning to Marshal of the Court Negel that the Russians were greatly displeased over the official expression of the American attitude made known in Romania and that tomorrow they would request an explanation from General Schuyler and Melbourne since American officials here were subordinate to General Susaikov. It was also understood that General Schuyler had addressed a letter to the Romanian General on the Romanian Armistice Commission, stating that he would only attend a military celebration of the coup d'etat on August 23. General Susaikov intended to make the day a completely political celebration and would order General Schuyler to appear.

Obviously Groza and Tatarescu are employing minimizing and bluffing tactics to institute doubt and induce hesitance in the planned course of action.

The British Government's reticent position

The Secretary stated the King had been notified this morning by Melbourne's British colleague, who had immediately notified him thereafter, that the British Government did not wish to give any advice or encouragement to the King since it would be unable to protect the King and opposition leaders from consequences of an attempt to overthrow the Government, but that it did not consider the NDF a democratic or representative regime. He admitted that the latter part of the British position might be an encouraging factor for the King to use in his interview with Petrescu.

The US Government's position

It was evident from the Secretary's conversation that Marshal Negel and other advisers had been somewhat affected by Groza's and Tatarescu's apparent unshaken confidence and by their own interpretation of the view of the British Government. On the Secretary's request and for the King's information, Melbourne reviewed his instructions in detail as previously reported on August 14 and he also showed him the radioed news text of the American note addressed to the Bulgarian Government. Melbourne further said the President's speech of August 9 in its references to Romania clearly indicated our intention to attain a position of equality with the Russians. Melbourne added for the King's information only that General Schuyler had been instructed to negotiate on a truly equal tri-partite basis for a revised ACC administration.

Savel Rădulescu — Melbourne meeting

Later in the afternoon Mr. Savel Radulescu, at the King's request, spoke to Melbourne in his capacity as a close counselor of the King. The American position was reviewed as outlined above, and Radulescu admitted the King's advisers had interpreted the British view as not envisaging continued support for the King. He inquired whether this was the American position. Melbourne stated, in view of past Department instructions now confirmed, it would be difficult for his government to see any justification for attacks upon the King, particularly when procedures for ascertaining the national will had not yet been determined.

The King's individual consultations
in view of Groza's resignation

Radulescu stated that in view of difficulties in securing Patrascanu and Petrescu for audiences today, the King had decided to begin tomorrow morning with individual consultations with the four political leaders, Patrascanu, Petrescu, Maniu, and Bratianu, in that order. The King then would personally inform Groza that since the American and British governments did not consider the NDF a representative regime, and in view of the need for a government to conclude a treaty of peace with the three Allied governments, the majority of the political party leaders had requested the cabinet's resignation. The King then personally would demand Groza's resignation and would inform the four consultant political leaders of his compliance or refusal. As appeared most likely, Groza would not resign, and the King shortly thereafter would be obliged separately to call the three senior members of the ACC with their governments' political representatives, and formally deliver an identical note outlining the unconstitutional obstacle, and request guidance from the Three Powers under the Yalta Declaration.

Radulescu stated that in view of their interpretation of the British attitude, the above procedure would be followed, although it originally had been intended if Groza refused to resign for the King to declare his Government illegal, to call the head of the Court of Cassation and appropriate military authority, and request them to announce publicly that the regime was illegal.

Radulescu further said that the King's position might be made more delicate after his constitutional action, and there might even be NDF street demonstrations against him and some repressive arrests. Likewise the King might still with his present government be confronted with the demand to sign important decrees for which he might request guidance from the Three Powers under the Yalta Agreement.

In conclusion, Melbourne made no comment, but stated that all developments that he had outlined would be reported.

August 20* *After Groza refused to resign*

At five p.m. the King summoned General Schuyler and Melbourne and stated that after consultation with the four party leaders all but the Communists had advised that the government immediately be changed. The King had called Premier Groza and formally requested him to resign and Groza had refused. The King then presented to General Schuyler one of three identical, original notes invoking assistance of the three Allied governments in forming a more representative regime as provided in Crimea Declaration on Liberated Europe. Text of the note and scope of the audience will be reported by General Schuyler.

August 21** *The King's decision*

The King's decision to make no further comment to Premier Groza when the latter three times refused his formal request to resign was prompted by his desire to present to the Three Allied governments the issue of an unconstitutional force impeding him in the normal discharge of his constitutional function, without desiring to widen the gap further than necessary between the opposition and the Communists. He was induced to this careful course by three main factors: (1) strong Soviet displeasure and possible serious reactions, (2) uncertainty as to the British viewpoint, (3) apparent inability of the United States and Great Britain to exert any pressure upon Russia except at the conference table.

Although the King's advisers knew the United States did not favor any present Communist attacks upon the King, yet they and the opposition knew this Mission had no instructions as to American reaction if arrests or threats were made by NDF or Soviet officials.

American messages...

Local American instructions were stronger than the British, since it was possible to state definitely the United States did not intend establishing diplomatic relations with the NDF Cabinet; it was known the United States supported the King, and that the American attitude toward the NDF had been expressed locally to both the government and the Russians.

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* See *FRUS 1945*, V, p. 574: Melbourne to the Secretary of State. Telegram 567, Bucharest, Aug. 20.

** *FRUS 1945*, V, pp. 583-584: Melbourne to the Secretary of State. Telegram 575, Bucharest, Aug. 21.

"The political opposition is jubilant"

The political opposition naturally is jubilant at the step taken by the King. But at an interview General Schuyler and Melbourne had with Dinu Bratianu this morning, Melbourne took the occasion to emphasize that the opposition should take extra precautions to remain calm, avoiding all demonstrations, assemblies, and any pretexts that might be seized upon by the NDF or the Red Army to intervene. Also Melbourne remarked that responsible opposition leaders should not seek to interpret the King's action as hostile to the Soviet Union, since it would be foolhardy in the present delicate situation to arouse Russian hostility when it is vital to secure Soviet cooperation at any joint conference upon Romania. Through two responsible sources Melbourne has communicated this message to Julius Maniu.

Maniu's conviction: "Groza must resign"

Through an emissary Maniu stated to this Mission his conviction Groza must resign since he could not maintain a provocative attitude toward the Anglo-Americans. He has postponed a party meeting scheduled for yesterday until the King's appeal to the Three Powers is known. It is reliably reported that Mr. Mihalache, Vice-President of the National Peasant Party, has informed the King personally that he also is in complete accord with Maniu's views.

Communists' position

Last evening the Communist Secretary General of the NDF[*] convoked a meeting which unsuccessfully attempted to draft a statement to be published saying that information received in Romania as to the American and British attitude toward the regime was invalid because it was not written and because it was transmitted to the government by "an inferior functionary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs." Reportedly Tatarescu informed his Dissident National Liberals that nothing was changed in the makeup of the government.

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[*] Vasile Luca.

No authoritative word has been received from Petrescu and the Socialists as to the party's intention to resign from the NDF Government.

The ideas advanced on August 17 as to the desirability of a technician government for Romania as the only possible government under present conditions with a fighting chance for survival remain unchanged.

Even this government would be subjected to the most severe strains if a dissatisfied Soviet Union sought to provoke internal disorder and political agitation, to capitalize upon its serious agricultural and economic difficulties and to denounce its execution of the Armistice Convention.

August 23 *The Soviet Government against Groza's resignation*

After stating that he had an important communication from his government to deliver, General Susaikov was received by the King at 8:45 a.m.

He then read the following statement: "The Government of the USSR has discussed and analyzed the question of the Romanian Government, and in the most categorical way, this government expresses itself against the resignation of the Groza Government."

Susaikov added that the communication was being communicated to Groza and the English and Americans attached to the ACC.

On his departure Susaikov remarked to the chief of the Military Household, General Niculescu, and the military aides that they are responsible for the King's attitude and that "there will be tears."

August 23 *"The delicate position of the King"*

The delicate position of the King between Soviet officials and the Groza Government is seriously concerning his advisers. By not appearing officially and publicly together with the Russians and the Government since his Soviet luncheon ordeal, Soviet authorities threaten that the King is adopting a course clearly unfriendly to Russia.

The King was unable privately to present Romanian military decorations yesterday to two Soviet generals who were unable to reach Bucharest when the King had awarded like decorations recently to a sizeable group of Soviet generals. The two generals insisted on accepting them only in the presence of the entire Groza Cabinet.

The New Soviet Minister in Romania

Tomorrow the newly-arrived Soviet Minister to Romania, Vice-Commissar Kaftaradze, is pressing to be received by the King in protocol fashion with the Premier and Foreign Minister present. The Russians are making a serious prestige question of the issue and the King's advisers feel that it may be necessary to accede to the Soviet request on this basis in order to save the large issues at stake since the King has invoked the Yalta Declaration.

The King intends for the time to sign no government decrees but has informally inquired whether in the views of the American and British governments he actually has relinquished his powers to sign decrees to the Three Allied governments or whether he might simply refrain from countersigning administrative decrees proposed by a government refusing to accept constitutional procedure.

In Romanian constitutional practice, the above problem could be solved by the proffered resignation of the NDF Cabinet since it would continue as the interim government for administrative decree purposes until the Three Powers evolved a joint decision upon the King's request for aid under the Yalta Declaration.

August 24 *"The USSR rejects King Michael's note"*

According to a report received from the Secretary General of the Ministry of the Interior and member of the Communist Party, General Susaikov this morning informed the Party's Central Committee that on Saturday or Monday the Soviet Union would deliver a note to the United States and United Kingdom governments to the effect that the USSR rejects King

Michael's note. The USSR will permit no interference in Romania's internal affairs and it considers the Groza Government as the legal government of Romania.

The Secretary General stated that he was present when Susaikov's communication was discussed by the Central Committee and that although he had opposed the decision, the Committee formally decided it would refuse to accept Groza's resignation if offered.

August 24 *The Social Democratic Party's declaration:*

There follows the declaration authorized by the Political Bureau of the Social Democratic Party to be read by one of its ministers at the Council of Ministers meeting convoked for 11 a.m. today:

"The Social Democratic Party declares that it cannot approve any government formula which does not have the agreement of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

The Social Democratic Party considers it necessary to adopt a government formula with should also have the agreement of the United States and Great Britain, so as to be able to secure, in accordance with the decisions taken at Potsdam, the re-establishing of diplomatic relations with Great Britain and the United States of America and, at the same time, to obtain the signature of peace treaties and Romania's admittance among the United Nations.

The Social Democratic Party is of the opinion that the Government should call upon the three Great Powers to find a solution of a nature to satisfy the points of view expressed above."

In addition to the declaration...

In addition to the declaration the Social Democratic ministers were obliged to present a protest in the name of the party that "under the grave circumstances of today the Council of Ministers had not been convoked to discuss the present Government's lack of legal basis."

Melbourne repeats that the party's leader, Mr. Petrescu, has authorized the publication abroad of his party's foregoing statement.

August 24 *The new Soviet Ambassador: S.I. Kavtaradze*

Early this evening the King, in the presence of the Foreign Minister, received the newly-appointed Soviet Ambassador to Romania, former Vice-Commissar Kavtaradze, and the meeting was conducted along purely protocol lines. However, the King's day did not pass without another mishap in his relations with the Russians, when he again declined to decorate the two Russian generals in the presence of Cabinet members including the Premier.

Communist parade

Shortly after the audience with the new Soviet Ambassador, trucks brought groups of Communists, perhaps numbering three hundred, to the Palace Square, where under careful coaching, they shouted for Groza and the Government. Whenever anyone shouted for the King he was beaten, and a Palace official reports one soldier just returned from the front and wearing the highest Romanian decoration was badly beaten, while another officer managed to escape into the Palace on drawing his gun. Later these organized Communists paraded in groups through the city shouting for Groza.

Public buildings such as the Presidency, Interior Ministry, Telephone Building, National Bank, and Post Office are being guarded by troops of the Tudor Vladimirescu Division.

An impossible situation

In the city there is a noticeable feeling of tenseness as it becomes apparent to the public that there is a grave issue between the King and the Groza Government. General Schuyler and Melbourne both agree that this is an impossible situation. If continued it will mean the popular forces desiring a cabinet change may disintegrate through direct Communist action, which has already begun in arrests and terroristic activities. The only alternative would be open conflict through counter-measures taken by the opposition.

2. Resuming Charge, 1945 August 26-September 13

August 26

I returned and resumed charge*

August 26 *The King and the Soviet Ambassador...*

The King today received the Soviet Ambassador at lunch. The lunch proceeded in a natural friendly atmosphere and in the course of conversation, the Ambassador remarked that he could see since his arrival that certain people were trying to prevent an understanding and even bring a break between Romania and the USSR. The King replied this was an exaggeration of the situation in that local politicians are always inclined to magnify their difficulties into issues of a mischievous character, but

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*"*Monday, 27 August 1945. Return of Mr. Berry from Washington.* — Mr. Berry returned yesterday afternoon. He sent a radio to us on Friday saying that he was in Greece, asking for immediate clearence. We took the matter up at once with General Vinogradov, who told us that Sunday was the best he could do. Therefore we arranged to send Colonel Emmens with my plane down to Athens Sunday morning, returning with Mr. Berry Sunday afternoon. This evening Mr. Berry came to my house for dinner, and we spent several hours going over various details which he had picked up in Washington. In general, it seems that the State Department is well satisfied with the manner in which our Mission is conducting itself, and the War Department feels that so long as the State Department is satisfied, there should be no change.
Mr. Berry saw the President once before Potsdam and once after. He said the President appeared to be very much interested in the Balkan situation and very happy to take a strong line at Potsdam. Unfortunately, Mr. Berry had left the States before this last crisis in Romania and therefore he was unable to give us much specific information on probable future actions of the State Department." (Schuyler, *Diary*, Ms. p. 281.)

that he felt it his duty as King to be objective and to regard his country's welfare without regard for special local interests.

The Ambassador admitted he did not know the situation fully, but said that if Soviet policy were set upon certain aims they would be continued.

At the conclusion of the lunch, both the King and the Ambassador agreed that, if they were doubtful or uncertain about matters of direct interest, they would mutually communicate with each other.

August 28 *Tight control over press and radio*

Local observers of the Romanian political situation are disquieted by the government's tight control over press and radio, which is being used by the NDF to mislead the public into believing that there is no disagreement between Crown and Government, and to prevent the dissemination throughout the country of the opposition leaders' viewpoint. They are particularly disturbed by the fact that foreign radio stations are beginning to carry the Government's propaganda position. To correct this evil Romanian political opposition leaders hope that the honest facts will be reported by American and British radio and press, and through them it will come to the knowledge of the Romanian people.

August 28 *Behind the façade...*

All political elements involved in the current crisis have been awaiting developments that they believe will arise either through unilateral Soviet instructions to the Government for a policy of repression against the opposition, or a statement by the 3 Allied Powers of their intended course of action as the result of the King's appeal. Behind this larger façade Romanian politicians have been busily negotiating on the alternative bases of the retention or change of the present cabinet.

"It is now known that..."

It is now known that except for Russian insistence, Groza would have resigned. Tatarescu, for purely personal reasons, is a prop in the Cabinet for Soviet policy. While the Government nominally retains its position of authority, the King since asking Groza's resignation has not signed any decrees, and internal pressures within the NDF are threatening its continued existence.

It has been reported by several reputable sources that Finance Minister Durma, nominally a member of the Tatarescu Dissident Liberal faction who considers himself an independent technician, has resigned from the Cabinet on grounds of ill health, although he has explained to Tatarescu the reason as dissatisfaction with the Government's fiscal program. Other prominent Dissident Liberals are expressing great discontent and reputedly several are on the verge of breaking with Tatarescu.

T. Petrescu determined to maintain the Socialist position

Two responsible sources reported that Titel Petrescu, the Socialist leader, this morning had told them separately of his determination to maintain the Socialist position that the Government should resign. In this he reportedly has the support of at least a majority of the party executive committee and all district organizations. This afternoon Petrescu intended to restate this view at a joint meeting of Socialist and Communist Central Committee members.

For tomorrow Premier Groza has called a meeting of key Cabinet ministers and leaders of the political components of the NDF to discuss the entire problem. Petrescu, with other Socialist leaders, has been invited to this conference where, he has told my informants, he intends to demand the cabinet's resignation. If this is not decided, the Socialists may then independently request their Cabinet representatives to withdraw.

August 29 *"Arrests of members of two clandestine political groups..."*

The press today carried accounts of Interior Ministry arrests of members of 2 clandestine political groups said to be working with the National Peasant and National Liberal parties in attacking the Soviet Union and the NDF Government through printed leaflets, as well as planning to operate illegal radio transmitters and forming "resistance centers." One group is called "Free Youth," purportedly composed of some Peasant and Liberal party members, while the second is named the "T" organization, allegedly directed by ex-Premier Radescu.

"Transparent effort to compromise the historic parties"

The Propaganda Ministry yesterday afternoon notified all newspaper editors of the above "plots" and insisted that they treat them in that sense. The Government refused to reply to one editor's query why General Radescu and Messrs. Maniu and Bratianu were not being arrested if the information were correct. Editors also pointed out that in late July it was announced that similar leaflets then attributed to Iron Guardists had been distributed in Bucharest and the press were told to publish that those responsible had been arrested.

Local sources interpret the news as a transparent effort to compromise the historic parties during the current cabinet crisis and possibly to justify outlawing them as Fascist organizations within the terms of Armistice Article 15.

August 30 *The King irritated by A.P. Pavlov's behavior...*

The King today gave a farewell luncheon for Pavlov, Soviet political adviser to the Chairman of the ACC. During the luncheon Pavlov made several disagreeable references to the activities of Marshal of the Court Negel and pressed the King to say how the country's administration would continue when the King refused to sign the Government's decrees. On leaving he told Negel that he was responsible for the King's "recent regrettable course of action."

The King irritated by Pavlov's behavior recalled him at 5 o'clock and told him that neither Negel nor anyone else was responsible for his decisions. He said he made them himself after consulting many advisers and with the interest of the country at heart. Pavlov retracted his statements to the extent of saying that it was not the Russians in Bucharest but all the people of the country that were decrying the fact the King was influenced by undesirable men in his immediate entourage.

The King continued by saying that he decided independently upon his action and that he based his decision upon the communiques of Yalta and Potsdam. He added that it was the first time in Romanian history that a government had refused to resign when requested to do so by the Sovereign.

Pavlov stated that it was important to find a modus vivendi for continuing routine business. The King replied that a procedure was established, but the Government by refusing to resign had prevented the operation of that procedure. When a government resigns it is asked to continue on an interim basis and the administrative decrees presented by such government are signed as such until a new government is named. The King said the Groza Government could carry on this basis if it desired to show good faith until he had heard from his request made to the American, British, and Soviet governments.

The King's principle objection to the Groza Government

Pavlov next suggested that the King charge Groza with conducting national elections but the King replied that he could not as the Groza Government was not recognized by all of the 3 Allied Powers. Pavlov then replied the Groza Government had been recognized by Russia and "it was 90% sure that it would be recognized soon by the United States and England." He asked the King if the United States and England would recognize the Government the King would continue to have anything against Groza. The King said his principle objection to the Groza Government was that it was not recognized by the United States and England. However, he did resent its refusal to accept his request to resign when asked to do so.

August 31*

Reappraising "the latest phase of the chronic Romanian political crisis"

The present moment, while the Left element of the NDF Government is preparing its next move and while King Michael awaits from the three principal Allies a reply to his letter, seems opportune to reappraise the latest phase of the chronic Romanian political crisis.

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* Printed in *FRUS 1945*, V, pp. 599-601: Berry to the Secretary of State. Telegram 626, Aug. 31. Repeated to Moscow as 194, London as 9, and Caserta as 160.

The Department was informed that the King, after the publication of the Potsdam Communique, consulted Romanian political leaders, the majority of whom favored the formation of a government under conditions which would permit its recognition by all of the three principal Allies. Acting on their advice the King asked Prime Minister Groza to resign, but Mr. Groza refused. The King then appealed to the three principal Allies, through their representatives on the Allied Control Commission in Bucharest, to lend the assistance anticipated by the Yalta Declaration for such an emergency.

The key to the solution of Romania's principal problem now rests with Washington, Moscow, and London. Nevertheless, the rhythm of political activity in Bucharest has been accelerated rather than retarded by the subordination of the position of Bucharest. Leaders of all groups are jockeying for position. Opposition leaders are vigilant but impotent. Groza is alternatively nervous and uncertain then boastful and pretentious. Tatarescu, fighting* for his political life, is using every trick in the bag to remain in power. Petrescu has hesitated to implement his party's recent declaration by calling for the retirement of the Socialist ministers in the Groza Government, perhaps minding a threat the Communists made against his life. The Left leaders of the NDF Government are seeking by every means to consolidate their position. And with press, radio, police, courts, and army directly controlled by Communists Ministers, they are able to put up a bold but shallow front, for they know that as they increase the tempo of their ballyhoo they lose support from the citizens of the country. The swing is definitely away from the NDF Government. The King is the rallying point for all opposition.

Exaggerating the decision of the King

Realizing the importance of the stake, and in order to precipitate a local solution, the Romanian Communist Ministers are trying to cloud the real issue by exaggerating out of its true proportion a relatively minor byproduct of the crisis – the decision of the King not to sign the decrees presented by the Groza Government. To discredit him they whisper that State employees will not be paid because the King will not sign a decree for their payment; that the Government cannot buy grain in order to increase the bread ration as the Bank cannot pay out cash without a royal decree. They even threaten that his life will not be safe if he continues to disregard the interests of the people. But in spite of pressure and threats the King has maintained his position. He feels that if he signs any he must sign all decrees. And if he signs all he will inevitably sign some that will make him appear ridiculous in the eyes of his subjects and cast doubts abroad upon the sincerity of his actions toward the Groza Government.

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* *FRUS 1945*, V, p. 600: erroneously noted "Petrescu, fighter (fighting?)" instead of "Tatarescu, fighting," as reported by Berry.

"Pavlov has been recalled"... Why?

The common goal of the Romanian Communists and Soviet officials in Romania was never more apparent than now. The Romanian Communists are out to discredit the King, to maintain the Groza Government. High Soviet officials, who apparently have been reporting back to Moscow a confirmation of the Moscow propaganda line for Romania to the effect that the Groza Government was solidly backed by the people, have been caught napping by recent events. They were surprised and horrified by the action of the King in calling for the resignation of the Groza Government and in appealing to the three principal Allies. Pavlov has been recalled, whether or not because of his failure to keep Moscow correctly appraised I do not know, and is definitely leaving Romania within the next few days. Susaikov said that he is going to save his own head at all costs and this probably means that he is going to close his eyes to the tactics used by the Romanian Communists to maintain their position.

The three principal Allies' moral position in Romania

If Romania is to be spared having a Communist regime fraudulently imposed upon her, it is essential that the three principal Allies act soon upon King Michael's request. The governments of the United States and England have announced their readiness to consult. The Soviets as far as is known here have given no reply. In fact, there is a growing feeling that the Soviet Government will give United States and England the same run-around that they gave us in March when we asked for consultations on the Romanian situation. We must avoid this or pay the penalty for failing to avoid it. The penalty in Romania will be the disastrous undermining of our moral position in this country: the abandoning of the King in an isolated and discredited position after he had acted in good faith on the basis of our own and our Allies' statements; the continuing of a NDF government in power, perhaps without Socialist participation, whose early action will be the confirmation of its position through fixed elections and the rapid neutralization or eradication of the influences of the Western democracies; and, finally, the fostering of a condition that will not be conducive to lasting peace in the Balkans. This can all be avoided if we discharge the responsibility we have taken upon ourselves and insist that our Soviet Allies discharge theirs. In securing the latter we now have the advantage of the knowledge that they know, and are aware that we know, of the weakness of their present position in Romania.

August 31 *Danger is growing…*

The King's advisers are seriously concerned over the growing danger of obvious government and Soviet pressure upon the King to sign Groza Government decrees. The King's position was again set forth on August 30th.

Today General Susaikov's aide telephoned the Marshal of the Court and urged, in the name of the General, that the King speedily sign two impending decrees establishing the joint Soviet-Romanian bank and aviation companies.

In order to avoid complicating tri-partite discussions concerning Romania the King would welcome any observations that the Department may choose to make upon his position as outlined on August 31.

September 1 *Procession… and demonstration*

Yesterday afternoon memorial services were held at the Atheneum for the deceased Romanian comedian Tanase, after which people began entering the nearby Palace to sign "Vive le roi" in the Palace book.

The Communists thereupon dispatched several hundred of their organized workers by truck to the Palace Square, who sought to disrupt the procession of people entering the Palace by starting an impromptu demonstration for the Groza Government.

Disciplined cheer leaders were strategically placed among the workers and members of their group were placed at various points to prevent automobiles from passing through the square and presumably disrupting the meeting. Later in the evening contingents of the same Communist-organized groups paraded through the streets until about 10 p.m. cheering for the Groza Government.

It was announced at yesterday's Palace Square demonstration that there would be a big organized demonstration today, with another scheduled for tomorrow. Apparently the Government is adopting the familiar technique that proved successful in bringing it into power in March, and every administrative facility will be at its disposal. The opposition, unless it desires to bring bloodshed and large scale reprisals in the name of governmental authority, is powerless to counter these tactics.

In order to avoid complication

General Schuyler and AVM Stevenson urged General Susaikov, on receiving the King's note on August 22, that all public meetings and demonstrations be banned as serving to complicate any tri-partite conversation upon Romania. At that time General Susaikov ignored their recommendations but General Schuyler will make a similar request today that the announced demonstration be canceled.

September 3 *Romanian Foreign Minister Tătărescu's requests*

In letter to Russian Ambassador dated August 31, Tatarescu requests that Soviet Government be apprised of desire of Prime Minister Groza and Tatarescu to visit Moscow not later than September 4, to discuss with Mr. Molotov prior to his departure for London, among others the following important problems:

1. Political situation of Romania vis-à-vis Soviet Union;

2. Romania's position with respect to Anglo-American demarche and Romania's position with respect to preparation of peace treaties;
3. Control of Danube;
4. Control of Straits;
5. Application of economic conventions.

Tatarescu states in letter that he and Prime Minister would be accompanied by Minister of Communications, Gheorghiu-Dej, Minister of Education, Stefan Voitec, Commissar for Foreign Commerce, Mircea Solacolu, Secretary General of Presidency, Emil Bodnaras, Price Commissar, Bucur Schiopul and Mihail Ghelmegeanu, President Romanian Commission for Execution of Armistice.

Department will note that Minister Voitec is Social Democrat and I am reliably informed that his party is discussing today whether or not he should go to Moscow.

Letter addressed by Tătărescu to the King

The same responsible source which provided Mission with copy of aforementioned letter also furnished copy of letter of same date addressed by Tatarescu to the King requesting an audience to discharge his constitutional responsibilities as Foreign Minister; namely explanation of the important discussions which he and Prime Minister will have shortly at Moscow with Soviet Government following an "invitation officially received August 30."

Although inference from these letters is that Soviet Government has not yet extended invitation to Mr. Groza, it is considered likely that a verbal invitation is already issued and that Tatarescu's letter requesting invitation was written at request of Soviet Ambassador for later use.

Significance of "such a step"

The King and all members of opposition are deeply concerned if the proposed discussions take place in Moscow prior to a Three Power conference on Romanian political situation. They consider such a step as unilateral interference in Romania's internal affairs and that it will strengthen Mr. Molotov's hand in submitting a fait accompli to the Anglo-Americans at London.

I have just received word that Soviet Ambassador today confirmed Russian invitation, granted upon request, and that party will leave for Moscow tomorrow.

September 4 *"A digest of communique from Presidency of Council of Ministers"*

Follows a digest of communique from Presidency of Council of Ministers, publicized today by all papers and radio concerning unanimous conclusion of the government at its meeting of August 24:

"(1) Groza Government was brought to power by fully expressed will of popular masses;

(2) Government has established truly democratic regime based on collaboration of parties representing all classes;

(3) Enjoying confidence of Soviet Union and "sympathy of great Allied Nations," the Government has regained Northern Transylvania;

(4) Government has carried out loyally Armistice conditions.

(5) The Government's achievements have gained the support and confidence of popular masses and, since its mission is not yet completed, it has the right to remain in power;

(6) Maniu and Bratianu, as leaders of anti-democratic political groups, have attempted to provoke Government crisis by intrigue and back-stage combinations. They have advised the King to undertake action obnoxious to the natural interests of Romanian people;

(7) Permanently based on principles which are foundation of conventions concluded between the Three Great Powers, which undertook to respect right of peoples to decide their own fate and to choose their internal democratic regime, the Romanian Government has decided to continue the fight until the end against the anti-democratic remains of fascism, whose actions are aimed against the democratic regime established on March 6, and which endanger not only the achievements of the Government, but also international harmony."

September 4* *The Romanian official delegation for Moscow and its depressing local effect*

It was publicly announced today that the Romanian official delegation left for Moscow accompanied by General Susaikov of the ACC and Soviet Ambassador Kavtaradze. Socialist Education Minister Voitec was included, allegedly on his own initiative and without a formal decision being made by his party, although it is stated he has been requested to be merely an observer and to refrain from signing other than purely cultural statements or agreements in Moscow.

The above announcement, combined with today's Government communique is having a depressing local effect in that the public feels some definite unilateral Soviet action will be made in Moscow in conjunction with the Groza regime. It is even said that the Soviet Government is deliberately making the continuance of the Groza Government a prestige question, and this is interpreted locally as an open rebuff to the American request that all Three Powers refrain from individual political action that might compromise tripartite discussions upon Romania's future government.

The Mission's reserved attitude... to be abandoned

Since returning to Bucharest I have followed literally the Department's instruction to avoid contact with Romanian political leaders while at the same time Russian officials obviously have received no instruction to interrupt their daily audiences with Romanian political leaders whose parties are represented in the Groza Government. This Mission's reserved attitude has resulted in a dampening of the spirits of the democratic leaders whereas the Soviet officials' heartening attitude has encouraged the arrogance and willful misrepresentation of NDF leaders. I fear that the continuance of our present tactics will assist in bringing about the defeat of the policies to which the American Government has publicly adhered. I suggest, therefore, that the ban placed upon this Mission's activities be removed and that from the United States we give encouragement to the Romanian people and leaders by more press and radio publicity on the

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* Cf. *FRUS 1945*, V, pp. 605-606: Berry to the Secretary of State. Telegram 641, September 4. Repeated Moscow as 190 and London as 13.

Romanian situation and by beaming some of this publicity to Romanian listeners.

September 5 *The Social Democrats' position*

With over a hundred party members under arrest and repeated open threats being made against the life of its leader, Titel Petrescu, the Social Democratic Party, which locally holds a key position in the present government crisis, is hedging on its original position.

None of the Social Democrat ministers have withdrawn from the Government and one of them, Stefan Voitec, with the party undecided as to its advisability, has accompanied Premier Groza and Foreign Minister Tatarescu to Moscow.

As yet neither Mr. Petrescu nor the Executive Committee of the party has taken exception to the communique of the government published yesterday which, if unchallenged, would appear to signify the party's tacit acquiescence in the continuance of the present government. This would be in direct conflict with Petrescu's advice to the King and the three-point statement delivered to the Groza Cabinet and which our government was authorized to make public.

In addition to the continuous threats by their Communist colleagues in the Government, the Socialists are impressed with the apparently strong position of the Soviet Government and the fact that there has been no confirmation that the three Allies were actually conferring upon the Romanian political situation as requested in our government's note of August 23.

Their ministers in the Government must remain in their ministerial posts provisionally

Seeing that the King has been placed in an awkward position, the Social Democrats argue that any precipitant action on their part, such as withdrawal from the Government, might be the signal for anarchy and bloodshed throughout the country. Consequently they feel that until a definite agreement has been reached by the Three Great Powers, their ministers in the Government must remain in their ministerial posts provisionally, as a bridge between the Communists on one hand and the King and opposition parties not represented in the Government on the other, with a view to the eventual formation of a government of all major political parties.

September 5* *"We must reply to Mr. Molotov's letter"*

Mr. Molotov's reply to the note addressed by Ambassador Harriman to him on August 23 on the situation in Romania justifies the fears Romanians have felt and I have expressed to the Department recently, for the note gives further indication of the desire of the Soviet Government to retard a discussion and circumvent an honest settlement of the Romanian problem.

Whereas the Western democracies have worked through word and deed toward preparing for the establishment of democratic institutions in Romania, there are persistent indications that the Soviet Government is working toward a different goal.

The three numbered points in Mr. Molotov's letter are such patent falsifications of the facts that answering them in the customary diplomatic language admittedly is a problem. The third point, when applied to the English and American representatives in Romania, is such a colossal distortion that even Mr. Vishinsky must have chuckled over it.

As seen from this level our course is clear. We must, if we are going to make good our commitments in Romania, reply immediately to Mr. Molotov's letter and in our reply, state in firm and clear language that we do not accept the Soviet analysis of the Romanian situation. We should proceed to reiterate our request for immediate consultation which shall be preceded by the resignation of the Groza Government, that Government, of course, continuing to serve as an interim government pending a solution of the Romanian problem by the three principal Allies. This seems to me to be a minimum of what we can accept from the Soviets.

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* Cf. *FRUS 1945*, V, pp. 608-609: Berry to the Secretary of State. Telegram 646, September 5. Repeated London as 15 and Moscow as 202.

September 6 *Titel Petrescu's position*

I have just received a signed statement from Titel Petrescu to the effect that on September 5 he transmitted to the Socialist newspaper, *Libertatea*, a copy of the three-point declaration made in the name of the party at the Council of Ministers' meeting on August 24, and transmitted to the Department. Mr. Petrescu finally decided to take this action as a challenge to the communiqué published by the government on September 4 and to clarify publicly the present position of the Social Democratic Party.

The Government's censors retained the declaration, refusing to allow its publication. This action on the part of the censors prompted Mr. Petrescu to forward his signed statement to the American and British missions and, as reassurance of his party's support, he likewise sent a signed copy of the declaration to the King.

In connection with Minister Voitec's journey to Moscow together with other members of the NDF Government, Mr. Petrescu also provided the Mission with a signed copy of the minutes of the Political Bureau's meeting of September 3 in which the advisability of Mr. Voitec's journey was discussed. The question was put to a vote, four members voting against his departure and five, including Voitec, for it. It was unanimously decided, however, that Minister Voitec could not discuss or make any engagements in the name of the party except in matters pertaining to a cultural convention between the two countries. In particular he was forbidden to engage in any discussions concerning the formation of a new government.

From statements made this morning to a reliable informant, it appears that Mr. Petrescu, supported by the vast majority of the party and at least three of the members of its Political Bureau, has decided to adhere to the original firm position outlined in the three-point statement, avoiding if possible an irreparable open break with the Communists. Mr. Petrescu has convoked a congress of the Social Democratic Party for the first part of October, the principal object of which he states will be the elimination from the party of Lotar Radaceanu and others who were considered to have compromised the party by aligning themselves with the Communists.

September 8 *Socialist Minister Lothar Rădăceanu...*

In continuation of the Government's attempt to bolster its position, all papers on September 7, with glaring exception of *Libertatea*, official paper of Social Democratic Party, published statement of Socialist Minister Radaceanu at press conference under headlines "Social Democratic Party Gives Entire Support to Petru Groza Government."

In answer to question of *Herald Tribune* correspondent regarding 3-point declaration of Socialist Party broadcast by Voice of America, Radaceanu, according to papers, denied that such statement had been made. He asserted that he had declared at Council of Ministers meeting: "The Socialist Party considers that in Romania there can only exist a government recognized by the Soviet Union. We wish that this government should also be recognized by England and the United States. The Social Democratic ministers and party unanimously support the Petru Groza Government."

"...more Communist than Socialist"

It appears that Radaceanu, commonly known to be more Communist than Socialist, is attempting to undermine his party's position and to brand Voice of America's report as a false rumor.

In an attempt to correct false impression created by Radaceanu's published statement, Titel Petrescu requested the party paper *Libertatea* to add the correct declaration as a footnote to Radaceanu's statement, but this was forbidden by the censors. Consequently, *Libertatea* refused to publish Radaceanu's statement. As a result the fact that there is internal dissension among prominent members of the Social Democratic Party is becoming obvious to the public.

September 9 Izvestia*'s article republished in the Romanian Communist newspapers:*

All newspapers, date-lined September 10, carry *Izvestia*'s article of September 8 entitled "Concerning the Question of the Romanian

Government."[1] Communist papers give article full front page coverage under banner headlines of "Position of the Soviet Union vis-à-vis Romanian Government," "King of Romania Has No Objection to Groza Government," "Who Brought Pressure Upon the King?"

Charges ... and... praises

Using all Soviet arguments known to our Government, article states King Michael's request to Three Allies for assistance resulted from pressure exerted upon him by British and American representatives of ACC who insisted that King request resignation of Groza Government. Article states the King declared to Soviet representatives he had no objection to Groza Government, and that he had only raised the question of its resignation because of declarations made by British and American representatives. Article asks, if such a procedure can be characterized as "action of a constitutional factor" being made because of American and British pressure, what is considered intervention in internal affairs of a state and concludes that it is not strange that Groza Government under these conditions saw no reason to resign.

In heavy print article charges that action of American and British representatives was taken without consent and without prior notification to Soviet colleague, violating established order of work of Control Commission. Commenting on this statement, article claims that this unilateral action violates political coordination of Three Allies and that public opinion in the United States and Great Britain is not at all informed as to truth of events in Romania.

The article repeats the Soviet charges that the Sanatescu and Radescu governments, under the direct influence of Maniu and Bratianu, were reactionary and fascist, sabotaging systematically fulfillment of Armistice and jeopardizing security of the Red Army in Northern Transylvania. It repeats the Soviet belief that Groza Government is one of concentration of democratic forces and that Maniu and Bratianu, because of their alleged refusal to participate in this Government, now find themselves in the situation of generals without troops.

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[*] See also Schuyler, *Diary*, Ms. pp. 296-297: "Romanian papers republish *Izvestia* article criticizing US and British 'political meddling' in Romania."

It lists achievements of Groza Government in past six months and states its conviction that through these achievements Groza Government has fulfilled all requirements of a democratic government adopted by the Three Powers at Crimea Conference. It claims all impartial observers are convinced that inclination of popular masses in Romania does not in any manner correspond with policies of reactionaries such as Maniu and Bratianu.

Referring to articles in the foreign press which compare the Romanian question with that of Poland, the article remarks that taking cognizance of the recent episode of the famous Polish question, more intelligent voices warn England and the United States lest they repeat the same policies vis-a-vis Romania.

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Soviet public opinion

In conclusion the article states that the position of Soviet public opinion is clear. It firmly adheres to its position that in principle intervention in internal affairs of Romania, which is an independent and sovereign state, is inadmissible and that it is ridiculous to believe that interference on behalf of the anti-democratic forces is in interests of democracy in Romania.

September 10 *Arrests and trials of NPP and NLP youth organizations members*

The trial of the members of the youth organizations reported arrested on August 29 and charged with being leaders of clandestine organizations aiming at the overthrow of the government and the assassination of some of its members, is being trumped up by Communist members of the Government into an important event. The purpose obviously is to implicate seriously the organizations of the National Peasant and National Liberal parties thus providing evidence for Mr. Molotov to use in support of his claim that these two parties are fascist and hence cannot be represented in a Romanian government.

The Mission understands that the arrested youths possessed no arms, save one shotgun and four cartridges not useable by that gun, with which to carry out alleged plans for assassinations. But evidence was obtained that they printed and distributed leaflets criticizing certain policies of the Groza Government and demanding its replacement by a government which would assure civil liberty and freedom of speech. In other words, some young people in a clandestine and amateurish form, colored by youthful impetuosity, printed political manifestos which, under a regime of press freedom, the opposition parties would have printed in their newspapers in a more tempered and mature form.

I have been informed by letters from the accused, from their parents and by persons who are in a position to know that the arrested youths were detained for forty days incommunicado by the secret police of the Interior Ministry and tortured by Gestapo methods. I am reliably informed that the General presiding over the Court Martial concluded his investigation on September 4 and expressed the opinion that there was not sufficient evidence to indict the accused. Accordingly, the Communists devised a scheme for destroying the concluded proces-verbal of the Court Martial and reopening the investigation under the presidency of a Colonel especially chosen for his reputation of not giving way to qualms of conscience.

Although contrary to the dispositions of the Romanian Military Penal Code, according to which the accused must remain in the prison of the military tribune, I am informed that the secret police have again taken five of the accused for the purpose of extracting new confessions from them. These will be used as added evidence in the hearings which reopened this morning.

September 10 *"The status and operations of the ACCommissions in Romania, Hungary, and Bulgaria"*

There follow (Top Secret) detailed answers* to points 1 through 5 as listed by the Department on September 8.** The information received from General Schuyler under each point is set forth between quotes:

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* Cf. *FRUS 1945*, V, pp. 609-614: Berry to the Secretary of State, Telegram 663, September 10. Sent to London as 24. *"Top Secret"* specification is omited in the printed form.

** Not printed. The five points are mentioned in *FRUS 1945*, V, p. 609, footnote 96. They concern "the status and operations of the ACCommisions in Romania, Hungary, and Bulgaria: (1) current position of American representatives on the Control Commissions and of the American political representatives; (2) the degree of American participation in the formation of directives to the local governments; (3) the difficulties in the circulation of American officials and the admission of and reporting by press correspondents; (4) the limitations on access to local information and officials; (5) the obstacles to the protection of American nations and interests (740.00119 Council/9-845)."

I. Current position of the American representatives

1. General Schuyler states: "Status of US representative on Control Commission is governed by statutes promulgated by General Susaikov 17 August 1945. These statutes establish rights and privileges of the US representatives exactly paralleling rights and privileges of the US Representatives in the Hungarian ACC. The US Representative has his own staff of 17 officers and 32 enlisted men established in a building several blocks from the Russian ACC headquarters. No American officer is expected to visit Russian ACC headquarters unless accompanied by the Russian liaison officer who is assigned to the US Representation. Chief US and British representatives meet with the Deputy Chairman, ACC three or four times each month, at which times questions presented in advance by British and US representatives are answered by the Deputy Chairman. In addition, at certain of these meetings representatives of the Romanian Government are present and present reports covering certain Romanian governmental activities. Senior officers on the staff of the Chief US Representative meet occasionally with Russian officers who are Chiefs of various Sections of the ACC (Military, Naval, Economic, and Air Sections). The procedure at these meetings follows the procedure at meetings of Chief Representatives.

In addition to the scheduled joint meetings, a number of important matters have been brought to the attention of the Deputy Chairman by letters addressed to him by the Chief US Representative. In the course of the past seven months, approximately 90 such letters have been written conferring a large range of subjects, as for example, protection of American property, questionable activities of the Romanian Government, deportation of German nationals to Russia, size and composition of the Romanian Army, personal safety of important Romanian political leaders, freedom of the press, and details of working procedures for the ACC Romania. Of these letters, less than 20% have been answered either verbally or in writing. In a few other cases, it has been evident that action on the matters presented actually was taken by the ACC Deputy Chairman. In the majority of cases, however, there has been no indication of any sort that the matters raised were ever given consideration."

The US Mission in Bucharest. Its status and activities

The United States Mission in Bucharest was set up independently of the United States representation on the Allied Control Commission and so from its inception did not consider itself bound by the statutes of the Control Commission. As it existed prior to the arrival of the American Representative on the Control Commission, its status and activities were explained directly to the local Soviet authorities. It was accepted by them in accordance with this explanation. Its activities within Romania have never been questioned or interfered with by the Soviet authorities. However, when clearances are required for members of its staff to enter or leave Romania it is obliged to fall in with the practices established by the Control Commission. In all matters concerning the Control Commission, this Mission operates through General Schuyler's office.

Upon its arrival the Mission was welcomed by the Romanian Government then in power. The same cordial relations continued with the succeeding government but with the present Government of Dr. Groza the Mission has had no social or protocolar relations. Nevertheless, the Mission continues to maintain close contact with the Government upon the administrative level. Informal letters addressed by the Mission to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs have normally received prompt and courteous replies.

2. *American participation in the formation of directives to local authorities*

2. General Schuyler states: "At no time since our arrival here last November has any US Representative participated in the formulation of any important directive to the Romanian Government. The ACC procedures of 17 August 1945 prescribe that the Deputy Chairman shall discuss questions of principle with US and British representatives before the issuance to the Romanian Government of directives covering these questions. However, no such discussions have as yet taken place. At no time since last November has any US Representative been permitted by the Russians to inspect any document of any nature delivered to the Romanian Government by the ACC. Certain instructions of a minor nature have been reported to US Representatives subsequent to their delivery, and one or two minor matters, such as the calling up of additional recruits for the Romanian army, were discussed at ACC meetings prior to the issuance of instructions."

3. Difficulties of American officials and press correspondents

3. General Schuyler states: "(a) US officials are authorized complete freedom of circulation throughout Romania, except for that portion of the Danube River between Braila and the Black Sea (Sulina). The Chief US ACC Representative recently was specifically denied access to this portion of the Danube by the Deputy Chairman, ACC, who stated that such portion was under the control of the Soviet High Command and not of the ACC Romania. (b) Great difficulty has been experienced in securing clearance for entry into Romania of US press representatives. Although over one month has now passed since the Potsdam Conference, only one press representative has been authorized by the ACC to enter Romania, and his clearance was not received until 7 September. The names of 14 press correspondents have been officially submitted to the ACC for clearance, some of these as long as six months ago. We have had frequent promises that clearances would be arranged, but thus far only one such clearance has come through. In the matter of difficulties in securing release of press reports, I believe the United States Mission has full information."

(a) From the time of the arrival of the officers of the Mission no restriction has been placed upon their movement within the country. There was little occasion to move around during the winter months but in the month of May in preparation of my trip home for consultations I traveled by motor car more than three thousand miles over Romanian roads. Although one passes Soviet control points in entering and leaving each city, I was permitted to pass freely upon the display of my documents.

(b) In March 1, I complained to Mr. Vishinsky, who was then in Bucharest, that the ACC had failed to act upon applications of many journalists who desired to come to Romania. He took note of my complaint. Two weeks later four American journalists were flown in from Moscow, permitted free circulation in Romania, and then flown back to Moscow. Such stories as they tried to send out from Bucharest were badly cut by the censor. As a result no one attempted to send out a true story and no important story from that group of journalists reached America until Leigh White arrived in Rome two months later. Since the departure of that group at the end of March, only two American journalists have visited Romania. They arrived on August 30 without the approval of the ACC but left with its approval on September 8. A single American journalist was cleared this week with the ACC. Thus between the end of March and the present time only one American journalist has been authorized to come to Romania although the applications of at least fourteen have been pending, some of them since last November.

The Romanian censorship is such that the last two journalists that came here said that they would not return and would advise against any of their colleagues coming here until American journalists were able to send out their stories without having them garbled by the Romanian censor to the point where their context is changed.

4. Limitations on access to local information and officials

4. General Schuyler states: "Under the terms of the 17 August 1945 procedures, members of the United States Representation can contact Romanian officials only through the Chairman or Deputy Chairman, ACC. No direct official contacts between US Representatives and Romanian Government officials are authorized. Of course, considerable local information is obtained by members of the US Representation from Romanian individuals through personal and unofficial contacts, many of which are social in nature. However, any information received officially from the Romanian Government must pass through the Deputy Chairman, ACC, or his Russian Representative. On many occasions, in conformance with this procedure, we have requested Russian assistance in securing information from the Romanians. In every case, the information was received after delays of from two weeks to several months and was couched in such general and nonspecific terms as to be almost useless for our purposes."

As this Mission is not restricted by the rules of the ACC it has received promptly from official Romanian sources copies of ACC directives to the Romanian Government and copies of replies of the Romanian Government to these directives. Occasionally, the Mission has received the latter before they were received by the Soviet authorities. Thus on an informal and personal basis, the Mission has had through local Romanian officials access to a full measure of local information.

5. Obstacles to the protection of American individuals and interest

5. General Schuyler states: "Chief difficulties in this regard have been as follows: (a) Russian seizure of machinery, supplies, and other items belonging to US owned oil companies. In cases of this type, the Chief US Representative has protested to the Deputy Chairman, ACC, and has requested that either the property be returned or that seizures be suspended pending consultations by US and Russian governments. In one such case, involving four American-owned tank cars, assurances were given that cars would be returned, but to date, this has not been accomplished. In the other, and more important cases, the requests were disregarded and seizures continued as originally scheduled by the Russians.

(b) In certain other cases, individuals claiming US citizenship have been seized by the Russians as Saxons and deported to Russia in disregard of certificates and other documentary evidence tending to indicate US citizenship. Letters addressed by the US Representative to the Deputy Chairman protesting these seizures and calling for the return of the individuals concerned have brought no results.

(c) In two cases, commercial organizations in which the majority stock interests are American, have been treated by the Romanian Government as enemy property, and have had Romanian administrators appointed to control their operations. Protests by the US ACC Representative to the ACC Deputy Chairman have thus far elicited no reply.

(d) Serious delays and difficulties have been encountered in securing clearance for entry into Romania by American businessmen and philanthropists closely associated with legitimate American interests in this country. Certain of these individuals have actually been refused entry, a few have been cleared after delays of several months' duration, and in at least two cases, clearance applications which were submitted over six month's ago are still pending, no answer having been received even after repeated reminders.

(e) Administrative delays and obstacles in .every-day operation of US Missions, Bucharest, are continually being encountered. Many of these must be considered prejudicial to the interests and prestige of the United States. For example, a regularly scheduled and properly cleared administrative airplane flight to Bucharest from Italy recently could not be made on the date specified because of bad weather. Our application to have the plane come in on the following day was rejected with a statement that an entire new clearance would have to be arranged, necessitating a delay of at least five days."

As this Mission has no means of exerting direct pressure upon the Groza Government for the protection of American citizens and their property, and it is doubtful if that government would have the authority to protect such property even if it desired to do so, it has been necessary where citizens or their property have been jeopardized to work for their protection through General Schuyler's office. His office issues certificates to cover property that is American-owned. When such property is taken or damaged he asks redress according to circumstances through the ACC or directly of Romanian authorities. Thus, the difficulties that the General has set forth above accurately describe the situation both for the American representative on the ACC and for the United States Mission in Romania.

September 10

It will be most useful to know if you have delivered the Department's note to the Soviet Government.

September 11 *Journalists' entry approved:*

ACC has approved entry of following named journalists: David Darah, Reuben Markham, Donald Werner, Joe Levy, Aldo Forte, Sam Brewer, Clay Gowran, Joseph Israels, Harold Lehrman, Mary Thayer, Frank O'Brien.

September 11 *Changes in the composition of the Court Martial*

The composition of judges in the Court Martial trial of the members of youth organizations has been changed for the third time. It is apparent that the Communists are determined to find three military officers who will do their bidding and deliver a unanimous decision condemning the accused.

Colonel Petrescu, who replaced the presiding judge, General Cretzulescu, is said to have attempted to obtain a promise to condemn the accused from Major Gileoveanu, a military magistrate of career. The latter, evidently a man of some principles, reportedly stated to the Colonel that his decision would be taken in accordance with the evidence produced during the trial and not otherwise. Yesterday the defense requested the court for a postponement of the trial to enable them to properly study the dossiers and to have contact with their clients in order to prepare the defense. This request was refused by a two to one decision of the judges, Major Gilcoveanu being of the opinion that the request was legitimate. Consequently, today he has been replaced by another judge.

Major Gilcoveanu has been replaced by Lt. Col. Tascau, former chief of censorship under Antonescu, and former director of the prison of Tîrgu Ocna, whose dossier is already before the Peoples' Court for trial as a war criminal and accordingly is at the mercy of the Communists. The same is true of Colonel Petrescu, presiding magistrate, who is famous for harsh sentences handed down against Communists in 1940. Following the coup d'etat of August 23, Colonel Petrescu was among the first officers to be placed on the inactive list. He received orders placing him again on the active list on September 8, so that he could preside over the trial on September 9. The dossier for the arrest and judgment by the People's Court of Colonel Petrescu has likewise been completed.

The third judge, Lt. Col. Olteanu, an officer in the Tudor Vladimirescu Division, who was captured at Stalingrad, is said to be on the Soviet list of war criminals.

The Decree Law promulgated by Antonescu

Not being able to find a law on which to condemn the accused, the government has reverted to the famous Decree Law No. 236 of February 6, 1941, promulgated by Antonescu for the purpose of eliminating all political parties and opposition to his regime; article 16 of which provides for doubling the penalty for anyone convicted of a crime, provided for in this law, if the crime is committed by a Jew, a person of ethnical origin other than Romanian, or by a Communist. The defense has tried to prove to the court that this law has been abrogated by a Royal decree of September 2, whereby King Michael restored the Constitution of March 29, 1923, article 5 of which provides that regardless of ethnical origin, tongue, or religion, Romanians may enjoy freedom of conscience, freedom of teaching, freedom of press, freedom of assembly, and freedom of association. This decree likewise repeals the decree laws of 1940 granting Marshal Antonescu the royal prerogatives to promulgate decree laws and all laws subsequently promulgated on the basis of those laws.

The defense has likewise advanced the argument that the Court Martial is not competent to try the case, since it has not been constituted by virtue of a decree law signed by the King. The Court, however, has rejected both of these objections without explanation. Accordingly, the interrogation of the accused commenced today, and the trial is scheduled to continue throughout the night.

September 12 *"Before Military Tribunal"*

Following is resume of declaration made before Military Tribunal September 11 by some of accused youths:

Dinu Manciulescu denied veracity of statement given Secret Service (Siguranta) since it was dictated for his signature after being maltreated. He was forced to say falsely he knew Colonel Emmens, an American officer.

Dan Cernovodeanu accused of being member of "T" organization and distributing clandestine paper, stated he was kept in cell without food and threatened with further solitary confinement if he did not make certain declaration concerning the King. He requested court to go into secret session so that he might reveal atrocities and pressure to which he was submitted to obtain statements compromising the King.

Remus Tetu denied veracity of any declaration given Secret Police and stated that under Antonescu regime as student under auspices of former Dean of University, Prof. Stoicescu, he had fought against legionnaires and published democratic paper. He admitted publishing *Vapaia* criticizing present Government for lack of freedom of press and democracy. He stated Inspector Petrovici hit him fifty times on back with a belt covered by wet napkin and that he was then asked what connections he had with Major Porter of British Mission and Colonel Emmens of American Mission, Bratianu, Maniu, and Radescu, to which he replied he knew only the Romanian politicians. He stated Chief Commissar Boltz and Prosecutor Grigoriu of Secret Service told him: "We want to compromise the historical parties and certain political personalities of Romania." They said, according to Tetu's testimony, that they would get these declarations from him at any cost and proceeded to give him a form with questions which indicated he had intended to kill Teohari Georgescu, Ana Pauker, Petre Groza, and Anton Alexandrescu. He said that naturally under pressure of torture he signed the statement, but in court today he denied veracity of these statements with exception of printing and distributing the paper *Vapaia*. He claimed his head was beaten against the wall to obtain explanations regarding his connections with American and British missions.

Nicu Georgescu stated he was forced to give declaration which was no longer in dossier that Tetu had received weapons from British Legation and that they had Anglo-American support for their movement.

Adriana Georgescu, female, former Secretary of General Radescu stated she was arrested at four in the morning, that she was taken to room where she saw Tetu who had been terribly maltreated; and that Commissar Boltz threatened her. That Dr. Stroescu of the Secret Service maltreated her beating her head against the wall and then placed her in cell with woman suffering from epilepsy and that she had been raped. At the prison of Calea Plevnei she stated she was forced to shout through the window "Tell them at the American Legation and English Legation that the Communists have arrested me."

September 12 *Additional depositions*

In secret session last evening of Court Martial trial of Romanian youths which was attended by member of General Schuyler's Mission, Remus Tetu attempted to describe questions he was forced to answer which were intended to compromise the King. The presiding magistrate, however, prohibited Tetu from revealing this information on the grounds that this evidence was not being utilized in the trial. Tetu did however describe in detail the methods of torture exerted upon them, stating that he still had festering wounds on his knees from being dragged over a rough floor and that his testicles had been hit by a pen, the pen point not having been removed.

Adriana Georgescu testified in the secret session that when she was taken to the prison at Calea Plevnei she was tied to a bed, blindfolded, and raped. She stated that she did not know who had raped her but that Commissar Boltz was present at the time she was blindfolded. She stated that she believed she was pregnant.

September 12 *Assasinations... at Constanta*

From a very reliable source it has been reported that some days ago in Constanza, a Romanian citizen, Lieutenant Commander Turkin, mysteriously disappeared. His wife reported the matter to the Military Tribunal of Constanza which commenced an inquiry. The military officer in charge of the investigation, Captain Balzac, discovered that the Commander had been assassinated in the prefecture of Constanza by a group of Communists and members of a legionary party. Since Captain Balzac was well on the way of uncovering a very nasty and embarrassing affair for the present government, on September 10 he was shot and killed by shots coming from a passing automobile. A Soviet patrol which happened to be passing by, and being unaware of the cause for the shooting, promptly stopped the car and arrested the occupants, who turned out to be a commissar of police recently nominated by the Groza Government, a chauffeur of the Frontul Plugarilor Party at Constanza, and a chauffeur of the Communist Party.

Since this scandal could not be covered up, it is reported that Mr. Bodnaras, Chief of the Secret Service, and General Popescu, Chief of the General Security office of the country, went to Constanza to inquire into the matter. The Prefect of Constanza, Mr. Dousha, known to be a former member of the Legionnaires, was called to Bucharest to give explanations to the Ministry of Interior.

It is reported that 8 persons involved in the assassination of Captain Balzac have been arrested.

This is just another of a series of instances which represent "the democratic character" and methods of operation of party adherents of the Groza Government.

September 13 *Trial continued...*

The Court Martial trial of members of youth organizations which was in session yesterday from 8 a.m. until 1 a.m. this morning was devoted almost entirely to questioning of witnesses, who without exception testified favorably for the accused. The Prosecuting Attorney did not question a single witness.

Maniu decided against appearing

Mr. Maniu was scheduled to appear as a witness in the afternoon, but the Communists sent three truckloads of workers to create an incident upon his arrival, shouting "Down with Maniu." Learning of this, Mr. Maniu decided against appearing.

At 10 p.m. the prosecuting attorney began presentation of the state's case against the accused. To the surprise of all, his presentation was, in the opinion of attending lawyers, the weakest ever heard. Evidently he received new instructions from the government to change the original plan of demanding harsh sentences. He requested acquittal for one, and extenuating circumstances for all others except Remus Tetu of the National Liberal Party and Virgil Isac of the National Peasant Party.

It is reported from a moderate Communist source that in the evening of September 11, Colonel Petrescu, the presiding magistrate, informed Ministry of Interior Georgescu that even he could not deliver a harsh sentence on the basis of existing evidence.

It is interesting to note that in his indictment the prosecuting attorney stated that the truly guilty ones had not been interrogated by the Secret Service. He stated that they will be the second lot to be tried and from a political aspect their trial is much more important. He identified the second lot as the teachers of the youths now on trial, obviously referring to prominent members of the National Liberal and Peasant parties.

Although at 10:30 this morning 20 more lawyers were to speak in the defense of the accused, the presiding magistrate stated that the case would have to be closed by 1 p.m. today.

September 13 *Minister Pătrăşcanu's address*

It is interesting to note that last evening Justice Minister Lucretiu Patrascanu, recently reported by moderate elements of the Communists to have definitely identified himself with the extremists, delivered an address on the occasion of celebrating the first year since the signature of the Armistice at Moscow, in which only a single mention was made of the Groza Government.

Mr. Patrascanu limited himself to reviewing in a serious and subdued manner the responsibilities assumed by Romania under the Armistice, the fact that the act of August 23 assured the country of the rights of life, liberty, and independence and, in conclusion, stressed the difficult problems of reconstruction of the country and establishment of a true democracy which still must be mastered.

September 13 *"In order to prepare the country for free elections"*

Subsequent to the coup d'etat on August 23, 1944 Romania has had three coalition political governments and one Russian-imposed minority government. Whereas the three coalition governments did not achieve much success, because of lack of forward cohesive *effort* on the part of the members, it is certain that any coalition government following the Groza Government would find the task even more difficult.

As one of the first tasks of the next government will be the restoration of the freedom of the press in order to prepare the country for free elections, we may expect each of the minority groups, who now hold positions in the government out of proportion to their representative strength in the country, to seek to maintain their present status. From the militant section of the Communist Party, who during the past six months has infiltrated its members into key governmental positions and which has never surrendered its arms, we may expect active sabotage against any except a Left-concentrated government.

With the experiences of the past in mind and looking towards the future, my British colleague and several Romanian political leaders, including moderate Communists, have privately expressed the thought that the internal difficulties of Romania have been aggravated to such a point that there can be no solution save one brought about through a government of neutral technicians which, of course, would have to be guided and closely supervised by a tripartite Allied Control Commission.

The Department will recall that the Soviet Government, reflecting the will of the Romanian Communist Party, vetoed the plan of the Romanian political leaders for a government of technicians to succeed General Radescu's government. Looking back it is easy to understand why the Romanian Communists opposed a government of technicians. In the absence of other commitments it is understandable too why the Soviet Government should back up that point of view. But now world opinion has reason to expect, in view of the Potsdam Communique, that this attitude of the Soviet Government has been altered.

Some people locally see a basis for hope that the Soviet Government might, after the departure of the Groza Government, be willing to underwrite a government of the technicians since a strong rein on that government will still be in Soviet hands through the chairman of the ACC. Should a government of technicians not be acceptable in its entirety, although in principle, it is believed that it would be feasible if the Prime Minister and the Ministers of Interior, Propaganda, War, and Foreign Affairs were non-party men.

September 13 *Next trial to follow... directed against Maniu and Bratianu*

Locally there are some indications that bear out the truth of the report transmitted through the British Embassy that Constantinescu Iasi has said that the Groza Government has decided to proceed with measures against reactionary elements and to apply these measures against Maniu and Bratianu.

The trial of the youths accused of subversive activities, as I have reported, is really an attempt to render impotent the historical political parties. During this trial both Maniu and Bratianu were called as witnesses. Both desired to testify but neither was able to appear. It is said that the next trial, which is unlikely to follow immediately the conclusion of the present trial, will not be directed against the small fry of the historical parties but personally against Maniu and Bratianu.

September 13 *Berry summoned to London*

At 11:00 o'clock the Communication Officer of the ACC telephoned me to come over and sit beside the radio as an important and urgent message was coming in for me. The message was from Offie[*] and said that he was sitting beside the transmitter by instructions of Secretary Byrnes in order to send to and receive from me a message. The message was that Secretary Byrnes wanted me to come to London immediately for the purpose of being present when Romania was being discussed by the Council of Foreign Ministers. Offie wanted an acknowledgment and a statement as to when I would leave Bucharest. I said that I would leave immediately upon securing clearance from the Russians. General Schuyler then sent Colonel Farnsworth to Baneasa where General Vinogradov, the Russian Clearance Officer, was waiting in a crowd of a hundred thousand people to welcome Premier Groza back from Moscow. Colonel Farnsworth found General Vinogradov, secured his consent to the flight, and telephoned me at 12:15 that the flight was cleared but the weather was very bad over Yugoslavia. I said that I would be ready and we should start at three o'clock, travelling south via Athens. We left in General Schuyler's plane on the dot, ran through rough weather over the Balkan Mountains, but reached Athens just at dusk. I telephoned Mr. MacVeagh, saw Theodore for a minute, and went to bed in the Grande Bretagne.

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[*] Offie, Gen. Joseph T. McNarney's political adviser at Caserta.

3. While in London, 1945 September 14 to 26[*]

September 14 *Arrival at London*

We left Athens at six o'clock and reached Caserta (Marchanese) at 10:30. Offie was awaiting me at the airport. We talked for half an hour and then I left in a special B-25, arrived at Orly Airfield at Paris three hours and forty-five minutes later, flying by the shortest route across Switzerland, and reached London at 5 o'clock. I went directly to the Embassy and worked until after midnight.

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[*] "Mr. Berry ordered to London to attend Council of Ministers Conference; Russian ACC needled into granting clearance in matter of hours.
At about 10:00 o'clock this morning, we received a radio from Caserta calling for Mr. Berry to leave at once for London. This to me was an encouraging sign, since it means that during the London discussions, we will be sure to have on the ground a representative who is thoroughly conversant with all phases of the local situation. He will thus be able to refute any Russian arguments and to present necessary evidence as to the true state of affairs here. Immediately after receipt of the radio we set to work on the Russian and by dint of much argument and much vigorous actioning three or four different sections of the Commission, we finally secured clearance for our plane to leave this afternoon. This was done in a matter of two or three hours. Unfortunately, the weather over the Balkan Mountains is bad; therefore we finally got Mr. Berry off in my plane for Greece, leaving about 3:00 o'clock. He should be in Caserta early tomorrow morning and in London probably some time tomorrow evening at the latest. With Mr. Melbourne on leave in Italy getting married, this leaves young Hulick as Senior State Department Representative in Romania. However, he is highly capabale and I feel sure he can hold down the job until Mr. Berry or Melbourne returns" (Schuyler, *Diary*, Ms. pp. 307-308).

Sentences in the trial of youth organizations…

In the meantime, Hulick, inasmuch as Melbourne was in Italy being married, reported from Bucharest that trial of "T" and "Tinerimea Libera" organizations of youths was concluded yesterday at 8 p.m. in a "democratic atmosphere" which only the adherents of the Groza regime could create. While defending lawyers, families of the accused and representatives of the British and American missions awaited results of the judges' deliberation, Communist riff-raff and intellectuals, totaling about 50, none of whom had ever been at the trial, began to infiltrate into the small crowded courtroom and, guided by Secret Service agents, pushed forward to the front of the room. When the verdict was read condemning Remus Tetu, head of "T" organization, to 7 years, Miss Adriana Georgescu to 4 years, Victor Isac of National Peasant Party to 5 years, and the others, with exception of three who were acquitted, to sentences of from one month to three years, the well-briefed Communists dutifully applauded their approval.

A result of General Schuyler's letter to General Susaikov

It is reliably reported that the sentences were decided upon by Minister of Interior Georgescu at noon yesterday while trial was still in process. As reported previously, the trial was based on decree law 236 of 1941, abrogated by the King's Decree of September 2, 1944. The defense built up its case on the fact that this law was not in force and on September 12, General Schuyler addressed a letter to General Susaikov, drawing the latter's attention, as chairman of the Control Commission, to the fact that Law 236 provided for racial discrimination, and was thus contrary to Article 6 of the Armistice Convention. Probably as a result of this letter, the presiding magistrate, under orders no doubt, in announcing the verdict, based the sentences upon provisions of a completely different law, namely No. 209 of the Penal Code, and this capped the illegal farce which has characterized this trial throughout.

Although some of the sentences are severe, it is the unanimous opinion of the lawyers that the presence of American and British observers throughout the trial was a most disturbing factor for the judges and prosecution, and that had they not been present, the trial would have been concluded more rapidly with considerably harsher sentences.

Remus Tetu's statement

Both the accused and their defending attorneys visibly derived hope and courage through the presence of official observers. Thus, Remus Tetu, when asked by the Court if he had any more to say in his defense, displayed courage. In a quiet but clear and impressive manner he stated "I have just received word that my main witness did not appear at the trial yesterday because he committed suicide as a result of being followed by agents and that Miss Nadejda Marinescu, one of the accused, is dying in a hospital as a result of mistreatment by Secret Service agents." He stated "I agree with the prosecuting attorney that not we who sit on the bench of the accused, but others, should sit here, although I am likewise convinced that the prosecuting attorney and I are thinking of an entirely different group of people. No matter how the decision falls, I will continue to believe in and fight for my country, the King, and liberty."

Other statements...

Likewise several outstanding defense attorneys, in addition to pointing out the illegal basis of the trial, frankly characterized the issue as political, and defined with clarity democracy as well as freedom of expression and freedom of press, pointing out that in a regime that respects these freedoms, which is supposed to exist in Romania today but does not in reality, criticism of political leaders or policy of the government does not constitute a crime.

All papers today published the sentences delivered by the Court without comment, which is in striking contrast with full front page coverage carried until today by the Communist papers, distorting facts and calling for maximum punishment.

Four cases postponed

Many people feel that the trial was a complete failure for the Communists, that the Military Court of Cassation will not uphold the decision, and that no attempt will be made to condemn the so-called "second lot." There are sufficient indications, however, that every preparation has been made to continue with the prosecution of a second lot, including outstanding members of the Liberal and Peasant parties, since sentences were not delivered for 4 of the accused, including Cernovodeanu, former school mate of the King, their cases being postponed so that their trial might be continued together with the "second lot."

September 14 *The King, Stalin's message, and Foreign Minister Tătărescu*

Hulick has been informed today by the King's private Secretary that immediately upon his arrival in Bucharest, Foreign Minister Tatarescu requested an audience with the King to deliver a personal message from Generalissimo Stalin. The King informed Mr. Tatarescu he had not changed his position, and that if Mr. Tatarescu had anything to communicate to him, he could do so in writing. Mr. Tatarescu replied that he could not deliver Stalin's message in writing, but that if Marshal Negel would come to his house, he would deliver it to the latter orally. Mr. Tatarescu was informed that the Marshal of the Court could not go to his house, but that he would be glad to receive Mr. Tatarescu at any time in the Palace. Mr. Tatarescu thereupon replied that he would be obliged to inform Stalin that his message could not be delivered.

According to the King's Secretary, Mr. Tatarescu delivered a lecture over the phone asking the Marshal of the Court what the King and his advisers expected to accomplish by their attitude. He stated that they were not well-informed, and wished to know in what sort of a dream world they were living. He asked the Marshal if he didn't realize that the Americans are thousands of miles away, whereas Russia bordered on Romania and Soviet troops were actually in the country.

"Molotov left for London with instructions"

The King's advisers have likewise heard, since the return of Premier Groza, that Mr. Molotov left for London with instructions to the effect that Russia cannot agree to changing the Groza Government which, from the Soviet point of view, is a government which assures the peace and security of Soviet Russia. Drawing conclusions from this information, the

Secretary reported the King is worried that the Conference of the Three Powers on the subject of his note may end in a deadlock with the Soviet Government adhering adamantly to its thesis, and the Anglo-American governments likewise remaining firmly by their position. The King is in a quandary as to what his next move would be if such a situation actually develops.

September 14 *The text of Stalin's message for the King*

The King's Secretary informed Hulick this evening that today the King received Mr. Scanavi, spokesman for Mr. Tatarescu, who reported on the latter's behalf the following:

When Premier Groza and party arrived in Moscow, they found that Russian officials from Generalissimo Stalin on down adopted a very cool attitude regarding the King and that Tatarescu had personally explained at great length the King's position, placing all the blame for the King's recent action on American and British pressure. He stated Tatarescu was convinced the Anglo-Americans would not succeed in bringing about the resignation of Groza's Government and consequently he had personally succeeded in covering the King for such an eventuality.

He stated Stalin's personal message for the King was as follows: "Mr. Stalin was convinced that the action taken by the King without consulting the Soviets was a result of Anglo-American pressure; that this initiative of the King does not weaken Stalin's confidence in the loyalty and friendship of the King and that Stalin thinks, in the interests of Romania and the Monarchy, the King should quickly find a solution for the present difficult situation."

The King's advisors are inclined to believe that the message is not genuine since, if it were, it would most likely have been delivered by the Soviet Ambassador or General Susaikov. The King will not repeat this alleged message or give it any credence unless he hears of it directly from Soviet representatives.

Mr. Scanavi also delivered a message from Mr. Tatarescu to effect that the latter upon his return noticed growing tension, particularly on the part of extra Leftist elements which were speaking of establishing a regency since they could not continue to operate under existing conditions. He assured the King that he would not have to worry about this since Mr. Tatarescu would personally see to it that other elements were armed in case of real trouble and that he would look after the King's interests.

September 15 *The Groza Delegation and the Moscow instructions*

A reliable informant advised Hulick today that Socialist Minister Voitec, who was present at Moscow, told him the Groza Delegation had received the following instructions from Moscow:

(1) The Government should not resign under any circumstances;

(2) The Government should utilize every means to establish good relations with the King, and

(3) Mr. Molotov assured them that Soviet troops would not be withdrawn from Romania until a Communist government was firmly established.

The same informant likewise reported that Titel Petrescu was so enraged by fact that his party paper *Libertatea* had given front page, banner headline coverage to the return of Premier Groza and party from Moscow, that he issued instructions to have his name removed as director of the paper and refused to attend the meeting last evening of Political Bureau of the party, stating that he had no desire to discuss matters with the present members of the Political Bureau.

September 16 *Additional "top secret" comment from General Schuyler*

There follows additional comment (Top Secret) from General Schuyler* contained in letter dated September 13 upon subject matter reported by Department on September 8 and by the Mission on September 10.**

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* Cf. *FRUS 1945*. V, pp. 619-620: The Acting Representative in Romania (Hulick) to the Secretary of State. Telegram 688. From Gen. Schuyler. September 16. Repeated to London for Berry as 38.

** See *supra* "September 10."

"In paragraph 3b of my outline, I referred to the difficulty experienced in securing clearance for newspaper correspondents to enter Romania and stated that of the 14 names of correspondents submitted to the ACC for clearance, only one had as yet been cleared. I think it only just to point out to you that the day after the preparation of this outline, a number of additional correspondents were cleared. At the present time, 11 of the 14 names officially submitted have received clearance."

"In paragraph 5c I mentioned that we had protested to the ACC the appointment of Romanian administrators for two commercial firms in which majority stock interests are American, and stated further that thus far these protests had elicited no reply. I now wish to add that a reply was received this morning from the Deputy Chairman, ACC. The reply calls for further proof of American ownership of these firms and demands data to permit of a full investigation of their trade liabilities. Thus while no positive action has been taken on our protests as yet, it is now apparent that the matter is under consideration.

"Again, under paragraph 5c of my outline, I quoted as an example of unnecessary obstacles to our administrative activities the fact that a regularly scheduled plane flight from Italy, canceled on account of weather, had to be cleared all over again, involving a delay of at least five days. I should now like to point out that this matter has been taken up officially with General Vinogradov and he has promised to take immediate steps so that in the future any properly cleared airplane flights which cannot take place due to bad weather may be automatically arranged for the following day. It is of course entirely possible that when Vinogradov considers further all the details of this new arrangement, it may turn out to be impracticable of application. We have not as yet had an example of its operation, and judging from past experiences, we may well expect further difficulties."

September 18 *Maniu's four point program; his discouragement over lack of action by US and UK*

In a meeting last evening with General Schuyler and Hulick requested by Mr. Maniu,[*] the latter analyzed Romania's political situation as follows:[**]

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[*] Schuyler, *Diary*, Ms. p. 310: "At Mr. Maniu's earnest request..."

[**] *Ibid.*: Maniu's "four point program for the immediate action in solving present crisis," (Ms. pp. 310-314).

(1) From economic and political view point, he feels it is essential that huge Soviet Army now bivouacked in Romania, in his judgment contrary to the Armistice stipulations, must be removed. He said normally Romania should not only be able to feed itself but to assist neighboring countries, although actually there was now reason to fear famine conditions in some regions and the obligation to feed a million Soviet soldiers would accelerate the approaching famine. He said, the Groza Government was doing nothing to combat famine conditions and it is his belief that this is a deliberate policy to sabotage in advance the chances of a new government to bring about order. (Comment: this last charge seems exaggerated.)

(2) He feels strongly that discussions in London on Romanian situation should not be prolonged since the Groza Government is utilizing every extra day to promulgate measures which will make it increasingly difficult for a new government to establish economic and political order. As examples he stated that the government has begun replacing high ranking generals appointed by royal decree with Communists adherents from the Tudor Vladimirescu Division by authority of ministerial decrees. He pointed out that over 1,600 members of his party were still in concentration camps without charges being made and without a hearing before a judicial tribunal. In this connection he stated a few days ago in Craiova 18 members of his party, including the Vice-President and Secretary General, had been arrested. As further illustrations of how Groza Government gains by each day of delay, Mr. Maniu stated that following expressed desire of King and Anglo-Americans, he has forbidden party to stage planned demonstrations, but he claimed in view of continued delay and repeated demonstrations staged by Groza Government this policy was difficult to justify. Both within the party and abroad it gives appearance of ineffectiveness of his party. Due to his party's discipline, Groza Government can state to world that it maintains order and enjoys support of popular masses.

(3) He emphasized that a compromise solution, if accepted by the Anglo-Americans in London, would be disastrous for the country and the King. He felt public opinion, although at present still supporting the King and violently opposed to the Groza Government, could not maintain this attitude if the Government continued in power much longer against the

will of the King and publicly expressed position of the United States and Great Britain. He has expressed his conviction that the present leadership of the Peasant Party, which for years had fought for the type of democracy upheld by the United States and Great Britain, could not survive a compromise solution in London. The opposition parties and public opinion could only interpret such a solution as proof that Anglo-Americans, in spite of public statements, were powerless to oppose Soviet Russia's desires in Balkans and that opposition parties would have to alter their policies to harmonize with those of Soviet Russia, which would remain supreme in Southeastern Europe.

Maniu's' repeated request, that US and UK accept opposition's representations...

Additionally to this analysis, Mr. Maniu said one of principal purposes of interview was to repeat request that United States and Great Britain accept two to three members of his party as unofficial representatives in our countries so that they could communicate directly with our officials and public opinion through our newspapers in an effort to explain position of Romania from opposition point of view and to combat hostile propaganda which, since 23 August, 1944, has been practically unopposed outside Romania. He drew a comparison of his position during period of German occupation when he had representatives in Switzerland, London, Turkey, Egypt, and United States, with whom he maintained secret contact, and his position as of August, 1944, up to present during which time he has been completely cut off from the outside world and silenced. He said his party brought continued pressure upon him to send out a few trusted representatives and that the party could not now accept previous Anglo-American excuses that acceptance of such representatives would be an act of indelicacy and poor faith vis-à-viş our Ally, Soviet Russia, in view of latter's grossly disrespectful action of inviting Premier Groza to Moscow for official conversations after King had requested latter's resignation and United States and Great Britain had officially declined to recognize Groza Government as democratic or representative. He illustrated his helpless position to combat criticism from within the party when, as a few days ago, a local newspaper headlined a Tass Agency message from New York quoting article of Detroit newspaper, "Romano-American" praising democratic character of Groza Government.

Maniu wished to send Dr. Manuilă to the United States

When asked who Mr. Maniu wished to send to the United States, he stated in confidence that he desired to send Dr. Sabin Manuila, present Chief of Romanian Statistical Institute, who had studied for many years in the United States and is well-known in government and university circles.

September 18 *Bodnaras as liaison between the Government and the King*

The King's secretary informed Hulick today that Mr. Lupu of the Peasant Party had sent three emissaries to speak with a responsible member of the government. They spoke with Emil Bodnaras, Communist, Secretary General of the Presidency. One of emissaries reported to Mr. Negel, Marshal of the Court, the substance of Mr. Bodnaras' remarks, apparently for purpose of acting as liaison between the government and the King.

Mr. Bodnaras was reported to have stated that Groza Government is attached to the King and does not desire to humiliate the crown. He explained that this was the reason the government had withdrawn at the last minute publication of its communiqué regarding Groza's visit to Moscow. The Government desired the King to receive Groza and all members of his delegation to hear a direct report of the Moscow conversations prior to publication of an official communiqué. Mr. Bodnaras stated that the Russians will be very angry if the King does not receive the Groza Delegation with which the Soviet Government had seen fit to conduct official negotiations. He stated that last night it was agreed to postpone publication of the communiqué for 24 hours, enabling the King, who, as the Marshal had explained, was not in Bucharest, to decide whether he would receive the delegation.

Bodnaras informed Lupu's emissaries of the Peasant Party

Mr. Bodnaras informed Lupu's emissaries that Messrs. Buzesti and Visoianu were responsible for the King's action; that the Americans and British have weakened their position; that they do not speak over radio concerning Romania any more; that Russia will postpone tripartite discussions for several months until another meeting of the Big Three; that as a result the King's popularity will subside; and that eventually the government will be forced to adopt Antonescu's system of promulgating decree laws without the King's signature or consent, but that it does not wish to push things this far. He stated the Government will soon forward decree laws to the King for signature concerning pay increases for the Army and civil servants, which were supposed to have been signed on August 23. If the King does not sign the Government proposes to request the King to declare publicly that he is ill and temporarily transfers his prerogatives to the government to sign decree laws.

According to Bodnaras, the Government wishes to cooperate with the King giving him 100 percent satisfaction and that it is ready to discuss question of broadening the basis of the government.

The King's Secretary stated that although he could not speak for the King, he was quite certain the latter would adhere to his policy of not receiving members of the Government or signing decree laws. He remarked, however, that the King and his advisers were somewhat alarmed by the apparent fact that tripartite discussions leading to a solution of the present impasse in Romania were not progressing, and they foresee considerable danger of the King losing popularity if the Government continues to inform civil servants throughout the country that the King is responsible for their not receiving wage increases which are sorely needed in view of steadily increasing prices and the approach of winter.

Considering the information given on September 14, it is the general consensus of opinion that the Government, including the Communist Party, is uncertain as to what steps it should take. They have undoubtedly been told to work for a local solution including the attempt to bring new personalities into the government, without taking steps which would bring about a complete open break between the government and the King.

September 18 *Pătrăşcanu blamed the American and British representatives*

Top Secret. In a private conversation yesterday, the substance of which has been reported to Hulick by a trustworthy informant, Justice Minister Patrascanu is reported to have said that the Soviets would not accept a government of technicians and that any new government would have to be one of coalition. He stated that the present situation was very bad and that he regretted it bitterly for the King. He blamed the intrigue of local American and British representatives and stated that they are only succeeding in making the King look ridiculous.

"Between Carol, King Michael, or a republic"

He expressed his opinion that Romania could not get along without the King; that there was no chance of Carol's coming back; that the choice was between King Michael or a republic; and he agreed that a republic would not work in Romania. (In connection with Carol, however, it may be added that in reply to a question of one of his political friends, Mr. Tatarescu is reported to have replied that he had discussed the question of Carol in Moscow since he believed it preferable to have Carol rather than Anna Pauker as responsible head of a Soviet-controlled Romanian Government.)

Mr. Patrascanu stated that by Wednesday a decision must be reached concerning the signature of decree laws providing for payment of government salaries and that if the King would not sign it, the government would have to do so without the King's consent.

Concerning "the stories of torture"

Asked whether there would be a trial of the so-called "second lot" of terrorists, Mr. Patrascanu said he did not yet know. When told by the person with whom he was conversing that the way in which the first batch of prisoners had been handled was a disgrace to the country, Mr. Patrascanu asked whether the former really believed in the stories of torture. When answered in the affirmative, he inquired whether the information was from a good source, to which he received the reply that it was unimpeachable. Mr. Patrascanu stated that he could not believe it since Teohari Georgescu, Minister of Interior, had personally assured him the torture stories were untrue. Asked what would happen if one of the victims died, he evaded giving an answer. Mr. Patrascanu admitted that two of the persons in the first trial were mentally unbalanced and he stated that the whole affair was really very unimportant. Nevertheless, he seemed disturbed at the amount of public attention paid to it, particularly with regard to the tortures.

To protect source this information should have strictly limited distribution.

September 18 *On "the mistreatment of the accused youths"*

The Secretary of the King informed Hulick today that Mr. Negrescu, one of the youths recently on trial and acquitted, had just been released from jail and told him that the stories of mistreatment of the accused youths, particularly the girls, were true. He stated that the conditions which he had observed while in prison in various jails during the past two months were indescribable. He reported that while he was detained in the prison of the Ministry of the Interior, he came across five army Colonels who had been arrested five months ago and whose whereabouts since that time have been generally unknown. He stated that they were in an appallingly weak physical condition, not having received sufficient food and that among other things, they had been flown to Moscow and back. Although he did not know as yet the exact reason for their arrest, he believed it was because of their connections with the Radescu Government.

Negrescu stated that to this day he did not know why he had been arrested or why after the arrest he had been acquitted.

September 19 *On the declining position of the Groza Government*

There is every indication that the position of the Groza Government is rapidly deteriorating and that in the very near future attempts will be made to form a new government.

Hulick has been reliably informed that on Saturday, September 15 in the Council of Ministers' meeting Mr. Tatarescu demanded that the Government take necessary steps to ease the economic and political situation in the country by restitution of liberty for industry and commerce, introduction of a plan for price control of food products, organization of transportation for servicing the Capital, the abolishment of concentration camps, and liberation of the thousands of citizens arrested under diverse pretexts by the Ministry of Interior. Mr. Tatarescu threatened that if the Government did not begin these reforms by Wednesday, September 19, he would resign, together with his friends, from the Government.

and on G. Tătărescu's virtual resignation

Friends of Mr. Tatarescu state that Mr. Groza, while in Moscow, presented a plan to Stalin for the nationalization in Romania of all means of transportation, banks; basic industry, such as coal, gold and iron mines, etc.; and that Mr. Tatarescu in a private interview with Stalin explained that economically Romania was not yet ready for such a plan. It is reported that Mr. Stalin replied that it was not necessary for Mr. Tatarescu to give details because he was well informed concerning the situation and he was in complete agreement with Mr. Tatarescu.

Yesterday a brief communique was published in all papers to the effect that the Prime Minister and Secretary General of the Presidency would not receive any one in audience until further notice. This communique is interpreted as meaning an official announcement that the Government is unable to carry out its function due to its inability to obtain the King's signature on essential decree laws.

This morning Hulick has been informed by several usually reliable sources that Mr. Tatarescu has left Bucharest and that he submitted his resignation last evening. It is said Groza and the Communists endeavored to get him to withdraw the resignation, but he is reported to have refused stating that he has the support of the Russians.

It is also reported this morning that Teohari Georgescu gave orders that no one should be allowed to enter the Ministry of Interior without his personal permission; that not even passes issued by the under-secretaries should be honored; and that the under-secretaries thereupon left the Ministry leaving Mr. Georgescu alone.

September 19 *Soviets' concessions*

Hulick has just received copies of four of the conventions signed at Moscow on September 11 concerning concessions made by the Soviets with respect to several of the articles of the Armistice.

Although General Schuyler will report in detail upon these conventions, the Department will be interested to note that in the convention concerning the reduction of deliveries which the Romanian Government has been obliged to make under Article Ten to Soviet troops in Romania, one paragraph of the convention stipulates that the Romanian Government will resume deliveries of certain foodstuffs for provisioning troops in Romania as of July 1, 1946, indicating that Soviet troops will remain in Romania indefinitely.

September 20 *Tătărescu's support for the Groza Government*

As of last evening there was no official confirmation that Mr. Tatarescu had actually carried out his threat to resign as reported on September 19. In fact late in the evening Hulick received a copy of a speech which it is said Mr. Tatarescu plans to deliver shortly and which would indicate his wholehearted support for the Groza Government.

September 21 *Confusion and tension*

The political atmosphere for the past few days has been very confused and charged with tension. Cabinet meetings have been scheduled every day, but postponed at last minute for following day. Concerning Tatarescu, there has been no confirmation of his resignation, although reports that he demanded radical changes in government policy have been confirmed and his friends are carrying on active whispering campaign stating that the government will accept his program. It is reported that one reason for continual postponement of cabinet meetings has been Mr. Tatarescu's desire to first obtain NDF acceptance of his proposals prior to discussion thereof by the Cabinet.

According to reports from members of Socialist Party, there has been real danger of the party separating into 2 factions, one headed by Petrescu, the other Lotar Radaceanu. Hulick is informed that the Political Bureau of the party has been meeting daily in effort to arrive at solution which would preserve unity of party.

The King's strike... persists

The King's Secretary informs Hulick several decree laws concerning pay increases, prolongation of the People's Courts and new law concerning the carrying of weapons have been presented to the King for signature. He states new efforts have been made to persuade the King to resume signing decree laws, with warnings that there will be dire consequences if he refused to do so. The latest warning came from General Rascanu, who states that on Saturday the Council of Ministers will give the King a period of 24 hours to decide if he will sign decree laws, and if decision is negative, a meeting of the Council of Ministers will be convoked on Monday to decide whether a regency will be set up, or whether the government will simply usurp the King's prerogatives.

Rascanu also reported he had recently seen General Susaikov and Ambassador Kavtaradze in effort to convince them a change in government would be beneficial, and that Mr. Tatarescu should be charged to form new government. Rascanu stated that neither Kavtaradze nor Susaikov accepted his proposal, and that latter had informed him that he had ordered another tank regiment to Bucharest on September 19th.

Foreign Trade Commissar Solacolu added to pressure by sending word to the King the Communists were planning "something" for Sunday. He did not explain what was being planned, but intimated trouble was in the air.

Pessimism continues

It is general consensus of opinion that the NDF while endeavoring to force a local solution is temporarily stalling until some word comes from London or new instructions are received from Moscow. All political circles express the conviction that the present state of affairs cannot continue much longer. In this connection, Mr. Ghelmejeanu, head of Romanian Commission for Execution of Armistice, who was present at Moscow, spoke for 2 ½ hours with General Schuyler yesterday, and was extremely pessimistic and alarmed as regards present situation. Concerning concessions on the Armistice, he stated their sole achievement was to obtain a definite figure on payments to be made to Russia under Article 12, and Soviet agreement that no new claims would be presented under this article. On other hand, he claimed this gain was washed out by the Soviets turning Article 10 into a vise with which they can apply an indefinite economic squeeze upon Romania. Mr. Ghelmejeanu told General Schuyler that he feared a Communist coup in the near future if a favorable decision did not come from London, and expressed his conviction that another coalition government would be disastrous for the country.

September 21 *"Jockeying for position"*

Hulick just received first-hand reliable information which throws an interesting light upon the jockeying for position of leading politicians.

Patrăşcanu's written statement

Patrascanu requested an interview with the King which was refused. He therefore sent his representative with a written statement to speak with the Marshal of the Court. Patrascanu's written statement asserted that Gheorghiu-Dej, Communist Minister of Communications, informed Central Committee of the party that Moscow instructions were to effect that Communist Party should not break with King and that for purpose of preserving relations with King party should be willing to abandon certain members of the Government, although maintaining same general structure.

Patrascanu reported Groza had made bad impression in Moscow, particularly in discussions with Stalin on Hungarian question. He interrupted Stalin three times in defense of the Hungarians and Stalin changed the subject abruptly after the third interruption. He said the Russians felt that Groza is light-minded and that Tatarescu had made a much better impression.

According to Patrascanu the Soviets are even willing to sacrifice the Government to preserve good relations with the Anglo-Americans. As proof of this contention, he stated that Tatarescu had pressed in Moscow for conclusion of unilateral mutual assistance pact similar to Czechoslovakia's and that the Russians flatly refused to discuss the matter stating that they had their allies and did not wish to break with them.

Patrascanu stated that his personal interpretation of Mr. Molotov's recent declaration to correspondents in London was that this represented Russia's last public support for Groza since Russia does not wish to break with the Allies and he guesses that Tatarescu will receive Soviet backing.

Between Titel Petrescu and L. Pătrăşcanu

Treating upon the present situation Patrascanu stated there were only two solutions. (One) that Titel Petrescu be made Prime Minister of a new government or, (two) that he, Patrascanu, should be entrusted with the Premiership. He stated that in a new government the Ministries of the Interior, Justice, Agriculture, Communications, and National Economy would be given to the Communists and that Ministry of Communication and National Economy would be given specifically to Ion Maurer, Under-Secretary of Ministry of Communication, and Gheorghiu-Dej, respectively, who were Malaxa's representatives indicating that the Soviets were working with Malaxa.

"if made Prime Minister..."

Patrascanu stated that if made Prime Minister, he believed he could arrange to have a neutral politician as Minister of Interior. Although not mentioning the National Liberals, Patrascanu said that Mihalache followers of the Peasant Party would be accepted in a new government. It is interesting to note that he eliminated not only Maniu followers but also those of Lupu.

Regarding elections, Patrascanu stated that his personal feeling was that the NDF must at any cost be prevented from attaining a majority since this would mean the loss of Romanian independence.

In conclusion

In conclusion, it is interesting to note, Patrascanu urged the King to discuss his suggestions for a new government with General Susaikov, but insisted that it should not be discusssed with anyone else, since this would hopelessly compromise Patrascanu. Hulick has been informed that the King does not intend to discuss the matter with Susaikov. He has interpreted this information as a clear indication that the Groza Government cannot last.

September 21 *G. Tătărescu's points*

An unimpeachable source informs Hulick that in addition to receiving Patrascanu's emissary, the Marshal of the Court also received this morning Mr. Tatarescu's emissary Mr. Scanavi.

Scanavi reported that Tatarescu felt it his duty to inform the King of the following: (1) that generally speaking, nothing would be settled regarding Romania in London, (2) that Molotov's speech is categorical and that the Soviets will make only window-dressing concessions, if any, and that Groza will remain in power, and (3) Tatarescu has fought hard for the King, but can only prevent Government action up to tomorrow, and that if King does not take action by then Council of Ministers will issue signed decision that the King is considered absent, and that Council of Ministers will take over royal prerogatives. The reasons for this action Tatarescu stated were: (a) decree laws concerning pay increases must be signed; (b) decree law providing modification of agrarian law must be signed, and (c) decree law concerning Soviet-Romanian corporations must be signed.

In connection with a, b, and c of foregoing paragraph, it is interesting to note that reliable sources have reported that last night Tatarescu drew up draft decree laws to carry out his suggested reforms outlined on September 19 and that his friends spread the story today that Tatarescu will resign if the Council does not accept these decree laws.

Tatarescu's message to the King concluded by begging the latter for an audience to discuss pending peace treaty particularly the all-important question of boundaries and stated that personally, from Saturday on, he declines to assume any responsibility for what might happen.

Leading politicians' conclusions

Leading Romanian politicians have concluded that Tatarescu is carrying on a war of nerves, that he will not resign, but is endeavoring to obtain the same effect as might be obtained from resignation without risking this decisive step.

A possible explanation for Tatarescu's dire predictions to the King may be seen in the fact that his political friends state that Tatarescu has assured them he will succeed in persuading the King to change his position and treat with Tatarescu on the subject of forming a new government.

September 22 *Soviet "ironclad censorship..." and Brewer of* New York Times

Although three correspondents here including Brewer of *New York Times*, ironclad censorship prevents them sending their stories.

Brewer has deposited with Mission total of five messages which have been returned as unacceptable by Soviet censor after being held 48 hours. Messages of five to six hundred words require 24 hours for translation into Russian by Soviets. Translator, according to Brewer, has to use dictionary for every other word.

Brewer's stories were presented to General Susaikov by censor. Latter returned them after delay stating he could not assume responsibility for censoring political messages. Censor informed Brewer he could not pass the messages or any future messages critical of Groza's Government or members thereof.

September 23 *The "Council of Ministers' meeting" and "solution of present crisis"*

The long postponed Council of Ministers' meeting took place yesterday at noon but was devoted entirely to minor departmental topics with no discussion on political situation.

The Ministers of Groza's Government are reported to be impressed with firm attitude adopted by BBC and Voice of America. This report is substantiated by Mr. Brewer of *New York Times* who was called to Propaganda Ministry and questioned regarding article of *New York Times* broadcast by Voice of America September 20. Propaganda Minister complained about false and inaccurate news broadcasts by Voice of America but when asked by Mr. Brewer to specify he was unable to do so.

The Political Bureau of the Social Democratic Party convoked by Titel Petrescu yesterday unanimously agreed that party would not be influenced either by extreme Left or parties of the Right with regard to its attitude upon solution of present crisis.

If Council of Ministers postpones a definitive settlement of the Government crisis

Extreme Communist elements are reported to be continuing their preparations for a coup if Council of Ministers postpones a definitive settlement of Romania's Government crisis. In this connection it is stated that General Nicolau, who several months ago was relieved of his post as Secretary General of Ministry of National Economy to be tried by the People's Court for crimes committed during the war, was nominated recently by War Ministry which will also have under its command all Gendarmerie of Bucharest. This is another example of Communist method of placing compromised individuals in key positions to assure that their orders will be carried out.

Straer,* the moderate Communist Secretary General of Interior, reports that Ana Pauker, Bodnaras, and Vasile Luca have expressed desire that Communist Party continue same internal policy until after conference of London where they believe Molotov will obtain postponement of Romanian question and that immediately after the conference the Communist Party should organize bloody repressive measures to eliminate opposition groups and secure way for Communist victory in elections.

The National Peasant Party and Liberal Party are restive

The National Peasants and Liberal parties are restive under self-imposed discipline and the daily postponement of the crisis. There is evidence that their discipline will soon crack. During the week scribbled slogans of "Down with Groza" and "Long live Maniu" appeared on the walls of public buildings.

From all these reports it appears that the stage is being set for violence which only decisive Allied action can prevent.

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* I. Schraer.

September 23 *The main points (1-6) of Maniu and Brătianu*

Last evening there was handed to Hulick copy of Aide Memoire signed by Messrs. Maniu and Bratianu, which they have delivered to General Susaikov in the name of their parties. A signed copy was likewise delivered to the British Mission.

The main points of the Aide Memoire are as follows:

1. According to available information Council of Ministers of London have decided to use the Armistice as basis for Treaty of Peace.

2. In conformity with Potsdam Accord representatives of interested states will be invited to participate in conference of Ministers when problems of direct concern to these countries are discussed. Pointing out that this has been done in case of Italy they consider failure to have legitimate representative of Romania present would be unjust and contrary to decisions taken by the Three Allies at Potsdam.

3. They admit that Romania does not possess representative and democratic government capable of representing Romania; that Groza Government is repudiated by majority of public opinion; and that by refusing to resign at request of King has legally disqualified itself to represent Romania.

4. Point out that a month ago question of forming representative government capable of representing Romania in peace treaty discussions had been placed in hands of Soviet, American, and British governments; that it is incumbent on Three Allied Powers, in accomplishing common responsibilities assumed at Yalta, to devolve solution as soon as possible; and that the Romanian people, confident in the spirit of justice and unity of the Three Allies, do not doubt that they will soon arrive at solution for formation of representative Romanian Government qualified to speak in the name of the country.

5. As regards treaty of peace with Romania, the National Peasant and Liberal parties, as interpreters of Romanian public opinion, consider profoundly unjust that treaty of peace should be pure and simple recediting of Armistice Convention in view of Romania's contribution after 23rd of August to Allied victory in Europe which placed Romania in fourth rank of European countries having fought against Germany; and

6. That Romania has incontestable right to obtain through treaty of peace substantial amelioration of Armistice Convention particularly in view of promises given at Cairo by representatives of Three Allies to delegates of National Peasant and Liberal parties with whom Armistice was negotiated that considerable amelioration would be accorded Romania if it accomplished that which was expected of it.

III

BACK ON POST

1. 1945. Sept. 27 — December 31

September 27

I returned to Bucharest having flown day before yesterday direct from London to Rome in four hours, then on to Naples for the night. Then yesterday to Athens awaiting clearance for the flight to come into Bucharest. Thence to Bucharest today.*

Orders received from Moscow

The King's Secretary has told me that Foreign Trade Commissar Solacolu sent a message to the King to the effect that he wanted to be first to inform His Majesty in strict confidence that the Government had received orders from Moscow not to stage any demonstrations against the King or to do anything to harm him. According to Solacolu, the instructions also specified that the Government should not attempt to usurp the King's

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*"*Mr. Berry returns from visit to Council of Ministers meeting in London* — Today Mr. Berry returned from his visit to the Council of Ministers in London. He gave me a number of details of the conference which I am not at liberty to report even here. I can say, however, that his news is far encouraging. It seems that the Council of Ministers has been unable to agree on a single thing, not even a treaty for Italy can be drawn up at this time. It now appears that the Conference will break up in a day or two, with almost nothing to show for its trouble. The United States and Britain on one side, and Russia on the other appear to have reached a complete deadlock with neither side being willing to give an inch. This certainly provides a dark picture for Russia. Nothing can now be expected in the way of outside help, at least until the next meeting of the Council, which I understand is scheduled for November. In the meantime, every day's delay plays into the hands of the local Communist Party. The King will certainly find himself in a difficult situation, and I must say I do not see how he is going to be able to hold out" (Schuyler, *Diary*, Ms. pp. 324-325).

prerogatives. Solacolu added that he did not want to take part in a new government, and begged His Majesty to protect him by appointing him to some diplomatic post.

September 27 *"...that no harm be done the King..."*

The tenseness in the confused political atmosphere that existed last week has subsided somewhat. Neither the threats of Mr. Tatarescu to resign, nor the whispering campaign conducted by his henchmen to intimidate the King, nor the more serious threats by members of the Communist Party to seize openly the royal prerogative and give free rein to the forces that wish to eliminate their political opponents have materialized.

On the contrary, the King learned from several quarters at the beginning of this week that the Groza Government had received further instructions from Moscow to the effect that no harm be done the King and no attempt be made to usurp his prerogatives. This directive is apparently confirmed by the news that the Groza Government has recently replaced high-ranking Generals by ministerial rather than royal decree, and by the published report that the Finance Ministry decided to grant the Bucharest municipality a 1,500,000,000 lei loan, advancing 500,000,000 without waiting for the necessary law to be signed. Moreover, Romanian Ambassador Jordan, who returned from Moscow during the weekend, while confirming the Soviet Government line toward the King, added the interesting statement that the Government in Moscow had assured him the Soviet Union will not sign a treaty of peace with Italy if the Anglo-Americans refuse to sign a treaty of peace with the Groza Government.

Berry's interpretation

I suppose it is only logical that a government illegally maintaining itself in office should find an illegal means to promulgate its decrees. The Groza Government has found a solution by simply giving effect to decrees, ignoring the absence of the royal signature, and dispensing with their publication. It is logical to believe that this situation might continue until the Three Great Powers answer the letter addressed to them by King Michael on August 20. However, Bucharest observers believe that this situation will be brought to an end by local action soon after the adjournment of the Council of Foreign Ministers in London. They feel that the King will continue to hold out. But they also foresee a deadlock in London, as foretold by Mr. Molotov when the Groza Government was in Moscow, through a failure of the Council of Foreign Ministers to answer the King's letter.

Thus, foreseeing an international adjournment of a solution of the problem, Romanian political leaders believe the Romanian Communists will start reagitating for a local solution. It is almost an unanimous feeling that whether the Communists adopt a militant or watchful attitude depends entirely upon the desires and instructions of Moscow.

Present confusion... and frustration

The present confusion among the Socialists and the frustration among the Peasants and Liberals creates an atmosphere for a solution favorable to the Communists. The latter, although opposed to the resignation of the Government, are willing to give a few Cabinet posts to Peasants and Liberals, thus creating the appearance of a coalition government, while maintaining their own authority by controlling all key ministries. They oppose a non-political government as that would strip from them the cloak with which they need to mask their activities for awhile longer.

September 27 *An important British opinion expressed in Moscow*

A telegram was received at the Foreign Office last evening from Romanian Charge d'Affaires Babes at Moscow containing a message to the effect that British Charge d'Affaires Roberts in Moscow had called on him and expressed his opinion that the Groza Government should resign pro forma and be re-enstated by the King. The telegram states that the British Charge said the British Government and British public opinion would be very satisfied with such a solution.

My informant stated that this information was of such an important delicate nature that he reported it to my British colleague who desired to keep it secret until he could check with the Foreign Office. However, while the Secretary was speaking with the British Representative, the Romanian Ambassador Jordan at the Palace informed three people about the message. Thus the message whether correctly or incorrectly quoting Roberts is known and is being used by the partisans of Groza to the disadvantage of his political opponents.

September 28 *Vishinsky's remarks upon the situation in Romania transmitted by the Romanian Ambassador in Moscow*

There follows the text in English translation of a letter dated September 10 from the Romanian Ambassador in Moscow, Mr. Jordan, to the Romanian Foreign Minister, reporting the substance of Mr. Vishinsky's remarks to the former upon the political situation in Romania:

"I have the honor to inform you of the talks which I have had immediately after presenting my letters of introduction to Mr. Vishinsky, first Vice Commissar of the People for Foreign Affairs, and with Messrs. Dekanozov and Lozovski, Vice-Commissars in the same department.

On all these visits I was accompanied by Minister M. Babes.

Mr. Vishinsky asked first of all about the internal political situation in Romania.

'The Anglo-American intervention in Bucharest reminds me of the last days of the General Radescu Government: now as then,' he said, 'certain elements in the country tried to obtain the power with Anglo-American help, although the USSR replied to London and Washington that it sees no reason for a change of government in Romania.' Mr. Vishinsky is convinced that these maneuvers will fail.

He advised us only to be patient because in his opinion the situation will be clarified in accordance with the true interest of the Romanian people by the Three United Nations.

He shows in this respect a determined optimism which is not only his own but also that of the entire Soviet Government.

Mr. Vishinsky looks very favorably upon the activity of the present Romanian Government which he considers capable and necessary for the real democratization of the country.

As regards rumors concerning a possible breach of the unity of the Romanian Government, he does not think that they could have any serious basis since that unity is founded upon the powerful solidarity among the political organizations which participate in the government of the country.

In connection with these rumors, Mr. Vishinsky stated that the politicians and the parties in the government who did take part in such maneuvers would no longer in future be of any account in our public life. Nevertheless in his opinion, it is necessary that the Romanian Government should not show itself to be too tolerant, on the contrary, it should take severe steps even at the risk of sometimes making mistakes, these being less harmful to the public interests than exaggerated tolerance.

As an example, he pointed out the attitude of the Soviet Government which in 1936 proceeded mercilessly against Trotskyites and other political adversaries.

If it had shown itself lenient, the USSR could not have the war against Hitlerists and Fascists.

The Soviet Government, added Mr. Vishinsky, has now more to work upon in connection with relations between the United Nations than it had during the war, because the existing unity of views and cordiality must be maintained and if possible even strengthened in order that the mistakes made after the First World War should not be repeated.

With the occasion of the visit I paid Mr. Dekanozov I recall that he is especially interested in the agreements of an economic character signed lately with the USSR, since he is to take over part of Mr. Vishinsky's duties regarding relations between Romania and the Soviet Union.

When we went to Mr. Lozovski, he asked for information about the agrarian reform, the organizing of teaching, the activity of the syndicates, and the position of the former Legionnaires.

He insisted on the urgent need to change public mentality everywhere in order that the misfortune of a war every 20 or 25 years should not be repeated and become bigger and bigger and more and more destructive.

Please accept, Mr. Vice-President of the Council, the assurance of my high esteem."

September 30 *Communiqué of the Council of Ministers announcing severe administrative discipline*

All papers publish today communiqué of the Council of Ministers to the effect that Government has decided to eliminate unsuitable elements from the State's administrative apparatus and to submit the administrative apparatus to severe discipline; to abolish concentration camps, all internees against whom legal proceedings will be opened to be transferred to detention prisons and those infringing economic laws to be transferred to work camps; to consolidate financial and economic situation; and to establish Control Commissions for the acceleration and proper execution of the agrarian reform law. The Agrarian Control Commissions will consist of a Magistrate or State Attorney as President, Chief Administrative Officer of the county, the ranking Agricultural Engineer, and two delegates from each county representing the people entitled to receive grants of land. These Control Commissions will be empowered to review all complaint and to force County Committees to carry out their decisions regarding application of the Agrarian Reform.

October 3 *Proposal of the Romanian MFA to establish a delegation in Austria (and Germany)*

A letter dated October 1st, and signed by Basil Stoica, Secretary General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was received at the Mission today. The text will be quoted later.

The Romanian proposal to establish a delegation in Austria with Foreign Office members may be an attempt by the Groza Government to get its representatives installed in Central Europe. If the request for our assistance is granted it will likely be interpreted locally as American semi-recognition of the Groza Government. In view of this I shall delay replying to Mr. Stoica's letter until I have instructions from the Department.

I have shown the foregoing to General Schuyler who stated that there is at present a Romanian delegation of thirteen members in Austria. Moreover, the Russians are forming a second delegation, in charge of a Romanian general officer, which will replace the existing delegation. Mr. Stoica's letter refers to this second delegation. General Schuyler suggests that as he has already done considerable work of coordination in this matter and as it primarily concerns a military problem that it be left entirely in military hands. I agree provided the Foreign Office representatives are omitted from the delegation.

October 3 *The letter signed by Stoica, Secretary General of the Romanian MFA:*

"Dear Mr. Berry: — The Romanian War Department has decided to send to Germany and Austria a delegation entrusted with the repatriation of the Romanian prisoners of war and civilians at present in Central Europe. The Delegation, with Headquarters probably at St. Valentino near Linz, is composed of eight members — out of whom two are representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs — and will be presided by General G. Baloșin. Considering that during its activity, they will most certainly request the assistance of the United States occupation forces, I should be very grateful if you would be so kind as to recommend them to the special care of the United States military authorities in Germany and Austria.
Very sincerely yours."

October 4* *Two currents of opinion "set in motion in Bucharest," after the termination of the London Conference*

The termination of the Council of Foreign Ministers' Meeting in London has set in motion in Bucharest two currents of opinion. The more prominent is loaded with disappointment and apprehension. The people who follow this line feel that Romania will be one of the first countries to experience unpleasant consequences as a result of the absence of a general agreement in London. They believe that the Soviet Union will now proceed more rapidly with a policy of communization in Romania.

The second current carries the opinion of a section of the more experienced but less numerous Bucharest public. These people reason like Mr. Maniu. He said that although nothing may have been gained, nothing certainly was lost nor will be lost as long as America and England maintain firmly their point of view. Mr. Maniu, of course, like all Romanians, would have liked to have seen an agreement reached in London for the setting-up of a democratic government in Romania and King Michael informed by a reply to the letter he addressed the three principal Allies. But barring such a solution Mr. Maniu feels that the conclusion reached is the best that could be expected.

FRUS 1945, V, pp. 620-622: Berry to the Secretary of State. Telegram 763, October 4. Repeated to London as 67 and Moscow as 230.

The Bucharest press

The Bucharest press, with the exception of a single newspaper, carried the TASS report of the Molotov statement upon the London Conference. Several sentences from Secretary Byrnes' statement, most favorable to the Russian interpretation, were appended to the Molotov statement. The single exception was *Momentul* which gave Secretary Byrnes' statement in full.

The members of the Government

The members of the Government publicly are making political capital out of the fact that the London Conference adjourned without taking action against the Groza Government. The press in reporting today a speech given on Sunday by Premier Groza adds the statement: "Dr. Petru Groza formed the government because such was the wish of the people, and he will remain at the helm of the Government until such time as the people demand his resignation."

At the same time Cabinet members are privately maneuvering so as to maintain their personal position in the Government that follows the Groza Government. Communist Minister of Justice Patrascanu has recently sent two messages to the King claiming the backing of the Russians and suggesting that he be asked to form a new government in which several key Ministries will be held by "neutral" personalities and in which all parties will be represented. Dissident Liberal Minister of Foreign Affairs Tatarescu has sent a confidential messenger to the King to say that he has the confidence of the Russians for forming a new government and that he can bring into being a government that will truly represent the country. Dr. Lupu of the National Peasants has given out that he has the backing of the King and of the Russians. Socialist Democratic leader Petrescu, while keeping his party's position in the present government, is talking daily with other political leaders about the next government.

The King's position

Above all this the King continues to display great resolve and patience while waiting a reply to his letter. He has indicated that he will maintain this attitude until the reply is forthcoming. But his position may become increasingly difficult if the Groza Government indulges in provocative acts or if the Soviet Government increases its pressure.

October 6 *Conversation Berry — V. Stoica*

In conversation with Secretary General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, I inquired as to the progress being made towards implementing the Government's communiqué for general reforms. He replied that the only instance to have come to his personal attention, where application has been made under the terms of this communique, occurred when a friend of his, basing himself upon the communique, asked a review of the expropriation of his rural property by a proper application of the Agrarian Reform. A high official of the Ministry of Agriculture laughed off the request saying, "don't you realize that the communique is only dust in the eyes of the public?"

October 6 *Secretary of State Byrnes' report published by Romanian papers*

PRESS: Summaries of Secretary Byrnes' report on the first session of the Council of Foreign Ministers are published by all papers dated October 7 with exception of *Scanteia*, *Frontul Plugarilor*, *Dreptatea Noua*, and *Argus*. The most complete version passed by the government press office was carried by *Jurnalul de Dimineata* and *Timpul*. Considerably condensed versions were carried by *Romania libera* and *Libertatea*, the latter under headlines "Peace of Europe Depends upon Existence of Friendly Relations between Soviet Union and Neighbors." *Ardealul* used as heading Mr. Byrnes' words: "Lasting Peace Depends Not only upon Friendship between Governments, but upon Friendship between Peoples."

All papers also carried full versions of *Isvestia*'s editorial of October 5 alleging breakdown of London negotiations due to attitude of Secretary Byrnes and Mr. Bevin, warning that if the latter adhered to their positions they will endanger the continued collaboration of the Big Three. In this connection it is significant that summaries of Mr. Byrnes' speech eliminated paragraphs explaining why Soviet proposal to sign four protocols had been rejected and why he considered further meetings useless.

As received in *Radio Bulletin* No. 238, October 4, Mr. Byrnes' speech contained 75 paragraphs. Of these the most complete Romanian versions eliminated in full paragraphs 8, 10, 52, 55, 57, 63, 65, 67, 68, and 69. The first sentence of paragraph 11 and the second sentences of paragraphs 12 and 27 were eliminated. Paragraphs 47 through 50 were very briefly summarized so that full meaning was lost. Important sections of paragraph 34 including last sentence and last phrase of penultimate sentence were eliminated.

October 8 *Concerning the Armistice Convention signed at Moscow (September 11)*

In convention signed at Moscow September 11 dealing with Article twelve, Soviet Government recognized the sum of 948 billion lei based on April 1945 prices as final countervalue of Soviet property to be returned by Romania; agreed that at time of signature (September 11) property valued at 348 billion lei had been restored to Russia; that deliveries of Soviet property by Romania would cease on September 11; and that Soviet Government would reduce value of property yet to be delivered from 600 to 300 billion lei and in lieu of Soviet property would accept available Romanian goods valued at 300 billion lei which would be delivered over three-year period beginning 1946 in equal installments of 100 billion lei per annum.

Soviet interpretation

In view of this convention it was rude shock to Groza Government when the Prime Minister received a letter from General Susaikov indicating deliveries of Soviet property under Article 12 were expected to continue. According to minutes of meeting held September 28 between Mr. Ghelmegeanu and General Vinogradov, the local Soviet authorities, contrary to the convention, do not agree that goods valued at 348 billion lei have been returned to Russia. General Vinogradov proposed that goods already delivered to Russia be re-evaluated and demanded in the meantime restitution of Soviet be continued. General Vinogradov expressed his conviction that the re-evaluation of goods received by Russia would show a value much lower than 348 billion lei.

This Soviet interpretation of the convention of September 11 has provoked profound concern among members of the Government, particularly the Communists. They see that in reality no reduction of future deliveries scheduled under Article 12 has been obtained although the Soviet Government, because of the extensive publicity given by Romanian press and radio to the signature of the convention, will continue to be highly regarded by the public for its magnanimous action in reducing Romania's debt under Article 12 from 600 to 300 billion lei. In brief, the Soviets publicly have been hailed for their generosity at a time when they never had any other intention than to collect their pound of flesh.

October 11 *Romanian censorship... and Soviet censorship control*

General Vinogradov has confirmed that Romanian censorship has been abolished for American, British, and Russian correspondents now in Romania. In this connection, "Associated Press" correspondent O'Brien stated that after a lengthy conversation with General Vinogradov several days ago, a better understanding on Russian censorship rules was apparently established. He stated that the Soviet authorities seemed to be easing up somewhat their strict censorship controls. Although the correspondents are encouraged by the reported willingness of the Soviet authorities to ease further the controls, they feel that working conditions are still unsatisfactory and that they are far from being free to report upon conditions in Romania as they see them.

"Campaign of strong defense of the Groza Government"

Communist Party leaders have planned a speech publicity campaign of strong defense of the Groza Government as the representative of the people, supported by the Soviet Union against the "Western bloc" of powers. Leading speakers include the three committee members of the Comintern wing of the party known as under direct orders from Moscow, namely Emil Bodnaras, Mrs. Ana Pauker, and Laszlo Luca.

Bodnaras' speech, delivered several days ago, was prominently featured in today's press after having been greatly tempered before publication. For example, in the masses of English and American peoples with the reactionary cliques which temporarily lead these peoples. He stated that

Russia had given Romania needed products, but that America had sent nothing, and in any event would only send perfumes and films.

Ana Pauker yesterday spoke at a Communist meeting of a Western bloc directed against the Soviet Union. She stated the Romanian Government was the concert of the Romanians only and that foreign powers were seeking to influence the situation because of the country's natural resources. The authorized text is to be published tomorrow.

Luca is scheduled to speak this evening and Communist Interior Minister Teohari Georgescu reportedly will address a meeting in the same vein tomorrow.

Mark Ethridge coming shortly to Romania and Bulgaria

I am delighted with the Secretary's announcement,* as reported in the *Radio Bulletin*, that he is sending shortly to Romania and Bulgaria a representative with an entirely new approach for the purpose of reappraising the situation. I am happy too that the man chosen is one who has behind him a long and impressive record of fact finding and reporting.

The Government press has also reacted enthusiastically to this announcement although for quite other reasons as it reads into the announcement a recognition of the need to reevaluate the supposed opinions and recommendations of the American Government's representatives in Romania.

Parties in opposition to the Government are depressed by the announcement as they believe the Groza Government will use it as a pretext for maintaining itself in power until the additional American Representative has made his report and the American Government has confirmed or altered the stand taken by Secretary Byrnes. They know that delay means a further loss of prestige for the King and further opportunities for the Communists to entrench themselves in power.**

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* "At his press conference of Oct. 10, the Secretary of State [*James Francis Byrnes*] announced the appointment of Mark Etheridge of the *Louisville Courier Journal* as his special representative to investigate conditions in the Balkans preparatory to the recognition of the govts of Romania and Bulgaria." (*FRUS 1945*. V, p. 622, footnote 27.)

** See *FRUS 1945*. V, p. 622: Berry to the Secretary of State. Telegram 789, Oct. 11.

October 13 *Common points of E. Bodnăraş, Ana Pauker, and Laszlo [Vasile] Luca speeches*

Translations are now available of the speeches of Emil Bodnaras, Ana Pauker, and Laszlo Luca. All three are remarkable for the unanimity of their contexts. Each stressed the following points:

(1) Prolonged defense of the Groza Government and of the Communist Party as opposing reaction, with the party "unshaken at its post of command and battle;" the United Workers' Front of Communist and Socialist Unions being the foundation of the NDF.

(2) Description of the atomic bomb as an "imperialist reactionary" threat which is mastered by a stronger opposing force resting on "the revolutionary energy of the working class."

(3) The Communist fight against the creation of a "Western bloc" that reactionaries, who are the same reactionaries that made the Munich Agreement with the Nazis, are seeking to form against the USSR.

(4) Interest in Romania's Government abroad is based on an interest in the country's wealth — "reactionaries are so desperate to retain their hold on the prey they see escaping from them."

(5) The reactionary opposition at home and abroad, which should not be confused "either with the British and American people, or wholly with their governments, and even less with the working classes of those countries," has learned nothing from the war.

(6) Violent and extensive criticism of Maniu and Bratianu, most pointedly by Luca, who stated, "they enjoy too much freedom. They are unmolested and unpunished, and they continue to be in a situation to send complaints abroad about Romania. These complaints are used by foreign reactionaries against the people of Romania and prevented the conclusion of the peace treaty with the United Nations."

October 16

Soviet censorship of despatches by American, British, and Russian war correspondents has been lifted in Romania.

Changing the United Workers' Front[*]

Communist party leaders in recent speeches have raised the question of changing the United Workers' Front, the trade union organization of Communists and Socialists, into a single workers' party organization in preparation for future elections. All observers feel that the Communists desire to make this tactical concession to conceal the party's real weakness with the voters.

On October 13 the Socialist Executive Committee voted to inform its party representatives in the United Workers' Front and the Communist Party that they desired new free and secret trade union elections in the United Workers' Front with each party presenting candidates; that the Workers' Front take no action nor hold public demonstrations without prior Committee approval; that the workers should be informed of the need to increase production while the Government should halt the rising prices and speculation; and that to stop illegal arrests and arrests of Socialists, the party will enforce "a control on the activities of the police."

Further attacking Communist trade union domination, the Socialists issued a communiqué October 15 ordering all members of the Central Committee of the Federation of Industrialists and Merchants to resign from the Committee since the federation is "expressly and openly at the service of a single political organization, creating a state of affairs which can no longer be tolerated." Socialist members are directed to remain in the locals of the Federation until a new central committee is organized representing the will of the members.

Titel Petrescu's independent position

On October 14 Mr. Titel Petrescu, the Socialist leader, made two speeches published today in which he emphasized the separate character of his party, which desired a sincerely democratic regime with all liberties that must not be exploited politically by those seeking to organize a dictatorship. He further decried the use of concentration camps and the treatment of the Saxon minority in the country. He finally appealed to the Allies to find a solution to permit Romania's admission to the peace conference.

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[*] Frontul Unic Muncitoresc.

Mr. Petrescu stated to a responsible source this morning that his party had determined to reject the Communist proposals for a United Workers' Front to operate politically, and that the party's Executive Committee wished to emphasize this by its formal actions as outlined above. His party felt that the Hungarian Socialists had demonstrated, by their collaboration with the Communists in the recent Budapest elections, that such a coalition was a fundamental error. Finally, by his own speeches he wished to show the Socialists' independent position, as well as indirectly to criticize the present regime.

October 23 *Tătărescu's ministerial order "resulted from Soviet pressure" and his desire to eliminate opponents*

Foreign Minister Tatarescu has signed a ministerial order retiring indefinitely 46 Foreign Office officials including Romania's ministers at Ankara, Stockholm, the Vatican, former ministers at Helsinki and Madrid, and staff members at Bern and Lisbon. The ministerial order is stated to have resulted from Soviet pressure and Tatarescu's natural desire to eliminate opponents. Technically the action is not legal since the Foreign Office Personnel Chief refused to sign the order which was made by Tatarescu alone.

Immediately after the above order Soviet officials approved the use by the Romanian Foreign Office of cipher telegrams to its diplomatic posts abroad.

Another feature of Russian interest in Foreign Office functions is the allocation to the Communist Secretary General of the Premier's office the right to issue all service passports and the right to visa all Romanian diplomatic passports before departure from the country.

October 25 *National Peasant & National Liberal Party leaders taken to Police*

Early this morning twenty-eight National Peasant and seventeen National Liberal Party leaders in the Bucharest district were taken to Police headquarters by Romanian gendarmes without warrants, where they remained for questioning. It was not until afternoon that questioning began and they were accused of belonging to two alleged new clandestine political organizations. All those questioned reportedly strongly denied the charge and before their release at 5:30 p.m. today they were obliged to sign a statement to this effect.

The King's birthday

Today is the King's birthday and it is believed that the Government desired to prevent street demonstrations and celebrations in his honor that they feared might be organized by the national Peasant and National Liberal parties, despite the fact that the Peasants and Liberals were known to have decided against such a step. However, at the Liberal Party club an enthusiastic although short meeting in honor of the King was held sponsored by the Liberal Youth. This planned meeting had been known for some days, but there was no police interference. It was attended by about fifteen hundred members who listened to several laudatory speeches for the King notably one by Dinu Bratianu, Liberal Party leader.

October 26 *The Social Democratic Party's resolution*

Last night at a session attended by all Central Committee members of the Social Democratic Party, it is reported that a resolution was unanimously voted to refuse the Communist proposal for a single workers' front political organization. It is remarked that the party Left wing members, notably Labor Minister Radaceanu, voted for the resolution. The significant statement in the resolution which expressed a need for working class unity is that "under actual conditions the realization of a single workers' party remains a desire of the future."

The Socialists' resolution of October 13 in which the party notably asked for new syndicate and factory committee elections, has been prevented publication by the authorities although copies have been distributed by hand in important factories.

The latest move of the Socialists is now expected by some observers to bring retaliatory Communist attacks.

November 1 *The United States position and the King's "foolish game" according to Vyshinski...*

The Foreign Minister last evening received a personal telegram from the Romanian Ambassador in Moscow reporting a recent conversation with Deputy Commissar Vyshinski.

Mr. Vyshinski reportedly said that the United States is conducting a war of nerves to bring about a change in the Romanian Government, but the Russians had strong nerves, and no progress was being made. In fact, according to Mr. Vyshinski, the United States was now considering taking a step backwards which was clearly indicated by Ambassador Harriman in his last conversation with Soviet officials. In view of this hesitating American attitude, Mr. Vyshinski advised the Romanians to maintain a strong front and under no circumstances to make any changes in the Groza Government.

Concerning the King, Mr. Vyshinski said that Michael was playing a very foolish game, as by refusing to sign decrees, he was assuming personal responsibility before the people for obstructing the application of Romanian legislation.

November 3 *Preparations for the arrival of Mark Ethridge in Bucharest*

An officer of the secret police yesterday inquired of a Romanian member of the Mission staff as to the date of the arrival of Mr. Ethridge. The officer explained his request on the ground that he needed advance notice in order to arrange for the largest spontaneous demonstration that Bucharest has yet seen.

Mr. Ethridge's tentative plan to arrive in Bucharest became known when a request for his clearance was filed with the Soviet chairman of the ACC. Nevertheless I have not given publicity to his arrival but, in view of the action taken, when asked I do not intend to deny that he is due to arrive Wednesday.

In order that Mr. Ethridge may lose no time in starting his work I am arranging a luncheon on Wednesday for him to meet Soviet, British, and French colleagues. If this is undesirable please telephone me.

Hotel accommodations as requested have been arranged at the Athénée Palace. General Schuyler, however, has offered hospitality to Mr. Ethridge at his home or, should Mr. Ethridge prefer, he offers the exclusive use of an apartment now occupied by one of his senior officers. The General makes this offer that Mr. Ethridge may have greater privacy than at the hotel. There we may expect the secret police to listen in on every conversation and note the arrival of every visitor. An office for Mr. Ethridge is prepared in this mission.

Relations with the Romanian press will be cleared as you suggest by MacDonald, USIS representative in Bucharest.

November 6 *Again, concerning the Ethridge visit*

Melbourne inferred from his telephone conversation with you *[?]* that the intermediary stop which you said Ethridge might make between Sofia and Bucharest could be interpreted as being [?] the United States.

Should such an interpretation be correct, I hope that you will do your utmost to persuade Ethridge to change his plans and visit Bucharest at the earliest possible date. Failure to visit Romania soon would deal a disastrous blow to the morale of the King and opposition and would give the Government an opportunity really to go to town.

As you know, the pattern for the two countries is the same, except in Romania it has been applied by the local Communists in a less harsh form than in Bulgaria. Since Ethridge has had considerable time to examine this pattern in Bulgaria, he could, if pressed for time, safely shorten his Romanian visit. I should say that he could see all the key personalities in one active week.

It would be splendid if Ethridge were to arrive Thursday, November 8, the King's name-day.

Senator Pepper in Bucharest

Senator Pepper* arrived in Bucharest the evening of October 30 and left this morning.

In order to avoid confusing the political situation just before the arrival of Mr. Ethridge and in view of the American attitude toward the Groza Government the Senator agreed not to seek an audience with the King and to avoid meeting the ministers of the Groza Government.

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* Senator Pepper of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

Senator Pepper understood that he could secure the same information that he might receive from Government ministers by talking with the principle Romanian political leaders. Accordingly he saw Mr. Maniu of the National Peasants Party, Mr. Bratianu of the National Liberal Party, Mr. Titel Petrescu of the Social Democratic Party, and Mrs. Ana Pauker of the Communist Party. He talked with such prominent non-party men as Prince Stirbey, Savel Radulescu, and Constantin Visoianu. Additionally he met Dr. Filderman, chief of the local Jewish organization, Mr. Zissu of the World Jewish Congress, Remus Tetu, leader of the "T" organization, American and Romanian businessmen, correspondents, and some Romanian workingmen. He had a long conference with General Susaikov, met General Vinogradov several times and had many opportunities of discussion with members of the staff of this mission and General Schuyler's office.

The Senator gave a press conference which some sixty correspondents attended. The statement which he read was published by all local papers but the discussion, opened by questions from the correspondents and the Senator's answers, was not published by orders of the Romanian censor. In this and in several other ways, notably the eleven-day delay in obtaining entrance clearance, the Senator learned that the path of cooperation with the Russians is not always smooth.

One of his final observations to General Schuyler and me was that before granting Russian requests for loans and other assistance it might be necessary to air all our grievances and thrash out an understanding at a governmental level. He added that his conversations indicated that the heavy majority of opinion supported the point of view we had reported to our government.

Final remarks on his visit

Romanians who came in contact with Senator Pepper are convinced that he considers the position of the Groza Government to be very weak but that he has no solution for ridding the country of it. The Communist leaders therefore believe that they can preserve the status quo. I understand that they are disappointed that Senator Pepper did not see the King and the ministers of the Groza Government as that would have given them an opportunity to capitalize locally upon any supposed differences of points of view between Senator Pepper and Mr. Ethridge. Failing in this they now hope that Mr. Ethridge too will be unable to suggest any formula for a solution of the Romanian crisis.

November 7 *The conflict between the Socialist and Communist leaders*

The Communists presently view the Socialist Party as the principal political group able to wage an open and effective campaign of opposition.

The growing public appeal of the Socialists and the full awareness of Communist weakness has forced Communist leaders strongly to declare for a single workers' party to include both Communists and Socialists as the only guarantee to defeat "reaction" in any national elections. Socialist leaders are fighting this proposal since they feel it would kill the party organization and would be merely a vehicle for Communist domination of their party.

The conflict between the two Left groups is now coming into the open with Communist fire beginning to range upon the Socialist leader, Titel Petrescu, who has temporarily succeeded in silencing the pro-Communist wing of his party that might under strong pressure favor a single workers party. Ten days ago Petrescu was heckled strongly by Communists on giving a speech at the Lupeni mines and the Socialist proceedings were criticized by the Communist press. On November 4 Petrescu spoke at Galatz to four thousand workers. It was of course known that his speech would be critical of the Communist Party program and methods. Sixty new Communist town police created such a disturbance that none of the hall audience could hear Petrescu. However, loud speakers carried the entire discourse to a large street crowd.

At the conclusion of the Galatz meeting Socialist delegates from the surrounding district enthusiastically voted to request the impending party conference of December 1st and 2nd to be transformed into a congress to elect a new central committee and to elaborate a new party statute. The district delegates also solidly favored the Socialist Central Committee resolution of October 25 opposing a single workers' party.

National Peasant & National Liberal parties for an open-air demonstration on the King's name day

Last evening representatives of the National Peasant and National Liberal parties separately consulted the Interior Ministry over plans for a popular open-air demonstration tomorrow on the King's name day which they stated would be completely devoid of political significance with marchers only shouting for the King and country. They allegedly stated that the parade would end at the Palace Square. The Interior Minister refused to grant authorization for the demonstration and notified Soviet officials of the ACC of his fears of disorder in the event of its being held.

This afternoon General Susaikov asked for General Schuyler's advice on the question. This is the first time the Russians have ever asked for the American viewpoint upon any important ACC matter and General Schuyler has replied suggesting that the Government and the leaders of the planned demonstration be informed that until the constitutional crisis is solved the ACC did not countenance street demonstrations of any nature. He further suggested that the ACC order the Interior Ministry to make public halls available if needed to celebrate the King's name day and that peaceful citizens waiting before the Palace to sign the King's register should not be molested.

November 8 *"King and Country"... at the King's name day. The day's activities*

This morning* church services were held for the King in many places throughout the capital, and early in the morning strong detachments of police and soldiers patrolled the Palace Square and its approaches. At about ten o'clock numerous trucks laden with workers circulated in the square shouting for Groza and disrupting groups of citizens beginning to congregate there. Police and soldier detachments disappeared upon the arrival of these trucks. However, the crowds of citizens increased with fresh influxes waving banners, until it is estimated the people shouting "King and Country" formed as large a demonstration as any in Bucharest during the past year.

About noon gendarmes in the Interior Ministry Building began shooting into the ground and in the air, and ricocheting bullets wounded several. These shootings occurred after the cordon of police had cut off approximately 150 persons and taken them into the Interior Ministry under arrest. Intermittent shooting continued during the next few hours near the Interior Ministry while a large crowd filled the square and

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**FRUS 1945*, V, pp. 623-624: Berry to the Secretary of State. Telegram 863, Nov. 8. Repeated to London as 880 and Moscow as 257.

surrounding streets. Soldiers at one point fired upon demonstrators and killed two and wounded three others. By mid-afternoon the crowd had gradually dispersed and cordons of soldiers across the square prevented any further demonstrations before the Palace. However, groups carrying banners were later seen parading through main streets of the city.

A crowd of demonstrators appeared before this Mission, the Military Mission, as well as British Headquarters, cheering the King, the United States, and requesting aid in releasing those arrested today.

A result of the day's activities

A report received this evening shows that seven persons were killed and sixty one hospitalized as a result of the day's activities.

November 9 *Conclusions relating to the previous day's demonstration*

Early this morning local people were encouraged by two facts: one, Russian soldiers did not intervene to break up yesterday's demonstration and two, a three-star Russian general ordered that the Tudor Vladimirescu Division cease firing upon the crowd. It was considered possible that the Russians were desirous of gauging the strength of both Government and opposition by permitting the demonstration to continue. It might have gone on peacefully had not, as I reported, trucks loaded with Communist workers driven into the public square, shouting for Groza and inciting the crowd to hostile reaction. The Americans that were mingling in the crowd all remark (1) the enthusiasm of the people for the King, (2) the courage of the people in standing their ground in the face of gunfire, (3) the fact that the demonstrators came from all social classes and, (4) the weakness of the Communist counter-measures.

The number of dead in Bucharest from yesterday's demonstration has reached 13. Reports reaching the capital state that riots and bloodshed occurred in at least three other Romanian cities. Accurate information from the provinces is still difficult to obtain, as all train service in and out of the capital has been suspended for two days.

In the course of the day nearly all of the people recently released from concentration camps had been rearrested. From National Peasant sources, I am told that several members of that party have been arrested in Bucharest today.

General Schuyler, at nine o'clock last evening, wrote General Susaikov requesting that an immediate meeting of the ACC be called to examine all aspects of the situation. Having received no reply until noon today, General Schuyler again wrote General Susaikov, saying that at the meeting it was his intention to propose that a board of inquiry be created by the ACC with American, British, and Russian members, for the purpose of establishing the facts. Late this afternoon General Schuyler received word from the ACC that his two letters were being examined.

The Ardealul *newspaper's announcement*

A small announcement printed in the newspaper *Ardealul* of November 6 urged everyone to demonstrate for the King in the Palace Square on his name day, November 8. The next day the Interior Minister ordered the paper's editor, Mr. Murcseanu, to publish a retraction which he refused to do. The Government retaliated by refusing to permit the paper to be published unless it carried a retraction.

On November 7 *Ardealul* was not issued at the usual hour but later in the day the Propaganda Ministry Press Chief, Mr. Preoteasa, without the knowledge of the editor or his editorial staff, proceeded to the plant and forced the printers to publish 1,500 copies of the paper under his supervision. These copies carried a strong denial that a demonstration for the King would take place. Editor Murceseanu was told by the Interior Minister that he could be held responsible for incidents occurring on November 8.

The Department will recall that the *Ardealul* carried a full story of Senator Pepper's press conference against the orders of the Romanian censor.

November 10 *Conversations with Titel Petrescu, Maniu, and Brătianu*

1. Meeting Mr. Petrescu late last evening, I said that it appeared to me that the hand that drafted his party's communique was not the same hand that drafted the speech he gave at Galatz Sunday.

Mr. Petrescu said that my assumption was correct. He was personally opposed to the release of the party communique. It was pushed through the Political Committee by Mr. Radaceanu, who was able to make his point because a member of the Social Democratic Party was killed during the demonstration by a person known to have been a Legionaire.

Mr. Petrescu added that one of the first actions of the Social Democratic Congress, convened for December 1, will be the elimination of Mr. Radaceanu from the Political Committee. This is necessary as Mr. Radaceanu is not and never can be other than a tool of the Communists. They have his dossier, which includes his former passports, showing he worked with and for the Nazis. Thus, Radaceanu, like Tatarescu of the Liberals, is no longer a master of his own actions. Because of this it is essential in Mr. Petrescu's opinion that Radaceanu be eliminated from the party's Political Committee.

II.* The Government is trying to place the onus for the casualties in Thursday's demonstration on the members of the opposition groups, namely the National Peasant, National Liberal, and to a lesser extent, the Social Democratic parties.

Therefore General Schuyler and I have had conversations in the last 24 hours with Mr. Maniu, Mr. Bratianu, and Mr. Titel Petrescu, for the purpose of informing ourselves of the facts not available from witnesses at Thursday's demonstration.

Messrs. Maniu and Bratianu said that the secretaries-general of their respective parties had informed the Ministry of Interior of their plans on November 6. These plans included orderly demonstrations of loyalty to the King in the Palace Square on his name day, November the 8th. At this demonstration there were to be no political speeches, no banners except the national flag, and no placards except the King's picture. There was no premeditated plan of march. The people would assemble, shout for the King, sign the Palace register, and depart. The Minister suggested using halls, but Mr. Maniu refused, bearing in mind the experience of General Radescu and more recently that of Titel Petrescu with Communist-packed halls. He insisted that the demonstration have a popular rather than a political character, and in the end the Minister gave his consent, a consent that he withdrew by telephone the morning of the demonstration as the crowds were assembling.

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* This following second part of Berry's report is included in *FRUS 1945*, V, pp. 624-625, Telegram 872, Nov. 10. Repeated to Moscow as 261 and London as 92.

November 7: demonstration for Soviet-Romanian solidarity... and the King's name day

All political leaders felt that the Groza Government had shown an excess of zeal in obliging factories to close the seventh so that attendance would be large at a Government demonstration for Soviet-Romanian solidarity, at which there were political speeches and a mixture of Romanian and Soviet flags and placards. The leaders considered that the Groza Government was culpable in declaring, contrary to tradition, that the King's name day was a working day, thus prohibiting workers and school children from demonstrating their loyalty to the King. In spite of this the leaders believed that the demonstration would have passed in an orderly and calm manner, had not the Government provoked the feelings of the people by sending trucks through the crowd loaded with men who shouted in favor of the Groza Government. Even then there would likely have been no fatality had not the Government withdrawn regular troops, who showed themselves friendly to the demonstrators, and substituted units from the Tudor Vladimirescu Division, which fired into the crowd.

Attitude of the Soviet authorities

The three leaders said that the Soviet authorities had abstained from intervening with Soviet troops. Moreover, these authorities had ordered the Romanian troops to cease firing into the crowd. The leaders said that they felt the demonstration had served a useful purpose, as by it the people had unmasked the Groza Government that the world might see its true features.

General Susaikov called on ACC meeting this afternoon at three o'clock to hear the reports of AVM Stevenson and General Schuyler on Thursday's demonstration. General Susaikov appeared to be open-minded, and the meeting proceeded in a temperate tone. When he had heard the reports he said he had not made up his own mind yet, but would call a meeting Monday in order to inform the other members of the ACC of his opinion.

November 12 *"On the occasion of burying workers killed on November 8"*

The appeal carried by yesterday's Communist press for a large-scale popular demonstration today on the occasion of burying workers killed on November 8 resulted in the most extraordinary measures being adopted by officials to secure a large turn-out. Workers in factories, employees in businesses, and government offices were ordered to turn out or to lose their jobs and ration privileges. Even hospital nurses were given similar orders. All shops and restaurants were ordered closed to assure the attendance of their employees.

By one p.m. large well-grouped columns of people under the supervision of organizers were assembled on side streets and merged with the larger procession that had started at Piata Natiunii and proceeded along a well-defined line of march to Piata Victoriei. There, six caskets of some killed on November 8 were displayed on a platform flanked by two large placards, one giving the names of the deceased, and the other placing the responsibility upon Maniu and Bratianu.

The procession bore signs urging punishment for the Fascists Maniu and Bratianu, asked retribution for those killed, and praised the NDF Government. The attitude of the paraders was quiet and spiritless, but on passing the platform, the column supervisors ordered the clenched fist salute. At this reviewing point it is estimated slow-moving columns of people passed for approximately one and one-half hours.

At about 3:30 when the parade ended, members of the Government drove up in a body and stood beside the platform, from which the caskets previously had been lowered preparatory to their removal. Shortly thereafter, at four o'clock, the paraders and crowds of curious in the piata had begun to disperse. Speeches which had formerly been broadcast from Piata Natiunii were then broadcast from Piata Victoriei. Their tenor was better denunciation of Maniu and Bratianu, as reactionaries, and vengeance for the dead.

Eye-witness accounts reveal similar scenes of processions bearing identical placards in other towns such as Fagaras and Ploesti, with the shops and restaurants likewise ordered to be closed for the day.

In spite of his promise to call an ACC meeting today, and in spite of two urgent requests from General Schuyler asking for a meeting, to this hour General Susaikov had not been located.

Other accounts

Prince Stirbey has informed me that he was told yesterday by a prominently-placed Communist of the more moderate faction that the Communist extremists are now in control of the party organization, and have decided to embark upon immediate large-scale repression of the opposition. The Communist source claimed the political opposition would assist in their own repression by resistance which they would make in the hope that some counter action would be taken by the United States and Great Britain, but which locally would, in reality, give the excuse for repressing them.

A more moderate Communist source…

Asked as to the Government's position, the source is said to have replied: "The Government does not exist, there is only the party, and the party only executed orders it receives from Moscow, where there are three or four fanatics who believe everything can be obtained by force or violence." He stated he did not know whether information sent to Moscow by Romanian Communist leader Ana Pauker, or moves suggested to her by Moscow were decisive in determining actions.

The Communist source said it was clear from the way his party had falsified events since November 8th that it was determined to bring the issue to a head. Hence, it was only a half-measure for the truth to be known abroad, or even to be re-broadcast through the Voice of America, since few peasants and workers have radio receiving sets, and thus the Government could spread virtually unhindered its own version of events throughout the country.

The only solution for the present dangerous situation, according to the Communist source, was a new government that would represent no one party and which would assure free elections. Thus moderate or "nationalist" Communists are traveling the same road as the political opposition in desiring identical solutions. However, he added, if the goal at the end of the road can be attained, there must be a general understanding that it was reached because of a decision by the Three Allied governments, and not by a victory of the opposition.

Prince Stirbey stated for my information that his Communist source and the political opposition as well intended to press the King, through his advisers, to issue a renewed appeal to the Three Allied governments, to refer to his unanswered appeal of August 20th, to state that events had proved the necessity for his original appeal and, in view of the rapidly deteriorating situation, to urge that it is necessary for the Three Powers to reach a quick decision.

November 13 *Miron Constantinescu at the burial spot…*

Following the ceremony yesterday at the Piata Victoriei, for six persons killed in the demonstration of November 8th, a portion of the crowd continued on to the burial spot. Reportedly 4,000 people were present at the graves, and another crowd of equal size in the adjacent avenue, when Miron Constantinescu, a Communist Central Committee member, led those assembled in an oath that they would avenge the deaths of those killed, would give the Government full support against the reactionaries Maniu and Bratianu, and toil for a free and independent Romania. The crowd is stated to have responded "We swear," thus ending an incident that local observers state is identical with similar scenes conducted by the Iron Guard.

D. Negel, the Marshal of the Court…
at the Soviet Embassy

This morning Marshal of the Court Negel related to me the substance of a conversation that he had had Thursday evening at the Soviet Embassy when General Susaikov took him by one arm, and Mr. Groza by the other, and led them into a corner. Susaikov opened by saying that Maniu and Bratianu on the pretext of shouting for the King were organizing disturbances for the morrow. He asked whom this would benefit, and then answered his own question, saying the Soviet authorities would not forbid anyone to shout for the King, but that they would not tolerate disturbances.

At this point Susaikov left, leaving Negel and Groza alone. Groza said that he always had been loyal to the King, that he would have resigned long ago if it were not for the fact that the Russians would have considered such an act offensive. Groza went on to say that when he was in Moscow, he had told Stalin that he thought he would resign because the King desired it, but Stalin said "No, you must stay."

At this point Susaikov returned, and picked up the conversation by saying to Negel that in February the people desired Groza to head their Government, and that they still desired Groza to head their Government. If Groza should leave trouble would begin, and to avoid trouble the King must stop listening to the advice of Maniu and Bratianu. Then Susaikov asked, "Why did the King ask Groza's resignation?," immediately adding, "Why did the King seek the advice of Maniu and Bratianu?"

Susaikov's threatening tone

The Marshal said that the King had sought the advice of the four leaders that had helped him bring about the coup of August 1944, and that three of those four leaders favored immediate resignation of the Government in order to replace it by a government that would be recognized by the Three principal Allies. Susaikov then became threatening and intimated that the Russians might have acted differently on August 23 if they had chosen, and that they might still do so if they chose. In a threatening tone he added, "We might have made the King a prisoner as the Americans have made the Japanese Emperor a prisoner." Then he repeated that there is no doubt the people wish Groza and the King should wish Groza, and further the King would be very wise to ask Mr. Groza to make elections.

Groza interrupted to say that he had asked the King's authority to prepare for elections, but the King had replied that the time was not propitious to hold elections.

Intimidating words and manner

Then Susaikov turned to Negel and said "You should counsel the King and succeed in persuading him to change his attitude toward the Groza Government." He added that he had not seen the King within three months and so could not persuade him himself. The Marshal said if he wished an audience he was sure the King would be delighted to have him come to the Palace. To this General Susaikov replied: "I represent Russia, and I cannot ask to be received, but if the King calls me I shall come. But tell the King that he must receive Groza and he must recognize the Groza Government. He must say that he wishes the Groza Government to continue as it is, as it is desired by the people and the King is in accord with the people's wishes. The political actions of the Groza Government are the political actions that the people have desired, and have approved, and the King must say that he also has desired and approved them. Moreover, the Groza Government should make the elections."

The King... "must revise his attitude
toward the Groza Government"

Continuing, he said Russia had received the King's letter upon August 20th, and on August 23rd it had replied, stating that it saw no fault in the Groza Government and then had exchanged diplomatic representatives with that Government. Since that date, the King had not seen him (General Susaikov) and it had been many weeks since he had seen the Soviet Ambassador. In spite of this treatment, and to just this point, the Soviet Government had shown much patience. He added that the people were not inclined to be so patient, and that when their patience was exhausted, they might go much further, for the judgment of the people is always a harsh judgment. Then again, he said the King must not permit himself to be misled by Maniu and he asked the Marshal to report the conversation completely and honestly to the King, adding, "You are not only to report it, but to convince the King that he must revise his attitude toward the Groza Government."

Mr. Negel told me that he had last seen General Susaikov on August 22, and the King had last seen him on August 23rd. The King last saw the Soviet Ambassador on the departure of Mr. Pavlov in early September. Since then the Russians have made no request for an audience and the King, while awaiting replies to his letters, has refrained from asking Soviet, American, or British officials to the Palace. The Marshal said that he thought the King would not be moved by General Susaikov's intimidating words and manner, but he added that he fervently hoped the present insufferable situation will soon be brought to an end through the receipt of replies to the King's letters. The Marshal interpreted Groza's remarks as indicating that Groza was not burning any of his bridges.

Conclusions

In weighing recent statements and activities of Soviet officials in Romania, the Department for back-ground may wish to re-read my telegrams Nos. 744 of September 27, 749 of September 28, 763 of October 4, and 842 of November 1.

At a meeting of the ACC on November 10, General Susaikov intimated that the demonstrators, in tearing down posters, among which were some expressing greetings on the 28th anniversary of the October Red Revolution, gave the demonstration an anti-Soviet character. A similar thought was expressed publicly by Ambassador Kavtaradze on November 12.

From these statements local observers believe that the Romanian Communists now have the open support of Moscow, through Soviet officials in Romania. Moreover, they may well press home their advantage in the present period of confusion by destroying the organizations of their political opposition.

November 16 *Mark Ethridge*

Yesterday the Bulgarian Minister told me Mr. Ethridge will return to Sofia today or tomorrow and remain there some time. Yesterday's *Radio Bulletin* quotes the Secretary as saying he expects Mr. Ethridge back in America in about two weeks.

The Secretary's statement has caused consternation in local circles. To steady the situation I have said I am fully confident that Mr. Ethridge will carry out his plan to visit Romania before returning to the United States. Please do your utmost to put across to him the importance of carrying through his original plan.

November 16* *On "the facts surrounding the events of the 8th"*

General Schuyler's urgent request on the 8th for a special meeting of the ACC being unanswered, the questions which he raised were considered a yesterday's regular meeting.

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* Cf. *FRUS 1945*. V, pp. 625-626: Berry to the Secretary of State. Telegram 892, Nov. 16. Repeated to Moscow as 2691 and London as 100.

General Susaikov said that he could not agree to the appointment of a tri-partite board to establish the facts surrounding the events of the 8th, as (1) that would be an infringement of Romanian sovereignty and (2) the Russian High Command not the ACC was responsible for order within the country. General Susaikov was equally unable to agree to General Schuyler's request that a board of inquiry be appointed to investigate the third degree methods used by the secret police on children, women, and men brought to the Interior Ministry. Please see General Schuyler's cable for a full report of this meeting.

In reviewing objectively all the facts I have been able to assemble upon the demonstration of the 8th, I wish not to supplement the sentence in my telegram of November 8, reading "These shootings occurred after a cordon of the police had cut off approximately 150 persons and taken them into the Interior Ministry under arrest."

It appears that one group of the crowd, as reported, was cut off and taken into the Ministry, that another group, provoked by this action of the Romanian authorities, made a rush towards the Ministry, and that soldiers replied to this rush with shots. Not being able to reach the Ministry building, the crowd showed its anger by tearing from the wooden fence before the Ministry, which was covered with Government printed posters, all printed matter. As the local Communist may make a point of this "attack" against a public building, I submit this supplementary information with the explanation of the provocation for the "attack." The Soviet authorities have already used the incident, as some of the posters boasted of Soviet-Romanian friendship, to label the demonstration "anti-Soviet." The next move, which is already hinted, would be to say the demonstration was created and sustained by the Anglo-Americans.

November 17 *General Susaikov's interview with Titel Petrescu*

At an interview last evening General Susaikov felicitated the head of the Socialist Party, Titel Petrescu, upon his growing popularity and that of his party. The Soviet head of the ACC urged that he collaborate further with the Romanian Communists, but Petrescu reportedly maintained his position that the Socialists should keep their separate identity in any national elections.

Susaikov energetically defended the present regime and stated his belief that any mistakes it had made could be rectified with a few cabinet changes. He coupled this with a hint to Petrescu that the few additional places might be allocated to the Socialists by replacing certain cabinet ministers representing Communist affiliates such as the Patriotic Unions.

To Petrescu's observation regarding the urgency in solving the constitutional crisis, Susaikov allegedly replied that the crisis was entirely the King's fault although the latter had admitted to him that it was not his personal objections to the Groza regime that induced him to demand its resignation but the fact that it could not secure a peace treaty nor gain recognition from the Anglo-Americans. Susaikov emphasized his convictions and asked Petrescu to inform the King that the cabinet solution he envisaged comprising a few ministerial changes should completely settle the question.

November 18 *"Concerning the Ethridge mission" at Moscow and Bucharest*

The Romanian Foreign Office received a telegram from Ambassador Jordan at Moscow reporting the conversation he had just had with Mr. Vyshinski concerning the Ethridge mission. The latter said that Mr. Ethridge had come to Moscow "to disseminate Anglo-American propaganda" but he had been given the brush-off by Soviet officials.

The Foreign Office regards this as yet another indication that the Soviet Government will continue to stand behind the Groza Government.

All Romanian people with whom I have talked within the past week feel that by visiting Moscow before completing his tour in the Balkans, Mr. Ethridge has compromised irreparably the success of his mission as regards its chances of effecting a solution of the Romanian political-constitutional crisis through the pressure created by his presence in this country.

The Government, while distinctly disturbed a fortnight ago by the prospect of the arrival of the Ethridge mission on a fact-finding tour, now regards that mission as just another futile American gesture.

Investigation of the November 8 demonstration is continuing

Confirming several other reports, last evening a responsible source stated that he had been informed by the army officer charged with the military

Court Martial investigation of the November 8 demonstration that the latter had been ordered to seek every shred of evidence that might be used to implicate the British and American missions. These instructions were given to him by the Secretary-General of the Secret Police in the Interior Ministry.

The Court Martial investigation is continuing and the impression is being given to those questioned that the Government is seeking to justify its allegations that November 8 was an anti-Soviet demonstration which took that bent through Anglo-American encouragement. The tenor of questions revolves about the presence in the demonstration area of British and American official personnel. It is a fact, of course, that officers were strategically located as observers to cover the proceedings thoroughly. Information is eagerly seized upon reporting English or American officers carried by the crowd accompanying American and British officials at the demonstration are queried closely upon Anglo-American comments and the leading question is put whether they were not pleased. A rumor believed to be spread through Government sources claims that the British and Americans spent "much money" to assure the success of the demonstration.

November 19

Ethridge and Black arrived in Bucharest this morning.

November 21 *Conversation Maniu — Schuyler — Berry*

Mr. Maniu asked urgently to meet General Schuyler and me.* He stated that in view that the fury of the reign of terrorism of the Groza

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**FRUS 1945*. V, pp. 626-627. Berry to the Secretary of State. Telegram 906, Nov. 21. Also Schuyler, *Diary*, Ms. p. 393: "Maniu requests sanctuary for Lazar, one of his assistants." It runs as follows:

"Monday afternoon I received an urgent message from Mr. Maniu asking that Mr. Berry and I arrange to meet him at once. Accordingly Mr. Maniu and Mr. Berry came out to my house after dinner Monday night. Maniu told us how all of his assistents are being arrested and that many are being beaten and some even killed. He said that Romania is living under a reign of terror such as she has never before experienced.

Government had not abated; that investigation had not been undertaken by the ACC in connection with the events of November 8; that the investigations made by the Government were directed exclusively against the National Peasant Party; and that the leaders of the Peasant Party no longer have any security of domicile or of person, he asked, (1), that the political situation in Romania be immediately examined, (2), that the ACC immediately investigate the events of November 8, and (3), that sanctuary be provided Dr. Ilie Lazar and his minor daughter. Dr. Lazar is head of the Peasant Party organization of the Working Men. He and his daughter have been threatened with death by their political opponents.

Bearing in mind the instructions sent this Mission on asylum and that if this Mission were authorized to extend asylum under the same instructions as issued Ambassador Patterson,[*] it would be unable to offer asylum because of the fourth condition. General Schuyler and I limited ourselves to a statement that we would forward to our government a report of Mr. Maniu's request.

Clearance for Westley's entrance to Romania...

Westley was assigned to this Mission as Agricultural Attaché in October. Clearance for his arrival, his wife's and step son's, were requested of General Susaikov on October 17.

Since November 1 General Schuyler's staff has made repeated requests that the clearance for Westley party be expedited. Upon two occasions I have supplemented these requests.

On November 20 General Vinogradov speaking for General Susaikov informed General Schuyler that as Westley has been assigned to the US

He said the arrests are designed systematically to break up the National Peasant Party. All of his district leaders are being hunted, and those who do not go into hidding are arrested immediately and disappear. He is particularly fearful for Mr. Ilie Lazar, who is his Chief Assistant in organizing the laborers of Bucharest. Even before November 8 Lazar had got himself into the bad graces of the Communists because of his efforts to draw the workers away from FND. According to Maniu, he has been most succesful. He says that if Lazar is found, he will certainly be beaten and probably killed. He begged us to afford sanctuary to Lazar and his daughter. Mr. Berry and I explained that under our instructions, we could not do this, but that we are urging the ACC to investigate immediately the numerous reports of beatings and improper treatment of prisoners. Mr. Maniu went away quite unhappy."

[*] Richard C. Patterson jr., Ambassador to Yugoslavia.

Mission as Agricultural Attache request for his entrance to Romania should be made by diplomatic channels. Upon enquiry General Schuyler and I learned that this means the request should be submitted by the Embassy at Moscow to the Soviet Foreign Office.

In view of Vyshinski's statement to you in mid January that no obstacles are to be put in the way of persons appointed to this mission and in view of Vyshinski's statement to you in early September that the Soviet Government agrees that applications shall be decided on the spot by the ACC Chairman without reference to Moscow, I assume that either General Susaikov is not informed of Vyshinski's statements or if he were informed, these statements no longer are valid. In either case I shall appreciate your clarification and assistance.

November 21 *Permission for Fraleigh from Belgrade*

Fraleigh from Belgrade desires to visit this Mission on leave and I wish him to come. Request for his clearance was filed by General Schuyler with ACC on September 3. Numerous verbal requests for expediting clearance have been made by General Schuyler's staff. On November 20 General Schuyler was informed that as Mr. Fraleigh is coming to confer with me, permission for his entry into Romania should be through diplomatic channels. As in the case of Westley, I understand this means Moscow and will appreciate the Embassy's intervention.

November 24 *As in the case Westley*

Informed today that ACC will not grant clearance for Ogilvie as request must be forwarded through diplomatic channels as in the case of Westley and Fraleigh.

November 26 *Mark Ethridge on "the urgency of the situation" in Romania*

Mr. Ethridge sent the following cable to Secretary Byrnes from Bucharest:*

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* Cf. *FRUS 1945*. V, pp. 627-631, Telegram 917, Nov. 26. Mr. Ethridge suggests that the Secretary may wish to repeat to Moscow for Harriman." Signed *Berry*.

"Although I leave here Thursday, on the way home, I am sending this telegram at the end of a busy week in Bucharest because of the urgency of the situation. The position of the Western democracies is disintegrating fast, the Russian position becoming stronger all the time, and unless we can take firm and effective action in Romania it will soon be too late. We are jeopardizing the confidence of the Romanian people in our intent and ability to carry out commitments we have made to the word.

During the past week, I have talked to almost all the major political figures, including the British and Soviet representatives, the King, leading members of the parties in the Groza coalition Government, leaders of the opposition, and numerous persons representing labor and industrial groups. Before leaving today for the provinces for two days, I should like to summarize briefly and tentatively for your information my impressions of the Romanian situation."

Significant differences between Bulgaria and Romania

"Although the pattern of seizure of power is much the same as that I found in Bulgaria, there are significant differences. In the first place, there is no political grouping here, such as the Fatherland Front regime of a year ago in Bulgaria, which the Yalta signatories could accept as a common denominator. Secondly, the refusal of Groza last August to resign at the King's demand has created a constitutional deadlock which is an important contributing factor in the present situation. Both sides profess to be anxious to solve it, but in the meantime the governmental situation is approaching the chaotic and some decision must be made. In the third place, the question of parliamentary elections is in the discussion stage because the present Government contends that further preparations are necessary. My own conviction is that the Government will not go to the people yet because it is not willing to risk itself in a free election, and wants more time to consolidate its power.

I am entirely convinced that the Groza Government is in no sense representative under the Yalta formula, because the two political groups which have the support of the vast majority of the Romanian people are not only out of the Government, but their leaders are being harassed by the Government, their political clubs largely taken over, their newspapers entirely suppressed, and all public meetings of the opposition barred. The

Peasant and Liberal parties are represented in the Government by only a few dissident leaders under Soviet control. The Social Democratic Party, which participates in the coalition, is greatly discontented with the policies of the Government and claims to be seeking an appropriate time to leave the coalition."

The Socialist Party

"Of the parties composing the Groza Coalition only the Socialist Party can be considered substantially independent of direct Russian domination. The Communist Party is almost wholly a Russian creation, in contrast with the party in Bulgaria. It is led by persons of non-Romanian traditions, policies which are daily increasing tension and resistance here. The Plowmen's Front and Patriotic Union are new groups created by the Communists to win adherents among peasant and artisan classes. Tatarescu, who seems to be the broker who is selling Romania out to the Russians, has been so discredited by his past conduct that he is now wholly dependent upon the Russians for protection. The Socialist Party alone has its roots in Romanian history and apparently has been gaining popularity during the past years although its leaders admit that constant efforts are made by the Communists to split and weaken it."

"The policy pursued by the Groza Government"

"The policy pursued by the Groza Government, under close and constant Soviet direction, is calculated only to further Soviet exploitation of the country without regard to the Armistice terms and has resulted in a degree of Soviet control beyond anything I found in Bulgaria. That is natural, of course, because Romania is inherently wealthy, but the Armistice agreement to which we as Allies subscribed has been circumvented by a series of conventions implementing its terms. Russia already has claimed 700 factories taken over from the Germans, it has a major interest even in banking institutions, it has joint ownership of Romanian-owned oil, steamship, and air line companies, and it has so priced the goods which Romania has to deliver in reparations that Romania is paying approximately three times what she anticipated when signing the armistice. In addition, the presence of more than 600,000 Russian troops who must be fed, clothed, and paid largely at Romania's expense, constitutes a drain that the country cannot long stand. Five-sevenths of all of current Armistice expenditures go to the upkeep of the Russian army. Outside companies, including those Americans have an interest in, are being squeezed to the point where they will have to get out of the country unless the trend is changed. Given another few months Russia will have complete economic domination of Romania and the sort of government the country has will make little difference. Groza and Tatarescu are the complete servants of Russia in the delivery of Romania into the hands of a dictatorship which certainly is worse by universal agreement than German occupation."

The two main opposition groups:

"As for the two main opposition groups, both barred from public speaking or writing, while anyone may criticize the conservative policies of the Bratianu Liberal Party in the past and the negativist maneuvering of Maniu, they personally undoubtedly represent very important segments, if not the absolute majority, of democratic Romanian opinion. Maniu particularly remains the unquestioned symbol of Romanian democracy and of traditionally Romanian and democratic feeling and in free elections his party would certainly win the biggest block of seats. Nevertheless, 27 of Maniu's district leaders have been jailed. Two of Bratianu's district leaders in Bucharest are in jail and the other two are in hiding. The personal security of the major leaders has not, however, been threatened as yet. There is no terror here in the Bulgarian sense of blood baths, but there is nevertheless great fear, great repression of political opponents, mid-night arrests, secret police beatings, disappearances, and all the accoutrements of making people behave your way."

Rise in the King's prestige and popularity

"A consequence of the King's demand that Groza resign last August and his refusal to sign any decree since then or receive any Minister of the Government has been a further rise in his personal prestige and popularity. He has become the symbol of resistance to the Communists and to Russia. Even Communists have admitted to me his great popularity and six of them have said that they hoped we Americans would be able to find a solution to the constitutional impasse between the King and the Government. Of course they want him to go eventually, but they would not dare now to try to find a settlement to the constitutional impasse intimated strongly that the Russians also desire a settlement. Whether Russia wants a settlement or not, Romanians certainly do. In view of the great prestige of the King, however, it is possible that the Soviet Government may be willing to make concessions in the political field if it can do so in such a way as to avoid giving the appearance of having acted under Anglo-American pressure. I am seeing Susaikov Wednesday night and he may raise the question. If so, I shall of course report it. Communists desire a settlement because, even though directed by Russians, many of them are Romanian in feeling and are getting alarmed at what is happening. Inflation is rising rapidly, transport is breaking down, factories are not able to get raw materials, shut off as they are from outside trade, and Russia is making such drafts of food that people fear a shortage of major proportions by February."

"... Little can be done here..." unless...

"It is obvious to me that little can be done here except to keep the pressure on to salvage as much as can be saved of Romanian political and economic independence. The real answer lies, as with Bulgaria, in Russia's intent and in the American Government's efforts to work out all its problems with Russia. Much could be done if we would insist that the Allied Control Commission become a truly tripartite body rather than a Soviet authority as at present with our only role one of constant but futile protest.

I am not recommending a course at this time. Perhaps the conversation with Susaikov will suggest one. I am only trying now to indicate the urgency of the Romanian situation and the fact that the country is fast being swallowed up economically, that its people are becoming more and more disillusioned, their morale sinking all the time, and that continued failure on our part to insist upon the application of our announced principles can only result in their being driven to Communism, which is repulsive to them."

November 27 *New information about November 8 demonstration*

On November 6 the Interior Minister personally stated to the Secretaries-General of the National Peasant and National Liberal parties that the public demonstration planned for the King on November 8 "cannot take place" since the Government had information that elements from these parties intended to provoke instances, but they were authorized to hold meetings in halls.

The National Peasant Party communiqué covering the November 8 incident, which is included in Dispatch No. 611 of November 15, is believed to give a substantially accurate picture of events and its contents, supplemented by certain additional reliable information, are carried below. It states that the National Peasant and National Liberal parties replied in writing on November 7 to the Interior Minister's above quoted statement of November 6 and said that they were completely ignorant of any plans for disturbances, which could only be committed by agents provocateurs. The Peasant Party could not "accept the suggestion that they should hold political meetings on the King's Day, and its members were free to take part in the demonstration of affection of the Capital." On the morning of November 8 the Peasant and Liberal party headquarters were informed by telephone from the Interior Ministry that the demonstration could not take place, and the Interior Minister summoned the Secretaries-General of the two parties who came immediately and to whom he read the contents of a reply letter from the ACC concerning the demonstration. Unknown to the parties the Minister on November 7 had addressed a strong complaint concerning the planned demonstration to the ACC. While this information was being given workers in motor trucks were already circulating in the Palace Square to disperse the crowd. Despite the Interior Minister's promise to give a copy of the ACC letter to each political party, he did not do so.

November 29 *Second telegram* sent by Ethridge: Impressions on Titel Petrescu and I. Schraer*

Mr. Ethridge sent the following cable to Secretary Byrnes from Bucharest:

"Since returning from a brief trip into Transylvania I have seen two key Romanian political figures whom I had been unable to contact earlier, Titel Petrescu, President of the Social Democrat Party, and Iosif Szraer,

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* *FRUS 1945*. V, pp. 631-632: Telegram 928, Nov. 28. As for the "*Summary Report on Soviet Policy in Romania and Bulgaria*," dated Washington Dec. 7, see *FRUS 1945*. V, pp. 633-637; finally for the Ethridge letter to the Secretary of State — intended for publication but not published — see *FRUS 1945*. V, pp. 638-641.

[*Schraer*] Communist Secretary General of the Ministry of Interior, who in separate interviews fully confirmed the impressions reported on November 26.

Both Petrescu and Szraer agreed that the Government was completely dominated by the Communists who receive their orders from Moscow and that the other parties within the Government enjoy no independence whatsoever. Whereas the Socialists had originally been promised full freedom within the coalition Petrescu reported that, below the top level, no such cooperation exists. He predicted that a definite split between the Socialists and the National Democratic Front was inevitable, although it might be several months before it materialized.

Petrescu added that the Communists would in the next several months make a vigorous effort to split the Socialist Party, but expressed his confidence that his party would be able to withstand these attacks. From another source I have further been informed that in the near future the Government will probably prefer official charges of treason against the leaders of the Peasant and Liberal parties, accusing them of having organized the "Fascist" demonstration of November 8."

Petrescu and Schraer on the prestige of the King...

"Petrescu and Szraer were also in agreement that the prestige of the King was at the present time higher than it had ever been before and that he in fact had become the symbol of Romanian sovereignty and independence. Their views likewise coincided that, given the facts of Soviet occupation and Communist discipline, there was no possibility of finding a solution to the Romanian problem on a local basis."

Ethridge persisting in his belief

"I therefore remain all the firmer in my belief that, if the United States desires to live up to the obligations which it assumed at Yalta and Potsdam, it must do so by bringing direct pressure on the Soviet Government, while at the same time preserving its attitude of absolute inflexibility in Romania. I believe we have the possibility of achieving this through the instrument of the Allied Control Commission if we can make that commission a truly tripartite organization. Upon my return to

Washington next week I shall undertake to develop in my report to you this approach to a solution.

I have notified Barnes[*] that I am not coming to Sofia."

Berry and Ethridge in Rome

In order to be available when Ethridge writes his report in Rome I am accompanying him to Rome this morning. I expect to return to Bucharest within two days. No travel orders are necessary as I shall make no claim for per diem and transportation is free.

December 2

Returned to Bucharest.

December 4 *A Romanian Commission to be sent to Switzerland*

The Romanian Government is planning to send to Switzerland a commission headed by Cristureanu, former Commercial Attaché of Moscow, and composed of Gugiu Tabrea, Counsellor of the Court of Appeals, and Vasile Georgescu, a political director of the Foreign Office.

The announced purpose of this commission is to investigate matters involving orders given by Marshal Antonescu. I understand that from Switzerland the Mission will try to enter France where its members will engage in activities more directly concerned with the advancement of interests of the Communist Party.

Tabrea and Georgescu are under the orders of Bodnaras, a leading figure of the Communist Party and present Secretary General of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers. On the arrival of the commission you may wish to pass on this information to the Swiss authorities.

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[*] Maynard B. Barnes, political associate of General John Crane, the US Military Representative in Sofia.

December 5 *SD Party resolution of December 3*

The Social Democratic Party conference of December 1 to 3 vindicated the position of its leader, Titel Petrescu, by deciding after a stormy session that the party in the event of elections should face the electors separately and not join a Communist organized coalition. It voted this action should not be reconsidered except through the convocation of a party congress which should only be called if the Party Central Committee decided new exceptional circumstances necessitated a reexamination.

On the last day of the conference the resolution, presented by Mr. Petrescu, passed by a vote of 108 to 94 despite every counter pressure exerted by the Communists through Socialist Left wing leaders, Labor Minister Radaceanu, Education Minister Voitec, and Under-Interior Minister Burca. The vote was not secret and Socialists attending the conference who held government positions under these ministers were ordered to vote against the resolution. Only eight refused. The resolution carried because of the well nigh unanimous vote of workers' delegations from industrial areas through the country.

December 6 *Concerning the points raised by Maniu in his memorandum*

Using the information contained in Department's cable, I answered in the presence of General Schuyler this evening the points raised by Mr. Maniu in his memorandum.

December 7 *Maniu's home thoroughly searched*

Mr. Maniu told me last evening that the Government is continuing its reign of terror against the leaders and members of the opposition parties. His domicile was thoroughly searched two days before, all of his papers were gone through and several of them confiscated. This was the first time in his life that such an indignity had been inflicted upon him.

Moscow in agreement that the opposition parties be dissolved

He added that he was informed from a good source that the Government has received word through General Susaikov that Moscow is in agreement that the Peasant and Liberal parties be dissolved. Mr. Maniu said that his party has been dissolved by the State three times in his lifetime but that each time he had continued to work, and if it is again dissolved, he will still continue to work in spite of the personal risk which is greater now than ever before.

"The pulse of public opinion..."

Mr. Maniu believes that the weakness of the Groza Government will force it to dissolve opposition parties before making plans for general elections as the Government would not dare to present a slate of candidates when the opposition has a slate. As an illustration of the Government's weakness Mr. Maniu cited results of three communal elections which were held during the month of November by the Minister of the Interior to take the pulse of public opinion. These were at Bailesti-Dolj, Bals-Romanati, and Seneca-Sibiu. At the first the Peasant Party received 2,961 votes, the Liberals 2,163 votes, the Socialists 568 votes, and the Communists 33 votes. At the second the Peasants received 2,163 votes, Liberals 1,216 votes, Socialists 326 votes, and Communists 7 votes. At the third the Peasants received 643 votes, the Liberals had no candidate, the Socialists 21 votes, and the Communists had no candidate. At all three voting places the voting was public, the voters announcing their votes after their names were called.

December 8 *Romania's alarming economic situation*

The past week has brought forth evidence of full scale Romanian economic disintegration which the Government is making no effective efforts to remedy. Inflation suddenly has assumed most alarming proportions and public confidence in Romania currency is being rapidly lost. Only today the National Bank put out fifteen billion in new bank notes. Several business houses using a pretext have closed their doors rather than have their stocks liquidated in a single day's wild buying.

Industrial production is declining, speculation is rife. Prices are increasing faster than currency can be printed. Moreover, it is reported that the Government has agreed to abolish restrictions upon wage increases, which are shortly expected to mount more than 100 percent. This has given a tremendous fillip to the onrush of complete inflation.

The economic picture is known to virtually all classes in the country, yet the Communist-dominated Government is making no serious attempt to bring order out of the economic chaos or to alleviate the resultant spreading public suffering. The problem was broached in this week's session of the Council of Ministers but, aside from a decision to increase taxes, nothing was accomplished. The Board of Directors of the National Bank unanimously opposed the releasing large quantities of Romanian state gold stocks in an effort to buy up circulating paper currency in order to try to stay the runaway inflation. The Government's inactivity in this crisis has strengthened the impression among many people that the present Romanian economic situation is one to the Communist Party's liking.

Two letters delivered to the King:
1. From General Rășcanu and 2. from Tătărescu

Princess Elizabeth Thursday asked for an immediate audience with the King. She was taken by special train to Sinaia where the King is in residence. Her purpose was to deliver two letters to the King.

The first letter was from General Rascanu, Minister of War. He asked the King to receive him at once in order that he might explain the disintegrating morale of the Army which he attributed to the fact that no promotions have been possible since contact was broken between King and Government on August 23. Promotions in the Romanian Army can only be made by Royal Decree. The General intimated that the King could not count upon the loyalty of the Army much longer if he maintained his present attitude.

The second letter was in the form of an unsigned memorandum from Tatarescu. A resume of this memorandum is given in the following paragraph. In substance it placed upon the King the responsibility for the present economic, political, and constitutional crisis, warned him that the King of Yugoslavia first lost contact with his people and Government and then his throne and that a similar fate is being prepared for the King of Bulgaria. It hinted broadly that Michael would be the third to share this fate which would be soon forthcoming unless he mended his ways.

In short: the stalemate created by the King's refusal to coop with Groza Government

"More than three months have passed since His Majesty the King, as a result of Anglo-American demands, tried to replace the Government of Dr. Groza and waiting for those three major powers to come to an agreement has interrupted any attempt to work with this Government.

After three months, one can objectively examine the situation created by this act.

1. The Government of the Soviet Union on the second day after the step taken by His Majesty the King made known its point of view: it opposes any changes in the Government.

2. The Government of the Soviet Union interpreted the King's act as being unfriendly.

3. The Governments of the United States and Great Britain to this day have not found the basis for an understanding with the Government of the Soviet Union and are today farther apart than at any time in regards to an understanding on the Romanian question.

4. The Government of the Soviet Union is today, more than ever before, not only against the replacement of Dr. Petru Groza's Government but even against minor changes in the structure of this government.

5. From the viewpoint of internal conditions, the situation is much more serious:

   a. We are without any protection in foreign countries because we cannot accredit ambassadors and ministers plenipotentiary who are to protect Romanian interests — in the grave moment in which the Anglo-American decision of not permitting the handing back of the whole of Transylvania brings into play the fortunes of Romanian boundaries. On the other hand, Hungary has started on extensive campaign to impose its point of view.

   b. We cannot strengthen the financial conditions of the country since the program for levying new taxes cannot be realised because of the impossibility of introducing fiscal laws which require the sanction of His Majesty the King. Meanwhile, inflation and a rise in the cost of living have taken catastrophic proportions, and we are on the eve of a grave financial and economic crash.

c. In other branches of the activities of the State, the attempts at consolidation are paralyzed by the same causes.

d. In the army the morale of the troops is very tense, and the isolation of His Majesty the King is creating a turbulent atmosphere.

e. There is noticeable evidence in the entire machinery of State of relaxation of discipline. To date in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, there have been three cases of insubordination provoked by irresponsible chiefs of missions who are abusing the prestige of the Romanian State in foreign lands; thus you have the example of a lack of collaboration between Crown and Government."

"There will be no external solution"

"6. The aspects of the situation today and the prospectives of the situation of tomorrow. The Government of Dr. Petru Groza cannot be changed – today less so than at any other time in the past. His Majesty the King waited for the decision as a result of the London Conference. This period of waiting was hopeless. His Majesty is possibly awaiting a solution as a result of Mr. Ethridge's visit. There are noticeable signs, however, that this visit will not bring a solution. The Anglo-American-Soviet tension is far from coming to a conclusion, and President Truman has declared that he does not see the need of a meeting of the Big Three. We could wait for a period of another three months, and there will be no external solution. From the outer world at the present time we are receiving only the echoes of crumbling monarchial institutions: Yugoslavia has declared itself a republic, Greece has decided to postpone for a period of three years its plebiscite on the solving of the monarchial question, while Bulgaria is preparing to adopt the same decision taken by Yugoslavia. Two kings who have carried the banner for the cause of Great Britain, the United States, and the United Nations have fallen and are being treated in London, according to reports in the English press as 'simple foreign persons.'"

"We have reached the hour of twelve"

"Meanwhile, in our country there is spreading a very heavy atmosphere leading to an act of madness, the seed of anarchy is germinating. We have reached the hour of twelve. We are on the eve of the creation of a general condition dangerous to our country and to the Crown.

I request the permission of an audience with His Majesty the King to present supplementary information and to bring proposals with the view to returning to a normal situation in our national existence."

Meanwhile

About the time that Tatarescu was drafting his memorandum he was busily sounding out candidates of a Council of Regency. He is reliably reported to have visited Patriarch Nicodim for this purpose and Mr. Ciresh the First President of the Court Cassation. On his own slate Tatarescu himself would be the third member.

As the Groza Government is trying to place upon the King the responsibility for the economic crisis, he last evening inquired my advice as to what action he should take. The Department knows that he has had under consideration the question of addressing a second appeal to the three signatories of the Romanian Armistice. The prompt action of the Soviet Government in replying to his letter of August 20 and the long delay of the American and British governments in replying is giving him great concern in view of the rapidly deteriorating economic-political situation.

The State Department position

I replied as I had to Mr. Maniu a few days before, that the Department has the Romanian political situation under continuing scrutiny with a view to exploring all paths which might lead out of the present impasse. I cited the Ethridge Mission as evidence of our active interest in Romanian affairs and said that I thought that no action on the part of the State Department could be contemplated until Mr. Ethridge's report had been submitted and studied.

I believe that the King will continue to show patience although the Department will understand the increasing pressure against him is well-nigh overwhelming.

December 10 *"Romania's economic life... subordinated to Russia's concept"*

No existing Romanian legislation prevents private importers and exporters from buying and selling goods. However, Romania passed in 1945 from a state in which private initiative in foreign trade was given every facility and security within an elastic framework of war controls to one of precarious compromise between a facade of free enterprise and an interior of muddling pseudo-communism apparently inching toward the monolithic state.

Every aspect of Romania's economic life has been subordinated more or less to Russia's concept of its needs and rights as a conqueror resulting in lack of internal and external confidence and placing business on the short-term speculative basis. Inflationary conditions directly and indirectly influenced by Russia, whether deliberately or unwittingly, made it impossible for foreign traders to enter into contracts. Prices changed drastically from week to week and recently from day to day.

The National Bank, formerly an institution of prestige and consequence in Romania's foreign trade, steadily lost ground in Government councils. Contraband trade between Romania and neighboring countries sprang up, all Romanian interior routes and frontier posts being policed by Russians. This and partially the relative poverty of neighboring countries Czechoslovakia excepted, tended to vitiate the full functioning of trade treaties between Romania, Russia, and the countries of the Russian bloc. Transport difficulties and Russia's forceful insistence on the formation of mixed Soviet-Romanian companies apparently looking to the long-range domination of basic elements in Romania's economy were additional factors unfavorable to the resumption of private foreign trade. Full report going forward this week.

Carol "an added threat"

"I hope* that the Department will do everything possible to support the British in their stand that Carol should not return to Europe as Carol on this side of the Atlantic will be an added threat to all democratic institutions in Romania."

**FRUS 1945*, V, pp. 641-642: Berry to the Secretary of State, Telegram 967, Dec. 10. Repeated Paris as 21 and London as 111.

December 11

In the interest of better Anglo-Russian relations

Romanian Socialists have been greatly concerned by a responsible report from a Socialist delegate who attended the International Youth Congress at London and who had a private conversation there with Harold Laski. Laski reportedly said that Great Britain would be obliged to recognize the Groza Government in order to end the "stalemate" with the Soviet Union over Romania and that Britain was working toward this in the interest of better Anglo-Russian relations.

The boundaries of Transylvania

That the Russians are apparently concentrating their pressure upon British policy is indicated by a report received from a high Interior Ministry official today. Interior Minister Teohari Georgescu has been notified by Soviet officials that the British Government has insisted that the question of modifying the boundaries of Transylvania to Hungary's advantage be discussed at the forthcoming Foreign Ministers' Conference in Moscow. The Russians reportedly assured the Groza Government that they are determined to maintain the present frontier.

To recover lost political ground, the Government is to take refuge in the nationalist sentiments of the Romanian people and the controlled press very shortly will commence a covert attack primarily against Great Britain and secondarily against the United States, which will ostensibly be directed against Julius Maniu of the National Peasant and against the Social Democratic Party, whose ties with the West will be proclaimed as insufficient to prevent the dismemberment of Romania.

"I [Berry] believe that we will come out of this stalemate in Romania..."

"A backdown from the principles* which were enumerated at Yalta and upon which we have stood since, such as is suggested by British Under-Secretary Sargent, would net us little in Romania except the contempt of a vast majority of the Romanian people. Certainly we could expect no more from the Russians after accepting their interpretation of Yalta than we are now getting and the Romanians in their bitterest hour would accuse us of having held out false hopes to them through many months.

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* Following three paragraphs are printed in *FRUS 1945*, V, p. 642: Berry to the Secretary of State, Telegram 972, Dec. 11. Repeated London as 113 and Sofia as 41.

From my conversations with the British political representative in Romania I am convinced that he would support me in this point. I may add the observation that, if the thinking of Mr. Sargent is generally shared by the British policy making group and if they expect to secure in the Balkans the recognition of the British point of view as well as respect for British interests by "nagging" the occupying power, the fundamental issue has already been lost.

I believe that we will come out of this stalemate in Romania with colors flying if we match Russian firmness with firmness and if we add to firmness, frankness, and friendliness."

Shea states he has found quarters for information services in excellent downtown location. Rental asked is $3,000 yearly. Shea estimates additional $3,000 expenditure needed for furniture, decoration, installations, etc. Proposed quarters would house library, exhibits room, documentation center, press office including offices for Shea and staff. Decision must be made soonest since building nearly ready and renting begun. Would appreciate immediate answer.

In considering the above the Department should make its decision on the basic issue as to whether the activities of the Press Attache's office are to continue to be conducted from the Mission building where they now are, where our friends seek us and from where it operates a delivery service, or whether the office is to be set up on some thoroughfare where its display windows will attract those whom otherwise it would not reach.

Concerning the role United States plan to play in Romania

The course chosen should be based upon the role we plan to play in Romania. If that role is to be an acquiescence to the Soviet domination of this country, or an ineffectual protest to that domination, then the information services should be continued from their present quarters and perhaps even reduced in activity in order to avoid giving the Romanian people a false impression of our role in Romania. If, however, we are able to insist that the Russians respect their pledges concerning Romania and accordingly we plan to make Bucharest an active outpost for the dissemination of our conception of democratic ideals, then such activities should be conducted from larger and more conspicuously located quarters than the Mission building offers.

December 12 *Premier Groza's points:*

One of the Mission's contacts has reported a long conversation with Premier Groza last evening, in which he made the following points:

(1) The Russians have indicated repeatedly he has their full support and that he will be maintained in office.

(2) The Monarchy is essential for the continued existence of Romania.

(3) He is fully aware of the grave economic and administrative crises which have gotten out of hand because of the political conflict between Government and opposition.

(4) He has more influence now with the Communists in his Government than he had several months ago. The Communists listen to him now because of their past many political and administrative mistakes.

(5) He has prevented the arrest of Maniu's Lieutenant, Ilie Lazar, and has advised the Communists that press silence regarding Maniu would better serve their interests than press attacks against him.

(6) Communications Minister Gheorghiu-Dej, who has now replaced Justice Minister Patrascanu as the negotiator for the Communist Central Committee, is already in contact with one National Peasant Party official for the purpose of discussing the present political impasse. Groza suggested the opposition should seek to strengthen this contact.

Berry's conclusions

The above interview may perhaps indicate that the Communists, realizing their great unpopularity as well as their responsibility in the eyes of the public for present Romanian conditions, are opening the door of cooperation to the opposition. But it was the informant's view that the inducements made will be of such an inadequate nature that the opposition cannot accept them.

This maneuver may account for the absence of press attacks on Maniu and Bratianu during the past five days.

The Department will recall that just prior to each international conference in the last year there has been a lull in Romania in the Communist offensive and a timid effort to reconcile the opposition. Never, though, has this effort been based upon a fair representation for the opposition in the Government. And therefore the effort in each case has been unproductive. Then after each failure and after the end of the international conference the Communists have renewed their offensive, laying all blame on the opposition.

December 13* *If the British Govt considers "changing its past firm policy on the Romanian situation..."*

Because of garbled transmission only yesterday did I see complete text of London's No. 12441 of November 28.

There are some indications that the British Government is in a mood to consider changing its past firm policy on the Romanian situation. Perhaps that policy is determined by much larger interests than the British position in Romania. If so the matter is one upon which this Mission has no right to pass judgment. It does, however, feel an obligation to point out that the British Government's zeal for a solution seems to be warping its view of facts that must be available. For example the disparaging perspective with which the Foreign Office views the position of the political opposition in Romania does not conform to facts.

The Liberal Party strength in the country is probably not great but there is a great deal of vigor in its leadership. Mr. Bratianu has often said that when Mr. Vyshinski installed the Groza Government that he took from the hands of the Romanian political leaders the possibility of finding any real solution of the Romanian crisis. We cannot quarrel with this analysis.

In spite of a constant effort by the Communists to split and weaken the Socialist Party it is a fact that it has roots in Romanian history and that it has shown considerable gains of popularity in the past year.

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* See *FRUS 1945*, V, pp. 643-644: Berry to the Secretary of State. Telegram 979, Dec. 13. Repeated to London as 116 and to Moscow as 287.

Maniu "remains the symbol of Romanian democracy"

Whether the British, or we, like Mr. Maniu's dilatory and often negative maneuvering, it is a fact that he remains the unquestioned symbol of Romanian democracy and in a free election his party will certainly win the largest block of votes. Moreover, from my observations, I cannot concur with the British that Mr. Maniu is useless in the Romanian political scene or that he has only "yes men" in his entourage. When I last saw him, on December 6, he appeared vigorous and alert. With his party newspapers suppressed and without the right to hold public meetings he has done a first rate job in maintaining party discipline, and this in spite of continued Communist endeavors to entice away some of his lieutenants and divide his strength. He, Mihalache, and others around him agree that the fundamental question for Romania is the continued independence and integrity of the country.

December 14* *"If the King maintains his present position"*

Through the channel I use in getting messages to and from the King I sent him word this morning that he might expect the United States Government's reply to his letter within a few weeks and that it is hoped that no action will be taken by him in the meantime which would prejudice the possibility of a favorable solution of the Romanian crisis.

"Concerning the formation of a Regency Council"

My contact told me that General Susaikov has now followed Mr. Tatarescu's exploratory talks concerning the formation of a Regency Council by discussing this subject with Romanians. My informant believes that the question will become critical if the King maintains his present attitude until the end of the month when plans must be discussed for the traditional New Year's reception. If the King lets it be known that on that occasion he will not receive the Government my contact believes the Government with full Russian support will set up a Regency Council which will receive them.

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* Cf. *FRUS 1945*, V, pp. 644-645: Berry to the Secretary of State. Telegram 981, Dec. 13. Repeated to Moscow as 288.

December 16

Concealed efforts... to establish a Regency Council

Last evening Mr. Maniu stated that he had trustworthy information that the hitherto concealed efforts of the Russians, Communists, and Tatarescu to form a Regency Council of three despite the reported uncertain attitude of Premier Groza, are bearing fruit and are now ready to come into the open. The proposed Regency Council would consist of the former Queen Elizabeth of Greece, the Patriarch of the Romanian Orthodox Church, and the head of the Court of Cassation, Oconel Cires. Elizabeth, sister of former King Carol, was chosen after Prince Nicholas, now in Switzerland, allegedly refused. She is the largest Romanian shareholder in the recently organized Sovrom Bank and through her economic interests is an advocate of close Romanian-Soviet economic collaboration. Elizabeth also is closely associated with Mr. Tatarescu and is an outspoken critic of the King's position towards the Groza regime. The Patriarch, although first reluctant to assent to the regency project, is now stated not to be unwilling if it is broached. The third proposed regent, Mr. Cires, is an appointee of the present regime and will faithfully play the role required.

As the next step Mr. Maniu stated that he had responsible information War Minister Rascanu would call a meeting of leading generals on December 17 to discuss several questions affecting the Army as a result of the King not signing decrees issued by the Government. One matter expected to be proposed is approval for the establishment of the Regency Council.

Since the Army is definitely for the King every possible pressure will be exerted upon the participating generals, including threats of dismissal, to secure their agreement to settle the present constitutional impasse. Many of the generals are flexible under heavy pressure and Mr. Maniu believes there is a fair chance that this move may succeed.

"Outlawing of the political opposition"

For the last four days Mr. Maniu has appeared at the Government conducted Court Martial investigation of the November 8 incidents during which time he has been asked 58 questions. It was not until yesterday that he became convinced that the Government was deliberately trying to establish a case against him as the "spiritual author" of the day's demonstrations, to cause his arrest, and to order the dissolution of the National Peasant Party. He said that the Government has succeeded in securing complaint "witnesses" who would testify that the crowd shouted anti-Soviet, anti-Semitic, and pro-Fascist slogans.

General Schuyler's important telegrams M-2457 and M-2458 December 13 reveal information now confirmed by this Mission that the Russians are determined to abolish the Romanian Commission for Execution of the Armistice and to place its responsibilities upon pliable government ministers.

A Regency Council... as an intermediary step

The three main factors outlined above, namely establishment of a Regency, the outlawing of the political opposition, and the complete reorganization of the Romanian machinery for executing the Armistice presently appear as logical parts of a general plan. The Regency Council would follow the now familiar Balkan pattern as an intermediary step between a constitutional monarchy and a declared republic. Since Mr. Maniu and his National Peasants are the core of any Romanian opposition they would be smashed. The American and British representatives on the ACC would be cut off from all official operational data concerning the Armistice until their governments agree to recognize the existing Groza regime or, if this fails, the Armistice Convention itself would be nullified. The pace of these three developments could easily be accelerated to ripen simultaneously during or following the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers.

December 20 *Romanian Army generals against a Regency*

The three-day meeting of top Romanian army generals has come to a close without the Government daring to formally bring up for discussion the question of a regency. It is understood that the Government's line of action was altered during the course of the meetings when it was ascertained that in private conversations most of the generals had declared themselves against a regency.

December 21 *Tătărescu's blackened reputation*

Tatarescu's speech is interpreted locally as (1) his bid for the leadership of a new bourgeois party if the Government proceeds to the dissolution of the Historic Parties and (2) his bid for the presidency of the Council of Ministers if the Soviets decide to drop Groza.

Since Tatarescu's reputation is so blackened by his conduct throughout this political career, he being, in the words of Mr. Maniu "the symbol of Romanian political immorality," and as Tatarescu is generally known today as a Soviet stooge, the speech has generally been heavily discredited, save on one point. This point, which is giving the King and all politicians considerable concern, is the statement that the Soviet Union was the only power which upheld the integrity of Romanian territory at the London Conference.

December 22 *Maniu, the Council of War, and the Military Tribunal*

The Mission has been informed by several generally reliable sources that the Council of War has decided not to prosecute Mr. Maniu as a result of the findings of the commission set up to determine the causes of the public manifestation on November 8.

As reported, it is generally believed that the Government was endeavoring to implicate Mr. Maniu and Mr. Bratianu and their respective parties as the instigators of the public demonstrations on November 8, with the ultimate intention of declaring these parties illegal.

It is reported that the Military Tribunal completed its conclusions on the morning of December 20 and was about to arrest 34 prominent members of the National Peasant Party to be judged along with Mr. Maniu and Mr. Penescu, the Secretary-General of the party. In the afternoon Mr. Maniu presented to the Council of War in his defense photographs taken when the agents of the Interior Ministry shot into the crowd, and of the Communist trucks which were driven into the midst of the demonstrators near the Royal Palace, and authentic texts of orders issued by the Patriotic Union convoking special shock troops for the 8th of November and instructing them to hinder any manifestation for the King.

Considerable political importance is attributed to the sudden decision to drop charges against Maniu. It is generally believed that this decision was taken by the Government with the consent of the Soviet Mission and that the plan to order the dissolution of the National Peasant Party has been set aside.

December 23 *Tătărescu's letter delivered to the King on December 10:*

There follows the text of the translation of a letter signed by Tatarescu on December 7 and delivered through a messenger to the King on December 10:

on "the return of Transylvania"

"Grave events connected with Romanian interests have taken place of late on an international plane, and it is under their pressure that I take the liberty of disturbing your Majesty.

As your Majesty knows, at the conference of Foreign Ministers in London, the proposal made by the Government of the Soviet Union that entire Transylvania should be returned to Romania, has not met with the approval of the Government of the United States and the Government of Great Britain.

I know today details of the debates which took place. The delegate of Great Britain requested that the taking of the decision on the return of Transylvania should be postponed, and he suggested that a special commission should study, on the spot, the de facto situation.

The delegate of the United States made an even graver suggestion. He said that the question of the return of Transylvania should be solved in the sense that by the decision taken 'a maximum of citizens of Hungarian origin should no longer fall under foreign control.'

The international discussion of the question of our western boundaries has thus been opened.

Since then and until today, the tone of the Hungarian press has been raised continually and now the semi-official papers of the Government parties openly discuss 'the problem of Hungarian boundaries which are today in a provisional state.' At the same time, the propaganda agencies of all countries have begun a campaign for popularizing the Hungarian thesis."

Romania's diplomatic representation

"Meanwhile, we are not able to begin any action of enlightenment and of counter-acting these campaigns because Romania no longer has, with the exception of Bern, any accredited minister who could defend Romanian interests. Moreover, two representatives of the country, the one at Ankara and the one at the Vatican, are failing to obey the Government, the Charge d'Affaires in Lisbon is in the same situation.

Our country has never before known such a state of disquiet and anarchy, and has never before found itself in a situation of total lack of defense of its interests abroad.

The diplomatic war of boundaries has begun, and the Romanian State cannot prepare for the fight because it cannot send its representatives abroad – since, as your Majesty knows, ambassadors and ministers may only be accredited by royal decree and our Majesty no longer consents to sign such decrees and to work with your Majesty's ministers.

My hands are tied, and I see with great anxiety our adversaries preparing a fight against us, and I am unable to make any preparations.

Romania is today not defended on the external front. Romania can be defeated tomorrow at the conference preparatory to the peace because it could not make ready its defense."

"Instead of ambassadors and ministers"

"Instead of ambassadors and ministers who cannot be sent to the posts because your Majesty does not consent to sign their decrees, I have tried to send political representatives of the Government.

This possibility was also taken away from me by the Government of the French Republic which did not agree to accept Mr. Mihail Ralea as representative of the Government, postponing its decision until 'after the solving of the constitutional crisis.'

The result of this refusal was that in the Commission of reparations which is holding its meetings in Paris now, we have had no authorized representative who could follow the debates and present Romania's request for reparations from Germany, and I was compelled to have recourse to the routine services of a minor employee.

These are the grave situations created for our country by a prolonged constitutional crisis which paralyzes the normal functioning of the State in one of the most critical moments of its existence."

Tătărescu's conclusion

"Burdened by the grave responsibility I have both toward the Crown and to the country, I thought it my duty to inform your Majesty of the dramatic situation in which we find ourselves only in just one section of the life of our State, and the impossible situation in which I personally find myself as one who is responsible for our external policy. That is why I respectfully beg your Majesty to show me by any means, which is the way I must follow and to what means I must have recourse in order to be able to do my duty in the action of defending the boundaries of our country and the interests of the State, both gravely endangered."

The King's comment

The King's only comment was to say that Mr. Tatarescu could contribute to the improvement of the situation by resigning his ministerial post.

December 24 *"Economic situation entered new phase"*

With price increases in the past week tending to double and capacity of the National Bank to meet demand for currency further impaired economic situation entered new phase. At the December 21 meeting of the Bank's Board, consisting of seven members elected by stockholders, and three members (two of whom since the advent of the Groza regime are Communists) appointed by the Government, the Communist members expressed Government inspired opposition to the Bank's desire to issue notes in denominations of 100,000 lei, 130 billion of which are printed and ready to circulate upon Government authorization.

Note circulation today is around 1,300 billion lei, and demand obligations amount to an additional 600 billion lei. Capacity of the Bank to print is 4 billion lei per day. Total demand for currency in recent days has been reaching 40 billion a day, compared with 20 to 24 billion previously.

Unquestionably the State's tardiness in making payments on accounts due, the snowstorm which seriously dislocated transport for the past several weeks, making it impossible for the provinces to remit currency to Bucharest, as well as the inflationary air generally, tended to drive prices upward and to increase the demand for currency. But basically the continuing pressure of the Armistice costs was the ultimate factor in the increased currency demand.

It is estimated that about 60 per cent of the note issue is on behalf of the Armistice account. Since April 1945, the Armistice account in the budget demanded a total of 653 billion lei out of total expenditures provided for of 1,160 billion lei. In addition the needs of the legitimate market for staple goods and services are about 20 per cent of the total circulation, and the speculative market, about 20 per cent.

The Soviet plan to provoke panic in Bucharest

The overwhelming majority of the Bank's Board feel that the Communist opposition to issuing the 100,000 lei notes is only part and parcel of the Soviet plan to provoke panic in Bucharest, excuse continued military operation, delay the peace, and to liquidate the present management of the Bank. The Bank has a breathing spell in the forthcoming holidays of five days during which its doors are shut, while the printing presses will produce a total of 20 billion lei, and the Bank acquire a reserve of 15 billion lei due from the provinces. This currency will tide the Bank over for perhaps a week or two. Meanwhile, the Bank's Governor will exercise his powers to convince the Government that the 100,000 lei notes should be distributed immediately. If he succeeds, the Bank will have another chance to turn around for perhaps six or seven months. Developments will be cabled.

December 30 *"A solution has been found for the Romanian constitutional crisis"*

The Moscow Communique* has quieted the voices of those who until yesterday urged that a regency replace King Michael. It has, as well, ended the talk that Messrs. Bratianu and Maniu soon will be prosecuted and that the political parties that they head will be suppressed.

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* The communique on the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers (Byrnes — Bevin — Molotov) was released to the press Dec. 27, 1945. See *FRUS 1945*, V, p. 645, and Berry's telegram 1031, Dec. 31, pp. 645-646. Repeated to Moscow as 295 and London as 124.

All people are pleased that an outlet has been discovered to the political impasse in which the representatives of the Three Great Powers when at London found themselves. The people are delighted that a solution has been found for the Romanian constitutional crisis. With this, unanimity of feeling ends.

The Communists initially were disappointed and confused by the communiqué, even hesitating in authorizing its full publication. The fellow travellers with the Communists reacted as the Communists. The opposition leaders' first reaction was of relief. They interpreted the communiqué as absolving their parties of the charge of being anti-democratic.

Non-party people generally have indicated a considerable degree of skepticism toward Soviet good intentions. Drawing on their experience of living in Romania during sixteen months of Soviet occupation, and bearing in mind that during this time the Armistice terms were warped under Soviet pressure to meet Soviet demands, they doubt that all people will be permitted to express themselves freely at elections particularly as the Government authorities insist on maintaining the Groza Government in office while the electorate has indicated its overwhelming distaste for the parties that support that Government. The most experienced of this group point out that under the terms of the communiqué the Communist Party in Romania will continue to run the country behind the familiar facade of the Groza Government.

December 31 *Harriman, Vyshinski, and Clark-Kerr arrived in Bucharest*

Ambassador Harriman traveling by train with Mr. Vyshinski and Sir Archibald Clark-Kerr arrived in Bucharest at 7 p.m. this evening.*

*American Ambassador W.A. Harriman, British Ambassador in the Soviet Union Sir Archibald Clark-Kerr, and Assistant People's Commissar for Soviet Union A.Y. Vyshinski were authorized by the three Foreign Ministers to proceed to Bucharest as a Commission (The Romanian Commission) to consult with King Michael and members of the Romanian Govt regarding the decisions adopted at their Conference in Moscow (*FRUS 1946*, VI, p. 555 n. 2).

2. 1946,* January 1-August 28

January 2 *Harriman, Vyshinski, and Clark-Kerr about the Moscow Decisions...*

Ambassador Harriman sent the following telegram:**

"Commission, Vyshinski, Clark-Kerr and myself met the King yesterday afternoon, January 1, to explain the Moscow Decisions. He said he had accepted the Yalta decisions and was prepared to accept the Moscow decisions. Clark-Kerr and I emphasized the importance we placed on the elections and the specified freedoms. The King inquired regarding the possibility of neutralizing certain of the Ministries to which Vyshinski replied that this was not covered by the Moscow Decisions.

We saw ten members of the Government last night. Groza, speaking for the Government, stated that the Government accepted the Moscow decisions and was prepared to give the required assurances. Again Clark-Kerr and I emphasized the importance our governments placed on these matters. Vyshinski has correctly presented the agreement and has supported in words at least our emphasis on the elections. However, the attitude of Groza and other members of the Government gave me the impression that they felt confident that in one way or another the elections would not unseat them. The Government undertook to approach the historic parties regarding their candidates for inclusion in the

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* The year of "efforts by the United States to bring about the establishment of representative government in Romania; participation by the United States in the Tripartite Commission for Romania; establishment of diplomatic relations with the Romanian Government" (See *FRUS 1946*, VI, *Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union*, 1969, pp. 555-672).

** For Harriman's telegrams dated Jan. 2, 3, 6, 7, 7. See *FRUS 1946*, VI, pp. 555-561. All of these Secret Urgent telegrams were repeated to Moscow as No. 1, 2, 4, 6, and 8.

Government. It was agreed that the members of the Commission as individuals, not as a Commission, would see today those members of the historic parties we consider desirable. I am seeing Maniu this morning and later Bratianu.

The Commission will meet with the Government again at five o'clock this afternoon.

The King has invited us to lunch today."

January 3 *Harriman's long talks with Maniu, Brătianu, and Mihalache*

Ambassador Harriman sent the following telegram:

"Yesterday I had long talks separately with Maniu, Bratianu, and Mihalache. They are all extremely skeptical that there can be free elections unless there is a change in the Ministries of Interior and Justice. They intend to endeavor to get the support of the King to this and hope to negotiate some concession with the Government. I told them that I could not associate myself with this question as the subject was not covered by the Moscow decisions. Clark-Kerr has taken the same position in his conversations with them. It seems unlikely that they will obtain any concession as I have been reliably informed that Vyshinski has told the Government to make no concessions.

The parties expect to nominate their candidates today. If agreement is reached on the candidates, which may take place today, the Commission's work will be completed. The reorganized Government will then presumably offer assurances that they intend to hold free elections and grant the specified freedoms of the press, assembly, etc. I doubt the sincerity with which these assurances will be given on the part of the present members of the Government. I assume that recognition will not be given until we are satisfied that the specified freedoms have in fact been put into effect. I recommend further that the steps to be taken by the Government in connection with the elections be currently scrutinized and objection made if they are not satisfactory.

I assume that even if we recognize this government we would not necessarily recognize the government resulting from the election unless we were reasonably satisfied with the conduct of the election. If we maintain this position throughout and allow it to be known to the

Government at the time of recognition, I believe there is a better chance that the election may conform more closely to the government's undertakings.

Vyshinski plans to leave Bucharest immediately after agreement on the candidates is reached. I expect to stay on in Bucharest at least one day after Vyshinski's departure to have an opportunity for consultation with Schuyler and Berry."

January 4 *A cable with no direct relevance to Romania*

Ambassador Harriman sent the following telegram:

"In discussions in Moscow you will recall importance placed on having deputy to General Hodges at Korea to handle details of Korean joint Commission who was familiar with dealing with the Soviets. I strongly recommended Major General J.R. Deane, former Head of Military Mission Moscow, now working for Joint Chiefs of Staff on American military participation UNO. In event he is not available I recommend for your consideration Major General Guenther formerly Deputy to General Clark in Vienna who did outstanding work with the Control Commission there. He is well-known to Matthews and others in the Department.

I feel increasingly that the careful selection of this deputy as well as the political advisers is of vital importance to the success of the agreement reached in Moscow."

January 5 *Skepticism about Soviet good intentions*

Ambassador Harriman sent the following telegram:

"Vyshinski's maneuvers in the last two days have given little encouragement to the hope that the Soviets intend to carry out the Moscow agreement in full good faith. The Peasant Party selected Ion Mihalache and the Liberals Constantine Bratianu,* nephew of the party leader. There is reason to believe that the Government would have accepted these candidates but Vyshinski behind our backs evidently instructed the Government to reject them.

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* Constantin (Bebe) Brătianu was Secretary General of the NLP from 1938 to 1947.

Charges against Mihalache
and Bebe Bratianu

"The Commission had a somewhat stormy meeting with the members of the Government on which the Government attempted to defend their rejection of these candidates. The principal charge leveled against Mihalache was that he had volunteered to fight the Russians in July of 1941 under the banner of Hitler which proved his undemocratic and Fascist tendencies. It seems that he served for three weeks and was released from the army on August 7. Tatarescu sat by unblushing despite the fact that he made a speech at that time calling the war for the return of Bessarabia a "holy war." The objection to Bratianu proved to be that he was a reactionary and as Secretary General of the Liberal Party was morally responsible for and in fact under indictment for the murders of the November 8 incident.

In the discussion it became evident from the general attacks leveled against the parties and all their principal leaders that the Government has no real intention of allowing the two Historic Parties a fair chance to put up candidates in connection with the election. It seems clear that they would like, if they can get away with it, to persecute and discredit by any means the leading members of these parties.

As the charge against Mihalache was new to Clark-Kerr and myself and was documented with letters to him from the War Ministry we could take no exception at the time. In connection with the rejection of Bratianu* we made it plain that we did not accept the accusation of culpability of himself or the parties for this incident. However, as Vyshinski supported the Government in the rejection of these two candidates, there was nothing to do but adjourn the meeting for discussion within the Commission itself.

Prior to the Commission meeting I looked up the charges against these men. Bratianu had not been indicted but only called as a witness in the investigation. As there is a law confiscating the property of those who volunteered in the war, Mihalache's case had been considered by the Government some months ago but as a result his properties were not confiscated. It seems that he was a reserve officer of the rank of major within the call age but as there was a law that no Romanian could volunteer in the army who was subject to call, he could not volunteer. In the evidence submitted by the Government to us no communication from Mihalache was produced, only copies of Government communications to him. Mihalache claims that Antonescu for political reasons had attempted just before the beginning of the war against Russia to induce him to join his staff and had even offered him a position in the Government. This had been refused but Mihalache was afraid that when called up he would be assigned to Antonescu's staff. He contends that to avoid this he requested combat duty. He further contends that as soon as Bessarabia was liberated he urged Antonescu not to cross the Dneister and, though unsuccessful in this, his resignation from the army was accepted."

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* Regarding Bebe Brătianu see also Schuyler, *Diary*, Ms. pp. 440-444 (4 and 5 January 1946).

Harriman's strong position

"I presented the above in connection with both men to Vyshinski at our Commission meeting. I took a strong position that, based on the evidence at our disposal, we could only place the blame for the November 8 incident on the members of the Government and others than the Historic Parties. Vyshinski, however, maintained his objection to both men. In the case of Bratianu, he brought up also his activities with the Radescu Government and implied without giving specific evidence, that he was implicated with General Radescu in the February 28 plot. In the case of Mihalache he argued that he could not accept a man who had wanted to fight the Soviet Union and would not acknowledge any difference between participation in the liberation of Bessarabia and the invasion of "other" Soviet territory. He also pointed out that he had mentioned Mihalache's name as unsatisfactory at one of the meetings in Moscow."

Vyshinski's veto

"It seems clear that Vyshinski's objections are really that he does not propose to agree to any candidate who has a popular following or is a prominent leader in either of the two parties. When we pressed him for suggestions of candidates he mentioned two professors who were respected members of the parties and, though active members, were in no sense leaders. For the Liberal Party he suggested Professor Danielopol who had been Minister of Health of the Radescu Government and for the Peasant Party he suggested Professor Zane.

In spite of the fact that we felt Vyshinski was not acting in good faith and was attempting to discredit the leadership of both parties as far as he could, Clark-Kerr and I believed we had to accept Vyshinski's veto. Vyshinski agreed, however, that from now on the discussions of candidates will be within the Commission without participation of the Government, and Clark-Kerr and I undertook to attempt to obtain additional names from the two parties.

We had a long talk with Maniu yesterday afternoon. After showing much resentment, as he considers Mihalache his strongest and most honorable colleague, he agreed to consult his party committee and, if his committee agreed, to submit additional names. I intend to see Bratianu this morning.

There is no doubt in my mind that Vyshinski intends to use every method to make difficult any real participation of the two parties in the election and to support the Government in similar tactics. In our discussions I have made it plain that the two parties must be given full right to put up candidates and conduct a campaign. To this Vyshinski has readily given lip service."

January 6 *Candidates proposed by the National Peasant and Liberal parties*

Ambassador Harriman sent the following telegram:

"Clark-Kerr and I have just received two new lists of candidates proposed by the Peasant and Liberal parties. The Peasant Party offers their entire membership of the permanent delegates of the party, eighteen in number including Maniu and Mihalache. The Liberal Party proposes four names who were their representatives in the previous governments, as follows: Constantine Bratianu, George Fotino, Michel Romniceanu, Dr. Dan Danielopolu. Clark-Kerr and I were told in confidence that they were listed in the order of their preference and with the particular request that we put up a strong fight for Fotino.

We are planning to meet shortly with Vyshinski as a Commission to consider the lists."

January 7 *The Commission approved E. Hatieganu and M. Romniceanu*

Ambassador Harriman sent the following telegram:

"After discussion within the Commission, and further consultations with the party leaders, the Commission has approved for the Peasant Party, Hatieganu, party executive committee delegate from Transylvania, and for the Liberal Party, Romniceanu, former Minister of Finance in the Radescu Government.

I am informed that Hatieganu is considered a strong man, and a first-class representative of his party. Romniceanu, in private life, is a businessman and banker.

The Commission will see the King later today to inform him of the above. Afterwards, Groza will seek an audience to propose officially the new ministers. The positions are to be Ministers of State without portfolio, which seemed to us and the party leaders the most desirable."

January 8

Prime Minister Groza informed the Commission this afternoon that the Romanian Government was prepared upon the Commission's approval to include in the Government the two representatives proposed by the historic parties and to draft the royal decrees of appointment.

The King would sign the decrees

The Commission thereupon informed the King in audience of the results of its consultation. He thanked us for our efforts and informed us that he would receive Groza upon request this evening and sign the decrees.

The Commission will issue a brief communique tomorrow on the results and termination of its work.

January 9* *The letter, signed by P. Groza, addressed to Ambassador Harriman.*

A letter addressed Ambassador Harriman and dated January 8 and signed Petre Groza, President of the Council of Ministers and counter-signed by Emil Bodnaras, Secretary-General, was received at the Mission. Translated it read:

"We have the honor to enclose herewith the declaration of the Romanian Government, completed in accordance with the decisions of the Moscow Conference with reference to Romania.

The declaration of the Government is based on the unanimous decision expressed in the meeting of January 8, this year, of the Council of Ministers, including the representatives of the National Peasant Party under the leadership of Mr. Iuliu Maniu and the National Liberal Party under the leadership of Mr. Dinu Bratianu. The Romanian Government thus conformed entirely with the decisions of the Moscow Conference.

Please accept, Your Excellency, the assurance of our high consideration."

and the declaration of the Romanian Government:

The following declaration was attached: — "Today, January 8, 1946, there took place an extraordinary meeting of the Council of Ministers under the presidency of Dr. Petru Groza.

The President of the Council, after presenting the new Ministers, Messrs. Mihai Romniceanu and Emil Haticganu, proposed the approval of the Council of Ministers of the complete execution of the decisions taken between the 16th and 26th of December, 1945, at Moscow by the Foreign Ministers of the Soviet Union, United Kingdom, and United States.

The Council of Ministers, taking this proposal under deliberation, considers it indispensably necessary to declare:

(1) The accomplishment of general legislative elections in the shortest time possible;

(2) The assurance of freedom of these elections which must be made on the basis of universal suffrage and secret vote with the participation of all

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* *FRUS 1946*. VI, pp. 561-562: Berry to the Secretary of State. Telegram 33, Jan. 9.

democratic and anti-Fascist parties which will have the right to present candidates;

(3) The assurance of freedom of the press, of speech, of religion, and of the right of assembly.

The Ministries of Interior, of Justice, of Religion, and of Propaganda are charged with the carrying out of these decisions."

January 10 *Brătianu's declaration censored*

Nearly a third of the declaration made by Mr. Dinu Bratianu in the name of the Liberal Party yesterday was censored by Russian authorities of the ACC. The workers' committee of the typesetters of *Universul* printing plant forbade the printing of one word of the declaration in the papers printed in that plant, the *Universul* and *Dimineata*. Other papers carried condensed versions of that portion of the statement which was not censored by the Soviet authorities. As the typesetters' action is the exact opposite of that promised by Prime Minister Groza in his interview yesterday with Ambassadors Harriman and Clark-Kerr, and as Clark-Kerr is seeing Groza again this evening, I have made this information available to him for possible use in his second talk.

January 11 *Groza's interview with the King*

Groza, in his first interview this year with the King, informed His Majesty that he desired elections to be held after the Peace Conference, arguing that there would be fewer troops in Romania at that time. Groza also stated that before holding elections, he wished to see completed both in private enterprise and public administration a purge program.

January 12 *Soviet troops' departure to Bulgaria*

General Schuyler reported this morning the recent departure to Bulgaria of a first echelon of troops of the Soviet 57th Army quartered at Craiova. The movement southward from this area of troops and material began about December 20th. Traffic units left Craiova December 31. Soviet officers and men talk more and more of their objective as Turkey. Motorized Soviet units formerly at Caracal crossed the Danube on the recently replaced pontoon bridge at Calafat.

January 13 *The Soviet (ACC) censorship reinstituted*

General Vinogradov stated in ACC meeting that the Soviet (ACC) censorship had been reinstituted for the purpose of preventing the premature and unauthorized publication in Romanian papers of reports of the work of the Allied Commission. The General added that now that the Commission had finished its work the ACC censorship had been lifted.

January 14 *Conversation P. Groza — Clark-Kerr re: elections*

Prime Minister Groza in a conversation with Ambassador Clark-Kerr January 11[*] reiterated his statement that the Romanian elections should not be held until late summer. He, however, changed his reasons from the "technical" reasons he cited in an earlier conversation with Ambassadors Harriman and Clark-Kerr to what is, in fact, a simple political reason. He stated that the month of May would mark the climax of suffering in Romania from food shortages and therefore it would not be a good time for holding an election.

If Groza wins his point and avoids holding the election in the spring, there will be little chance of it being held before October as from May until October the Romanian peasantry is occupied full-time in harvesting the barley, the wheat, and finally the corn crop. Such a delay would give the Communist-dominated Government time to nullify the effect of that part of the Moscow decisions which recognizes the National Peasant and Liberal parties as democratic parties. The opening move is likely to take the form of a maneuver designed to force a split in the Bratianu Liberals and a later merger between one faction and the Tatarescu Liberals.

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[*] Cf. *FRUS 1946*, VI, pp. 568-569: Berry to the Secretary of State. Telegram 48. Secret. Urgent. Jan. 12. Repeated to Moscow as 14 and London for Secdel and Harriman as 11.

Although no direct assault is expected on the National Peasants, yet it is expected that the Government will attempt to exploit and merge at least two of the splinters from the party which are now headed by Lupu, Alexandrescu, and Viforeanu.

To prevent the torpedo which Groza is aiming at the Moscow decisions from reaching its mark and at the same time to force the Romanian Government to live up to its pledge for holding elections "as soon as possible," the British Minister* has suggested that his Secretary of State** attempt to secure Mr. Vyshinski's cooperation "in persuading" the Groza Government to hold elections in the late spring. Although the recent negotiations in Bucharest do not indicate the presence of sufficient good faith to justify such optimism for the success of such a move, I believe, nonetheless, particularly as Mr. Vyshinski is soon due in London, that it is worth trying before attempting an alternative local solution for the success of which an analysis of recent events shows even less justification for optimism for a satisfactory solution.

January 17 *Interview with M. Romniceanu and E. Hatieganu*

Information secured in the past few days from political circles including interview with the National Liberal and the National Peasant representatives in the Government, Messrs. Romniceanu and Hatieganu, show that no practical implementation of the freedoms has yet been achieved. Both Romniceanu and Hatieganu appear in all good faith to be seeking cooperation with the Government and continue to express tempered optimism.

Yesterday, a ministerial group composed of the Premier, the Ministers of Justice, Interior, and Propaganda met with Messrs. Hatieganu and Romniceanu in a salutary atmosphere, and discussed general principles relevant to applying the Government's pledge concerning the freedoms. Mr. Hatieganu after the meeting reported his belief that the Government would give effect to the freedoms gradually according to the circumstances.

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* Le Rougetel, British Political Representative (Cf. *FRUS 1946*, VI, p. 569 n.).

** Ernst Bevin, British Secretary of State for FO (*Ibid.*)

Hatieganu said that Groza has promised that the former opposition would be permitted to resume publication of party newspapers. These will be subject to nominal government and ACC censorship upon Armistice matters. The Prime Minister, however, objected when the two representatives pressed for general press freedom. Later this week Romniceanu and Hatieganu are planning to meet separately with individual key Government Ministers for the purpose of attempting to work out a practical government program for the application of the freedoms.

January 19 *Press attacks and censorship*

On January 15 *Ardealul* published an article criticizing a Craiova Communist paper dated January 5 for printing an alleged attack upon the Crown despite the fact that the Craiova journal in two issues of January 11 and 13 had carried a conspicuous apology for what it termed a printer's error. *Ardealul*'s rebuke was couched in terms toward the writer which brought a mass of counter-charges of Fascism and anti-Semitism down upon *Ardealul*'s editor Muresanu from the Bucharest press.

On January 17 it was announced that *Ardealul* had been suspended for two weeks by the Soviet and Romanian censors despite previous official notification of lifting of ACC press censorship.

The direction of the abovementioned Bucharest press attacks was turned against Maniu and the National Peasant Party, whom the Government press charged with being the unofficial backers of *Ardealul*. An article by the editor of *Jurnalul* denouncing editor Muresanu as an "agent provocateur" at a crucial moment in the lifting of press censorship was stopped by the Romanian censor. The Soviet censor attempted to have modified this same article before passing it.

The Peasant Party press office, without communicating with party chiefs, attempted to defend *Ardealul* on the basis of freedom of the press. This move, when made known to the party leadership, was immediately countermanded by Maniu, who ordered the issuance of a party statement clearly disclaiming any tie whatsoever with *Ardealul*.

A usually reliable informant states that Muresanu recently has become an agent of Premier Groza and that the incident was created deliberately in order to give justification for withholding press censorship and to seek to compromise the National Peasant Party. Whether true or not, informed circles unanimously condemn *Ardealul* for lack of journalistic integrity.

January 20 *No intentions of conducting a free election*

A Communist contact within the Government well known to this Mission privately stated his conviction today that the Groza Government has no intention of implementing further the Moscow Agreement or conducting a really free unfettered election and that no progress would be made to these ends without further discussion and agreement among representatives of the Big Three.

The source stated that to insure relatively free elections it was absolutely necessary that the Ministries of Justice, War, and Interior be neutralized in so far as possible. He seems to feel the Soviet authorities could be prevailed upon to make concessions in this direction, for he believes the Soviet Government is desirous of salvaging some of its lost popularity with the Romanian peasantry. He says that the only hope of the Communist Party to grow in Romania is to give the country a free election at this time when the people know that the party controls the Government. He suggested therefore that the Communist Party and Vyshinski on behalf of the Soviet Government might be prepared to accept the following three-point proposal which would achieve a minimum neutralization of the aforementioned ministries without loss of prestige to the Communist Government or the Soviet Union:

The "three-point proposal"

(1) The Three Allied Powers agree that Patrascanu remain as Minister of Justice but be specifically prohibited from now on until elections take place from shifting magistrates from one district to another or making promotions as has been the practice of Romanian Governments during election time;

(2) That Rascanu remain Minister of War but likewise be specifically prohibited from making promotions or shifting commanding officers from one command post to another; and

(3) That a neutral High Court judge be made Minister of the Interior. To make this latter change acceptable to the Russians he suggests that the 3 governments agree to abolish the present posts of Undersecretary of State in the Ministry of Interior now held by Social Democrat and Tatarescu Liberals, and only the post of Secretary General be maintained. This post he suggests should, in common agreement, be given to the present incumbent, Joseph Sraier,* who is a Communist, and that a clear and unequivocable mandate be given to the new Minister of Interior and his Communist Secretary General to insure the carrying out of a truly free unfettered election.

January 23 *Notes on the Soviet-American Oil Commission's meeting*

Following are Walters'** notes on 5th meeting of Soviet-American Oil Commission held January 22.

Americans presented some additional information on liftings and statement regarding release of information. Russians reiterated at length same statements made last meeting regarding (1) release of information; (2) incompetence of Commission to discuss point 1c American memorandum, October 29; (3) that point 1b same memorandum takes precedence over 1a; (4) that they had asked Americans to furnish certain documents, and these had not been presented; (5) American obligation to prove ownership.

Americans pointed out same statements were made at October 30 meeting. They agreed that point 1c of memorandum remain dormant and that point 1b may take precedence over point 1a. They then reminded Russians of proposal in 4th paragraph first item in memorandum and Russians' statement at October 30 meeting to refer this proposal to their Government for instructions. The reaction of Committee members suggested they had not given this proposal serious consideration. In fact, they reread it as though they had not seen it before. Russians again referred to their method but, after Americans insisted several times on an answer, finally said they could not accept American method. Their reply was primarily a statement that they could not understand why Americans had not accepted their proposal.

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* Iosif Schraer.

** Ray Pierce Walters, geologist on Berry's staff; Petroleum Attache.

Americans suggested Russians present one or more hypothetical examples, assuming Romano-Americana had bought certain equipment from certain origins under certain conditions, etc. and, as a result, they would consider such material German, and one or more similar cases for which Russians would be willing to admit American ownership. The reaction was that, as Americans had raised question, it was their responsibility to furnish information. During conversation, the Americans repeated this request several times unsuccessfully. In nearly all instances, Russians were very evasive in answering questions.

Americans offered, in order to arrive at same result, to furnish information in line with that requested by Russians on few sample items only, in the hope that Russians would state their opinion as to German or American ownership. After some discussion, Russians finally agreed to accept such material, but did not state they would give their opinion as to ownership. One member in fact stated he could not see that furnishing this information would constitute any advance on main problem. This can be considered the only progress made at meeting inasmuch as this same suggestion had been refused by Russians at October 30 meeting.

It appears that during 2 months which elapsed between last meeting and Russian request for 5th meeting, they had actually spent little time considering American proposals. From this and from nature of the request to hold 5th meeting which was made informally over a cocktail, it is difficult to believe Russians are interested in Commission progress.

January 29 *Differences between the British and the American note*

My British colleague* today received from his government the text of the note he is to deliver to the Groza Government. He is instructed not to deliver it until February 4, and he is informed that it will be published February 9. Since Department has instructed me to concert the delivery of the American note with that of the British, I do not intend, unless otherwise instructed, to present the note before February 4th.

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* Le Rougetel.

In view of the Department's statement that the British note in context would be virtually the same as the American, I wish to point out certain conspicuous differences. While the American note seeks confirmation of more detailed assurances which would be considered prior to granting recognition, the British note concludes with the phrase that the British Government is "now prepared to accord recognition to the Romanian Government" and expresses willingness to consider any Romanian nominees to represent the country at London.

The British Representative is also informed of his government's view that the Russians could accuse the Anglo-Americans of bad faith if recognition were made conditional upon receiving further confirmation of written and verbal assurances made by the Groza regime.

After watching the evasive tactics of the Groza Government since the assurances were given the Allied Commission on January 8, I believe that the Department in Point Five of its note has adopted the most practicable method to increase the possibility that these assurances made by the Government and Prime Minister may become effective.

January 30 *Regarding Von Papen hidden assets in Turkey*

The Mission's source, on being assured of the Department's interest, volunteered more details on the Von Papen gold and documents cache. He knows seven persons aware of the trunk's location in Ankara; three signed a proces verbal in placing the trunk in its present depository; these three are still in Ankara; the trunk was brought from Von Papen's home by his car, though he personally was not allowed by the Turkish authorities to leave his home, and all arrangements were made through persons who visited him while in enforced domicile. The source claims to know that in mid-November 1945 the cache remained undisturbed.

From latest conversation it appears none of seven knowing location are German; that one if not two proces verbal signatories are high Turkish officials who might, if source of Department's information were revealed, take reprisals against Mission's source through his assets in the Ottoman Bank and that one of the seven is likely to be present Spanish Minister in Ankara. The source emphasized the utmost discretion is needed to prevent quick change in the trunk's present location, which can be done only with the consent of the three proces verbal signatories.

It was not admitted to the informant that his information was the first received regarding hidden Von Papen assets in Turkey, but he expressed willingness to give full details upon receiving written confirmation from this Mission that he would receive the value in gold or American dollars one tenth of the gold coins found, or $ 30,00 dollars, to be placed to his credit in an American bank.

January 30

Mission informed that intention is not to repeal enemy property legislation on grounds that it refers to enemy countries and therefore once a former enemy country becomes non-enemy, law is no longer applicable. Mission is making study of situation and will report in greater detail within ten days.

January 31 *Romanian Press Censorship*

Ardealul was suspended on January 16 for a fifteen day period by the Chief of the Romanian Press Censorship and on January 29 it was notified in writing by the Propaganda Ministry that "in accordance with orders given by superior organs we inform you that the authorization for the publication of your paper has been withdrawn, consequently the paper *Ardealul* shall no longer appear." The notice was signed by Press Director Preoteasa who is also editor of the Communist paper *Romania Libera*.

February 1 *On the administrative purge law*

The Council of Ministers met on January 31 for the first time since January 8. The principal topics of discussion were the Justice Minister's proposals to prolong the administrative purge law and the law for the indictment and punishment of war criminals. The administrative purge law, excluding magistrates, was prolonged until March 31, while the law for indicting war criminals was prolonged until June 1.

Mihail Romniceanu, National Liberal Cabinet Representative, stated today that he was the sole Minister to oppose the extension of the war criminal indictment period, since the Government gave no indication as to whom it intended to indict and his party feared that the law would be used as a political weapon by the Government during national elections. Although Romniceanu was assured privately by Groza that the law would not be used as a political weapon, he continued to oppose it as he felt that in the course of the past year all top war criminals had been indicted.

The NP and NL parties' newspapers

The National Peasant and National Liberal parties each have secured the right to publish two newspapers. *Dreptatea* for the Peasants and *Liberalul* for the Liberals are scheduled to appear early next week in Bucharest. *Patria* for the Peasants and *Natiunea Romana* for the Liberals are to be published later at Cluj. The Cabinet stated that it was impossible to grant permission for the publication of more papers in view of the newsprint shortage.

Romniceanu states that the Government has granted the traditional parties "the form" of popular freedoms through liberty of meeting and the right to publish two newspapers. He mistrusts that the party press will be able to operate without censorship and states that traditional parties have not yet taken up with the Government the question of access to the radio. The question of national elections was raised by Romniceanu in the Cabinet meeting but was quickly shelved.

February 4 *Again Romanian censorship*

No reference to Vyshinski-Bevin debate appeared in Romanian press Saturday. Although Rador agency distributed story with excerpts from both statements, Romanian censorship stopped it. Papers yesterday still silent on debate but carried story London date-line reporting reception given by Vyshinski at which Bevin, Vyshinski seen together in cordial atmosphere. This censorship relatively ineffective leastly in Bucharest where story of debate is discussed by virtually everyone. One editor thus upsummed: "Everyone with radio in Romania is getting UNO news directly from London."

February 5 *United States and British notes to the Romanian Government*

At twelve o'clock noon today, February 5th, I sent the note to the Prime Minister as directed by the Department.

My British colleague, at the same hour today, sent a similar note to the Foreign Minister.

February 5 *"Ready to recognize the Romanian Government"*

At two p.m. today the Presidency of the Council of Ministers issued the following communique:

"The Representative of the Government of Great Britain in Romania today informed the Romanian Government by a written communication that His Majesty's Government is now ready to recognize the Romanian Government and to take into consideration the persons who will be indicated with a view to appointing a representative of the Romanian Government in London.

Today also, the Representative of the Government of the United States informed the Romanian Government, by a written communication, that the Government of the United States is ready to recognize the Romanian Government."

Communist official organ *Scanteia* in extra big type edition announced in headline that "Romanian Government has been recognized by United States and Great Britain." Paper then went on to print above communique textually.

February 5 *Hațieganu's statement: "introduction of democratic liberties continued to be mere desiderata"*

In statement to *Dreptatea* Hatieganu declared that one month after broadening Romanian Government according to Moscow Decisions introduction of democratic liberties continued to be mere desiderata. He pointed out (1) so far National Peasant Party was denied permission to publish more than two dailies (2) liberty of press cannot be regarded as guaranteed so long as Government fails take legal action for stopping censorship exercised by printers, long as opposition parties are denied same facilities as Government for distributing their publications and long as Peasant and Liberal parties are excluded from use of broadcasting system (3) freedom of holding meetings had not been insured so far (4) United Labor Front decision establishing that voting at Trade Union elections should be effected by voting at Trade Union elections with show of hands contradicted democratic spirit of Moscow decisions (5) Government had failed to make any preparations for speeding up general elections which Peasant Party desired to take place before May 1, 1946, under supervision of Interallied Commission. Hatieganu emphasized party strongly disapproved prolongation of law for purging the civil service and had demanded insistently neutralization of the police forces, disarmament of all paramilitary organizations, and abolition of all legal and administrative provisions prohibiting public meetings and demonstrations. Hatieganu stated also that party considered paragraph 16 of Armistice Convention providing that printing, importation, and distribution of periodical and non-periodical publications must be carried out in agreement with the Allied Control Commission has been implicitly abolished by Moscow Agreement.

National Peasant appeal signed by Maniu

National Peasant appeal to population signed by Maniu stresses that relying on joint obligations of Allies and on assent of immense majority of Romanian population National Peasant Party believed Moscow Decisions had rendered necessary a new political atmosphere which should be characterized by supremacy of freely expressed will of the majority and by the right of the minorities to criticize Government. Where foreign policy was concerned, the party advocated Romanian adherence to alliance between Big Powers and cooperate loyally with all her neighbors and particularly with Soviet Union near which fate had placed her. Where internal policy was concerned the party advocated creation of National Peasant State resting on national and social justice and continuing the national traditions. After reaffirming the party's policy as already outlined in Mihalache's Campulung speech of January 27 appeal ends with call to all citizens to rally round National Peasant flag which stands for freedom, justice, and national independence (*Dreptatea*).

Summaries of Hatieganu's statement and of National Peasant appeal to population are carried only by *Jurnalul*, *Timpul*, and *Universul*.

February 6

Of interest concerning introduction by Romanian Government of democratic liberties in accordance with Moscow decisions is the viewpoint of National Peasants reported above.

February 7 *On "what is reported as recognition of Romanian Government by United States and Britain"*

Morning papers give prominent front page space to news of what is reported here as recognition of Romanian Government by United States and Britain and carry editorials underlining momentous importance of event. All papers carry banner headlines announcing news. *Romania Libera*'s "a decisive victory for Romanian democracy." *Scanteia* and *Frontul Plugarilor* display 2 column-wide pictures of Prime Minister Groza. *Romania Libera* also displays picture of King Michael together with that of Prime Minister Groza. *Timpul* displays 2 column picture of King Michael together with one column pictures of King George, President Truman, Generalissimo Stalin, and Prime Minister Groza. The pictures of latter four are also published by *Universul*.

Editorials are unanimous in expressing deep satisfaction about news and pointing out this act justifies best hopes of rapid recovery for Romania. *Jurnalul* greets recognition stating that sentimentally Romania had never ceased to be attached to Western Democracies and that resumption of normal relations with them is source of deep joy and great hope for her. Traditional character of Romania's relations with the United States and Great Britain is also stressed in editorials of *Universul* and *Frontul Plugarilor*.

Scanteia, *Universul*, *Poporul*, *Timpul*, and *Finante si Industrie* state resumption of normal relations with United States and Britain create promising possibilities for Romanian economy. *Timpul* underlines particularly that American industry can supply Romania with any quantity of manufactured articles and points out Romania at last will be in position to ask for and obtain American loan enabling her to make substantial imports of American products. Editorials of *Scanteia*, *Romania Libera*, *Frontul Plugarilor*, *Libertatea*, *Poporul*, *Dreptatea Noua*, and *Aurora* express view that recognition of Romanian Government by United States and Great Britain constitutes heavy blow for Historical Parties and especially for National Peasant Party on behalf of which Prof. Haticganu had declared on February 4 that Groza Government was procrastinating execution of Moscow decisions.

Scanteia, *Romania Libera*, *Frontul Plugarilor*, *Poporul*, and *Timpul* regard recognition as an irrefutable proof that United States and Britain have satisfied themselves Moscow Agreement is being carried out loyally. *Scanteia*, *Romania Libera* and *Frontul Plugarilor* also stress recognition strengthens considerably Government's position.

Scanteia and *Poporul* express deep gratitude is due Soviet Union for substantial support given Romanian Government in obtaining recognition from United States and Britain.

Libertatea claims recognition of Romanian Government is result of foreign policy advocated by Social Democratic Party.

In front page editorial commenting on gift of American scientific publications offered Romanian Academy and to several other scientific institutions by Rockefeller Foundation, *Semnalul* warmly praised solicitude shown by United States for keeping up international scientific relations and underlines cooperation by Bucharest USIS office for speeding up reestablishment of Romanian-American scientific relations.

February 7

Our note of February 5 to the Romanian Government, which was set forth in the *Radio Bulletin* for February 6 was given routine circulation this morning. The British Mission at the same time circulated as a press handout the British note to the Romanian Government of February 5, a letter from Sir Archibald Clark-Kerr to Mr. Groza dated January 11th, and the enclosure to that letter.

February 8 *The note adressed by Tătărescu to Berry:*

There follows the unofficial translation made in the Foreign Office of the text of a note dated February 7, addressed to me and signed by Tatarescu, which was delivered at the Mission at 2 p.m. yesterday:

"I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter addressed to His Excellency the President of the Council of Minister, Dr. Petru Groza, on February 5th, 1946, in which you notified that the United States Government are prepared to award recognition to the Romanian Government.

The Romanian Government received this notification with the deepest satisfaction and believe that it will constitute the beginning of the resumption of the old relations of friendship and cooperation which existed between our countries.

At the same time, the Romanian Government express their wish to be put in the position to proceed at the earliest date to the re-establishment of our diplomatic relations by the appointment of a Romanian Representative in Washington."

February 9* *Reaction of the Political Committee of the Communist Party*

I am privately informed that the Political Committee of the Communist Party found our note of February 5 entirely unacceptable. The Committee took Groza to task for having laid himself open to a point where we could send such a note to the Romanian Government. But Groza claimed generally his innocence and particularly that he had made no commitments to hold elections this spring. To support his point, he is said to have referred to his conversation with the King and his stenographic notes of his conversation with Ambassadors Harriman and Clark-Kerr. The Committee accepted his explanation and also accepted Tatarescu's offer to find a way out. Tatarescu's way was to ignore the essence of our note and send a brief acknowledgment over his own signature.

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* Compare with Telegram 159, Secret Priority, sent to the Secretary of State, Byrnes, dated Feb.8. Repeated to Moscow as 31 and London as 30. (*FRUS 1946*, VI, pp. 574-576).

Skepticism as to the sincerity of P. Groza otherwise the Political Committee of the Communist Party

The Department will recall that the Ambassador felt considerable skepticism of the sincerity of Mr. Groza and his collaborators in giving the assurances required by the Moscow Decision. It can be seen that the Ambassador's skepticism has been fully justified. It has been suggested by Hatieganu and Romniceanu that only those freedoms have been given which, if denied, would have immediately been evidence of sabotaging the Moscow Decision, and that these have been given tardily and reluctantly. I have seen no evidence of an effort on the part of the Government to cooperate wholeheartedly in implementing the Moscow Decision. On the contrary, the line that I suggested that the Communist Party would continue to pull the strings that control Groza's action is confirmed. In this connection, I report that this evening, six hours after I had the Government reply, I was told personally by Romniceanu, and I received word from Hatieganu that they had not yet seen the official texts of the American and British notes, and the notes were not discussed at the cabinet meeting on February 6.

Consequently..."we can establish that"

Analyzing recent developments against this background we can establish that the Groza Government jumped the gun on announcing recognition, that it arranged a public demonstration in self-glorification for having secured recognition, and that in an official note it has ignored the very essence of our communication. We have reason to believe that this latter course has been dictated by the Political Committee of the Communist Party rather than by the full Cabinet. I believe that the reason for these tactics goes much beyond the problem of our recognition of the Groza Government. It springs from the fundamental desire of the Communist Party to minimize the influence of the Western democracies in Romania and to discredit the public statements of our national leaders. Since Propaganda Minister Constantinescu-Iasi said that recognition was a fact, I have heard that local Communists are now quoting with a wink the sixth point (American non-recognition of governments imposed by foreign powers) in President Truman's statement of American foreign policy as most recently expressed* in the State of the Union Message. Feeling they have made good progress in discrediting statements of President Truman they are now seeking to discredit the work in Romania of the American and British ambassadors in Moscow by avoiding confirmation of commitments made by Groza to the ambassadors. Should we accept this Romanian reply we will be playing directly into the hands of those persons whose object is to undermine now and to eliminate eventually our influence in Romania.

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* January 21, 1946.

"we should follow the Tatarescu note with one addressed to Groza"

From this observation post it seems that our future line is clear. It should be based on the fact that Mr. Groza accepted the Moscow Decisions and gave commitments to our ambassadors. After studying these commitments the American Government has made a statement of its understanding of these commitments and has asked a confirmation. We should not let Groza, or the Communist Party in Romania, get by with confusing what is a clear issue. In my opinion we should follow the Tatarescu note with one addressed to Groza stating that the reply made by Mr. Tatarescu is unsatisfactory and that it is pointless to discuss the name of a person to go to Washington to represent Romania until Mr. Groza has confirmed the salient features we made in our note of February 5. This note should be sent immediately and should be made public immediately, along with the reply we have received from Tatarescu. If we follow this course we must realize that we are entering an avenue which may be turned into an impasse by Groza's refusal to reply. But weighing all facts as I see them in Bucharest, I believe that this is a necessary risk and one that is certainly preferable to the alternative of making ourselves a party to Groza's efforts to sabotage the Moscow Decision.

February 10 *"In order to inpede distribution of the American and British notes"*

Communist Party members using trucks in the early morning of February 7 attempted to buy all morning newspapers they could find in order to impede distribution of the published American and British notes concerning recognition that appeared in all the papers. It is reported that by 9 a.m. it was difficult to find a newspaper.

The evening newspapers did not publish the notes but simply implied that recognition is complete. *Semnalul* stated that it only remains for the three governments reciprocally to request agreement for the nomination of their ministers.

February 10 *The United States Secretary of State J.F. Byrnes' reply...*

This morning* I received the following telegram from the Secretary, which was in reply to the observations I sent him on February 9:

"I do not feel that any purpose will be served by requesting further specific confirmation from Groza of the guarantees he has already given in writing and orally as set forth in note sent to him on February 5. As Tatarescu's reply does not repeat not take issue with the statement contained in that note of our understanding of those guarantees, it seems to me that his reply may be regarded as a satisfactory formal acknowledgment of those undertakings. I believe we will be more likely to obtain the practical execution of those guarantees by maintaining vigilance and protesting any violations as they occur than by engaging in further correspondence in an effort merely to achieve more specific affirmation of assurances already definitely given.

Accordingly please acknowledge receipt of Tatarescu's communication along the following lines:

'My Government has been pleased to receive the communication of February 7, 1946 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs which my Government considers happily confirms the United States Government's understanding of the assurances received from the Romanian Government in execution of the decisions taken at Moscow. In the circumstances, the United States Government is prepared to entertain a request for Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to the United States.'

We are informing the British Embassy in the foregoing sense."

**FRUS 1946*, VI, p. 576: the above Telegram No. 98 is dated Feb. 12. Secret. Urgent. Sent to Bucharest, repeated to London, Moscow, and Sofia.

February 11 *The Social Democratic Party President's views*

The Social Democratic Party Executive Committee through February 9 and 10 held sessions to discuss the question of the party's adherence to the Communist formula of a single electoral list and to fix the date to convoke the party congress. Party President Petrescu's views were opposed by the majority who favored views of the extreme Left wing urging collaboration with the Communists in order to preserve the United Workers' Front. Mr. Petrescu succeeded in getting the party congress convoked for March 10, and is hopeful on the basis of reports from party locals that an overwhelming majority there will vote to present a separate electoral list. As a result, he is stated to anticipate an open break with the extreme Left wing, who will attempt to organize a dissident Socialist Party to collaborate with the Communists.

February 12 *The National Peasant Party's newspaper at Cluj*

Although the Government has granted a permit for the National Peasant Party to publish *Patria* at Cluj as its single Transylvanian newspaper, it has as yet been unable to appear because of lack of newsprint. Last evening, Mr. Hateganu, the Peasant Party Cabinet Representative, sent word that he had been informed by Premier Groza that even when newsprint becomes available, it may be taken by newspapers "which need it more."

February 13* *The King's conversations with Tatarescu and General Rașcanu*

At the Palace this afternoon, the King took me aside to tell me of conversations he had this morning with two Cabinet ministers.

Tatarescu had called and brought with him the American note of February 5 and the Romanian reply of February 7. Tatarescu explained that before Vyshinski left Bucharest, he told Ambassadors Harriman and Clark-Kerr that any further conversations they might have with Romanian officials would be considered private talks. Bearing this in mind, the Romanian Government, in answering the American note, had no choice but to ignore the subject of freedoms, inasmuch as a discussion of that subject would be based upon Groza's conversations with the ambassadors which, according to the Russian view, were only private conversations. Tatarescu added that any other form of reply would have offended seriously Vyshinski and the Soviet Government.

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* Cf. *FRUS 1946*, VI, pp. 577-578; Berry to the Secretary of State. Telegram 188. Secret. Feb. 13. Repeated to London as 35 and Moscow as 3.

The King said he had received this morning General Rascanu, Minister of War. The Minister came to get the King's signature to a decree law which would permit the Government to retire 8,000 officers from the army. The King agreed that the officer corps should be reduced as was normal at the end of any war, but he thought that fundamental changes of this nature should be undertaken only by the government that would be formed after the elections. He added for my information that the process planned by this government would leave on the active list only officers of Communist sympathy. The Minister took away his decree unsigned.

The King said that he had also refused to sign a decree incorporating into the gendarmerie a corps of officers and men of the Tudor Vladimirescu Division (former Romanian prisoners of war trained, re-equipped, and returned to Romania by Soviet authorities), for this would bring the gendarmerie under the direct control of the Communist Party. He asked if I knew that officers and men of the Tudor Vladimirescu Division had been placed as instructors in every regiment in the army. He said that he had information that some of these men were openly speaking against him in their "instructions" to soldiers, pointing out the advantages that life holds in neighboring republican states.

The King "was beginning to receive complaints"

The King told me that he was beginning to receive complaints from the members of the Government that the two recently appointed ministers of state were not cooperating loyally with the Government. Moreover, the Government claims that the newspapers which are the official organs of the Peasant and Liberal parties are critical and disloyal to the Government. The King commented that the officials of the Government well knew how to criticize but they hadn't learned how to take criticism. He recalled that Groza had said that within three weeks after the departure of the Allied

Commission, the Government would have things in hand as securely as it had had before the arrival of the Commission. The King remarked that, although such is not today a fact, yet the tendency clearly is in this direction.

February 14 *"Currency demands on the National Bank"*

Groza has just exerted pressure on the National Bank to accept two more Communists on the Board prior to the annual election February 17. The pressure was so resisted that Groza threatened to provide legal sanction for the move, but apparently decided to postpone the action.

Because of the wage and price increases anticipated to be effective very shortly the Government granted the bank authority to distribute currency in denominations of 100,000 lei, the announcement of which is expected February 17, and to be made effective sometime next week. It would seem inevitable that currency demands on the National Bank will grow within a relatively short period to three times the present monthly volume with attendant effects, and the currency undermined in like or greater proportion.

February 15

Our note was delivered at the Foreign Office at twelve noon yesterday.

February 17 *The National Bank crisis*

Government yesterday moved another step in the National Bank crisis of deep political implications foreshadowed in several of Mission's economic reports during past four months. In renewed effort to dominate the direction of the Bank, Government proposed appointment of three Communists on the Bank's Board of ten at the annual meeting of stockholders scheduled for today, and the election by the stockholders of a fourth Communist. At 1 p.m. yesterday Government withdrew the proposal and declared it would seek enactment of legislation to increase the Bank's Board membership to 16 members, 6 of them to be Communists appointed by the Government, in addition to the three Communist appointees, giving a Communist representation of 9 against 7.

The sudden move presaged postponement of the annual meeting because of the possible refusal of the Government and certain other stockholders to appear.

However, the meeting was held at 12 o'clock today, about 113,000 shares out of the total of 200,000 having been represented, including the 20,000 of the Ministry of Finance. Prior to the opening of the meeting an agreement had been reached whereby the four old Board members who are up for re-election this year might be re-elected under the condition that some time after the meeting one would resign and be replaced by a Communist. The Government had agreed to give a written guarantee that the third member of the three appointees would not be replaced, and that no other change would be sought in the constitution of the Board. When the Board assembled before the general meeting, the Prime Minister had privately communicated to the Governor of the Bank that the written guarantee would not be given. Nevertheless the meeting took place and the four old members were re-elected by a large majority in the presence of the unusually large assemblage of 437 individual stockholders. Though the Bank thus acquired a technical position considerably better than it had enjoyed for some months, the essence of the conflict between the Government and the Bank has not been removed, and further important developments may be expected.

February 20 *Trade Union Committee elections*

First reports of the Trade Union Committee elections being conducted in Romania show that voting is being done simply by employing the raised arm principle. The Committee composition lists apparently are determined beforehand by the Bucharest office of the Federation of Labor for important firms in the country.

A typical election at the important Astra industrial plant at Brasov was conducted by two Bucharest representatives of the Federation of Labor resulting in the re-election of virtually the same plant committee comprising ten Socialists, nine Communists, and one "independent." There no voting was done. The assembled workmen were merely asked to raise their arms if they opposed the selected committee. None dared to do this and the two Bucharest representatives thereupon declared the official list as "accepted."

The Communist press commenting upon most recent trade union elections declares that "everywhere the most active and most honest unionists have been elected."

February 21 *Commenting upon the National Peasant Party's position*

National Peasant Party leaders base their current feeling of political disappointment upon the conviction that every available sign points to neither early nor unfettered elections, and that the Anglo-Americans in the recognition negotiations did not insist on a written confirmation from Premier Groza of his verbal commitments. During this present period of depression, National Peasant Cabinet member Hatieganu has raised the question of the utility of supplying to this Mission examples of violations of the Moscow Decisions and of the wisdom of making further written protests to the Government. Hatieganu and other leaders now consider this last measure only serves to increase the heat of Soviet hostility, without any compensating party benefit.

Similarity between the National Peasants and the Small Holders of Hungary

The National Peasants compare themselves to the Small Holders of Hungary. They are depressed by reports from Budapest as to the apparently unrestrained measures being taken by Soviet authorities there against the Government in an attempt to break that party. Thoughtful Peasant leaders now doubt whether the Russian Army will leave Romania following the conclusion of peace treaty, and see their party subject to direct Soviet pressure for an indefinite future period.

According to Hatieganu

According to Hatieganu, Soviet officials realize that the National Peasants have a political stranglehold upon popular feelings, particularly in Transylvania. He reasons that the Russians feel by terrorism they can control electorally the Peasants in the less politically advanced Old

Kingdom, whereas this would be much more difficult in Transylvania. Thus, last week, in a search for a more pliable Transylvanian National Peasant figure, Soviet Ambassador Kavtaradze invited Hatieganu to his Embassy, where, after a good dinner, he suggested that it might be expedient for Mr. Maniu to retire and for Hatieganu to succeed him, rather than any other party leader. As a loyal Maniu follower, Hatieganu naturally did not consent to have a share in this maneuver.

February 22 *Upon nomination of a Romanian Minister to the United States*

The Mission understands that considerable difficulty has been encountered in reaching an agreement upon the nomination of a Romanian Minister to the United States.

It had been expected that the nominee would be Basil Stoica, the present Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, who had the support of Groza, Tatarescu, the Historic Parties, and the King. Stoica planned to take with him Riposeanu,* Groza's son-in-law, as counselor, and Professor Margineanu** as cultural attaché.

Yesterday Margineanu was told by Groza that Stoica was unacceptable to the Communists, being too much of an Americanophile, and that Professor Bagdasar, the only member of the Romanian Communist Party who has visited the United States, was the party's choice for Minister.

Groza advised Margineanu to go and "make peace" with Bagdasar. At the meeting the latter said that Margineanu, not being a member of the party, was unacceptable for the position. Margineanu replied that he was not a political man and he thought the cultural attaché should represent no political party but all Romania. To this Bagdasar replied that Margineanu apparently misunderstood the purpose of the mission to the United States which was "to impress upon Americans the superior advantages of the type of democracy exemplified by the Groza Government" and only a Communist could do this.

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* Pamfil Ripoşanu.

** N. Mărgineanu (1905-July 1980). His Memoirs — *Amfiteatre şi inchisori. Marturii asupra unui veac zbuciumat* — published by Voicu Lăscuş (Cluj-Napoca, Dacia, 1991) represent a reference-book imbued of first rate Romanian-American information regarding the postwar years.

February 26 *Press Campaign... Polemics*

Within the past week the National Peasants and the Communists have indulged in a press campaign each attributing political terrorism to the other side.

At the Dacia Textile plant in Bucharest student members of the National Peasant Party had been carrying on political activity which was countered on February 20 by armed Communist railway workers severely beating these students.

A worker at this plant named Vasile Bleanca who several days previously had been threatened by the factory committee, had been taken forcibly from his home and wounded by gunfire and forced to go to a hospital for treatment. This National Peasant version was not denied by an official police communique issued later saying that Bleanca had been treated at the hospital and then proceeded to the Dacia plant to engage in political agitation of a "hooligan character."

In Arad, on the Grivița railway strike anniversary

In Arad on February 16 the NDF commemorated the thirteenth anniversary of the Grivitza railway strike and assailed the National Peasant Party and Maniu as responsible for the strike's repression. On this anniversary celebration the Communist press claims three workers were injured by armed "Maniu hooligans," whereas the National Peasants claim that without provocation their party headquarters were invaded by Communists, the District leader killed, several party members injured without any possibility of police or legal intervention.

Mr. Maniu telegraphed the Arad organization that he had asked through Party Cabinet Representative Hatieganu for an inter-ministerial investigation to include the latter as member and on February 21 this was accepted by the Cabinet.

While in their press the National Peasants describe the political terrorism as being committed by Communists, the Communist press in turn uses "Hitlerites and Iron Guardists" as synonymous terms for the National Peasants, who they say are the responsible parties.

February 28* *The King's* Memorandum *to be presented to the United States Secretary:*

His Majesty yesterday asked me to present to the Secretary the following six subjects upon each of which he said he would be pleased to learn the American point of view for the purpose of formulating his own course of action.

With a prepared memorandum in Romanian before him, King Michael read me the following in English:

(1) The first step in the application of the Moscow Decision was taken collectively by the US, UK, and USSR. Does the US expect to continue to participate equally in the carrying out of succeeding steps required to give full effect to the Moscow Decision concerning Romania?

(2) Is it the point of view of the United States Government that the Soviet troops in Romania will depart after the ratification of the Romanian peace treaty?

(3) Certain members of the Romanian Government make it understood that a failure of the Groza Government to be returned by the electorate will have serious consequences for Romania. Is this the view of the United States Government, or is it the view that the Three Allied Powers will accept whatever government results from the expression of the will of the people at the elections.

(4) Some Ministers pretend that the US and the UK wish to re-draw the frontier line between Romania and Hungary, whereas the Soviet authorities wish to retain the present frontier. As the present frontier was established by the Anglo-Americans after the First World War, it is as important for Anglo-American prestige in Romania as for the Romanians themselves that that frontier be retained.

(5) Does the United States Government expect to occupy itself at all after the peace treaty with the economic situation in Romania?

(The King verbally enlarged this point as meaning whether the United States expected any commercial relations with Romania and whether it would accept the situation created by the economic agreements signed between the Groza Government and the Soviet Union which have fostered

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[*] *FRUS 1946*, VI, pp. 578-579: Berry to the Secretary of State. Telegram 246. Secret. Feb. 28.

monopolistic Sovrom companies in every important phase of Romania's economy.)

(6) Can it be expected that after the signing of the peace treaty, the United States will seek to establish commercial relations to permit the economic development of the country such as exporting American farm machinery, mine and petroleum equipment, and road building machinery to enable Romania to produce more grain, minerals, and improve its roads?

Berry's suggestion... for "some general statement of Secretary's views"

Explanatory of King Michael's statement, I added that some of his counsellors, disappointed in the part of the Moscow Decision concerning Romania, have advised the King that Moscow was a "sellout" and therefore that the interest of the American Government in Romania will disappear with the holding of elections, as that is the final commitment of our Government under the Yalta and Moscow agreements. On the other hand, in my conversations with the King, I have praised the statesmanship of the Moscow Decision, stressing that it was essential to break the deadlock that had existed between the Three Great Powers since September, that it was important to secure Soviet recognition of the democratic character of the two Romanian Historic Parties, and equally important to secure Soviet agreement to the holding of free elections in Romania as soon as possible.

I should welcome, therefore, some general statement of Secretary's views which I might transmit verbally as a message to His Majesty from the Secretary.

A message which was transmitted verbally to the King

The Secretary replied:*

"In regard to King Michael's inquiry, I feel views of this Government as to desirability of concerted Soviet, US, and UK policy and action and our wish to see established democratic governments truly representative of will of people expressed through free elections have been so frequently stated as to make reiteration unnecessary. The same can be said for position this Government that rehabilitation of economy of those nations which have suffered as result of war and establishment of normal commercial relations throughout world are cornerstones of a stable peace. As indicated my address February 28, Great Powers have no right to keep troops in territories of other sovereign states without their approval and consent freely given and must not unduly prolong making of peace nor continue to impose troops upon small and impoverished states.

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* Cf. *FRUS 1946*, VI, p. 581: The Secretary of State to Berry. Telegram 148. Secret. March 8.

Concerning Romanian-Hungarian frontiers, it will be recalled that in negotiations preceding signature of Romanian Armistice, US Government, in line with its general belief that all territorial questions should be postponed until final peace settlement, took position that matter of Romanian-Hungarian frontier should be thus deferred. While we do not believe that any useful purpose will be served by hypothetical discussion at present of matters to be taken up in connection with peace treaties, it may be stated that US Government will approach each question of this nature at appropriate time with utmost sympathy towards wishes of inhabitants of area involved and with most careful attention to ethnographic, economic and political aspects of problem.

You may inform King Michael orally of foregoing."*

March 1 *Romanian National Bank's policy*

National Bank's Board is discussing oral proposal of Minister of Foreign Trade, obviously prompted by high Russian and Romanian levels, that Romanian Government credit of 100,000,000 Swiss francs be established on basis of Bank's gold stock in Switzerland of about 20 tons, the credit to be used for the following purposes:

First, payment to N. Malaxa of $2,250,000 due him from the Romanian Government for the tube mill taken by Russia under Article 11 of the Armistice Convention.

Second, reimbursement of the Romanian Danube Navigation Company (SRD), member of Sovromtransport, for part of certain equipment to be turned over by SRD to Sovromtransport, such part being estimated at $2,000,000 in value.

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* See *infra*, March 20, p. 380.

Third, the redemption of the 7½ percent 1931 Development Loan sometimes known as the Romanian Tobacco Monopoly Loan which was really the Ivar Krueger Match Monopoly Loan, Swedish interests having recently proposed the settlement of the loan on very attractive terms.

The proposal regarding Malaxa appears to be motivated by pressure to facilitate Malaxa undertakings particularly abroad, the Russians having in effect paid the Romanian Government for the obligation incident to the tube mill. The SRD proposition represents a Russian maneuver to overcome SRD's unwillingness thus far to turn over equipment in question without receiving compensation agreed to.

National Bank's policy will not permit the engagement of its gold for any other purpose than the import of goods. Bank does not believe that approximately 9 percent of its total gold stock can be made free by exports to Switzerland, since possibilities of such export are not apparent. Bank unwilling to agree to anything on behalf of private or semi-private interests until currency is stabilized under conditions guaranteeing that amounts of gold remaining over and above stabilization purposes will be used for essential imports only. Moreover Bank will stand on Romanian law controlling foreign exchange payments which provides that payments by Romanian subjects must be made in national currency even though other currencies may be stipulated.

The proposed credit is so relatively large that it would seriously hamper possibilities within the next year for the resumption of minimum trade relations between the United States and Romania. The character of the credit furthermore is contrary to the ostensible spirit of the law effective February 27, 1946, authorizing Romanian owners of undeclared foreign assets to use them for the importation of listed essential articles.

If Switzerland should refuse to open the proposed credit...

If Switzerland should refuse to open the proposed credit the National Bank will have been relieved of serious embarrassment. But according to the present outlook it seems to be only a question of time, lacking strong international developments, before the Bank must become discouraged and succumb to pressures from various quarters for expedient actions favoring special political interests regardless of their baneful effects on the national economy. Department may be especially interested in the implications of the credit proposal, which the National Bank may eventually be forced to carry through in one form or another, in view of the repercussions that its credit might have on international monetary questions pending such as accounting for certain Romanian gold assets acquired during the war.

March 2 *Violent polemics continued*

Outstanding event in political scene for week beginning 24th was increased tempo of violent polemics between National Peasant and National Liberal parties on one hand and FND parties on other. Other major developments as reflected in party press were National Peasant appeal to civic resistance, sudden Liberal and Peasant attacks on Tatarescu, omission by FND papers of Bratianu's statement that Liberal Party would maintain agrarian reform.

Dreptatea continued to lead attacks on Government and Communists. Whereas week before attacks centered on press and other freedoms guaranteed by Moscow Decision and pledged by Groza Government, this week stress of opposition press is on attacks and so-called Communist aggressions against meetings of historical parties Arad, Timisoara, Pitesti, and Bucharest. These attacks were described as part of intimidation campaign by Teohari Georgescu against sympathizers and potential sympathizers of Peasant and Liberal parties. *Dreptatea* attack concluded with demand for dismissal of Georgescu.

Liberalul attacked both Government and Communists in connection with automobile accident of Bratianu which paper says was attempt on his life. Organized attempts were made to break up Liberal meeting at Campulung.

There was less emphasis this week in press on elections but interest was still high.

FND papers, on other hand, continued fierce criticism of historic parties and charged that Peasant appeal for civic resistance was call to rebellion.

Non-party papers including *Jurnalul*, *Timpul*, and *Momentul* pleaded for moderation.

March 2 *Romanian censorship*

From newspaper sources I am informed that the Romanian censor has prohibited the publication of the text or excerpts from the text of both Senator Vandenberg and Secretary Byrnes' recent speeches.

March 2 *Regarding the post of Minister to the United States*

Foreign Minister Tatarescu sent his Secretary-General to the Mission this afternoon to state officially that the careful consideration being given to the choice of the nominee for the post of Minister to the United States has retarded the making of a decision, but a decision is expected next week.

Unofficially I understand that the deadlock continues between the political committee of the Communist Party on one side and the King, Prime Minister, Foreign Minister, and all political groups except the Communists on the other. The first group wishes the Minister to be a party member whose chief role will be to second the efforts of the Soviet Ambassador in Washington, while the second group wishes the Minister to be a person who is desirous and capable of representing his country.

March 4 *On suppression of Byrnes' speech*

Herewith report on facts established to date on question of suppression of Secretary Byrnes' speech to Overseas Press Club February 28. Full text received under good conditions in Radio Bulletin and, as matter routine, mimeographed and distributed to various Missions and small list newspaper editors.

OIC office also telephoned each newspaper that important Byrnes speech upcoming.

Rador news agency received summary of speech by radio. From journalistic point view this 400 word summary well done and covered all main points speech with textual passages. Director of Rador Gaston Boeuve (penname Serban Voinea) told O'Brien of Associated Press that he was "prevented" from distributing story to newspapers. He told Braniste, editor of *Jurnalul* (who in turn told OIC here) that he was given "friendly advice" from Russians not to distribute story. This occurred late Friday night. On Saturday night Voinea, who is reputable and independent journalist and member Central Committee Socialist Party, told colleagues he planned to distribute story "on own responsibility." This he did on Saturday night.

Friday and Saturday some papers made passing mention that Byrnes had delivered speech. No Communist or FND newspaper even mentioned fact that speech had been made, although it seemed all Bucharest familiar with it, chiefly from BBC and Voice of America.

Dreptatea was only newspaper of March 1st to print any story as to what Secretary said. This was three paragraph summary based on Radio Bulletin received from OIC.

On March 2nd *Liberalul* printed statement that Rador had not distributed story.

Meanwhile, Rador distributed story to newspapers, which received copy Saturday night. Opposition papers set story in type Saturday night and sent proofs to Romanian censor as customary. Proof sheets have not yet been returned. Independent editors say it's beyond contention that Russian authorities applied pressure to Romanian censorship to prevent full story from appearing.

On March 2nd *Dreptatea Noua*, *Semnalul*, and *Timpul* printed editorials about the speech, thereby commenting on discourse which had not appeared in press. *Dreptatea Noua*'s editorial contained several textual excerpts from speech but omits passages concerning occupation foreign territories and seizure of enemy property in liberated and ex-satellite states. (*Dreptatea Noua* also obtained its textual material from OIC Radio Bulletin.)

Possible explanation of why *Dreptatea* was allowed to print its brief account Friday is that it promptly translated passages from OIC Radio *Bulletin* and submitted them to censorship before directive was issued. It is also possible that Government, anticipating protest, placed itself in position to refute charges that speech had been completely outblacked here.

No morning papers published here Mondays. No afternoon paper mentioned speech.

Receiving Secretary-General Stoica of Foreign Office on Saturday I expressed my astonishment that the Romanian authorities had stopped publication of Secretary Byrnes' speech, and meeting Foreign Minister Tatarescu Sunday evening, I repeated this statement. Both these officials said they would do what they could to correct the situation, although both intimated that the suggestion to suppress the speech had not come from a Romanian authority. Since the initiative came from the Russians, General Schuyler will take up the matter at the next ACC meeting.

March 5 *Dr. D. Bagdasar proposed as minister to the United States*

This evening I received a letter signed by Foreign Minister Tatarescu stating that the Romanian Government proposes as Romanian Minister to the United States Dr. D. Bagdasar, Professor at the Bucharest University and at present Minister of Public Health.

Dr. Dumitru Bagdasar, an executive of the National Popular Party, a Communist-dominated organization, was appointed Health Minister on the formation of the Groza Government. He was born in 1893 near Galatz of Armenian parentage, studied medicine in Bucharest, and for many years has been a well-known brain surgeon and teacher at the University of Bucharest. With the aid of the Rockefeller Foundation he studied medicine for 2 years in the United States. He was known during the war as having Leftist tendencies but did not profess Communist convictions until after the coup d'etat. Following the Bucharest disturbances of November 8, 1945, reputable sources at the time reported that Bagdasar had requested all hospital heads to conceal the fact that the wounded had been hit by police and army calibre bullets.

The Bagdasar nomination is a complete victory of the Communist Party over every other Romanian political element including the King, who informed Foreign Minister Tatarescu that such a nomination after the expressed preference of the Monarch for Foreign Office Secretary General Stoica, or other career diplomat, was Tatarescu's personal responsibility. The Marshal of the Court hinted tonight that the King would not be displeased if Bagdasar were found unacceptable. Bagdasar is in poor health, suffering from progressive paralysis of his left arm and a lung affliction.

Secretary General Stoica confirmed that he, and after him, career Minister Ciuntu, was offered the post of Counselor at Washington which each refused feeling that he could not serve under a man he considered unqualified.

March 6* *In regard to the Transylvanian frontier*

Soviet officials have informed Romanians that the Americans desire to alter the Transylvanian frontier in favor of Hungary. In repeating this information, Groza Government officials hammer home the point that the Soviet Government is the defender of Romania against a projected Anglo-American aggression. Moreover, they have reminded the Romanians that the Soviet Government, during the Armistice negotiations, desired to return the whole of Northern Transylvania unequivocally to Romania, but was prevented from so doing by the insistence of Mr. Churchill that the final settlement be held over for the Peace Conference.

The King has raised the question of the maintenance of the present frontiers to me and to Mr. Le Rougetel.

"The importance of the subject"... "a tug of war between the Anglo-Americans and the Soviets"

The Marshal of the Court, in a recent conversation with me stressed the importance of the subject, saying that the Romanian peasant was unimpressed by the fact that six cyphers have been added to the national budget because of Soviet demands, but the same peasant will be profoundly impressed by the moving of a frontier post a few kilometers. The Marshal added that the discussions in London were being represented in Romania as a tug of war between the Anglo-Americans and the Soviets, with the Soviets pulling on the Romanian side. He said that the story of the American proposal is reacting among Romanians of all political parties to the advantage of the Soviet Government and the Romanian Communist Party. Moreover, if the Americans maintain their attitude in discussing the treaty terms with Romanian officials, and that discussion precedes the Romanian elections, the Americans will be presenting an electoral victory to the Communist-backed Groza Government.

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* For Telegram 271. Secret. US Urgent. Sent the same day, March 6, to the Secretary of State. Repeated to London as 5, Moscow as 51, and Budapest as 5, see *FRUS 1946*, VI, pp. 579-581.

"It is my [Berry's] belief that"

After giving this subject very careful consideration, it is my belief that (1) the Soviet authorities have consistently sought, and will continue to seek, to confirm the present frontier between Romania and Hungary; (2) this attitude is increasing the prestige in Romania of the Soviet Government; (3) our suggestion to make minor rectifications in the frontier on ethnic grounds touches all Romanians on a very sensitive spot and will cause our prestige to diminish if our pressure is maintained; and (4) the Hungarians, in view of the presence of heavily concentrated groups deep in Romania, will likely be as dissatisfied as the Romanians with our efforts if we press to establish the principle of rectification of the frontier for ethnic reasons and then apply the principle only within a few kilometers of the present frontier.

Not being informed of the development of the Department's policy on frontier realignments I hesitated to make a recommendation concerning the Transylvanian frontier. I suggested, however, in view of the conclusions that I have stated above, that consideration be given to the thought that the solution of the problem of the alteration in the Transylvanian frontier be sought within the framework of the UNO, rather than at the Peace Conference.

March 7 *J. Le Rougetel's new post*

John Le Rougetel, my British colleague in Romania for the past seventeen months, left this afternoon for a period of instruction in London before assuming his new post as Ambassador to Iran.

March 8 *Resignation of Minister of Religion Burducea*

Private sources state that the resignation of Minister of Religion Burducea carried by the press on March 7 was forced by the knowledge of the Government that *Dreptatea*, the National Peasant newspaper, intended to publish picture of Burducea in 1941 wearing a green shirt and standing beside Horia Sima, the leader of the Iron Guard movement. Arts Minister Ralea has been designated interim Minister of Religion.

March 9 *Romanian and Soviet censorship continued*

In practice the Romanian Government maintains the view of Premier Groza as given in the memorandum of conversation with Ambassadors Harriman and Clark-Kerr on January 9 by continuing to censor speeches of top American officials.

The Romanian censor cut President Truman's speech carried by *Radio Bulletin* No. 56 of March 6 by eliminating his plea for American aid to the famished people of the world. Treatment of Secretary Byrnes' speech was described earlier. Senator Vandenberg's speech of February 27 was not distributed by the Radio News Agency on the "friendly advice" of the Russians. A recent press statement by former Ambassador Harriman on American Soviet relations was summarized by Rador but deleted from press by the Romanian censor.

Although Soviet censorship has been officially abolished its control is sometimes asserted directly as in the case of Vandenberg's speech, and invariably indirectly through the Propaganda Ministry. The latter makes no move in censoring American official declarations except after receiving advice from highest local Soviet officials.

With the above supplementing other information, I can only conclude that unless the ACC policy is changed and strong representations made to the Romanian Government the practice of restricting American official policy statements in the Romanian press certainly will be continued, perhaps even with greater severity.

March 10* *"Lengthy separate interviews with D. Bratianu and I. Maniu"*

In the two months since the Groza Government was reconstituted and gave its formal commitments to the Allied Commission, this Mission has carefully watched and reported the application of popular freedoms. A running commentary on the highlights has been supplied.

Recently, I have had lengthy separate interviews with Dinu Bratianu and Julius Maniu, the National Liberal and National Peasant leaders, who gave me supplementary information which they felt indicated a considered government program to undercut the intent and operation of the Moscow Decisions upon Romania. They feel recent speeches by the Government and Communist leaders indicate elections will be indefinitely deferred until an NDF coalition unquestioningly can win through manipulation or violence. They point out that, although the British and American governments expected national elections by May, no electoral law has as yet been published. Moreover, Groza declared recently to a prominent National Peasant that he has every intention of holding on to his position.

The Historic Parties' leaders state political violence is increasing. The large Peasant and Liberal meetings are impeded but not prohibited, while NDF bands disrupt their small meetings and wreck meeting premises. No traditional party clubs taken over by the Government have been returned, although the Allied Commission, while it was here, was led to understand that the clubs would be made available. Lawsuits against Peasants and Liberals charged as responsible by the Government for the November 8, 1945, demonstrations are continuing despite Groza's promise to the ambassadors to dismiss them. Opposition party literature distribution is being blocked automobiles used for this purpose. The historic parties still have no access to the radio.

Peasant and Liberal newspapers are subjected to what party leaders consider unreasonable Romanian Government pressure and their newsprint allocations are arbitrarily low. *Dreptatea*, the National Peasant paper, according to Mr. Maniu, receives two newsprint rolls daily, while

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**FRUS 1946*. VI, pp. 582-583: Berry to the Secretary of State. Telegram 297. Secret. Priority. March 10. This was repeated London as 58 and Moscow as 57.

one of the Communist papers, *Scanteia*, receives 20. Mr. Maniu further has pointed out that a year ago his party had 20 newspapers in Transylvania alone, whereas today it has only three for the entire country.

Mr. Maniu repeated to me his views expressed to the American and British ambassadors while here that the Moscow Decisions were a great personal disappointment but that he had accepted them because he understood that the American and British governments would exert pressure upon the Groza Government to make good its commitments. He further expressed his belief that the Government's post-Moscow tactics had been adopted with the complete approval of the Soviet authorities.

Looking at the reverse of the medal, we must admit that the Groza Government did accept representatives of the two historic parties, that these representatives participate in at least some Cabinet discussions, that the Groza Government has authorized the publication of a party organ in the capital and another in the provinces for each party; that up until now these newspapers have printed on local matters exactly what they pleased, often to the very considerable embarrassment of the Government; and that political meetings are being held.

Berry's remarks

After weighing all available information at my disposal from the NDF and Historic Parties upon the application by the Groza Government of promised or tactily agreed popular freedoms during the stay of the Allied Commission, my considered opinion is that the general complaints of the political opposition are justified and that the time is opportune for the Department to consider previously outlined procedure.

United States Secretary of State's reply to the foregoing

The Secretary replied to the foregoing that it seems clear from recent reports from Bucharest that Groza Government, while making some effort to mount a facade of compliance with the assurances it has given with regard to freedom of expression, assembly, etc., and the early holding of elections, is countenancing and from all indications actively engineering the practical circumvention of those commitments. Two months after the reorganization of the Government, not only has no date been fixed for the elections which it was hoped would be held at the end of April or early in May but no electoral law for such elections has been promulgated. In the meantime, while a measure of free expression has been provided by the authorization of publication of a limited number of opposition newspapers, the exercise of censorship has in certain notable instances prevented the free dissemination of important public pronouncements and the suspension and suppression of opposition papers on unsubstantial issues has further restricted the free expression of political views.

Official censorship

The treatment accorded the address of the United States Secretary of State on February 28 is a case in point. Reliable information in our possession confirms that official Romanian Government "advice" was given to newspaper editors which resulted in the suppression of the text of that address. Subsequently important passages were deleted by censorship from an address by President Truman on March 6 and publication in whole or in part of speech by Senator Vandenberg of February 27 was prohibited.

At the same time...

Concurrently, official suspensions and suppressions of individual newspapers have been ordered on grounds which stem to be clearly of a repressive character and there has been obvious discrimination along political lines in the distribution by Government of newsprint paper. As regards the abridgement of freedom of assembly, political violence is increasing. Traditional party clubs taken over by the Government have not been returned, meetings of democratic elements are disrupted by organized bands of hooligans whose activities bear unmistakeable evidence of Government instigation, and legal proceedings against Peasant and Liberal Party members charged as responsible for demonstrations on November 8th are continuing despite Groza's promise to Ambassadors Harriman and Clark-Kerr to dismiss them.

"This situation should not be allowed to continue without protest"

It is our view that this situation should not be allowed to continue without protest. Accordingly, you are requested to discuss the matter with Foreign Office and inquire whether in circumstances British are disposed to join in possible Three Power request to Romanian Government (1) to fix firm date for elections and (2) to take immediate measures to correct abuses in compliance with guaranties given by the Government. If Foreign Office is agreeable to proposal we will approach Soviet Government with view to latter's association with British and ourselves in a tripower communication to Romanian Government. It would be our intention in event of Soviet disinclination to join in three power action to consider advisability of United States or concerted US British representations to Romanian Government along this line.

March 11 *Other similar examples*

Increasing censorship of Romanian press was marked during week beginning February 3.

Speeches of Vandenberg, Byrnes, Eden, Churchill, and Harriman were suppressed or slashed. Byrnes speech was held for 24 hours by Rador on what Rador chief described as "friendly advice" of Russians and eventually to be released to the press. However, those few opposition papers which set it in type never got copy back from Romanian censor.

Case of Churchill speech this never appeared in Romanian press although press was allowed to quote attacks on speech from foreign press and commentaries.

Opposition press (*Liberalul* and *Dreptatea*) continue attack censorship outpointing it violates Moscow Agreement and assurances given by Groza Government regarding freedoms.

Meanwhile Voice of America and BBC closely listened to by people virtually all whom au courant situation thanks to radio.

Other important developments presswise during week were: (1) warning by Government to *Dreptatea* to discontinue attacks on public authorities; (2) continued violent polemics between FND and opposition press;

(3) publication by *Semnalul*, *Momentul*, *Timpul* of editorials hailing Government's achievements on occasion first anniversary; (4) abstention of *Jurnalul* from any comment on accomplishments on anniversary; (5) continued debate on whether or not Socialists will join common election ticket with FND.

New difficulties in Soviet-American relations have produced tension here. People whispering of war between Russia and States. This feeling also reflected on higher levels. Example following incident told OIC by Professor Zahirnic, Secretary of YMCA who is scheduled attend YMCA conferences Geneva and New York this month. His application for exit visa been pending in Secret Police branch Ministry Interior for months. This week he finally got to Communist Minister Interior Teohari Georgescu who told him flatly that if he were to make intervention on behalf American cause at this time of tension following Byrnes speech he himself (Minister) would risk arrest.

Recommended: full coverage important American speeches and statements on Voice of America; continue stress freedoms especially press and democratic elections.

March 12 *Premier Groza "upon possible national elections"*

Premier Groza in a speech on March 6 commemorating the first anniversary of his Government made the following statement upon possible national elections as reported by the press: "There will not be an opportunity for demagogy, of misleading the electorate in order to obtain the greatest possible number of votes, or to steal them from the ballot boxes or to buy them. These elections will be a consultation of the popular will, which must confirm – and will confirm – the fact that we are in line with the development of human society, with the development of the peoples living in this country, with the development of the Romanian people and of our country. These elections with their results, which we can foresee, which we await, and which we do not fear in the least – these elections will set aside prospective adventures. They will enable us to proceed with even greater determination on our road to the reconstruction of this country."

March 13 *The position of Social Democratic leader Petrescu weakened by Rădăceanu-Voitec wing*

The position of Social Democratic leader Petrescu was weakened on March 8 when he was defeated in the Central Committee, 20 votes to 5, in opposing a motion that forthcoming party congress would decide its voting methods and all Committee members must accept the congress' decisions as final. The Committee also declared Petrescu had disregarded party discipline in statements concerning separate electoral ticket made to Reuters correspondent despite Petrescu's claim of being misquoted.

The Congress of the Socialist Party

The Congress of the Socialist Party was attended by 352 delegates, one supposedly chosen for every thousand party members. Credentials committee refused to approve 40 additional delegates for technical faults in credentials. Several sources report strong pressure upon delegates by Radaceanu-Voitec wing, while Social Democrats demonstrating before Congress Hall for Petrescu were disrupted by Socialist Interior Under-Secretary Burca who brought armed police to prevent this vocal support.

Speakers urging NDF electoral collaboration based this upon tactical reasons, while Petrescu and supporters said no European Socialist party had accepted such collaboration, except in Hungary where party had lost votes because of this. Petrescu wished Romanian Socialists to stand as individual party to test own strength and join democratic government coalition following election. However, letter read by Tudor Ionescu made deep impression on delegates although this evening both National Liberals and National Peasants have issued formal denials of document's authenticity and have begun legal action.

Petrescu and 31 delegates left Congress Hall at 01:00 hours March 11 in protest at proposed open voting methods foreseeing same pressure tactics as used by Socialist Cabinet Ministers at the Party Congress in December 1945.

First reports from Petrescu today indicate that he has broken with party claiming that the congress was subjected to great moral intimidation and that it was not representative since there were only small delegations from party strongholds and large delegations from weak districts picked by the local NDF. He informed an American journalist that he was applying for permission to publish a newspaper representing his political views.

March 20 *"The deteriorating relationship between King and Groza Government"*

This afternoon I delivered the Secretary's message verbally to King Michael he having returned to Bucharest today from his mountain castle.

The King asked me to remain for tea with him and the Queen-Mother. During the hour and a half that followed I was told feelingly the melancholy story of the deteriorating relationship between King and Groza Government, as well as the malignant details of a projected but unsuccessful assassination plan.

In my cables and dispatches I have kept the Department fully informed of these things.

It is sufficient to say that I found both King and Queen-Mother distraught and visibly showing the effects of the Government's war of nerves directed against them. I believe in our conversation I made some progress toward getting them to focus their attention on the more hopeful prospects that will begin to unfold after the making of peace treaties rather than, as at present, upon the dismal day by day events that Romania is now experiencing. I am, however, not sanguine about the lasting effects of my remarks.

The Secretary of State's suggestion to General Schuyler

The Secretary replied[*] that after careful consideration of the reports from Bucharest,[**] he feels it desirable that the General in accordance with his suggestion, raise matter at early meeting of ACC. He may point out (1) that information received by him indicates possibility attempt on life of

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[*] See *FRUS 1946*, VI, pp. 583-584: The Secretary of State, Byrnes, to Berry, Telegram 185, Top Secret, March 23. Sent to Bucharest, repeated to London and Moscow.

[**] Byrnes referred only to Schuyler's Telegram 822, March 20, which according to the same documentary source (*FRUS 1946*, VI, p. 583 n. 54) is "not printed." As for Berry's Telegram sent to the Secretary of State the same day, 20 March, Byrnes did not even referred to. — Schuyler's Telegram tenor is to be found in his *Diary*, Ms. pp. 492-494: "King Michael recounts assassination Plot."

King, (2) that while it is obviously impossible to evaluate with certainty the foundation of such reports the reliability of the sources of this information is such that we would feel remiss if we did not bring the matter to ACC attention, and (3) that the United States Government is doing so in order that the Soviet occupying forces in Romania may so long as they remain in occupational control of that country take such steps as may be necessary in their judgment to fulfill their responsibility for the safety of the Royal Family, unless and until such time as the Romanian people declare in a free and orderly manner that they desire some constitutional form other than a monarchy.

The question of sanctuary for the King or his mother

He added that should the question of sanctuary for the King or his mother arise in the meantime General Schuyler and I should be guided by previous instructions.

March 21 *Interpreting American absence of reaction*

Romanian NDF, and especially Communist, circles are showing growing concern at the absence of an American reaction to the nomination as Minister to the United States of Health Minister Bagdasar. Interpreting silence as indicating displeasure with the nomination, they comment that the United States is likely maintaining a watchful attitude towards the Groza Government, not being satisfied that the Government is living up to its commitments under the Moscow Decisions.

March 22 *Regarding "free and unfettered elections" to be held "as soon as possible"*

The Moscow Decision stated that the three governments take note that the Romanian Government should declare that free and unfettered elections will be held as soon as possible. At the same time the Soviet Government declined to consider sending an Allied Commission to supervise elections thus placing on the officials of the three governments in Romania the responsibility for reporting to their governments the manner in which elections are held.

Berry proposes to accompany
General Schuyler to Athens

In order to be in a position to discharge satisfactorily this responsibility I wish General Schuyler to go to Athens for four days in early April to talk with the members of the American Election Delegation in Greece. I wish to accompany him. The General and I both feel that there is no better way to learn about election abuses and their prevention than to talk at length with our delegates in Greece.

I urgently recommend therefore that the Department request the War Department to authorize General Schuyler to go to Athens for four days as soon as practicable after the Greek elections. Transportation will be by General Schuyler's plane. My trip can be made without cost to the Department if the Department in writing the War Department will include the request that I be authorized to accompany General Schuyler on his plane. In order to arrange clearances I shall appreciate the Department's early action upon this suggestion.

March 23 *"Gift or sale of an American plane to King Michael"*

The Department may be interested in General Schuyler's telegram on the subject of the gift or sale of an American plane to King Michael. I see no political significance to such a transfer although of course it is possible that the King at some time might attempt to use the plane to leave the country should life become intolerable for him here.

March 28 *Comments upon "the Soviet text of a draft peace treaty with Romania"*

I have studied carefully the Soviet text of a draft peace treaty with Romania and give in the succeeding paragraphs my reaction. My information upon the development of the treaty negotiations is so fragmentary that a great deal of what follows may be so much water over the dam but after considerable thought I am sending these comments for what they may be worth.

In general, I believe that the subjects touched on by the Soviet text are so over-simplified that the Soviet Government later may be able effectively to put its own interpretation on each article. Therefore, for the purpose of avoiding future misunderstandings, it seems to me important to spell out much more fully the meaning of each article. This will have to be done by us if the rights of the Romanian nation are protected in the treaty, as we can expect the delegates of the Groza Government to be subservient to the wishes of the Soviet Government. The draft is equally faulty in what it omits. Most glaring omissions are the Danubian question, the redefinition of all frontiers, the rights of nations other than those mentioned in the preamble which are now in a state of war with Romania, the maintenance of war graves, the resumption of diplomatic relations, the stating of our right to set up consular offices in the cities of our choice, the return of Romanian naval vessels by Russia, and the future status of the Romanian navy.

Comment upon certain articles follows:

Article 1 should include a ceiling limiting personnel and equipment for Romanian ground, sea, and air forces. Article 2 should contain specific recommendations as to the means and methods of meeting claims and damages and other losses by all United Nations and their nationals. This could take the form of an agreement that each of the United Nations is authorized to take over and apply to its claims the Romanian assets within its jurisdiction. Perhaps here an understanding could be reached as to the definition of the United Nations Property, bearing in mind that the Russians often claim as war booty property that we claim as American.

In Article 4, both as a protection of American interests and as a protection against excessive Soviet demands upon Romania, the term "German assets" should be clarified. As far as is known to this Mission, the American Government has not received officially a copy of any bi-lateral agreement entered into between the USSR and Romania during the Armistice period, including the "relevant Soviet-Romanian agreement" mentioned in Article 5. It would seem to me that we have the right to copies of such agreements before consenting to the incorporation of this article in a peace treaty, and the pertinent agreements should be included in the treaty as annexes.

My views on Article 7 have been stated previously. As the dissolution of the Fascist organizations took place during the Armistice period, there is no need to mention the subject in Article 8. Moreover, as the terms of this article could be used to nullify the bill of rights in Article 9, the entire article had best be omitted. The Romanian Jews feel that discriminatory legislation and restrictions imposed upon them because of their racial origin have not been entirely removed. As regards discrimination, this I believe is true, and it is likely to continue to be true, given the general Romanian attitude toward the Jews. It may be appropriate therefore to make definite recommendations concerning them in Article 9.

The statement of Article 10 is very sweeping, and therefore very dangerous, in view of the ignorance in which the American Representative on the ACC has been kept as to Soviet actions in Romania. In re-writing this article, care should be taken that it is not used by the Soviet Government to claim that the United States Government has given its sanction to recent Soviet-Romanian trade agreements, and the formation of companies created under them which are highly exclusive in character. It would seem desirable in Article 11 to put a time limit for the indictment of war criminals, otherwise this article may be used indefinitely by the Government against the opposition as a political weapon.

General Schuyler has commented upon Article 12: "This article as written permits Russia to maintain unlimited forces on Romanian soil, thereby reducing Romania to the actual status of a vassal state. Russia should be guaranteed right of transit through Romania for troops and supply movement into or out of Russian-occupied territory in Austria. To insure efficient handling of personnel and property, Russia should be authorized to maintain a commission or inspectorate in some form along lines of communication; however, I consider it most important that the treaty specifically state that on or after a certain date, except for commissions specifically prescribed by the treaty, there are to be no Allied forces maintained on Romanian soil."

March 29 *Romanian internal politics swayed by the state of relations between the Great Allies*

The Romanian public has been following with the closest attention UNO developments upon the Iranian question through foreign radio broadcasts such as the Voice of America. Romanians are impressed by the American and British determination to force consideration of the question despite

Russian opposition. They interpret our action as the opening of a diplomatic offensive to force the Soviet Union back within its own frontiers.

The course of Romanian internal politics is swayed constantly by the state of relations between the Great Allies. Thus the present United Nations action has somewhat tempered the execution of current plans of the Communists dominating the Groza Government, and has encouraged persons of other parties within and without the Government to hope there may be an eventual relaxation in the Soviet political and economic dominance of Romania. Also feeling that current UNO discussions mark a changing international outlook, Romanian politicians believe the execution in this country of the Moscow Decisions of December 1945 may be effected.

March 30* *Premier Groza's irritation at the lack of reply to the note nominating Dr. Bagdasar*

The Romanian manager of a large American company reports that in a personal conversation yesterday Premier Groza expressed marked irritation at the lack of reply to the Romanian Government's note nominating Dr. Dumitru Bagdasar as Minister to Washington. My informant is one of Groza's intimates, they having served a prison term together.

Groza stated that the US would "have to take Bagdasar" as he would name no other man for the post. The entire tenor of his conversation showed an intransigent attitude toward the US and belittled the chances of success of any American action directed against the Groza Government as there was "equality of weapons." After expressing strong dissatisfaction with the activities of the National Liberal and National Peasant parties he concluded by announcing his intention "to do something" about them.

My disturbed informant, although accustomed to Groza's eccentric talk, expressed the opinion that the Premier was voicing ideas with which he had been primed at some recent Soviet pep session.

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* See *FRUS 1946*, VI, p. 586; Berry to the Secretary of State. Telegram 375. Secret. Operational Priority. April 1. Repeated Moscow as 65 and London as 67.

April 1 *On "Romania's case for Transylvania"*

On leaving for London Romanian Minister Franassovici was given a lengthy memorial outlining Romania's case for Transylvania which he was to give officially to the Allied governments in London. The study reportedly was objective in clearly showing the Hungarian enclaves across the present frontier line. Tatarescu has now instructed his Minister at most to give copies unofficially since the Russians have objected in that they alone wish to present a case in the Allied councils for retention of the Trianon Treaty frontiers.

Foreign Office circles state their belief that this information points to a Soviet intention to pose as the sole Great Power defending Romania's frontiers and publicly to oppose any moderate rectifications proposed by the Anglo-Americans. The same sources also have begun to receive reports that the Russians, after securing the Trianon frontiers, plan to organize Transylvania as an autonomous area.

April 2 *On Minister Franasovici's frigid reception in London*

In reporting to the Foreign Office his frigid reception in London by British officials, Romanian Minister Franassovici blandly blamed Romanians resident in London as responsible for this attitude. He also reported his first interview with the Soviet Ambassador at London to whom he gave assurances that he would make no important moves without the Ambassador's prior approval.

April 3 *Romania "breaking diplomatic relations with Spain"*

Foreign Minister Tatarescu yesterday telegraphed Romanian Legation at Madrid stating Romania was breaking diplomatic relations with Spain and that the staff should prepare to return home. Foreign Office circles state that this action was taken at the express request of the Soviet Union.

April 5 *After the French Government presented King Michael with magnificent motor car...*

King Michael told me that the French Government has just presented him, through the French Minister, with magnificent Delahaye motor car equipped with special racing motor. The Department knows Russian Government presented King with two airplanes when he was decorated with Order of Victory. In view of this trend and to prepare favorable reception for future American activities in Romania, I now recommend gift of desired American plane from surplus Army property.

April 6 *A Romanian Commercial Commission... to visit Europe & America*

There is talk that a commercial commission will soon be appointed by the Groza Government to visit Europe and America to work out a trade promotion program. Malaxa and Ausnit are mentioned as possible members of the commission.

It seems to this Mission that the departure of a commission is premature in view of the fact that the Department has not acted upon the Romanian Government's nomination of Minister to Washington. However, I have requested instructions as to the Mission's attitude towards the commission.

April 7 *"American ownership of companies claimed by Soviet ACC to be German"*

On March 22 General Schuyler tentatively decided that problem be discussed informally with Economic Section (Soviet) ACC. On March 30 Colonels Lawrence and Crist therefore informed lower level representative of said section that American ownership of companies claimed by Soviet ACC to be German was being verified, and that meanwhile the companies in Romania concerned had been advised not to make payments demanded. American representatives were informed that matter would be reported to Mr. Krinkin, chief of the Economic Section (Soviet) ACC, but no reaction has yet been forthcoming. Other than followup in due course General Schuyler contemplates no formal ACC discussion unless new development dictates. In the event of another peremptory demand for payments General Schuyler will be governed by instructions given before.

British Mission advised British companies to pay only net balances owed into German clearing, but not sums owed to associated British firms in Germany or any sums owed to Austria and Hungary in accordance with procedure applied in England under trading with enemy legislation.

April 9 *"Seventh meeting... at Soviet's request"*

Seventh meeting Soviet American Oil Commission held April 8 at Soviet's request. Soviets stated they had studied information presented on February 15 at sixth meeting. There was some quibbling over details but their conclusion was that the only possibility of making any progress would be to study question as a whole and to submit information requested by them at meeting September 6.

As foreseen, negotiations had led into blind alley and material presented by Americans has not furthered Commission's work. This further strengthens opinion already expressed that no progress can be made at present level. The whole question is part of the large problem of defining war booty and until Soviets agree with other Allied nations on some acceptable definition I can see no possibility of Commission making progress.

Walters desires to arrive in Budapest April 18 for consultation with Mission and while there requests instructions to proceed to Washington.

He will leave Bucharest on 18 unless instructed to contrary. If Commission is eventually reactivated please refer to my previous telegram in considering replacement for Walters.

April 11 *Looking for new nominee as Romanian Minister to United States*

Stoica told me today that Government had decided no agreement would be received for Bagdasar and had started to select new nominee. Ministers Tatarescu, Ralea, Voitec, and Patrascanu compose committee of selection. They met yesterday and requested Patrascanu attempt to convince the political committee of the Communist Party of Stoica's acceptability.

Failing to accomplish this, Patrascanu is to try to secure acceptability of Ciuntu. Stoica said that I might expect a letter from Tatarescu next week withdrawing name of Bagdasar and submitting another. Groza told Stoica to refuse an appointment to the Hague as sooner or later he would be the inevitable choice for Washington.

In view of this trend I hope that the Department will continue to withhold agreement for Bagdasar.

April 12 *NDF whispering vs. "American extorsions" from Romania*

As the interest in London Peace Treaty talks mounts in Romania, the NDF parties are increasing their whispering campaign against "American extortions" from Romania. Only yesterday Tatarescu informed the King that the Americans were insisting upon presenting Hungary with 24,000 square kilometers of Romanian land. As I have pointed out such tactics which are interpreted by the Romanian peasants as an American challenge to Romanian territorial integrity and political independence, unless counteracted will present the Groza Government with a victory in the coming elections.

In regard of Transylvanian frontier

For protection of our interests in Romania it is important that it be known here that the United States Delegation in London is not attempting to trim Transylvanian frontier in favor of Hungary. Of course this will be public knowledge when Romanian officials participate in peace talks but if the American position is not known generally until that time, the Groza and the Soviet Governments will receive all credit, being in a position to convince the Romanian peasants that the United States was forced to accept the Soviet position. I consider it important therefore that our stand be known now.

I suggest that this can be done by a correspondent asking Mr. McDermott if it is true that America desires to trim the Transylvanian frontier in favor of Hungary. Then, if he replies such is not the case, this conversation should be broadcast over the Voice of America beamed to Romania.

April 13 *On crime committed in Romania by American seaman*

Seaman Robert L. Beechin, Oiler on SS Robert Parrot, as result of dispute in restaurant in port of Constantza, shot and killed seaman Robert Goodman of the SS John W. McKay on January 19, 1946. Case was handled by Naval Section of General Schuyler's after on ACC.

Conference with members my staff was held to decide whether Beechin should be tried in Romania or sent back to US for trial. Although informed of regulations that crimes committed by sailors ashore must be tried by competent authorities of country where crime committed, naval officers were doubtful whether American seaman could be tried by courts of country technically in state of war with United States. Decision was taken to query WSA authorities and it was understood Beechin would be held here until instructions cleared through State Department were received. Priority cable was sent by General Schuyler on January 23 to WSA OPNAV (ONI) giving facts and stating unless instructed otherwise Beechin would be returned for trial to United States in custody Master SS John McKay January 25. Since instructions to contrary not received and have never been received above action was carried out. However, this Mission was not informed of contents of General Schuyler's cable to WSA.

Coroner's report on deceased seaman, Robert Goodman, authorization to transport body from Romania, death certificate, detailed report prepared by Lieutenant (jg) Sivess, Assistant United States Naval member ACC at Constantza, signed statement by Beechin and seven signed statements of witnesses delivered to Master of SS John McKay.

Unless the Department instructs otherwise, the American ACC Representation and this Mission are of the opinion that crimes committed in Romania by American merchant seamen under jurisdiction of WSA should not be tried by Romanian courts so long as Romania is under an Armistice.

April 14 *Romanian delegation attending Italian Socialist Congress*

Labor Minister Radaceanu, Education Minister Voitec, and Serban Voinea now attending Italian Socialist Congress comprise first prominent Socialist delegation permitted to leave Romania since the Armistice. They represent dissident wing recently pledged to electoral collaboration with Communists in opposition to party rank and file led by President Titel Petrescu who has protested their right to speak for Romanian Social Democratic Party.

April 16 *Ministers Romniceanu and Hațieganu's protest*

Yesterday Ministers Romniceanu and Hatieganu presented a joint written protest to the Prime Minister which has been refused press publication by Groza highlighting the great lack of Cabinet cooperation with the National Peasant and National Liberal parties. Illustrations were offered such as rare Cabinet meetings, Cabinet silence upon the draft electoral law, promulgation of important decrees without Cabinet discussion or consulting the two Ministers, sending certain decrees by messenger for immediate signature, and giving inadequate notice of some decrees before Cabinet discussion and approval. These measures were cited as making impossible the "loyal collaboration" of all Government elements under the terms of the Moscow Agreement.

There also was transmitted to the Prime Minister by the Presidents of the National Liberal and National Peasant parties a lengthy statement concerning the non-observance of the political freedoms guaranteed by the Government to the three Allied Powers in the fields of the press, public liberties, propagande, and public assembly of a character similar to those reported in the previous reports of this office.

April 18 *About sending official & unofficial commercial commission to United States*

The plan to send official commercial commission to US has been abandoned. In place of commission small unofficial delegation from American Chamber of Commerce in Romania desires to visit US.

Chairman Max Ausnit of American Chamber explained object of delegation is to renew old connections of trade and particularly to secure and give information about possibility for future commercial relations. He has several projects which he wishes to discuss with American friends. I explained that I thought American capital would not be interested in investments in Romania until the political situation is stabilized, but

Ausnit said he had no plan calling for immediate investment. He wishes to explain his projects and if they are well received, send a technical delegation of Americans to study projects in Romania. Only after their favorable report is received, does the question of capital investment arise.

The delegation is composed of Max Ausnit, Chairman; Nicolae Malaxa, Jacques Bochori, and Ionica Weiss, members; accompanied by three experts, Lazar Stoicescu, Dan Dragomirescu, and Marcel Petreanu, designated by the Government.

I have no basis for modifying the information submitted about Malaxa. On the other hand, the fact is that Malaxa is working hand in glove with the present Romanian Government and, as Ausnit says, if American business is coming in here under the present Government, Malaxa is going to participate. I believe that the decision must be taken from this very realistic point of view. Ausnit's war record is creditable. Confidential biographies of Ausnit and Malaxa follow by pouch. Subsequent information will be given about other members. The experts are practically unknown but inasmuch as they are designated by the Communist-dominated Government they are assumed to be favorably inclined to it.

After careful consideration, I decided to recommend favorable consideration for the applications of the delegation for visas at Paris.

April 19 *General Schuyler on Bessarabian frontier*

Supplementing General Schuyler's conversation with Mr. Dunn* on subject Bessarabian frontier, the General has supplied following extracts from minutes of ACC meetings:

Meeting of September 6: "Frontier between Bessarabia and Romanian Dobruja. AVM Stevenson referred to a question raised by General Schuyler at a previous meeting relative to the exact delineation of the Bessarabian frontier along the Danube between Galatz and the Black Sea.

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*James Clement Dunn, Assitant Secretary of State for European, Far Eastern, Near Eastern, and African Affairs. Was serving as Deputy US Representative at the Council of Foreign Ministers at London. "Dunn and the Deputies of the British, Soviet, and French Foreign Ministers were meeting in London to consider the draft peace treaties for Italy, Bulgaria, and Romania" (*FRUS 1946*, VI, p. 586 n.).

He asked for information as to which part of this frontier is still under the Soviet High Command and which part is under the juristiction of the ACC. Admiral Bogdenko asked that he not be pressed to answer this question, since he felt that it could not be answered satisfactorily on ACC levels. He said the frontier in this region is still not clearly defined and that in his opinion, it would be settled at some later date, either as a result of joint discussions among the three major Allies, or possibly by a commission consisting of representatives of the nations concerned."

Meeting of July 27: "Authority of the ACC in the Danube Delta Area. General Schuyler mentioned that in a recent letter asking for assistance in arranging a boat trip through the Danube Delta area, General Susaikov had replied that his authority extended only to Galatz. General Schuyler asked for further clarification of this statement. General Susaikov replied that from Galatz the Soviet-Romanian frontier runs generally along the Danube, but that this frontier had not been finally agreed upon in 1940 to 1941, and therefore it could not now be definitely fixed. In view of this, the present frontier posts are not being maintained strictly along the Danube, certain of such posts being south of the river. Under this situation and until the frontier can be definitely fixed (probably at the peace table), the jurisdiction does not now rest with the Allied Control Commission. General Schuyler thanked General Susaikov for this explanation and pointed out that if the Control Commission has no jurisdiction over this area, then his own interest in the area is not a legitimate one either."

April 26 *Acceptance of D. Bagdasar*

I have informed Foreign Minister in letter dated today of acceptance of Bagdasar.

April 29 *On the Hungarians in Transylvania; Transylvanian border*

Two responsible Foreign Office sources stated today that Hungarian Foreign Office Assistant Secretary named Sebestyen arrived from Budapest and had interviews with Foreign Minister Tatarescu and Premier Groza on April 27. The envoy stated to Tatarescu that he was authorized by his Government to open conversations to further good relations with Romania and to discuss the question of the Hungarians in Transylvania and a revision of the present Transylvanian border. Tatarescu allegedly replied that although desirous of good relations with Hungary, his country could not agree to any revision of the Trianon Treaty frontiers and that questions pending between Hungary and Romania could only be discussed following the peace conference. Sebestyen made courtesy call on Groza and left for Budapest yesterday.

May 1 *General Susaikov to General Schuyler's inquiry*

General Schuyler at ACC meeting on April 26 received following reply from General Susaikov to his inquiry.

During the first year of operation of the Armistice Convention delinquent charges for failure or delay in delivery of items and quantities, as specified in the Russian-Romanian Convention of January 16, 1945, were assessed against Romania in the amount of approximately $180,000. Recently, however, the Romanian Government requested the Russian Government to remit these penalties in view of the serious economic situation confronting the nation. The Soviet Government has agreed to comply with this request, and therefore these penalties have now been dropped from the books. No penalties have as yet been assessed against Romania for non-deliveries during the second year of the Armistice. It is expected, however, that some such penalties will accrue since already there have been delays in delivery of a number of items.

May 1 *Inviting N. Malaxa to America*

Photostatic copy of letter adressed to Malaxa by President Graham-Paige Corporation inviting Malaxa to America was presented me.

Carol Scharrenbreuch added to Chamber of Commerce Delegation. I have informed chairman I will refuse to submit this name as Scharrenbreuch is well-known as active sponsor of the Nazi cause in Romania during war.

May 1 *Maniu's letter on Government's bad faith about executing Moscow Agreement*

A letter from National Peasant Party leader Maniu received yesterday and also transmitted to British and Russian Missions states that Government does not respect Moscow Agreement and hinders cooperation of Peasants and Liberal Party Cabinet representatives. It requests examination of Romanian internal situation at Paris Conference as well as question of country's representation at Peace Conference.

Attached to Maniu's letter is statement, sent Premier Groza referring to Hatieganu and Romniceanu incidents as climax of Government's bad faith to execute Moscow Agreement. Maniu affirms internal situation worse than upon reorganization of Groza Cabinet January 8. He states that Government's unanswered protests of Peasants and Liberals to abuses and violations of commitments show agreement with Three Allies broken. National Peasant Party concludes Groza Government "can no longer become a representative government of Romania" while "on eve of Peace Conference our country does not have a government which can be recognized by the Three Great Allied Powers."

May 2 *Foreign Minister Tătărescu's dilemma... to go to Paris...*

For weeks a plane was held in readiness to depart on an hour's notice for Paris with Foreign Minister Tatarescu and his commission of experts. Tatarescu had been most anxious to go to Paris that he might return to Romania, claiming that with Russian aid he had succeeded "in wresting from American and Hungarian hands all of Romanian Transylvania." Since the word has gotten around that the Americans are not trying to deprive Romania of any of her territory within the Trianon frontiers, the Paris trip no longer offers any political advantage to Tatarescu. In fact such a trip now offers decided political disadvantages. If he raises the Danube question and Soviet economic infiltration on Romania, he will be offending the Government of the Soviet Union and if he fails to raise these questions, he will be ignoring Romania's vital interests. Caught in this dilemma Tatarescu prefers to remain in Bucharest hoping that these two questions will be raised by the Anglo-Americans and settled to their advantage as well as Romania's.

May 3 *Monseigneur Cassullo's remarks and fears… in regard to Marshal Antonescu*

Monseigneur Cassullo, Papal Delegate, informs me that Prosecutor of People's Court scrutinizing secret papers of Mihai Antonescu uncovered notes attributing to Cassullo laudatory remarks about Marshal Antonescu and statements sustaining cause of Hungarians and Germans.

Cassullo is confident no incriminating statements exist beyond those made in pursuance of his normal official duties. He fears however that Romanian Communist Party with Soviet backing will make mountain of mole hill to bring about his own dismissal and restriction of Church's influence. As indicative of Soviet attitude toward him he said Ambassador Kavtaradze had declined to recognize him as Chief of Diplomatic Corps.

Tatarescu advised Cassullo to leave Romania during Antonescu trials but he will stay at his post even agreeing to reply to questions the court may wish to put if it will accept a deposition made at his residence.

Department will recall Romanian Government recently broke diplomatic relations with Spain upon insistence of Soviet Government. It may well be Soviets will use coming trials to discredit Papal Delegate and thereafter ask Romanian Government to break relations with Vatican.

Should it appear as plan of Groza Government to exploit evidence and I have occasion, I will, unless instructed to the contrary, counsel moderation in any informal conversations I may have with Romanian and Soviet colleagues.

May 3 *Marshal Antonescu, Mihai Antonescu, and others… will be placed on trial*

Marshal Antonescu, Mihai Antonescu, General Pantazi, General Vasiliu, Eugene Cristescu, George Allesseanu, and Radu Lecca have been brought to Bucharest from Russia and will be placed on trial before a People's Court on May 6, accused of being responsible for the country's disaster or guilty of war crimes. Some 18 additional persons present or in absentia will also be tried.

May 3 *Secretary Byrnes' proposal*

Secretary Byrnes' proposal for a four-power alliance and press commentaries on the subject have not been published in Romania because Rador, the official Government service, has complied with instructions of the Government and the Communist Central Committee not to transmit such dispatches to Romanian newspapers.

May 3 *On "frontier between Bessarabia and Romania"*

Commenting on refusal to permit American naval officer to visit Sulina, Deputy Chairman Susaikov of ACC said on April 26 the difficulty arises from fact that since 1940 actual frontier between Bessarabia and Romania has not been definitely defined. He said frontier posts in some places are still located on south side of Danube; that no Romanian or Russian frontier commission had been organized as far as he knew; that nothing was being done to determine the exact location of frontier, but he expected the questions to be solved by Foreign Ministers in Paris.

May 4 *"The war criminal trials of Marshal Antonescu and others."*

The war criminal trials of Marshal Antonescu and other Ministers scheduled to open May 6 are reliably reported as being organized to aid a future governmental electoral ticket by seeking to discredit National Peasant and National Liberal leaders Maniu and Bratianu in the course of testimony.

It is even reported that Molotov at Paris has requested a selected dossier on the two men to be used in the present sessions of Foreign Ministers and that Marshal and Mihail Antonescu have been promised certain clemencies if they implicate Maniu and Bratianu during the trials. For political purposes the Government seeks to compromise other personalities in addition to the Papal Nuncio, including Jewish leaders and political deputies of Bratianu and Maniu.

National Liberal Representative in Cabinet meeting May 2 sought to avoid joint trial of 24 accused war criminals and collaborators seeking their separate trials or joint trials of all Antonescu Ministers whereas the Government has exempted several. He was informed that Government intends to follow the first group of accused with a second list.

May 7 *Joy "upon return of whole of Northern Transylvania to Romania"*

An effervescense of joy has followed Paris radio announcement that Foreign Ministers have decided upon return of whole of Northern Transylvania to Romania. Government line, of course, gives all credit to Russia, but perhaps because of this, there is a general inclination on part of public to give credit to us.

May 8 *Virtual ultimatum to Papal Delegate [Monseigneur Cassulo]*

May 8 Foreign Office spokesman, hinting calumnious disclosures, during Antonescu trial, gave Papal Delegate through his Secretary virtual ultimatum to leave country. Delegate says he will remain at his post until compelled to abandon it by force.

It is becoming increasingly clear that Government, with SS urging, considers time ripe, in view of opportunities to introduce degradatory evidence during Antonescu trial, to rid itself of a representative of Vatican.

As Papal Delegate does not have code privileges I have accepted one message for transmission to Vatican at the discretion of AMVATROME and in view of special circumstances, if asked, shall accept others for transmission unless Department directs otherwise.

May 9 *Congress of the Petrescu Faction*

This morning the Petrescu Faction of the Social Democratic Party held its congress in a small Bucharest hall with about 200 delegates present, comprising 2 or 3 chiefs from most party districts. After a few speeches and a vote reaffirming the program of party President Petrescu, the meeting was interrupted by a Romanian army major who announced, in view of instructions received by the Interior Ministry from the ACC, he was forced to order the meeting to disband. Adding force to the argument, the two sides of the street before the meeting place were blocked off by Romanian troops. The congress then closed after making a formal resolution of adjournment.

May 9*

Russian ACC officials' program "facilitating Romanian economic recovery"

Russian ACC officials suggest that ACC propose to Romanian Government adoption of following five-point program in view of facilitating Romanian economic recovery:

(1) Organization of centralized industrial planning agency.

(2) Establishment of Government control over export and import of all goods with special attention to early import of essential raw materials and semi-finished products.

(3) Closer supervision over activities of all Romanian banks to insure full utilization of bank credits by those industries considered to be most important to Romanian economy.

(4) Establishment of new controls over distribution of liquid and solid fuels to eliminate present bottlenecks in this distribution.

(5) Revision of the budget with a view to approaching balance in near future.

General Schuyler's opinion

At ACC meeting General Schuyler said he felt questions involving stricter government control of private enterprise must be carefully examined before being accepted. He had in mind the notorious inefficient and graft-ridden reputation of Romanian Government which has shown itself incapable of establishing and enforcing just and impartial system of economic controls. The General added he would prefer to see the Government take steps to encourage private enterprise and to release it from most controls already existing, particularly in the matter of foreign trade.

**FRUS 1945*, VI, pp. 590-591: Berry to the Secretary of State. Telegram 484. Secret. May 9. Repeated to Secdel Paris as 39.

He has asked advice...

General Schuyler has now asked advice as to line he should take in next ACC discussion, since the ACC may take action that influences economic developments in Romania that being a question closely related to foreign policy of American Government.

May 11 *On Romanian celebration of "Independence Day"*

Romanian Government inaugurated celebration of Independence Day with "festival for the anniversary of the Red Army victory over Fascism." Prime Minister Groza heaped praise upon Soviet forces and gave passing mention to contribution of American and British forces. War Minister Rascanu in principal address omitted any reference to American or British contribution.

At informal after-luncheon conversation with Foreign Minister Tatarescu, I mentioned my surprise that American contribution should be so lightly considered in official Romanian celebration of victory over Fascism. Tatarescu was profuse in his apologies, explaining that program was arranged at Presidency of Council and that Rascanu's speech represented only his own views.

This morning, after customary Te Deum, King Michael unveiled statue to memory of Red Army heroes fallen in cause against Fascism, and then received salute from selected civilian and military groups as they marched past. Although schools were obliged to keep open, several thousand University students broke through police lines at end of formal parade, and joined by workers and military persons, marched by grandstand, singing national anthem and shouting their loyalty to King.

Throngs cheering the King

Seated at large luncheon at which King was host, guests could see throngs outside cheering the King. Interior Minister Teohari Georgecu, on my right at table, called my attention to throngs, asking how anyone in Romania could doubt that there was freedom of assembly and expression.

As we were served coffee, several groups carrying King's picture and slogans praising King joined assembled groups. Men leapt from parked trucks, tore the slogans down and manhandled bearers. Turning to Georgescu to resume our conversation, I found that he had left table.

May 11 *Berry ask permission to delay his trip to Washington*

Today I telegraphed the Secretary: "After conversations with you* in London last September I felt that my work in Romania had more point and effectiveness. Again I feel the need to renew personal contact and I wish to inquire your plans for the future direction of this Mission. For this purpose I shall be happy to come to Washington, but as that trip will require more time than a trip to Paris, I suggest it be delayed until the Antonescu trials are completed and the local political situation is calmer. If this suggestion is agreeable to you I shall appreciate confirmation."

May 12 *Nationalization of banking... the new Romanian — Czechoslovak Trade Agreement...*

Nationalization of banking, among last major barriers remaining in path of Soviet march toward utter control of Romanian economy, moved another step forward when Cabinet Council on May 8 ratified new Romanian-Czechoslovak Trade Agreement. This provides for Czech export to Romania in amount of 300 million Czech crowns to be paid by Romanian gold in opposition to established National Bank gold policy thus coercing Bank to act contrary to precedent and law, climaxing backstage efforts of Communist Party to control Bank for its political end, and endangering international pre-war and war claims on Romania's gold. Now fully expected that Bank will be nationalized in matter of months, so that loan and discount policies will be those of Communist Party, eventually leading to nationalization of all banks outside Sovrombank combination, and consequently of industry.

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* The Secretary of State, J.F. Byrnes.

... and trade relations with United States and Britain

Simultaneously no clear move appeared to show Soviet and Communist-controlled Romanian Government intended to open up international trade to private enterprise. Soviet's alleged and publicized lenient treatment of Romania in extending term of Armistice burden, and Romanian Government gestures toward willingness to resume trade relations with United States and Britain, should be viewed with skepticism inherent in oblique but coercive moves thus far made to socialize nation as much as possible along Soviet model even before national elections. In forthcoming trade trip to United States, Malaxa will seek to buy goods with several million dollars of personal assets now frozen in United States, the funds having been acquired presumably through triangular deals approved by Soviet, and to sound out sentiment for securing credit. Important fact is that Soviets do not permit exports from Romania to world markets, although several staples are available in formidable quantities, and although country sorely needs imports, temporarily at least preferring to let Romania make gold payments for imports.

"Soviets maintaining virtual monopoly of Romania's oil production"

As result of extension of Armistice burden Romania has approximately 320,000 tons of various oil products available for export to markets other than Russia, it being understood that the internal market would be supplied as at present, that obligations under Articles 10 and 11 of the Armistice Convention would be fulfilled together with all existing commitments under commercial accords. Unless Romanian Government renews commercial agreement with Soviet on increased volume basis Romania should have above exportable tonnage during remainder of 1946. Value of such export would materially help Romanian oil production by providing for import of special equipment available only in United States, and thus tend to ease the decline in crude oil production. In local discussions between ACC members Soviets manifested disposition to accept principle of allowing British and American owned oil companies to export a quota of their production to free currency markets. In practice Soviets showed no willingness as yet to implement such disposition. On the contrary, Soviets maintaining virtual monopoly of Romania's oil production, have prevented export programs to countries other than Russia from being realized. The only exports allowed to markets other than Russia have occurred by reason of under the counter manipulations of local Soviet and Romanian Communist officials.

In Romania's case the considerations involved in Schoenfeld's 330 to Department, particularly the third paragraph, are very similar although not yet quite as pronounced. The serious economic elements in the country in opposition to Communism place reliance in Peace Treaty negotiations on Western powers, and hold conviction that Romania can resist until the peace is signed in the event such signature is not inordinately delayed.

May 13* *Letter of D. Brătianu and Maniu's memorandum*

President Bratianu of National Liberal Party has addressed letter to American, British, and Russian representatives in Romania, pointing out that shortcomings of Government have become increasingly clear in five months since its reorganization.

Bratianu cites official and clandestine censorship of press; unequal distribution of newsprint; one-sided propaganda in favor of Government made by State broadcasting service; aggressions of shock troops transported in official transportation against campaigning members of the Liberal and Peasant parties; and isolation of members of Liberal and Peasant parties within Cabinet.

He recalls past efforts to draw attention of President of Council to infringements have been ignored and states he therefore is now forced to address Three Great Allies upon faults of past and dangers of future, mentioning specifically that if electoral law is promulgated without consultation of full Cabinet, as the budget was promulgated, it will not be fair law.

"United States Government should protest to Romanian Government"

Maniu's memorandum, with Bratianu's letter, give official confirmation by leaders of Historic Parties to events this Mission has reported since departure of ambassadors on January 10. They give point to my recommendation that United States Government should protest to Romanian Government upon turn of affairs. I may add longer our protest is delayed less effective it will be.

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* Cf. *FRUS 1946*, VI, pp. 591-592: Berry to the Secretary of State. Telegram 493. Confidential. Urgent, May 13. Repeated Secdel Paris as 44 and London as 84 ½.

General Vinogradov who, regardless of what he thinks, must take Russian attitude that all is well in Romania, has ordered Communist Interior Minister Georgescu to prepare 150 dossiers upon acts of provocation and violence, allegedly committed by members of Historic Parties. I understand these documents are for use by Mr. Molotov in answer to any protest we or the British may make on one-sided respect for freedoms in Romania.

May 14 *At Antonescu trials ... Maniu shook hands with the two Antonescus*

Bratianu and Maniu have now given their testimony at Antonescu trials. Both gave excellent performances and it should be difficult for Government, on basis of what they said, to compromise them or their parties.

An incident did occur upon which Government may capitalize. After finishing his testimony, Maniu was asked to sign record. He refused until he could read it. Two hours was given for this purpose. At end of that time he returned to the Court and signed, then started to leave. He was recalled for additional signatures and as he was leaving again, Dragos, a defendant, seated two yards away, stood and bowed. Maniu returned salutation, offering his hand. Other defendants stood and Maniu shook hands with the two Antonescus before leaving the Court. The Government may claim this as evidence of collaboration.

Representative of Mission at trial stated that under circumstances Maniu could hardly act otherwise than he did. Maniu himself said, when asked for explanation, "I am a Christian. I cannot forget that during the Hitler regime, Antonescu twice saved my life. Today I saw him for the last time as a living man. Mindful of his faults, but bearing in mind he had saved my life, I could not do less on such an occasion than shake his hand."

May 15 *People in favor of leniency*

Sometime tomorrow Special Court is expected to return death sentences for Ion and Mihai Antonescu and several other of principal persons charged with war crimes. After announcement of verdict any one of convicted may beg the King's clemency, in which case he must confirm or commute sentence.

Whereas year or more ago country would have solidly favored execution of all 16 defendants temperament of people has changed in favor of leniency. Moreover, much publicized Maniu handshake instead of acting to his discredit has confirmed people's opinion that Antonescus are not so bad after all.

Nevertheless, in view of record it seems unlikely that King will commute any sentences upon his own responsibility. Therefore they are likely to be carried out unless, as in early series of trials, Soviet Government, speaking through voice of Communist Romanian Minister of Justice indicates they should be commuted.

According to present plan King, when Government presents for signature decree for execution or clemency, will suggest to Prime Minister that he inform Three principal Allies of decision of Court and intention to carry out that decision at the time prescribed unless, before the hour to carry it out arrives, Three Allies make other recommendations.

The King's purpose was...

King told me at private luncheon today that his purpose was to give Three Great Allies an opportunity to ask for custody of Romanian war criminals if we think they can be of any service at Nuremburg or elsewhere, to protect Monarch from criticism at home and abroad in confirming verdict of Court and to place upon Groza Government responsibility for informing American, British, and Soviet authorities of intended action without placing those authorities in position where normal course of events is retarded by failure on their part to take action.

Of course, Groza may not inform British and American authorities, knowing in advance desires of Russian authorities, but in any event responsibility is clearly his. I see no American advantage in retarding normal process of justice in these trials, but should it be to the interest of our Government the opportunity may exist if immediate action is taken.

May 17 *"... the Holy Spirit is not enough to win an election" (Maniu)*

At Mr. Maniu's request, General Schuyler* and I received him this morning. He stated Romanian political situation was growing steadily worse and time was near when his party members would have to decide whether to accept the situation Communist impose and stay in their own backyards and be killed as chickens, or return violence with violence. He feared latter choice would create for Anglo-American friends of Romania more difficult task.

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* In his *Diary*, Schuyler noted: "*Maniu Appeals to Britain and US for Assistance; Faces Alternative of Giving up Fight or Meeting Force with Force.* — On Friday morning Berry and I had a meeting with Mr. Maniu at my house at the latter's request. Maniu said he wanted to inform us of the seriousness of the political situation. He said that the assurances given by the Government to Messrs. Hall and Clark-Kerr had not been kept in the slightest degree. He said the Four Freedoms were being violated daily. The National Peasants have been denied the use of the radio, their newspapers are being suppressed, their automobiles are being requisitioned, their party meetings are being broken up, and their leaders are being beaten and in some cases have actually been killed. Amplifying the situation of his press, Maniu went on to say that the editors of *Patria*, which is printed in Cluj, and the editor of *Dreptatea* in Bucharest had been called before the ACC and warned specifically to change their policies. They had been told that since the Government is now recognized by all three major Allies, criticism directed against the Government can be considered only as criticism of the Allies and particularly of Soviet Russia. The editors were threatened with dire consequences unless their papers' policies changed (this statement of Maniu's was verified by what transpired at my recent meeting with Carandino, the editor of *Dreptatea*, who told me that Susaikov himself had issued the warning to change the policy of his newspaper under threat of personal violence to Carandino himself, and possible closing of the newspaper).

Maniu went on to say that he is now facing a most serious dilemma. He cannot continue to have on his own hands the blood of his loyal helpers. Yet his only other alternative is to give up his opposition policies and tell his party to disperse. He begged for some indication as to whether or not the United States and Great Britain were still interested in Romania and whether we desired at all costs to have Maniu continue in opposition, in the hopes of some future outside help within a reasonabale time. Of course we could give him very little encouraging information. Maniu said he was even considering meeting force with force and that he had such a large body at his command that if there were no outside intervention, he could successfully overthrow the Government. I told Maniu that so long as I was on the ACC I could in no manner condone an attempt at civil war, and that it would be my duty to recommend at once to the ACC in such an event that the Russians themselves intervene in Romania to restore peace and order.

Mr. Maniu ended by presenting a note to Mr. Berry setting forth in writing his present difficulties and asking that the three governments send observers at once to Romania to supervise and report upon the progress of the electoral campaign and to insure its fairness throughout the country. Mr. Berry agreed to transmit the note, but told Mr. Maniu that from a realistic point of view, he thought there was little hope that any such course would be adopted." (Schuyler, *Diary*, Ms. pp. 518-519.)

After reiterating statements now well-known to Department about breaking up of meetings, censorship of party newspapers, limitation on newsprint distribution, inaccessability to radio, lack of motor transport for party members, acts of violence against persons of Ministers of State, Mr. Maniu concluded "We have been stripped of everything except the Holy Spirit, and that is not enough to win an election."

...There could be no free election...

He added that in this atmosphere there could be no free election unless foreign observers were present. He asked that we send such. I said he had made same request to American and British ambassadors in January and had been told question had not come up in Moscow discussion, and as no provision was made, no observers would be sent. He recalled conversation, but said situation had changed very much in meantime, and ambassadors had their responsibility, as they had assured him if his party entered Government that Groza would be required to keep his promise, whereas as a matter of fact he had not kept single promise.

According to high Government official
situation was more tense

While talking with Mr. Maniu, another Mission officer was received by high government official who is member of Communist Party. That official said that the political situation was becoming more and more tense, that there was no liberty of press or of action, and that there would be no free elections. He said NDF Government, with control it now has could return itself as majority group in the National Democratic Assembly, which assembly in short order would take care of the Monarchy and the position of the Western democracies in Romania. He concluded only way to avoid this would be neutralization before elections of Ministries of Interior, Justice, and War.

May 18 *New night arrests*

Upon reported Soviet instructions, Interior Ministry last night arrested all locatable Ministers and Secretaries that served in various Antonescu Governments since 1940. Some sources give number apprehended as high as 80. There are but three known exceptions who had served in governments since coup d'etat of August 23, 1944, namely Marshal of Court Negel, General Potopeanu, and Burchi.

May 18 *Death sentences in the King's hands*

Marshal Antonescu and 12 others, including Mihai Antonescu and General Pantazi, received death sentences yesterday evening in war criminal trials, while lesser penalties were imposed on 11 remaining defendants. All filed appeals with Court of Cassation which is expected to give negative answer, on May 20. The time for executing the sentences then will be fixed by public prosecutor. Apparently this will be before June 1, when the present war criminal law expires. Thus for intervening ten days issue will be in the King's hands.

May 20 *General Sussaikov on "Russian concessions" granted to Romanian Governement*

Soviet Government's publicized economic policy towards Romania may be drawn from statements in recent ACC meeting. General Susaikov said suggestions made by Soviet authorities for economic rehabilitation of Romania "were made in the full knowledge that Romania is capitalistic country with the remnants of a feudal system and that no one is suggesting a Sovietization of Romanian economy."

Susaikov added even capitalistic society in times of stress must have distribution and production controls. His present interest is mainly in making sure that any such aid granted to Romanian Government shall be used to satisfy needs of masses rather than simply speculators, merchants, and landowners.

In discussion General Susaikov said Russian concessions granted under Articles 11 and 12 of Armistice will result in large savings to Romanian

Government this year by reducing planned Armistice expenditure from 3,500 billion to 1,500 billion lei. According to Susaikov, this saving, together with a readjusted tax policy, gives every hope that Romanian economy can now be developed on a sound basis without violating present basic structure of Romanian society, giving up monarchy and resorting to dictatorship of proletariat.

May 21 *Opposition parties in view of Antonescu trial "revelations"*

Reports are circulating among usually well-informed sources that Soviet Union is preparing formally to abrogate Moscow Agreement upon Romania either before or during next session of Foreign Ministers. If this is done it is expected Russians would declare they cannot collaborate further with opposition parties in view of Antonescu trial "revelations" which Russians would assert show Maniu and Bratianu as Fascist collaborators.

Actually Antonescu trial proceedings have revealed no startling new facts concerning Maniu, Bratianu, and their two political parties which were not known to Allied governments during the war and upon signature of Armistice. Nevertheless projected Soviet move would justify presentation to electorate of only Government approved list of parliamentary candidates in national elections that may take place in late summer.

Buildup for Soviet abrogation act allegedly is forecast by fiery anti-opposition articles of last few days in Government press and May 18 editorial of *Graiul Nou*, official Red Army paper in Bucharest.

May 21 *General Susaikov on applicability of Armistice Article 13*

April 19 General Schuyler presented letter to Soviet ACC outlining Department's views regarding applicability of Armistice Article 13 to confiscation American-owned property under Agrarian law.

At joint meeting ACC chiefs May 16 General Susaikov rejected Department's views upholding his position that Article 13 had not been infringed. He justified his stand as follows:

1. Romano-Americana was founded and is still operating as Romanian juridical person and

2. Since majority ownership of shares does not change juridical character of company the latter is in same status as Romanian-controlled companies; that as such the rights of companies are not infringed by application of non-discriminatory Romanian laws; and that consequently Article 13 is not applicable.

Berry asks authorization to "proceed with discussion with Romanian Government"

I am convinced no progress will be made with Soviet ACC or Soviet Government in this matter and recommend Department authorize me proceed with discussion with Romanian Government. Further delay will prompt competent Romanian authorities to believe matter not taken seriously by our Government and encourage them adopt adamant negative attitude.

May 22 *An important case in Soviet-American relationships*

Neither Mission nor Military Representative informed by Romanian Government as alleged. Such information would be disregarded in absence of Departmental instruction. American representative has gone no further than request temporary stay pending resolution ownership question which was done informally. American representative personally feels that New Jersey Industries hope to win favorable action merely by being impractical nuisances to Mission and Representation. Case too important in general Soviet-American relationships not to observe strictest letter of fact and legality.

May 23 *Regarding Markham's expulsion order*

At ACC meeting today Susaikov refused to consider General Schuyler's protest against Markham's expulsion order.

Schuyler stated that expulsion is contrary to Potsdam Agreement, that he had not been consulted or informed prior to issuing expulsion order and that Markham had not been given chance to defend himself.

Susaikov's attitude was antagonistic and uncompromising. Apparently he had made up his mind that Markham's presence was an obstacle to Soviet aims in Romania, and therefore must be removed at all costs.

General Schuyler has arranged for Markham to leave for Vienna on ATC plane Saturday May 25.

May 24 *In regard to Byrnes' speech on Paris Conference*

Only thirteen of twenty-six Bucharest papers covered Byrnes' speech on Paris Conference. They are *Jurnalul*, *Universul*, *Timpul*, *Fapta*, *Poporul*, *Dreptatea*, *Liberalul*, *Semnalul*, *Adevarul*, *Era Noua*, *Cotidianul*, *Ultima Ora*, and *Scanteia*. The Communist daily *Romania Libera* did not mention speech.

All summaries printed omit (1) passages stating details of differences concerning Italian reparations, colonies, and Italian-Yugoslav boundary (2) those touching on difficulties with Russia, and (3) passage expressing fear that United States might be impelled to admit that cooperation in restoration of Europe is impossible. Passage referring to occupation soldiers on foreign soil in Europe is covered only by *Jurnalul*, *Universul*, *Libertatea*, and *Dreptatea*.

May 24 *Berry's note protesting Soviet failure to honor freedoms:*

I shall deliver to Foreign Office note addressed to Tatarescu Monday morning May 27.* Text of note follows:

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* In his *Diary*, Schuyler noted: "*Mr. Berry Hands Strong Note of Protest to Romanian Government.* — On Monday, 27 May [1946], Mr. Berry handed a strong note to the Romanian Government calling them to task for their failure to implement the terms of the Moscow Agreement insofar as the Four Freedom in Romania are concerned. The note points out that the historical parties have not been accorded full freedom of the press, freedom to use the radio, or freedom to organize and conduct their electoral

Upon instructions from my Government, I wish to draw to your Government's attention two aspects of political life in Romania that are giving concern to the Government of the United States. First, the fact that no election law has been promulgated, or date set for the elections and, secondly, the abuses of the freedoms and particularly the increasing frequency of acts of violence which mock at the application of the freedoms guaranteed by the Romanian Government through its acceptance of the Moscow Decisions.

It is now more than four months since the reorganization of the Government and, not only has no date been fixed for the elections, but no electoral law for such elections has been promulgated. This situation, incompatible with the Moscow Decisions, gives the impression that the Government is procrastinating in the fulfillment of its promise.

While a measure of free expression has been provided by the authorization of the National Peasant and National Liberal parties to publish newspapers, the exercise of censorship has, in certain notable instances, prevented the free dissemination of public announcements, and suspension or suppression of papers has restricted the free expression of political views. Thus, a form of censorship prevented the prompt and full distribution of the address of the United States Secretary of State on February 28. Important passages were also deleted by censorship from the address of Senator Vandenberg on February 27. In addition to such official impediments to the free dissemination of news I have been informed of cases where the Printers' Union has exercised an effective censorship, and of others where an unequal distribution of newsprint acts as a means of censorship.

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campaingns. It points also that elections have not been held as promised, and it invites the Romanian Government to change its attitude and to show by its future actions the sincerity of its promises given to our Ambassador last January. One hour later, Mr. Holman presented a similar note on the part of the British Government. This is the result of action recommended by Mr. Berry last March. Both the US and British governments attempted to get Moscow to join them in their protest, but were of course unsuccessful. The note is still being kept confidential, but is to be released in both England, America, and by ourselves in Romania on 1 June. It will be particularly interesting to see whether the note is suppressed in the local press or whether at least this much freedom of the press is to be authorized." (Schuyler, *Diary*, Ms. pp. 525-526. See also Cortlandt V.R. Schuyler, "The View from Romania," in *Witnesses to the Origins of the Cold War*. Edited by Thomas T. Hammond. 1982, pp. 151-152).

Access to the State broadcasting facilities, according to my information, remains a monopoly of certain parties within the Government, contrary to the Government's commitments under the Moscow Decisions.

An increasing number of instances have been brought to the attention of this Mission where organized bands of hooligans have broken up meetings called by the National Peasant and National Liberal parties, or interfered with the movements of members of those parties when going to attend such meetings. While there is little point in listing all such instances, I do desire to state that a sufficient number of them have been investigated or witnessed by American officers to establish beyond any doubt that political violence is on the increase.

The legal proceedings against the National Peasant and National Liberal Party members, charged as being responsible for the incidents on November 8, are continuing, according to Bucharest newspapers dated April 15, in spite of the Prime Minister's assurance to Ambassador Harriman and Sir Archibald Clark-Kerr that they would be dismissed.

The Ministers of State, representing the National Peasant and National Liberal parties, have not been given the opportunity to cooperate fully with the Government. Full Cabinet meetings are rarely called, and important pending legislation frequently is not discussed in them. In many instances, the Ministers are not given adequate time to study draft laws and in some other important cases, decree laws are published without having been submitted to these Ministers for their study.

In bringing these matters to your attention it is my purpose to point out that a definite impression is being created abroad concerning the present Romanian Government. The impression is that through the Government's action and inactions, while trying to give the appearance of carrying out the assurances of the Moscow Decisions, it is, in reality, circumventing the commitments which it has made. My Government, being a party to the Moscow Agreement, has an interest in seeing that this impression is dispelled. I therefore urge you to take the necessary steps without delay to see that it be dispelled.

Accordingly, it is believed that a different impression will be attained through prompt action on the part of the Romanian Government in implementing the assurances given the Allied Commission in January, by promulgating an electoral law and setting a date for elections, at the same time taking adequate measures, during this period prior to the elections, that all democratic parties may put forward their candidates with the assurance that the freedoms set forth in the Moscow Decisions apply equally to the members of all such parties."

May 25 *The British Government wishes to publish the text of its note*

My British colleague states that his Government wishes to publish the text of its note to the Romanian Government on Tuesday, May 28, the day after it is delivered, and that it is consulting the American Government to approve a common procedure. My colleague, if receiving London's notification of approval, intends to make available to the Romanian press on May 28 the text of the British note as a practical test of current press freedom. Unless other instructions are received, I propose to release simultaneously the American note.

May 26 *Regarding Markham's expulsion from Romania*

After receiving information Department was making strong representations to Moscow, requesting Soviet Government immediately to rescind order expelling Reuben Markham from Romania, I asked General Schuyler to see General Susaikov again and insist upon suspension application of his order, pending settlement of affair at governmental level.

General Vinogradov speaking for Susaikov agreed to the request, attaching two conditions that Markham must not attend political meetings or attempt to send out stories until the matter is settled.

Markham had already left Bucharest for Constantza en route to Turkey, but he was caught by long-distance telephone, situation explained to him, and he returned to Bucharest at 11 o'clock last evening.

Message communicated to Markham who greatly appreciates *Monitor*'s support and Department's actions. Markham is not in need of funds.

May 27 *Re: Premier Groza's inability to influence Government policy*

In two frank conversations with trustworthy source Premier Groza complained of his inability to influence Government policy or to give it effective advice. These powers he attributed to Romanian Communists closer to "quarters where political instructions are made" and described Communist Party as comprising two factions, Comintern group of Bodnaras, now Groza's Secretary General, and Romanian group led by Communications Minister Gheorghiu-Dej, who has superseded Justice Minister Patrascanu.

Electoral campaign policy's chief present Communist factional differences. Bodnaras wishes to employ extremist violence tactics to assure ninety percent vote for Government ticket, while Gheorghiu-Dej and Groza would be satisfied with sixty percent secured by chicanery that permitted opposition remaining forty percent. Groza criticizing idea of overwhelming Government vote claimed it would make collaboration impossible with any opposition remnants and with Americans and British, and said "why not let Maniu and Bratianu, after all, share the responsibility of Government in these very hard days."

The elections Groza considered to be completely "matter of international solution. We are too small to be master of our destiny, as always in our history." It appeared clear that he and some Communists fear forthcoming Soviet electoral campaign instructions and would welcome Anglo-American pressure upon Russians in hope of their modification.

May 28 *"Country was entering upon another critical cycle"*

Numerous significant events on May 27 charged Romanian political atmosphere to indicate country was entering upon another critical cycle. While American and British notes were delivered to Romanian Foreign Office listing abuses of Government and requesting implementation of its January assurances to Three Allies, the King at elaborate official ceremony in Constantza gave high Romanian decoration to Groza with citation said to be composed by Tatarescu "appreciation achievements of Government presided by Dr. Groza." In Bucharest sentences varying from three years to few months were announced for those arrested May 10, Romanian Independence Day, who had shouted for King. Simultaneously wave of arrests struck city involving National Peasants and National Liberals as well as alien employees of this Mission and Military Mission.

The King's "first great political mistake"

Local observers believe explanation for above events can be found in Government's electoral plans. A palace source stated last evening that King under Soviet pressure agreed at last moment to unprecedented citation with award to Groza in return for promised alleviation in campaign for trials of war criminals and those responsible for country's disaster. Other advisers maintain King in agreeing to citation made first great political mistake since coup d'etat of 1944 permitting himself to be used for Government electoral purposes.

Arrests caused consternation

Arrests caused consternation throughout Bucharest where their number is not yet known. National Peasant leaders Ilie Lazar, Gerota, Ministerial Secretary-General in first Antonescu Cabinet, Dr. Domokos, and Bosca-Malin, who reportedly had written articles during Antonescu regime, were arrested. Generals Aldea and Cassian, the former once unsuccessfully accused by Groza regime of subversive activities, were taken in custody. Several National Liberals, including Secretary-General Bebe Bratianu, are under house arrest and youth leader Valsanescu was taken into custody. President Dinu Bratianu's home and others were searched.

Now held in Malmaison Prison are one Romanian employee each of this Mission and Military Mission, who were arrested at home. Another Military Mission employee escaped imprisonment only by spot American intervention at time of arrest. I have made oral inquiry at Foreign Office and made unsuccessful efforts to locate and question responsibly placed Soviet and Romanian authorities about the arrest of our employees.

May 31 *Appeal made to King for clemency*

Court of Cassation today reaffirmed constitutionality of law setting up People's Tribunal to try war criminals in rejecting appeal made by Marshal Antonescu and 7 of his ministers in custody that were sentenced to death. All now have appealed to King for clemency. King Michael told me this afternoon that Government had decided upon death penalty for four principal defendants and clemency for others. The King asked the Government's recommendation be made in writing and that opinion of ACC be secured by Government. Groza agreed.

Since original sentences of 24 defendants announced May 18, section of Court of Cassation on May 27 decided (1) composition of People's Tribunal in accord with law specifying judges should represent all political parties in Government despite absence from tribunal of National Peasant and National Liberal members and (2) three defendants, Busila, Mares, and General Popescu sentenced 10 years correctional punishment were allowed pleas to later revision of sentences since penalty not provided by Peoples' Tribunal law but only by ordinary law.

May 31 *Re: Romanian censorship reimposed?*

Associated Press correspondent Frank O'Brien stated he has no confirmation of six messages sent Paris Office between May 27-29. He has sent no stories since last date believing Romanian censorship has been reimposed without notice. O'Brien stories covered delivery of American note to Romanian Government and wave of arrests summarized previously.

If true this annuls reporting freedom granted American correspondents in Romania. O'Brien is only remaining American correspondent permitted to operate here. British have none.

In view of complete cutoff of Romanian news from American newspapermen, I have suggested to Washington that they may wish to make certain news material available to OIC for the Voice of America broadcasts and possibly American news agencies.

June 1 *The protest "on the subject of arrests of Missions' employees"*

At noon today I left at the Foreign Office the following note on the subject of arrests of Missions' employees:*

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* Cf. also Schuyler's report to the US War Department, dated Bucharest, May 28. (*FRUS 1946*, VI, pp. 594-595: Telegram 1352. Secret.)

"I am instructed by my Government to protest formally against the interference by an organ of the Romanian Government with the functions of the American Representative of the Allied Control Commission through the arrest of one of its employees, Mr. Alexandru Paul Stanescu, and with those of this Mission through the arrest of its employee, Miss Elvira Olteanu.

The United States Government considers the action of the Romanian Government in arresting summarily personnel attached to United States official Missions as outrageous. It expects the immediate release of Mr. Stanescu and Miss Olteanu.

If the Romanian Government in the future should suspect employees of United States Missions of improper activities, these suspicions should be brought to the attention of the appropriate United States Representative for such remedial action as the facts may warrant."

June 1 *Premier Groza's first "statement concerning seven war criminals sentenced to death"*

This morning Prime Minister Groza visited the King and presented short written statement concerning seven war criminals sentenced to death. He recommended sentences be unchanged for four, namely Marshal Ion Antonescu, Mihai Antonescu, General Constantin Vasiliu, Under-Secretary of the Interior, and Gheorghe Alexeanu, Governor of Transnistria. Clemency was recommended by changing sentences to life imprisonment for three remaining, General Constantin Pantazi, War Minister, Radu Lecca, Commissar for Jewish Affairs, and Eugen Cristescu, Chief of Secret Service. Groza verbally informed King that he had consulted ACC authorities who were in accord with Government's recommendation.

The King followed Government recommendation

The King found phrasing of Government's statement unsatisfactory which brought lengthy discussion joined by Vice-Premier Tatarescu and Justice Minister Patrascanu. After breakup of conference, Patrascanu returned at 1 p.m. with formal statement to King in name of Government proposing "for high state reasons" to reject appeals of four and to commute to life imprisonment other three sentences, basing this on need of "fulfilling the great interest of our country." On basis of this written request and Groza's verbal statement of ACC concurrence, King followed Government recommendation as above reported. At 5 p.m. Marshal Antonescu and his three associates were executed.

June 1 *The King informed Berry of recent political developments:*

At King Michael's request I called at his country place yesterday afternoon. His principal purpose was to inform me of recent political developments, but as all he said I have reported,[1] there is no point in repeating.

"background of recent award to Groza"

Additionally the King gave me full story of background of recent award to Groza with extraordinary accompanying citation. The King said that Tolbukin, Susaikov, and other Soviet officials expressed annoyance at spontaneous demonstration occurring immediately following May 10 parade. Susaikov at time suggested to King that he do something to show his displeasure of this action by "disorderly elements." The subject reoccurred occasionally in conversation during next few days but did not take concrete form until Tatarescu suggested that high decoration be awarded Groza because Soviets so wished. No action was taken until Major Skoda, General Susaikov's aide, telephoned General Niculescu, King's Aide, that on following day Justice Minister Patrascanu would call at Palace for King to approve draft citation to accompany decoration for Groza. Major Skoda added that this was outgrowth of Susaikov's suggestion to King on May 10.

Citation was so wholly unacceptable that King refused to accept and as suggestion for decoration came from Tatarescu, he told the latter he would give decoration but unwilling to sign citation. Tatarescu agreed to secure Russian acceptance, but on following day telephoned Marshal Negel that citation must be made as written as Soviets would accept nothing less to assuage their anger for events of May 10. This attitude was confirmed by telephone conversation from Major Skoda to General Niculescu.

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[1] See *FRUS 1946*, VI, pp. 596-597: Berry to the Secretary of State, Telegram 559, Secret US Urgent.

King still refused but was persuaded on eve of scheduled ceremony, after conference with Tatarescu and Patrascanu. In conference allusions were made to Government's desire to prolong war criminal law and increasing political violence throughout the country of which likely culmination would be arrest of Maniu and Bratianu and elimination of their parties. The King was given to understand that these things would come about unless he stopped them by meeting Soviet desire in signing citation. He was told if he did sign, the war criminal law would not be indefinitely prolonged, political violence would subside, and arrested would be released.

Queen Mother interrupted to say several people had come to Palace to urge King not to sign citation saying his popularity would wane thereby. She said that although King by signing would be accused of weakness by those who did not know, yet she thought he had shown character because he said a monarch, different from a movie star, must not gauge public actions by popularity reaction but must act in interest of his country. In present case loss of some popularity was small price to pay for reduction of political violence and keeping historical parties in field for coming elections.

Although it is true the King has been generally criticized for this action as his first mistake since coup d'etat of 1944, yet in view of this first case of Soviet pressure this year I think that he made wise decision particularly if it later becomes evident that Government keeps its part of bargain.

June 2 *"United States Missions with Romanian reactionaries planning subversive activities"*

Several independent sources including one "friendly" within Communist Party have hinted that recent arrests were made to secure evidence involving United States Missions with Romanian reactionaries planning subversive activities.

Some weeks ago I was informed by usually reliable source that documents were being spirited away from section of Military Mission, photostated, then returned. This was immediately made available to the Military Mission. Today an official in position to know confirmed this information adding his opinion that documentation now in hands of Government would prove American culpability.

Soviet's plan to use this information is of course unknown but in view of alertness of United States Missions and position our government has taken, we definitely form a major obstacle to Soviet progress. Whether Soviets will attempt to remove this obstacle through press and radio attacks such as unsuccessfully tried in Bulgaria or by other means, we cannot foresee, nevertheless, it may be useful to Department to know evidence is being assembled for possible later "revelation."

June 3 *Romanian Foreign Minister's reply to American Note of May 27*

The following note was received this afternoon from the Foreign Minister in signed English and Romanian copies, replying to American Note of May 27 concerning Romanian Government's execution of Moscow Agreement:

"I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your note dated May the 27th and at the same time to forward you the Romanian Government's reply thereto.

From the contents of your note if follows that the anxiety expressed by the United States Government is caused, first, by the non-fixation of the date for the general elections and, secondly, by the manner in which the Moscow Decisions concerning public liberties are being carried out.

(1) The Romanian Government are eager to effect the general elections as speedily as possible. To this end they have, after laborious studies and works, set up the provisional draft of the electoral law, which they have submitted to public discussion, in their desire to win the assent of the entire public opinion to the final wording of that law. After the law's promulgation the Government will proceed without delay to the establishing of the electoral lists and then, after that procedure will have been accomplished, they will consult the electorate.

(2) With regard to the public liberties, guaranteed by the Moscow Decisions, the Romanian Government have taken all measures to ensure their exercise.

At present the opposition parties have at their disposal sixteen newspapers, wherein the free expression of opinions is complete, bordering as it does on license, through their violence of language. On February the 22nd last, the President of the Council of Ministers, wishing to take cognizance personally of the complaints of the press, called a conference of representatives of all newspapers in the country, including opposition newspapers. No complaint whatever was raised at that conference by the representatives of the opposition newspapers in connection with the action of the services of censorship. The directives of the Allied Control Commission aiming to prevent the diffusion of polemics between the Allies have but rarely been applied to certain statements from abroad.

According to regulations in force, broadcasting facilities are and remain available only to persons with official responsibilities in the performance of their governmental or administrative duties, yet not to persons without responsibility.

The political violence which at times manifests itself at public meetings and demonstrations is due, for the most part, to the campaigns of agitation and hatred, that have been launched lately by the opposition parties against the Government and its members, and the responsible authorities are making all efforts to temper it and to maintain public order and tranquillity.

The legal proceedings against the authors of the incidents of November the 8th have been continued only in regard to those who, at the time of the governmental statement, were under inquiry for offenses against common law and were found in a position of obvious and legally ascertained guilt, – as the application of the law cannot be suspended in favor of any citizen.

The ministers representing the National Liberal Party under the leadership of Mr. Dinu Bratianu and the National Peasant Party under the leadership of Mr. Iuliu Maniu have participated and are still participating in all Cabinet meetings, where they mean however to exercise, according to their initial statements, only the function of observers, not that of collaborators.

Thus, the impression abroad, to which your note refers, can only be the consequence of a certain propaganda that aims to misrepresent the acts of the Government and to ignore realities in our country.

The Romanian Government wish to implement the Moscow Decisions in their entirety, yet with constant mindfulness to defend the rule of public order and security, necessary for the fulfilment of the obligations which they have assumed under the Armistice agreement as well as for the realization of the commandments of the State's permanent interests. Very truly yours, (signed) G. Tatarescu, Vice-President of the Council of Ministers, Minister for Foreign Affairs."

June 4* *Commenting on the Romanian reply by subjects:*

The Romanian reply leaves much to be desired. On scrutiny it is nothing more than a weak defensive document filled with sophistries and second-rate falsehoods. Although designed to give appearance of above-board playing, through furnishing answer to points we raised, it really shows, as I have reported to Washington previously, Government's lack of integrity.

Brief comment follows by subjects:

Elections. — No date is still set for elections and no date even set for consideration by Government of electoral law.

Liberties. — Note says opposition parties have 16 newspapers. That depends upon definition of opposition. The fact remains that Maniu's National Peasants have one daily paper published in Bucharest and Bratianu's National Liberals also have one daily. Neither have dailies published in provinces. Maniu's Peasants publish six weeklies irregularly when newsprint is available in the provinces, and Bratianu's Liberals publish two weeklies. Prime Minister's willingness on February 22 to give an ear to complaints, hardly applies to conditions today. He did hold press conference on date mentioned and when those present asked for more equitable distribution of newsprint and freedom to criticize Government on administrative questions, said he would see what he could do. Published reports of this conference excluded this exchange. The excuse that censorship of statements of high American officials was necessary to "prevent diffusion of polemics between the Allies" breaks down under extensive Romanian press coverage given Foreign Minister Molotov's interview to *Pravda* of May 27. Russian official statements are highly publicized while American are suppressed or played down. Most recent example, no Romanian paper has published our note of May 27.

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* Cf. *FRUS 1946*, VI, pp. 598-599; Berry to the Secretary of State. Telegram 570. Secret. Urgent. Repeated Moscow as 93.

Radio. — On this point Groza is simply reneging upon his promise.

Violence. — From information available here and in Department, Government bears chief responsibility for present wave of political violence, despite note's allegation to contrary.

November 8 arrests. — As all November 8 arrests were made on political basis, Groza is now abandoning promise made to Allied Commission.

Cabinet collaboration. — Here Government is on strongest grounds, as the Ministers on joining Cabinet did say the implementation of Moscow Agreement was chief task of Government and that they could not be responsible for Government's administrative acts. Since then they have shown a desire to collaborate but have not been met halfway. As reported, they were not consulted on budget law, indeed seldom are important matters discussed at rare Cabinet meetings. I understand Liberal Representative is currently protesting non-discussion of British and American notes by Cabinet.

Distorted foreign impression of Romania. — This is a well-worn statement originally produced in Moscow but now manufacatured under license by Soviet satellite governments. Statement that public security comes before Moscow Agreement is attempt to justify Government's course.

I understand that my British colleague has recommended to his Government that it declare Romanian note unsatisfactory. It certainly is that. I suppose the Department will wish to consult with British Government in order to coordinate action here. I have suggested that we do reply to note, saying it is not satisfactory and United States is reserving its attitude.

June 5*

Bodnăraş' indignation at the Mission's note requesting release of Elvira Olteanu

Yesterday afternoon officer of Mission conferred for third time with Bodnaras, Secretary General of the Presidency and key Communist Government member on release of Mission's accountant, Elvira Olteanu, arrested May 27.

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* Cf. *FRUS 1946*, VI, pp. 599-601; Berry to the Secretary of State. Telegram 571. Secret. Priority. Repeated Moscow as 93.

Prefacing remarks with statement he was speaking in private capacity Bodnaras referred to our note requesting immediate release of Olteanu. He expressed shock at language of our note, which he considered without precedent in overstepping bounds of diplomatic procedure. In terse emphatic manner, Bodnaras stated no matter how small, Romania was sovereign state, that it reserved to itself right to do as it pleased with Romanian subjects; and that if it saw fit to arrest Romanian employee of United States Mission, under no circumstances would it feel obliged to explain its actions or set free person under arrest such as Olteanu simply because it received demand to do so from foreign state. He claimed our note made it impossible for him to settle matter on informal, friendly basis, that Romanian Government could not be bullied under pressure of foreign state into releasing from arrest Romanian subjects.

Bodnaras said he had not yet discused with colleagues text of Government's reply to our note, and added, "but no matter what their opinions may be, I for one will categorically oppose satisfactory reply, even if Olteanu were innocent which she is not." Regarding charges Bodnaras alleged simply evidence existed that Olteanu had contact with uncle, Gavril Olteanu, fugitive from justice who, according to yesterday's papers, has been apprehended, and faces trial together with others before Court as leader of purported conspirative, terroristic organization. Parenthetically, Mission has no reason to believe Olteanu connected with uncle's alleged activities.

As in previous interviews, Bodnaras again expressed indignation at manner in which American officers "had forced their way into the Presidency," and unheard-of way they prevented qualified State authorities from carrying out arrest of Romanian citizen against whom they held arrest warrant, that this warrant would stand until individual delivered by American military authorities to Romanian authorities. He then said even if Olteanu were guilty, it was not so serious but in interest of good relations between our two governments, Romanian Government could have closed eye and permitted Olteanu to return to her position, but in view our note this was out of question unless our note should be withdrawn and matter approached on different basis whereby both sides extend informal apologies and make reciprocal concessions. By this, it is understood Bodnaras was suggesting release of Romanian employee now held by General Schuyler to Romanian authorities against release of Olteanu.

Although I shall continue press for release Romanian employees our Missions it is obvious for present they will not be released.

I believe Bodnaras could not have furnished our government with more eloquent description of what we must expect in dealing with Groza Government, which was so aptly described recently to an officer of this Mission by more "friendly" Communist member of Government when he said, "This is not a government, but simply a gangster police force."

June 6 *Leading members of the "Society of Friends of United States" arrested and threatened*

Information has been received by press office from Transylvanian cultural "Society of Friends of United States" that one vice-president was arrested, another avoided arrest, while a third vice-president was attacked by armed men on return to Cluj from Alba Iulia, where he had attended opening of new branch of Society. Leading members of Alba Iulia branch are now threatened with arrest. Because of tension secretaries of societies at Cluj and Brasov have cancelled scheduled American film programs.

June 6 *"American and British notes and Romanian replies would be published"*

Upon instructions from his Government British Minister called at Foreign Office this morning and asked that British Note of May 27 be published in Romania immediately. Tatarescu agreed, calling me immediately by phone and asking if I had any objection to publication of American note. I told him I objected only to censorship that had prevented publication. He said both American and British notes and Romanian replies would be published tomorrow.

June 6 *The Romanian Foreign Ministry's reply concerning Elvira Olteanu and A. Stănescu*

There follows below the text of the Foreign Ministry's reply dated June 6 to my note of June 1 concerning arrest of Miss Olteanu of this Mission and Mr. Stanescu of General Schuyler's mission.

Text of note follows along lines Mission led to expect by the remarks of Secretary General of the Presidency Bodnaras on June 5.

The concluding paragraph was particularly noted, which I interpret to mean we may expect further arrests of our alien employees. This will deal such a heavy blow to their morale that for practical purposes our Romanian employees will be little more than observers within the Mission for the Romanian and Russian secret political police.

*Foreign Minister's Note:**

"Sir, I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your note dated June 1 and to request you to take cognizance of the Romanian Government's reply.

From statements and information received from the authorities of the General Security Police of the State it follows that Monsieur Alexandru P. Stanescu has not been arrested, but Mademoiselle Elvira Olteanu was taken in custody on May 27th.

The account of the General Security Police specified that 'the arrest has been necessary as the above-named is a member of a subversive organization directed against the security of the state.'

The Romanian Government deeply regret that the United States Government have ascribed an offending intention to an act performed by responsible agents within the bounds of the Romanian laws. The quality of clerk in the service of a foreign mission carries no privilege and so much the less any other immunity. That quality does not protect against sanctions provided by the laws of the country any citizen who commits an offense.

With regard to the request for the release of Mademoiselle Olteanu the Romanian Government regret to be unable to take this demand into consideration in principle.

Romania is a free and sovereign state and cannot permit the immixtion on the part of other states, even though they are friendly, in the internal order of the country and in the application of the national laws. Her position as a country under an Armistice only commits her to certain obligations ensuing from the Armistice agreement. Towards the fulfillment of such obligations the Government can receive orders and instructions from the Allied Control Commission only.

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* Cf. *FRUS 1946*, VI, pp. 601-602; Berry to the Secretary of State, Telegram 578, Secret, June 6, 1946.

The Romanian Government avail themselves of this opportunity to point out an occurrence the gravity of which will no doubt be taken into consideration by the United States Representative in Romania.

The Ministry of the Interior by its letter No. 1425 of June 3, 1946, has advised them that the 'security agents of the Ministry of the Interior and the Military Police while pursuing the acused Romanian citizen Teodor Manicatide, of Bucharest, Number 27 Strada C.A. Rosetti, have been unable to arrest the above-named because he was taken under the protection of the American Military Mission and given shelter at that Mission's residence.

The proces-verbal drawn up by Monsieur Gr. Burdea, public prosecutor at the district Tribunal of Ilfov, of which I enclose a copy, gives ample information as to the circumstances under which it has been impossible to perform this arrest.

From the content of the proces-verbal it follows that the Romanian authorities have been stopped through the intervention of members of the United States Army from accomplishing their legal duty in a serious matter regarding the safety of the State.

The Romanian Government trust that this regretable act has happened without the knowledge of the superior authorities of the United States Military Mission. It has been brought to the attention of the Allied Control Commission for investigation and settlement.

At the same time the Romanian Government beg to inform you that they will supply you in due course with further information and with the results of the investigations that are being made with regard to the Romanian clerks in the service of the United States Mission in order to strengthen thus the feelings of trust and friendship on which they wish mutual relations between our countries to rest.

I have the honor, Sir, to request you to accept the expression of my highest consideration."

June 7 *Premier Groza's message referring to D. Bagdasar's replacement*

Late this evening Prime Minister Groza sent his trusted aide with personal message for me. The messenger stated "Bagdasar is seriously ill and cannot go to his post in the United States. Groza therefore wishes to suggest name of replacement. He desires to send Mihail Ralea. The Prime Minister, for local political reasons, does not wish to withdraw name of Bagdasar and put forth name of Ralea until he has informal assurance that Ralea will be acceptable to United States."

Berry's thoughts and doubts

After the messenger had his say I replied I would forward message immediately, but the Prime Minister must be prepared for an unfavorable reply in view of the atmosphere created by the unsatisfactory Romanian reply to American Note of May 27, and the increditable nature of Romanian reply to Note of June 1. There followed a very unpleasant half hour for my guest while I gave him benefit of my thoughts. Referring to latter note I said I didn't see surer way to create bad press abroad for Romanian Government than to arrest summarily employees of American Missions and hold innocent persons for spiteful reasons. Messenger said he quite understood my point of view, but Prime Minister had been offended by action of our military people and that there were powerful but irresponsible elements in Government which insisted upon uniting the two affairs and holding Miss Olteanu. He said that he would see Prime Minister and would do his best to work for satisfactory solution.

I believe there would be good chances of seeing this matter settled to our entire advantage if it were not for what I believe to be fact, that it is part of Soviet pressure campaign upon Americans applied upon instructions from Moscow in Bulgaria and Yugoslavia as well as Romania.

Ralea is officially member of Groza's Plowmen's Front Party. I am informed that since some time he has been enrolled as member of Communist Party. Formerly he was known as one of King Carol's men. He was proposed as ambassador to Paris. The French Minister tells me that Ralea was not acceptable to French Government last autumn. Groza's messenger said Ralea could not go to Paris as Vyshinski asked him to remain in Bucharest as his help was necessary in pre-election period. The King will nominate Ralea, if we approve the choice, although with reluctance, as he doesn't trust him. I recommended that I be authorized to inform Prime Minister verbally and at once that Ralea is not acceptable.

June 8 *On Romanian forthcoming elections, and Tito's reaction*

Secretary General of Prime Minister's office, Emil Bodnaras, who is most influential Communist in Government, recently told responsible source that it was vital for Romania's territorial integrity that Government ticket win forthcoming elections. He said Tito had informed Government that Yugoslavia had no territorial demands while present Romanian regime existed, but change through elections would jeopardize his communication lines with Soviet Union and Yugoslavia perforce would present Banat claims. Similar reaction allegedly was secured from Bulgarian Government. Bodnaras added with determination that he would see coalition ticket won elections.

June 8 *With regard to the "conflict between Romanian and Hungarian nationalists" at Cluj*

Most embarrassing political incident for Groza Government has developed at Cluj in conflict between Romanian and Hungarian nationalists having origin in events over past month. Announcement CFM* decision confirming Trianon Treaty frontiers of Transylvania and Romanian Independence Day May 10 were turned into great Romanian celebrations in Cluj that obliged Hungarians to remain scarce. Soviet ACC authorities in Cluj were hailed by Romanian populace especially university student body which demonstrated in their favor and were granted friendly speeches in return.

On night of May 28 ostensibly Communist Hungarian factory workers in Cluj delivered sudden reprisal blow for above demonstrations of Romanian national sentiment by attacking students' hostel in estimated force of 1,500 men. Students took refuge in upper floors of hostel and premises were sacked to extent of several hundred million lei damage. Predominantly Hungarian Cluj police did nothing and students called upon local Soviet authorities who, recalling student demonstration in their favor, intervened to restore order. Faculty and students unanimously signed motion demanding redress for the aggression, while all professors in signed statement declared intention to resign unless satisfaction secured. Combined faculty and student delegation headed by Romanian Communist rector of University* presented petition to Prime Minister.

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* Council of Foreign Ministers.

Ordinarily Government in course of arrests following incident would have favored its Hungarian supporters over students who are opposition National Peasant sympathizers. Yet Interior Minister who is now in Cluj to ease unprecented tension there has instructions to make equal arrests of Hungarian workers and Romanian students to avoid offending Russians on two counts: (1) their original assistance to students and (2) possible Soviet charges of chauvinism if more Hungarians penalized.

June 9

I expect to be in position to deliver text of note, as transmitted to me from Washington, on Thursday at noon. My British colleague is in agreement.

June 9 *M. Ralea as D. Bagdasar's replacement*

Foreign Minister Tatarescu late yesterday in a letter addressed to me stated Bagdasar is unable to go to his post and proposed name of Ralea as his replacement.

June 9 *Elvira Olteanu "arrested as member of Avram Iancu terrorist group"*

After my interview of yesterday with Groza's aide I received telephone message that Prime Minister would have two arrested persons released at beginning of week. In quite opposite sense a communique was published by Bucharest papers this morning from Ministry of Interior stating Olteanu "of American representation" was arrested as member of Avram Iancu terrorist group. Manicatide "of American representation" although similarly charged is still being sought. There is no mention of Stanescu.

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* Emil Petrovici (1899-1968). Rector 1945-1951.

June 10 *Reuben Markham*

I have suggested follow up note to Soviet Government regarding Markham. After two weeks of inactivity Markham is becoming restive. Should he leave we must expect long delay in getting him back, and without him Romanian news blackout for American public is more complete. This is most undesirable in pre-election period.

June 13 *Elvira Olteanu and A. Stănescu still arrested*

An emissary of Premier Groza today stated Secretary General Bodnaras had informed the Prime Minister that he was seeking to implicate American Missions as having supplied funds to General Aldea, arrested as alleged leader of terrorists. Groza gave impression that Bodnaras activities are result of Soviet instructions. The arrested American Political and Military Mission personnel, Olteanu and Stanescu, have not been released but Groza has given orders that they be well treated and says he expects to give more details by first of next week.

June 13 *In order "to inform conectly Romanian public opinion"*

I have suggested that the Department may wish to issue general statement regarding arrests and molestation of Romanian employees of American Political and Military Missions, or to permit Voice of America to broadcast American Government's position in order to inform correctly Romanian public opinion which is completely ignorant of American version of incident.

June 14 *Provocative demonstration at Craiova*

After checking several sources it appears on June 9 at Craiova, during Plowmen's Front Congress attended by Premier Groza, some high school and other students, about 50 in number, demonstrated before meeting place. Crowd gathered, shots were fired, and Soviet lieutenant was killed by stray bullet. Most of demonstrators were arrested but no arms were found upon them.

National Peasant circles state students shouted "Long live the King" near Plowmen's Front meeting and that shots fired at students from nearby Communist headquarters killed Soviet officer and wounded several persons. They deny any formal tie-up between demonstration and local party organization.

Government statement issued June 13 asserts National Peasant youth began provocative demonstration, that they began to use firearms, and that they shouted "antidemocratic slogans." The report simply says stray bullet killed Soviet officer but that investigation makes Craiova National Peasant organization responsible for disorders.

June 14 *More on Craiova incident*

Censor today forbade publication National Peasant communique outlining party version of Craiova incident. Statement additionally said only persons allowed arms were NDF cohorts, that Craiova Peasant leaders were not in town at time, and the Communist organization responsible for death of Soviet lieutenant. Party demanded investigation commission to include its delegates. Peasant members report second death, namely student who died yesterday of bullet wound received.

Government press ignores incident except *Scanteia* which reports two students condemned to three years and another to a month's imprisonment for participation in affair on basis old Antonescu penal code, for making demonstration against high state officials. Local sources point to sentences and above censored communique as proof of weak Government position and believe incident now closed.

June 14 *British and American reaction*

Note to Romanian Government delivered at noon today.

My British colleague said this morning he will circulate copies of his note tomorrow. Concerting my action with his, I plan to circulate copies of ours with copies of *Radio Bulletin* tomorrow morning. On delivering note

I told Stoica of my plan and he raised no objection (Tatarescu was out of the city).

As editors of all newspapers receive our *Radio Bulletin*, it will be interesting to see if they are permitted to publish notes immediately as Tatarescu recently promised British Minister.

June 15* *Re: attacks directed against America and its Missions*

There are no facts at my disposal to contradict Barnes' analysis and many to confirm it.

In the political field Soviet or Soviet-backed Romanian activities in last few weeks have been intensified in atmosphere already over-charged with bitterness and violence.

Spearhead of this attack has been directed against America and its Missions in Romania. It has sought, first, to reduce our powers of observation by every means, notably ordering summarily Markham to leave Romania, refusing clearance for Americans desiring to visit Romania, delaying clearances for airplanes and obliging them to use corridors. It has sought, secondly, to reduce means of making our presence felt by stepping up general campaign of violence, hoping to intimidate our friends, threatening officials of Society of Friends of US, arresting member of my staff, member of General Schuyler's and kidnapping second member of his staff, and censoring increasingly newspapers of opposition which would like to carry full statements of Secretary Byrnes and other American statesmen.

In military field

Campaign has sought to paralyze growing conviction that Romania's survival depends on strength of its ties with Western democracies. Soviets and their Romanian Quislings are frantically seeking to blast Romania free of such ties. A recent broadside of three anti-American articles in single issue of Red Army newspaper opened latest phase of this campaign.

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* Cf. *FRUS 1946*, VI, pp. 604-605: Berry to the Secretary of State. Telegram 605. Secret. Repeated to Sofia as 17, Paris as 70, Belgrad as 17, and Moscow as 98.

In military field, there is evidence of increasing Soviet activity, particularly in air section, which is not of defensive character. Many new planes are arriving daily. The influx reached its peak first week of June. Now an estimated 6,500 to 7,000 Soviet military airplanes are in Romania. Fifty percent are fighters, thirty percent assault, and twenty percent light bombers. Romanian aerodromes now occupied or being prepared for Soviet occupancy number 141. In Transylvania are 71. Buildings of all sorts and shops near airports have been requisitioned in large numbers. Fuel dumps maintained at capacity level. In Lugoj area, departure point for Yugoslavia, there are now 400 to 600 Soviet aircraft. At Arad there are 400.

General Schuyler has reported recent Soviet troop and material movements south and west. Although number of Soviet troops in Romania is less than six months ago, there has been gradual shifting of troops throughout country toward concentration in southwestern area. Romanian Army is being coordinated with Red Army through better liaison and supervision.

Such facts are impressive and, in present atmosphere give cause for serious concern, although it must be admitted that same facts would be viewed otherwise if there were more evidence of Soviet intention to cooperate with Western democracies in international matters, rather than to act unilaterally in support of position of Communist Parties in foreign countries.

In accordance with Barnes' conclusion

In sum, therefore, I must agree with Barnes' conclusion, that stage is set for another Soviet unilateral action in southeastern Europe. Whether such action which will tighten Soviet control of this area take place now, I believe will depend upon Paris rather than Balkan developments.

June 17 *"Incident cannot be considered closed"*

I am grateful for information and authority but do not plan to use for time being for variety of reasons.

(1) General Schuyler has not yet received complete refusal of Susaikov's assistance to normalize situation. Moreover both Groza and Tatarescu

have indicated that Bodnaras has overstepped and they are doing what they can to arrange satisfactory settlement. Therefore our position will be stronger if next move comes from them.

(2) I understand in Bulgaria within 48 hours after assurances were given that no further summary arrests of Mission employees would take place two additional arrests were made. In Bulgaria as here such assurances are worthless, as organ performing arrests is not responsible governmental agency, but instrument of Communist Party. Therefore at this stage it is unwise to give Bodnaras satisfaction by withdrawing note in return for his assurances.

(3) Incident cannot be considered closed upon giving of assurances, release of arrested person, and withdrawal of note, as such does not provide for return of Schuyler's "kidnapped" employee Stanescu whom Romanian Government says is not arrested.

June 18 *More on the United States and British Notes to Romanian Government*

Although texts of American and British notes to Romanian Government declaring unsatisfactory latter's reply concerning execution of assurances under Moscow Agreement were released to press Saturday morning, June 15, censorship still forbids publication. Saturday evening censor sent following written order to press:

"The publication of the texts of the American and English notes is forbidden. It is forbidden even to send to the censor the texts of the notes.

If one or another of the newspapers will dare to publish the notes all the same, it will be immediately permanently suppressed."

June 18 *New note received from the Romanian Foreign Minister*

Following is translation of note received at 1 p.m. today from the Romanian Foreign Minister to be published tomorrow:

"Sir, I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your note of June the 14 whereby you are notifying me, upon instructions received, the reply of the United States Government to the Romanian Government's Note of June the 3.

The Romanian Government regret that the account and statements contained in that note have failed to satisfy the United States Government.

They regret even more the appreciation made of the explanations and statements that have been presented. Since these explanations and statements are based exclusively upon facts which have been scrupulously ascertained and verified, the Romanian Government find themselves obliged not to retain the appreciation formulated in your note.

On the other hand, the Romanian Government, in receiving this new note of the United States Government, cannot refrain from observing that the Moscow Decisions have been the result of discussions and of decisions arrived at jointly by the governments of the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics, the United States, and Great Britain. Therefore, the Romanian Government must assume that any observatory act destined to control and to direct the implementation of the Moscow Decisions cannot be the work of the signatory governments individually but the collective work of these governments.

The Romanian Government, however, have not received from the Government of the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics any objection or any observation regarding the implementation of the Moscow Decisions and they cannot, therefore, disregard this situation.

In formulating this observation, the Romanian Government are prompted only by the determination to implement within the scope of a unitary conception and action all obligations they have assumed towards the three governments that are parties to the Moscow Decisions. The general elections which will be held as soon as possible and not later than September, as the President of the Council has specified in his repeated statements to the internal and foreign press, will provide the most important implementation of these obligations, the total fulfillment of which remains the constant purpose of their internal policy."

June 19 *"Sound reasons" for delaying agreement of M. Ralea as Romanian Minister in Washington*

With Romanian Government clearly violating Moscow Agreement, shrugging off American protests, engaging upon anti-American campaign, and arresting mission employees – all separately reported – it is believed the "sound reasons" exist within meaning the Secretary's instruction, for delaying agreement of Mihail Ralea as Romanian Minister in Washington* until political situation clarifies. To accept Ralea today would have most damaging effect within Romania by giving impression of American diplomatic retreat in face of Romanian Government's full scale attack.

June 19 *Comment on the Romanian Government Note*

In clear language Romanian Government by its note tells us that we and British cannot influence trend of events in Romania unless joined by Soviet Government. This note places Romanian problem back where it was prior to Moscow Conference. It ties up Romanian settlement with general settlement among Big Three and means that if no general settlement is forthcoming US Government cannot expect to implement effectively commitments it made at Yalta, Potsdam, and Moscow.

June 20

Foreign Office official telephoned late last evening stating publication of notes deferred indefinitely by order of Presidence of the Council of Ministers. As this morning's *Radio Bulletin* carried text of note with comment, I telephoned Secretary General of Foreign Office before permitting circulation to inform him and explain Romanian revised decision for deferring publication came too late to inform Department before publication in America. Secretary thanked me, commenting personally publication didn't matter.

June 23 *Strongest opposition to the new electoral laws proposed by the Groza Government*

National Peasants, National Liberals, and Socialists led by Titel Petrescu, in written memoranda submitted this Mission and in popular announcements have expressed strongest opposition to Justice Minister Patrascanu's two proposed electoral laws. Three parties state that in present form provisions are unconstitutional and make impossible holding unfettered elections within meaning Moscow Agreement. They also believe as expressed by Peasant leader Maniu "Three Allied governments are by right to be acquainted with these draft laws and to advise as to their conformity with Agreement" and refer to recent American and British notes as supporting thesis.

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* See *Memorandum* by the Acting Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, to President Truman, dated June 21, concerning the "request for agreement to appointment of Mihail Ralea as Romanian Minister to the United States" (*FRUS 1946*, VI, pp. 610-611). The President's positive marginal notation on the original read as follows: "Approved Harry Truman" (*Ibid*. footnote 99).

Political opposition base objections on deviations from democratically approved 1923 Constitution which it maintains automatically was restored by act overthrowing Antonescu dictatorship that likewise rendered invalid 1938 Constitution imposed by former King Carol. Chief censure is against planned abolition of Senate, granting Ministers right of initiating laws and cutting of Royal prerogatives by giving single chamber right to dissolve or convoke itself. Also Opposition cites copious examples as showing Government intent to control voting completely through change of proportional representation from national to district basis, all-powerful district electoral boards, excluding as voters and candidates all "pro-Fascists," bringing Army into politics, inadequate registration and policing.

Justice Minister Pătrășcanu's Reply to the opposition party leaders

Justice Minister has made serious issue by replying to opposition that no constitution, let alone that of 1923, followed Antonescu overthrow. He alleges Royal Decree signed August 21, 1944, gazetted two days later and approved by the three opposition party leaders, created "new constitutional instrument" and gave full authority to disregard constitutional factors in organizing legislative power. Relevant decree articles follow:

"(1) The rights of the Romanians are those recognized by the Constitution of 1866 with the amendments subsequently made by the Constitution of March 29, 1923.

(2) With the exceptions specified under Article 3 and 4 of the present Decree, the powers of the State shall be exercised in accordance with the rules contained in the Constitution of March, 29, 1923.

(3) A decree passed in accordance with a Cabinet decision (Order in Council) shall organize the National Representation. Until the National

Representation will be organized the legislative power will be exercised by the King in accordance with the suggestions of the Cabinet Council."

Opposition circles assail Pătrăşcanu's argument

Opposition circles in rebuttal affirm decree placed 1923 Constitution in operation and did not confer electoral law authority to disregard it. They assail Patrascanu's argument as legal justification for dictatorship by present regime.

Full Cabinet met June 21, examined electoral bills, and reportedly will continue discussions through ministerial committee representing all parties in Government in preparing final draft decrees.

June 25 *"Events spoke louder than words"*

General Schuyler has no original or photostatic copies of documents mentioned by the Department. He does have copies secured from responsible opposition sources, who were obliged to make them clandestinely from originals in official files. I am sending translations of copies at the request of General Schuyler, whose Mission will endeavor to meet Department's request. Meanwhile Schuyler does not feel sources would be compromised by use of documents in manner indicated.

If the Department desires originals and photostats of Government documents showing concerted campaign against opposition parties latter with some difficulty can secure interesting specimens. Up to now their leaders have felt that events spoke louder than words. Unless original Romanian Government documents, secured clandestinely and thus open to denunciation as forgeries, were used with every possibility of success in having Government mend its ways, I believe they would prove more harmful than helpful to opposition and our already strained relations with Government.

June 26 *Bilateral agreement "on war graves' registration"*

On June 19, I handed the Foreign Minister a note attached to which was text provisions of bilateral agreement which our government desired to conclude with Romanian Government on war graves' registration, etc. I said that we wished to conclude such agreement without delay by exchange of notes and requested comment of Foreign Minister. He replied that he would accept textually agreement we suggested and would so inform me in writing within a few days.

Today I received a note from the Foreign Office which stated that the Romanian Government accepted our proposal. The note incorporated text of suggested agreement attached to my note. Romanian Government considers agreement concluded and will take immediate steps for its application by their authorities in agreement with delegates designated by us. Copies of my note and original Romanian note go forward by pouch tomorrow. Unless the Department designates ortherwise, I shall ask war graves registration commission now in Romania to continue to act as US delegates for execution of agreement.

June 27 *Finaly "Markham has left Romania"*

Soviet reply of June 19 refusing to rescind expulsion order against Markham repeated certain charges already refuted by Markham. Despite Markham's record as journalist of integrity Soviet reply was not unexpected here as his expulsion formed vital element in anti-American campaign of Romanian Government preparatory to rigging national elections.

First paragraph Soviet note clearly voids Potsdam Agreement by obliging every American news correspondent coming to Romania to be "loyal" to Groza regime or not report. I do not believe Markham's presence as observer at recognized meetings of all political elements in Government, some of which are called "opposition groups" by note, can be considered as interfering in Romanian internal affairs. On other hand *Graiul Nou*, Red Army paper in Romania, daily offers blatant example of interference.

Prior to his departure Markham solemnly affirmed that he had never made public speech of any kind while in Romania. Barlad meeting of June 6 is obvious mistatement since Markham was immobilized at time and locally it is considered reference to Barlad National Peasant Congress of April 7 when many were injured in conflict with Plowmen's Front members. Military Mission Representative on spot confirm Markham did not attend this meeting as he was unable to supply him with transport. Rosiori de

Vede incident was accurately reported by Markham as given previously, and confirmed by American ACC officer and trusted Romanian employee who intensively questioned local Government officials and all political elements in town.

Markham has now left Romania, Soviet and Romanian governments have achieved their objective, principle, and application of uncensored American news reports from Russian controlled areas has received great setback and entire affair has been another heavy blow against American prestige in Romania by reducing our effectiveness in bringing about free and unfettered elections.

June 28

Secretary General of Foreign Office informs me that Argentina and Persia have requested resumption of diplomatic relations with Romania. Romania has agreed.

June 29 *Titel Petrescu's party status*

Titel Petrescu informed me that legal status of his [new Independent] party is confirmed and asked in name of Central Committee that it be mentioned along with Peasant and Liberal parties in any future notes of protest we send Romanian Government regarding failure to grant freedoms undertaken under Moscow Agreement.

June 30 *Private conversation with Premier Groza and with Tătărescu*

At Groza's request I had a three-hour private conversation with him June 27. Among other things he asked me to show little more patience on question of arrest of our employees, promised there would be no further arrests in this manner, and said we could expect satisfactory conclusion of affair.

Tatarescu in the course of a long conversation at his house said substantially the same thing.

July 1 *More on unfettered elections*

In my talk June 27 with the Prime Minister I stressed importance we give to holding of free and unfettered elections and urged fuller cooperation with historic parties in the pre-election period. Prime Minister said that he realized importance of truly national government and is working toward that end.

July 2

My British colleague tells me he is planning no action and publicity on PL withdrawal inasmuch as in Romania our PL [Postal law] was never recognized.

July 4* *King Mihai's firm stand*

Yesterday King Mihai formally notified representatives of all political parties that as constitutional Monarch he could not sign two draft Government electoral laws since first decree had unconstitutional provision for abolition of Senate. To settle impasse he urged all parties to come to common agreement. This action followed unsuccessful pleas of Communist Justice Minister that King accept decrees and after meetings of Interministerial Committee in which representatives of all Government political parties could not agree upon revisions of decree texts. National Peasants and National Liberals during these meetings succeeded in removing every constitutionally objectionable article in national representation decree except Senate abolition. They secured certain modifications in second decree for elections to Chamber of Deputies but consider law undemocratic and designed to secure NDF majority.

While King is mainly concerned with constitutional violations and realistically seeks local settlement, opposition to Government-sponsored bills including National Peasants, National Liberals, and Petrescu Socialists, object to both decrees and request that they be submitted under Moscow Agreement to Three Allies who guaranteed unfettered elections.

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* See *FRUS 1946*, VI, pp. 611-612: Berry to the Secretary of State, Telegram 641, Secret, Urgent.

In interviews with Maniu and Bratianu

In interviews yesterday both Maniu and Bratianu, Peasant and Liberal leaders, expressed fervent hope that American Government would support King in his position and additionally would express opinion upon electoral decrees by right of Moscow Agreement. They base this request upon their conversations with Ambassador Harriman prior to reorganization of the Groza Government promising Three Governments "would see that the various steps to the implementation of the Agreement were fulfilled." Maniu went so far as to tell me in strictest confidence if King signed law as drafted, his party would refuse to enter candidates in coming election. He asked that I use my influence with King to stand firm on his decision.

The King's Secretary yesterday likewise told me in confidence that King was taking this firm stand hoping to force political parties to find compromise that would be acceptable by all. Failing to succeed in this the King would, after a few days, sign the laws as drafted. Secretary in name of King asked me to use my influence with Mr. Maniu to be reasonable.

I am taking precautions not to meet King this week-end in order that Department may have time to send me instructions. If no instructions are received and King informally inquires my opinion I propose to tell him that it would be mistake in my opinion to refer matter for decision to Three Great Powers of Yalta Convention. In effecting local solution he should do his utmost short of breaking with Government to act in accordance with the principles of constitution. If Government refuses the yield he should accept laws with objectionable features in order to be able to fight again when his position is stronger.

July 12* *In order to obtain maximum concessions*

In conversations with political leaders and the King's close advisers throughout week I have maintained it was vital that all local democratic forces coordinate their strength in order to obtain from Government maximum concessions in its draft electoral laws. Stressing that this was my personal point of view, in order to leave door open for change of front

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**FRUS 1946*. VI, pp. 614-616: Berry to the Secretary of State. Telegram 705. Secret US Urgent. Repeated to Moscow as 106 and London as 97.

if Department desires, I said I felt maximum progress could be registered at this time by Romanian politicians themselves. I did not deny Maniu's charge that we had our responsibilities under Moscow Decisions, but I said our effectiveness today in implementing Decisions could go little beyond notes of protest, whereas he, having member of his party in Government, could bring about changes in draft legislation. Although not convinced, historic party leaders, and particularly Liberals, followed this lead and in course of week made considerable progress in removing objectionable features of Government draft electoral laws.

Last evening Cabinet in nine-minute session approved the fifth draft of two electoral laws over strong objections of National Peasant and National Liberal representatives. Opposition ministers declared national representation law unconstitutional by virtue of suppressing Senate and that second or election law proper was drafted to facilitate all possible electoral frauds, citing as examples provisions for voting in factories, business enterprises, and government offices, limited time given to control electoral lists, and permitting Government to name its functionaries as heads of all local electoral boards. They then left session and cameramen proceeded with filming of Cabinet approving two decrees.

Cabinet communique announced electoral bills had been discussed in several cabinet sessions, with an interministerial commission, and had been frequently amended. The final texts were now approved and Justice Minister Patrascanu authorized to submit them to King for signature. Patrascanu in press statement referred to free discussion of proposed bills, to adoption of many amendments suggested by Historic Party leaders adding whether they agreed or not, decrees had been "drafted with direct participation of both Mr. Romniceanu and Mr. Haticganu." On constitutional question he retracted his previous statement and declared 1923 Constitution in force except as modified by Article 3 of Constitutional Decree of September 2, 1944 which he maintained authorized Government to abolish Senate and organize Chamber of Deputies as "representative assembly of people's will."

The King's position

After Cabinet session, General Susaikov sent his aide to Marshal Negel to say General hoped King would sign laws "today or tomorrow at the latest." Before signing the King will, I understand, seek to clarify Government's recognition of 1923 Constitution, aside from clauses concerning Senate.

King Michael realizes electoral law offers opportunity for Government to pack ballot boxes and return an assembly of its own choice. He realizes the dangers to crown and country of Communist assembly. He knows the country is overwhelmingly anti-Communist. However, he feels he cannot refuse his signature on the ground that abuses will be committed under the law. He realizes the Government, if acting under most perfectly framed electoral law, could still resort to same corrupt practices for purpose of returning itself. Clearly, if there is no good intention on part of Groza Government to hold free and unfettered elections, no law however carefully phrased will prevent Government from carrying out its plans. Its immediate plan is to win elections regardless of its promises and commitments under Moscow Decision. In this I believe it has concurrence of Soviet authorities. In recent private conversation, Communist Cabinet member told the King that in free election Government could not obtain 20 percent of votes, whereas Government expected to have 80 percent of votes of elected assembly.

Berry's opinion

Faced with this situation, what should our attitude be? In my opinion on receiving protests from Maniu, Bratianu, and Petrescu, we should call Government's attention to inadequacies of present law and recall its commitment to hold free and unfettered elections. We must reconcile ourselves to fact that such will be little more than paper protest in view of fact that truly effective ways of forcing Government to hold free elections, that is neutralization of key ministries and presence of foreign observers, were eliminated before the Ambassadorial Commission reached Bucharest last January.

July 13* *The King's interviews... Then he signed*

This afternoon Maniu asked to see King Mihai.

Maniu said King should provoke constitutional crisis and break with Government. He should make international scandal of situation thereby

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FRUS 1946, VI, p. 616: Berry to Secretary of State. Telegram 707. Secret.

forcing America and England to take action even if it meant open Russian occupation of Romania. Maniu said this was only way to prevent fraudulent election with Communist legislature determining future destiny of country along Communist lines. The King replied that if he followed Maniu's advice it would mean the ending of chapter today, whereas if he fought rearguard action there was always hope of story someday having happy ending.

Then Bratianu was received. He confirmed Maniu's stand. Next came Groza, then Tatarescu, and finally Patrascanu. The King asked Patrascanu for further concessions and received some. When he insisted on others, Patrascanu said, "If the Government gives more it will be giving the elections to the Historical Parties – that it can never do. We have given all we can." The King then signed two decree laws.

July 13 *Elvira Olteanu couldn't be released until...*

Inasmuch as it is now clear we can expect no help through Susaikov, I used authority of Department received June 13 in course of hour's talk with Groza July 10. Groza said he personally wanted very much to see situation clarified and general atmosphere improved. He promised to communicate my suggestions to other interested ministries and would let me know their advice in a day or two.

Groza sent me message today that Ministers of Justice and Interior considered charges against Olteanu "very grave" and that she couldn't be released before dossier was completed. He hoped to send me further word in four or five days.

From my sources within the Ministry of Interior, I understand that there is nothing of any importance against Olteanu, but Ministry does not wish to release her until Government has made decision as to what line to take in publicizing this latest "reactionary plot." Source says it may be used in one of three ways, against King and Army, United States, or Romanian political opposition.

July 17*

"It is essential that the Historic Parties put up their candidates"

Should Maniu return to his threat not to put up candidates because an undemocratic electoral law would make it impossible to elect such, I propose telling him that I think such action would be disastrous for his party. Although it is true many persons will abstain from voting through fear of violence and it is probable that many votes will be improperly counted, yet I think it is essential that the Historic Parties put up their candidates. Some are likely to be elected and those that are elected will act as the voice of the parties in the Parliament. Without such voice, the Historic Parties will merit Vyshinski's description of "archaic" and Parliament will be organized without their participation. It would only then be a step to suppress them as reactionaries leaving the whole field to the Communists and fellow travelers.**

July 23

Tatarescu informed today of acceptance of Ralea. I understand Ralea is considering taking staff of some eight people.

July 26

Alleged activities of subversive terrorist organizations

Interior Ministry communiqué issued yesterday described alleged activities of four subversive terrorist organizations under central command and named 76 Romanians to be tried by military Court Martial. Seventeen have disappeared. Remainder are under arrest.

Groups are accused of planning civil war "with vain hope of armed conflict between Great Powers," of giving "military information to power or powers which would have fought against Romania and her Allies," and plotting against "democratic regime, by creating anti-democratic current and organizing street fights against authorities and peaceful citizens." Central organization claimed to have collected arms depots, tried to undermine army morale, and responsible for demonstration of November 8, 1945.

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* Cf. *FRUS 1946*, VI, pp. 616-617: Berry to the Secretary of State. Secret. Urgent. July 17, 1946.

** Berry was authorized to state his proposed advice to Maniu as the Department view (*FRUS 1946*, VI, p. 617, footnote 9).

Accused include Elvira Olteanu

Peasant and Liberal Party leadership said the communique have supported combined organization which allegedly operated under control of General Aurel Aldea, aided by former Premier General Radescu, Peasant leader Ilie Lazar, and Liberal Youth leaders Valsanescu, Farcassanu, and Vintila Bratianu. Accused include Elvira Olteanu, clerk of this Mission, and Teodor Manicatide, employee of American Military Mission, listed as missing.

July 27 *According to Groza, trial will be soon and secret*

In general talk yesterday Groza explained communique published by Minister of Interior was put out in his absence otherwise he would have talked first with me before publishing it. He added that his orders that American Mission not be mentioned in communique had been followed and that he would see to it during trial that no hostile publicity be directed toward American Missions. According to him trial will be soon and secret. To this I said since two of our employees were involved I would expect to send an observer. He assented. I went on to say as I had no evidence of guilt of our employees, and as Romanian Government had shown me no evidence of their guilt, I thought Government was making a mistake to press matter. Groza said he personally agreed, but he was "a prisoner of circumstances" adding many of accused were his personal friends and he was convinced they were innocent but could not help them until they had passed through court. Groza concluded by saying serious organization did exist to overthrow Government but for all that he could see our people were not seriously involved.

Groza... "prisoner of circumstances"

The Government's action in permitting Interior Ministry to publish communique charging members of subversive organizations with giving secret Romanian and Soviet military information to foreign power and inclusion of employees of this and American Military Mission in list of accused has been accepted locally as showing the Government's determination to continue using US to which all democratic elements in Romania look for moral support, as political scapegoat despite recent conciliatory American gesture of accepting Ralea as Romanian Minister to Washington. Of course public does not know of Groza's ideas expressed yesterday to me, but if it did consensus of opinion would likely remain unchanged as the clause "prisoner of circumstances" is broad enough to hide a failure to make good on his promises.

July 30 *Re: compensation for confiscated agrarian lands*

I cannot see how we can approach Romanian Government regarding compensation for confiscated agrarian lands without prejudicing position set forth heretofore. Once subject of compensation is introduced Romanian Government as well as Russian ACC will consider move abandonment our stand taken accordance with Department instructions. I repeat my conviction Russians cannot be budged from their position as described.

It behooves us to determine now whether to drop question Romania's restricted sovereignty and explore matter recovering equitable compensation or cling to principle at risk of losing all. I favor former choice believing we stand gain more in material sense and lose less in prestige through negotiation controversial problem. Matter must be held in abeyance pending reply from Department.

August 1 *NDF agents destroyed* Dreptatea*'s plates*

This morning about 25 NDF agents entered Imprimeria newspaper plant where *Dreptatea*, single National Peasant newspaper, is published, destroyed the day's plates, and caused some minor damage to presses. Most of plant workmen were taken to Federation of Labor headquarters for questioning as to their attitude in permitting *Dreptatea* to publish certain articles.

Responsible National Peasant information this afternoon confirmed that unknown number of workmen were imprisoned in Interior Ministry for further questioning. Since the newspaper presses were lightly damaged, and easily reparable. *Dreptatea*'s editors feel assault primarily aimed at intimidating all of its workers.

August 3* *Bratianu and Petrescu protesting against electoral laws*

I have received signed documents from Bratianu and Petrescu protesting against electoral laws. In resume they say they are inconsistent with Moscow Agreement; unconstitutional in abolition of Senate, and make possible widespread voting frauds by prescribed methods of voting and control of district electoral boards. These documents reaffirm detailed objections previously made by Liberals, Petrescu Socialists, and National Peasants. Today I was verbally notified by emissary of Maniu that he considered himself in accord with rest of opposition in objecting to electoral laws for exactly same reason invoked in his written protests prior to their passage.

United States Mission's next tack

Rather than send note to Romanian Government as I suggested, I now believe our next move will be more effective by taking another tack. Tatarescu will leave soon for Paris. He will ask to be received by Secretary Byrnes. I hope the Secretary will see him and tell him of importance we give to matter of civil liberties in pre-election period. He might say that under the electoral law a fair or corrupt election can be held following intention of the Government. As the Government has promised free and unfettered election, we expect it to fulfill its promise.

I believe Tatarescu will immediately give broad assurances. If he does, I hope to be informed of them and authorized to use them in my conversations with Groza, with the Communists, and with the leaders of the Historic Parties. In order to prevent misconstruction, I would like authority to place information I hope to receive in informal memorandum form and leave copies with Groza and other leaders. Of course if

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**FRUS 1946*, VI, pp. 617-618: Berry to the Secretary of State. Telegram 753. Secret Priority. Repeated Paris for Secdel as 97.

Department wishes to follow this recommendation with formal note to Foreign Office so much the better.

August 3 *"Romanian Peace Conference Delegation"*

Romanian Peace Conference Delegation slated to be headed by Foreign Minister Tatarescu, but definite list not yet decided as changes daily made while Romanians awaits official invitation from Paris. Other leaders probably will include Justice Minister Patrascanu, Education Minister Voitec, and Under-secretary Communications Maurer. Final list when received will be transmitted and Secretary's Delegation will receive confidential biographies.

August 4 *Separate from the official Delegation*

Responsible information has come to hand that the National Peasants and National Liberals intend to have their own representatives at the Paris Peace Conference entirely separate from the official Romanian Delegation. Two men will be authorized to speak for the political opposition, one will be Grigore Gafencu, former National Peasant and Foreign Minister under former King Carol, who now resides in London and Paris. The second will be Alexandre Cretianu who, as Romanian Minister to Turkey, was prominent in Romanian Armistice negotiations and was dismissed from his post at Ankara by Groza Government.

August 6 *Printing staff of* Dreptatea *were released*

Printing staff of *Dreptatea* after intensive questioning by police and Labor Federation agents were released on August 1 and following day were obliged by union leaders to sign statement asking to be given work in other publishing houses because of "Fascist propaganda" of *Dreptatea*. Somewhat obviously statement concluded signers had done so of "own free will." Publishing house picketed by union on August 2 and 3 with no printing help available. Arrangements have now been made to issue two-page *Dreptatea* without union printers.

Oportunity for entire incident arose when *Dreptatea* printed derogatory epigram concerning recently deceased Health Minister Bagdasar which Government press seized upon with indignation and justified raid as originating in workers' "righteous anger." Meanwhile National Peasants lack services of sole party paper, their printers who were all party members by threats are forbidden to work for them, and Maniu has declared that this is another flagrant violation of the Moscow Agreement.

August 8 *Unanimity of thought on three subjects*

In talks in past few days with prominent Romanians, including Maniu, Bratianu, and Visoianu, I found unanimity of thought on three subjects.

(1) The unrepresentative character of Romanian Peace Delegation. — As planned the numerically large delegation includes no members of the Peasant or Liberal parties. Historic party leaders claim omission is evidence of yet another violation of spirit of Moscow Agreement by Government which is preparing to commit country without consulting Peasants and Liberals. Visoianu described delegation as NDF section of Government Paris-bound on holiday. I understand that only point in treaty draft delegation will contest is size of Anglo-American reparations. But if Hungary raises Transylvanian question, we may expect considerable Romanian oratory in Paris for export to Romania. Tatarescu has let it be known that he is already in accord with Russian point of view on every question disputed at Council of Foreign Ministers.

(2) The need for some Allied supervision of coming election. — Violence is growing in Romania and many people think it will continue to increase for purpose of intimidating completely Historic Parties. The Government intends to fix elections and then to claim that they were free. To secure necessary sanitary certificate, Propaganda Minister, a Communist stooge, while in London and Paris recently arranged for hand-picked groups of newspaper people from those countries to visit Romania during election period. In view of this, I believe it is not too soon for American and British governments to urge American news associations to detail correspondents to cover elections.

(3) The precarious situation of the Historic Parties which faces a political dead end. — Mr. Maniu said that he felt he was swimming against a

maelstrom. He and his party don't lack courage but they do lack capacity to do impossible. He had always had some support from West but now he and party realized that they perforce stand alone. I agreed their position is indeed serious, but in view of limited moves open to us, I believe there is nothing to be done for time being beyond that recommended to the Department on August 3.

August 9 *Conversation with M. Ralea*

Ralea called prior to his departure this weekend for Paris and eventually the United States. In the course of an hour's conversation he asked if there were any particular Romanian problems that he might be asked about on reaching Washington. I stressed (1) our interest in the importance of free and unfettered elections, (2) the desirability of a broadly representative Romanian delegation at the Peace Conference, and (3) the matter of the arrests of our employees. I hope Department will take opportunity to express its strong feelings on each point in early conversations with Ralea.

August 12 *Attacks by armed bands upon National Peasant Party's prominent members*

Since publication of electoral laws each week here sees an increase in repression, physical violence, and flaunting of freedoms guaranteed by Moscow Decisions. During past weekend there have been two attacks by armed bands upon prominent members of National Peasant Party. Clearly, NDF Government is entering final stage of preelection intimidation of Historic Parties which, if unchecked, may lead to liquidation of leaders such as Maniu, Mihalache, Bratianu, and others.

August ninth, Nicolae Penescu, Secretary General of National Peasant Party was severely beaten at Pitesti where he arrived to conduct meeting of NPP district leaders to draw up electoral list for District of Arges of which he is legal resident. George Mihai, former Director of Penescu's cabinet, who accompanied him was killed by revolver shot, Professor Dumitru Popescu died of blows received in abdomen and eleven others, members of Arges party committee were hospitalized as result of beatings received from Communist thugs armed with revolvers and iron pipes with heads resembling medieval maces.

August 10th, Ionel Pop, prominent Peasant Party member, head of organization at Turda, and other local committee members were attacked and beaten by armed gangs of Communists. Mr. Pop, according to party communique is suffering from concussion of the brain and others of the committee were severely wounded.

Details of attack on Penescu

Details of attack on Penescu as given by him to foreign press conference representatives at his home last evening where he is convalescing from fractured left ankle, severe head wounds, and internal injuries are important enough to report in detail, as local press forbidden print single word.

According to Penescu August sixth he had long interview with Interior Minister Teohari Georgescu in which he presented his party's protests against numerous attacks carried out against party members throughout country. At end of conference Georgescu asked Penescu when he was holding meeting of District Committee of Arges and Penescu replied on August ninth. Georgescu asked him to remind him of this one day in advance so that he could take measures to maintain order in Pitesti. On same day, Penescu requested Vice-President of party's organization in Arges to notify Prefect in writing of meeting to be held August ninth requesting him take measures maintain order and prevent attacks against party.

...in Pitești...

Arriving in Pitesti around ten o'clock August ninth Penescu met some party members on street who warned him that since early morning trucks with workers from Targoviste armed with iron pipes and automatic revolvers had been arriving in town and that some members of committee were awaiting him in Courthouse. Penescu states he thereupon told friends committee meeting would have to be postponed. On way to courthouse he noticed groups of men armed with clubs and revolvers but, apparently being unrecognized, was able enter courthouse where he announced decision to postpone meeting and was then told that an attack was being prepared against him. Soon afterwards he heard commotion in courthouse and cries of "Give us Penescu!" The Committee members dispersed seeking refuge and Penescu accompanied by Mr. Mihai succeeded in being admitted into office of District Prosecutor. But six armed men followed them. Mihai and Penescu tried to escape, Mihai being killed on spot by two bullets entering his head. The men rushed Penescu and beat him over head and abdomen until he was unconscious. Attackers finally left thinking Penescu dead whereupon friend removed him to place of safety. Attackers upon returning saw that Penescu had been moved and thinking him still alive began search for him. After time friendly Commissar of Police who knew Penescu came to his side and protected him at risk of his own life from the gang of armed men and a higher ranking Commissar who demanded he turn over Penescu. The attackers before leaving Pitesti manifested their satisfaction with day's events shouting "Death to Maniu." Upon their departure Commissar took Penescu to local hospital.

Pitesti police not only made no attempt to restrain attackers but according to Penescu had explicit instructions not to intervene. In view of Penescu's full statement, it seems clear that Ministry of Interior was an accomplice in pre-arranged attack on Penescu and local committee members.

Although wiley Vice-Premier Tatarescu and his NDF peace treaty commission will suavely attempt to convince members of peace conference with persuasive speeches of peace-loving "concentrated" democratic character of Groza Government, it is difficult to imagine how members of United Nations assembled at Paris, if fully apprised of events in Romania such as foregoing, would for one moment have confidence that this Government could or intended in good faith to provide for implementation of the Moscow Agreement or of Article 3 of the Peace Treaty drafted for Romania.

August 13 *Tătărescu's statement before leaving for Paris*

Before leaving Sunday morning for Paris, Tatarescu read statement of policy of Romanian Delegation for Peace Conference. In his public statement he carefully avoided taking definite stand on any of articles which have not been agreed upon by Council of Foreign Ministers. Privately, he has already expressed stand he will take. Groza in public statement printed this morning goes far beyond Tatarescu. In the name of Government he demanded among other things: (1) deletion from Article 30 of draft treaty of most favored nation clause for all of the United

Nations and (2) Danube question not be settled by treaty but by special convention which will be concluded between river states alone.*

August 19 *Secret Police questioned N. Carandino*

Nicu Carandino, Editor of National Peasant organ *Dreptatea*, one of Romania's two opposition dailies arrested eighteenth at home by Ministry Interior Police. House searched. Carandino released after several hours, questioning.

Secret police questioned Carandino on two articles juxtaposed in *Dreptatea* of seventeenth. One was picture of late Gheorghe Mihai, National Peasant youth leader assassinated at Pitesti August ninth with caption stating simply he died. Story of Pitesti incident still suppressed. Below was story headed "Doctrine of Petru Groza" citing speech Groza made to Executive Committee Plowmen's Front August 17 discussing elections and plans of Government after election wherein Groza quoted as saying "It will not be necessary to kill many people, only one or two from each capital of each province."

Check shows above passage correctly quoted according to full text of speech printed by Government newspaper *Universul* of August 11.

August 22 *Maniu's main point: "is America still interested in Romania?"*

Mr. Maniu asked me this morning if I realized the courage his party was showing in persisting in its preparation for elections in face of murderous aggressions of Government. He reviewed long sad story of flaunting of freedoms by Government and said if we could do nothing to force Government to respect its pledges we could at least interest ourselves in condition of persons who had suffered because they believed they could count upon us to make good our guarantees.

He mentioned Ilie Lazar, now under arrest for eighty days, who had been permitted only four hours of exercise in that time and although ill with stomach trouble is kept isolated and given food of very poor quality. I believe Mr. Maniu has a point here and if the Department concurs I will suggest to General Schuyler that he inquire at an ACC meeting concerning political personages whom the Government is holding.

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* Two of Berry's reports, dated Aug. 15 and Aug. 17, on trade and economic matters are not included in his *Diary*. See *FRUS 1946*, VI, pp. 619-620.

Mr. Maniu then laid stress on three subjects.

First, he said there will be no free and unfettered elections unless official observers are sent to observe elections and preparations for elections. Newspaper people and unofficial observers are not enough, he said, there must be official observers and they must come now.

Second, it is important for future of Romania that representatives of National Peasant and National Liberal parties, or preferably their presidents, be invited to Paris to express their views. Without this, conference will hear from the Romanian delegation only Russian views expressed by Romanian voices.

Third, he inquired if America is still interested in Romania. If so, the Peasant Party will continue to fight, regardless of sacrifices, in hope of ultimate victory. If, however, America is indifferent, party is not willing to sacrifice life of a single additional member.

Bratianu "made same points"

Later in day, Mr. Bratianu called and made same points which I have given above. Additionally he said that it was vital to limit by Treaty the number of Russian troops of occupation kept here to guard lines of communication with Austria. Without such numerical limitation he feared number of troops in Romania would be increased rather than decreased.

August 23 *Premier Groza's "three and a half hour monologue"**

What I expected yesterday to be a brief courtesy call on Prime Minister Groza turned into three and a half hour monologue. Following is essence of his statements:

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* See *FRUS 1946*, VI, pp. 621-622: Berry to the Secretary of State. Telegram 819. Confidential US Urgent. August 24. Repeated to Secdel at Paris as 113.

(1) Concerning freedoms, he admitted that we had cause for complaint on restriction of freedom of assembly, upon all others he said no one could complain. Moreover, freedom of assembly was restricted because of overriding necessity of maintaining order. He claimed there were provocative elements in extreme Right and Left which desired trouble. Serious trouble would only mean disappearance of present "democratic" Government which would be followed by dictatorship of extreme Left. Therefore, in interests of most Romanians, he was restricting occasions for clashes between extremists. Concerning Pitesti and other incidents, he said he regretted them more than I, but realized more than I how reduced were casualties compared to what might have been if he had acted less energetically.

(2) Concerning election date, the Prime Minister said he had told ambassadors in January that he would not present himself until electorate had full bellies. In January he expected such condition to exist in September, and in June had announced elections for that month. Then came the drought and corn crop failure. He was meeting this new crisis by importing corn. He recently received 1,700 tons from Yugoslavia. Shipments were coming from Poland and Russia and he was negotiating to buy elsewhere. Within six weeks he expects to be in position to show the electorate that he has provided for their alimentary needs and then hold elections forthwith.

(3) Concerning freedom of elections, he said that when the Anglo-Americans agreed to the Moscow Decisions they were thinking in terms of free elections such as were held in England or America; whereas Russians were thinking in terms of free elections such as were held in Russia. In view of presence of Russian Army in Romania, coming elections would likely be held according to Russian interpretation of "free and unfettered."

(4) About detention of our arrested employees he claimed he desired to release them long ago, but was prevented by extremists within his Government. Only by exerting his greatest efforts had he been able to play down the affair. He has now succeeded to the point where in states evidence there is no connection made between American employers and employees' subversive activities. Moreover, trial will be secret, except for American observers, and press will carry no stories of it. He expected cases to come to trial "very soon."

(5) In previous conversation he mentioned his desire to see closer relations between Balkan countries. When I asked if his plans had developed he said as soon as peace treaties were signed and elections held

I would see tremendous changes. He will invite chiefs of Balkan and Eastern European states to visit Bucharest. Out of visits will grow an economic union extending from Austria to the mouth of the Danube and including Poland. This will be customs union rather than political federation, as in politics, the states already have similar point of view. I inquired if he had discussed subject with Russians, to which he replied he had discussed it with Marshal Stalin, who told him to go ahead and do what he pleased, as Russia had no intention of interfering in internal affairs of her neighbors, except to see friendly government in power.

August 24 *Re: Berry's withdrawal prior to elections?*

Personal and Urgent for Barbour[*] from Berry:

Most grateful for your advance word (Transfer from Romania to position of Political Adviser with the rank of Minister to General Hodges in Korea). I will discuss matter with Secretary in Paris and with you in Department. Until then, will greatly appreciate holding further steps in abeyance and no mention being made of transfer. In my conversations I will be guided by following reasoning:

All democratic elements would interpret my withdrawal prior to elections as American abandonment of democratic cause in Romania. Moreover, on basis of Secretary's approval of my return to Romania for elections, I have made statements to King, Government, and opposition concerning my return that will be damaging to our interests if not made good. Therefore, would expect to return for elections which should take place within two months. Soon thereafter would be the logical time for my transfer.

August 26[**] *A Situation which demands a decision from the United States*

After giving very careful consideration to every fragment of evidence concerning the Groza Government's election intentions, I come inescapably to the conclusion it is not the intention of the Government to hold the free and unfettered elections required by the Moscow Decisions. Moreover, the Romanian Government's attitude has the full support of the Soviet Government.

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[*] Walworth Balbour, Division of Southern European Affairs, Department of State.

[**] See *FRUS 1946*, VI, pp. 622-623: Berry to the Secretary of States, Bucharest, August 24, 1946. Secret. Urgent.

This situation demands a decision from us. If we are unable* to insist upon reasonable compliance with the Moscow Decisions and therefore plan to recognize results of the Romanian elections no matter how fraudulent, simple justice requires us now so to inform leaders of opposition parties who are staking existence of their parties as well as their own lives upon our good faith.

Should we permit opposition leaders to go into elections without this knowledge, we must expect those who have been our friends in Eastern Europe to say that we have shrugged our shoulders at our obligations, let down all democratic elements of this country, and given coat of whitewash to Groza facade of Communist Party.

If, on the other hand, we are going to insist on free and unfettered elections for Romania, according to our interpretation of those words, it is important to confirm now to Romanian representatives in Paris that such is our intention, adding that if the Government takes a contrary course it will incur from us consequences where and as we are able to apply them.

In conclusion

In Romania we are not able to do much at this time to bring about an acceptance of our viewpoint except by holding to a firm line politically. In the Western world, however, we could in all matters concerning Romania act so as to prevent divergence from growing up between our official statements and our day by day actions.

August 28 *Leaving for Paris, then to Washington*

Leaving for Paris, via Athens and Rome, for consultation with the Secretary's Delegation at the Peace Conference, then to Washington for further consultations and, I hope, home for a month's leave.**

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* Erroneously: "*liable to*" in the printed text, p. 622.

** During Berry's absence Roy M. Melbourne assumed the charge of the Mission.

IV

IN PARIS AND WASHINGTON

Editor's Note:

The following Top Secret Report was presented by Berry to President Truman on September 1946. The tenor of it is announced in the text's first sentence: "Romania is a window through which we are able to observe Soviet methods at work in a foreign land..."

From its initial proceedings, the Paris Peace Conference (1946, July 29 - October 15) provoked Berry's apprehensions. He saw in them the prefiguration of an American failure vis-à-vis Russia's ascendency, specifically in regard to United States efforts to bring about the establishment of representative government in Romania. A prelude of such feelings which led Berry to forewarn the President against the imminent effects of the Conference is recounted by Schuyler in his Diary, *as follows:*

*— "The AVM [*Stevenson*] thinks that Russia has given in all along the line at Paris and that the peace treaty will insure to the US and Great Britain all the rights and privileges which we need in order to protect our interests here.*

*This attitude — Schuyler goes on — is quite at variance with that of Mr. Berry, who yesterday [*early August, 1946*] had a long discussion with me on this subject. Berry feels that the Romanian Peace Treaty, as already agreed to, does sway with our last hope of ever establishing a democratic government for Romania. Mr. Cannon of the State Department sent him a message that he would like to see him in Paris, but Berry has replied that he prefers not to come. He says at an earlier date he would have been glad to furnish information and advice to those working on the peace treaties in the hope that they might thereby be in a position to secure better terms for Romania. Now, however, that the treaty in his opinion sells us out to*

Russia, he prefers to have nothing more to do with it since any information given at this late date would be entirely wasted. He is going to the United States at the end of this month for a little leave and a conference with Secretary Byrnes, and will return here in late September, probably just before the elections."[*]

Several days later, Schuyler points out: "Mr. Berry has been planning a trip to America, to take place near the end of the conference, in the hopes that he could see Mr. Byrnes in Washington and discuss the entire matter at length with him. In compliance with this plan, Berry is leaving by my plane on August 28. However, he has just received a telegram from Byrnes telling him to stop in Paris on the way. We are hoping that this may mean a little reawakening of interest in Romania on the part of some of our delegation. Berry, however, is still skeptical. I understand that Barnes also has been called to Paris to discuss the Bulgarian question..."[**]

And Schuyler concludes: "Mr. Berry left yesterday in my plane for Paris and the States. Just before leaving, he received a peremptory order from Secretary Byrnes to stop and consult with him in Paris. On the day prior to his departure, Mr. Berry had a long talk with Ana Pauker."[***]

According to Liliana Saiu — who scanned Berry Correspondence *at Lilly Library — Berry was received in the White House on September 9.*[****]

*On his way back to Bucharest he met [*again — C.B.*] Byrnes and James Clement Dunn, the Assistant Secretary, in Paris, on October 5.*[****]

C.B.

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[*] Schuyler, *Diary*, Ms. p. 559.

[**] *Ibid.*, Ms. p. 565.

[***] *Ibid.*, Ms. p. 570.

[****] See Liliana Saiu, *The Great Powers and Romania, 1944-1946*, 1992, pp. 211-212.

1. "Top Secret" Report upon Romania, September 1946

Top secret
To the President
A report upon Romania
from Burton Y. Berry,
Representative of the United States in Romania

Soviet methods at work...

Romania is a window through which we are able to observe Soviet methods at work in a foreign land. As it was the first window to be opened to the American Foreign Service, we in this Mission have watched intently and reported fully that the State Department might have knowledge of the Soviet pattern applied to Romania, which often amounted to advance knowledge of the Soviet pattern prepared for application in other occupied countries. What we saw and what we may expect to see in the basis of this report.

The Allied Control Commission, an instrument of Soviet policy

First of all we saw the Allied Control Commission made an instrument of Soviet policy. Although Romania had surrendered to America, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union, the representatives of the Three Great Powers forming the Allied Control Commission did not work as equal partners for the purpose of administering the country. Rather, the Soviet Chairman issued the orders in the name of the Control Commission, while the American and British representatives were reduced to the role of observers frequently hearing first from the Romanian public of orders issued by the Commission. Thus, by the ACC, the Soviet authorities were able to proceed to disorganize the economy and weaken the political administration of Romania.

Then, with the preparation achieved, Deputy Foreign Commissar Vyshinski came to Bucharest to mould Romania into the role of an active satellite of the Soviet Union. The foundation of the new epoch was marked by a preparatory period of two phases, first, that of covert help to the Left Parties, then overt assistance to them, and it was consummated by the forcible installation of a Communist-dominated minority government.

Gradual Soviet domination

After this the story of the gradual Soviet domination is the story of the development of the ascendancy of the Romanian Communist Party. The methods by which the party rose and maintains itself, its failure to appeal and take root in the country, are highlighted by the events set forth in the appendix to this memorandum.

The core of the Romanian Communist Party, persons of non-Romanian origin

An analysis of those events shows that there is little distinction made in the projection of Soviet policy in Romania between the official level and the unofficial level. On the official level the Soviet Government first worked through the ACC and the officers of the Red Army of occupation. On the unofficial level it worked through the Communist Party, the core of which is composed of persons of non-Romanian origin, who have had long training and are hard, skillful, and totally unscrupulous in the accomplishment of their objectives. The party, using the tactics and methods of an underground organization, works through the labor unions, and through the Government itself, since the installation of the Groza Government. On both levels Soviet policy is directed towards weakening the power and influence of the Western democracies on the theory that their elimination will create a vacuum which will be filled by the expanding Communist influence.

Communists work in economic, political, moral fields

The Communists work towards the destruction of all forms of personal independence. In the economic field they eliminated the power of the land owners through the application of a confiscatory agrarian reform; they eliminated the power of the bond holders by an inflation of the currency;

and they eliminated the industrialists through a control of industry by workers' committees which have usurped the prerogatives of management. In the political field they have, for all practical purposes, eliminated for the time being their political opponents by securing and maintaining control over the press and all key positions in the Government administration, particularly in the army, the police, and the law courts. In the moral field, they eliminated the possibility of independent thought and actions through control of the lives of people of all social classes, and particularly the workers, through membership in labor unions by which the conditions of work, leisure, and living are regulated.

The Communist Party acts as the agent of Moscow in establishing the party line in Romania, and the line once established is binding upon all party members and those that depend upon them. In determining the party line truth is not a consideration. The goal is fixed, the approaches to it considered, and then the facts established to suit the circumstances. The Romanian party line is a reflection of the Soviet party line established by the necessities that existed in Russia before the war and that continue to exist today.

Communist Party's opponents

We have remarked too, that the Communist Party can only live and grow in a disorderly atmosphere. It does not want peace as we understand peace. It must always have an enemy. In Romania its enemies are the "Fascist reactionaries." Anyone who opposes its policies can qualify as such. Abroad, the enemy is any nation that is capable of opposing Communism. Today that means the Western democracies. Consequently, those in Romania who are influenced through education or commerce or the humanities by democratic ideals are, in the eyes of the Communists, reactionaries and enemies. The party sees life as a war for survival on many fronts. So, on the Romanian front, it loses no occasion to build up the prestige and strength of the USSR to the disadvantage of the Western democracies.

Suggestions helping to restore Romanian equilibrium...

While I do not have a solution to propose for restoring Romanian equilibrium, I do, on the basis of my experience here, put forward three suggestions which I believe if applied over some time will put us into a stronger position, and this of itself may do a good deal towards achieving the end we desire. The efficacy of my suggestions, of course, rests on the assumption that the Armistice period will soon end, the Russian army of occupation will withdraw, and a treaty of peace will be concluded with Austria, thereby eliminating any need for Russia to maintain troops in Romania to guard its lines of communication.

First, it is important to understand the nature of the movement with which we are dealing. Seeing clearly what we are facing removes a large part of its menacing qualities. It shows up its weaknesses as well as its strength. We must realize that close social relations with our Soviet colleagues do not influence their actions or their Government's policy. The same applies to the Romanian Communists. We must realize that the ethical level on which the Soviets work differs entirely from that of ours.

Secondly, it is important to give much fuller information to the American public. Facts concerning events in Romania should be given out soon after the events occur. Public knowledge usually means public discussion and a rallying of public opinion to the Government. As our actions here only implement the stand our Government has taken publicly at international conferences, which the American public has approved, we have much to gain from public discussions. On the contrary, Soviet actions in Romania usually are at cross purposes to the commitments which Soviet officials have made. The Soviets know this and as a result their policies tend to wither in the spotlight. Hence the Soviet Government is very sensitive to publicity. The information given out in America should be made available to the Romanian public through the Voice of America as long as a strict censorship exists here. We should assist in the dissemination of information through the maintenance of our informational services here at a highly efficient level, through the exchange of teachers and students, and through taking advantage of every opportunity of letting Romanians feel America's interest in their country.

Thirdly, it is important to have and to hold to a political policy toward Romania that is positive and clear and consistent. We should react much quicker than we have in the past to events in Romania of which we disapprove. Such reaction will give courage and strength to the leaders of those groups who appreciate the democratic way of life and who are representative of the majority of the Romanian people. This will help to create in Romania a strong public opinion before which opinion, the

Romanian Government, once there is a Parliament, should be less recalcitrant. In commercial matters we should be just as hard as the Soviets, refusing Romania all loans, financial inducements, or commercial advantages until the Government functions as a representative, democratic and independent government.

In conclusion

I believe if we direct our efforts along these lines we will have better opportunity to fulfill the commitments our Government has made. Should Moscow confirm its present line and the Groza Government continue to follow that line, nothing from our point of view will be lost as we will have stood by our moral principles and the whole world will know it. The Soviet Government is sensitive only to public criticism and the threat of force. In the implementation of its policy it moves ahead rapidly until it encounters one of these elements, then it hesitates, withdraws, goes around the obstacle, or strikes directly forward, according to the strength of the resistance it meets. It is extremely flexible, ready at any time to take advantage of a weak point. I am convinced the occasions for Soviet withdrawal in Romania and throughout the world will become more frequent as our understanding of its policy and methods becomes greater and is put to practical use.

September, 1946

2. Appendix: Soviet Methods at Work in Romania 1944 Spring-1946 July)

The King's plan to abolish
Marshal Antonescu's dictatorship
and end the war...

In the early spring of 1944 King Mihai secretly established contact with the leaders of the old Romanian political parties for the purpose of preparing plans to abolish the single party dictatorship of Marshal Antonescu, and to end the war against the United States, the Soviet Union, and Great Britain.

The coup was a complete success

The plan developed to the point where it was decided to bring off a coup d'etat on August 25. Unfortunately for the planners, Marshal Antonescu scheduled a visit to the troops at the front on that date. The King, hearing of this and believing that it was a case of "now or never," summoned the Marshal to the Palace on the evening of August 23rd, arrested him, and clapped him and several collaborators into the Palace vault. Mihai then spoke to the country by radio telling of what he had done and ordered the soldiers at the front to lay down their arms. They obeyed; the 20,000 German soldiers in the Capital retreated, and the coup was such a complete success that the Red Army advanced in less than a month from the front at Iași, where it had been held for four months, to the plains of Hungary, a thousand kilometers west. Four us the coup meant the Balkan Front had broken, and the Germans were deprived of Romanian oil for continuing the war.

General Sanatescu Government

Julius Maniu, President of the National Peasant Party, was expected to head the Government, but Maniu was not quite ready, so the King asked

General Sanatescu, the Chief of Staff, to form a government. This was done on the evening of August 23rd, with the leaders of the four political parties who had worked with the King in preparing for the coup d'etat, (National Peasants, National Liberals, Socialists, and Communists) serving as Ministers without portfolios. The Sanatescu Government at once asked for an armistice and sent its delegates to Moscow, where they signed an Armistice Convention on September 12, 1944.

The United States Mission... the ACC established

When, six weeks later, we established this Mission, the first to open in a former satellite country, the Romanians received us joyfully and the Russians hospitably.[*] The latter explained that their only interest in Romania was in seeing the fulfillment of the terms of the Armistice. However, their army was in occupation of the country, and the Romanian Army was moving to fight the Germans and Hungarians under Soviet commanders. A tri-partite Allied Control Commission was functioning under a Soviet chairman and with a British representative.

November 1944: Vyshinski opened a new epoch

The situation did not remain stable for long. Deputy Commissar Vyshinski came to Bucharest in November and by his work opened a new epoch. In a threatening atmosphere he demanded and received Romanian acceptance of a harsh rule of application for the reparation clauses of the Armistice agreement. In his conversations Mr. Vyshinski negotiated by means of ultimatum. He completely bypassed the Allied Control Commission, thus setting the pattern, two months after the signing of the Armistice, for unilateral Soviet action in Romania. Seeing this action on a governmental level, and its consequences, I reported in November, 1944, that, unless we persuaded the Soviets to desist in their efforts to communize Romania, we would be too late and the experiment being worked out in Romania would be repeated elsewhere in a more perfect form on a larger scale.

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[*] See *supra*, November 10, 1944.

Soviet advance toward domination

Following Mr. Vyshinski's visit,* the Soviet pace for full domination accelerated. In its first phase it took the form of covert help to the Left parties. At the Mission we remarked that visa applications from foreign correspondents were ignored; conservative Romanian newspapers were suppressed or suspended; Mr. Maniu was attacked increasingly by the Soviet press and radio; the Romanian police, gendarmerie, and units of the army within the country were reduced in strength. Factory workers through trade unions began to call for the dismissal of government officials and to demand a controlling voice in the management of the factories where they worked. Soviet authorities on the Allied Control Commission lent a sympathetic ear to the workers.

At Potsdam it was decided to set up a commission

From October to December, 1944, the Soviet authorities lifted some 7,000 tons of oil equipment belonging to an American oil company. Demands for its restitution were made without success in Bucharest and Moscow. Finally at Potsdam it was decided to set up a commission to find a solution for the problem. The commission at the time of writing has been meeting for a year without positive results. The Soviet member at each meeting repeats the Soviet position with the consistency of a gramophone record, apparently under instructions which contravene the principle agreed at the Potsdam Conference that the burden of war reparations or trophies should not fall upon Allied nationals.

Maniu's statement in December 1944

Mr. Maniu informed me early in December, 1944,** that if he had known that we would permit the Soviets a free hand in Romania, he would have advised the King against the signing of the Armistice. He said that he had been convinced that the democratic powers would preserve a democratic and sovereign Romania. But reluctantly he had become convinced the Soviet Union was planning to communize Romania without interference from the Western Powers. He stated if we intended to abandon Romania we owed him the obligation of saying so, and saying so at once, that he might make the best possible terms with the Soviets for the Romanian people.

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* *Supra*, November 11, 14, 15, 17, 22, 29, 1944.

** *Supra*, December 8 and 9, 1944.

Soviet covert help to the Left elements

In December the Soviets began transporting to Bessarabia all persons who were resident there in June, 1940.* General Sanatescu was replaced as Prime Minister by General Radescu,** but the political crisis continued. By the end of the year the first phase of Soviet advance toward domination, that of covert help to the Left elements and weakening of the Conservative elements, was in full flower.

The Soviet bait

We watched and reported fully its unfolding: the trips of Romanian Communist leaders to Moscow and, on their return to Bucharest, their statements that the time had come for a Left government to take over Romania. We remarked the use of the bait they had brought with them — that as soon as a Left government was installed, the Soviet Government would return the Romanian prisoners of war and the control of the Romanian transportation system, as well as the administration of Northern Transylvania.

At the same time ample funds, newsprint, and transportation facilities were provided for the Left papers, while the Conservative press had increasing difficulties with the ACC censor and with the Communist censor working through the "typesetters' syndicate." Communist leaders, including those within the Government, openly attacked the Government. Mr. Maniu overnight became a "Fascist." Apathetic street demonstrations, hostile to the Government, were described by the Soviet Government as vibrant manifestations of the will of the people.

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* *Supra,* December 23.

** *Supra,* December 3 and 7.

Transportation of the Romanian nationals of German race

Early in January the Soviet authorities asked the Romanian Government to prepare lists of Romanian nationals of German race, both men and women, between the ages of 18 and 40, in order that they might be transported to the Soviet Union.[*] In the end, some 80,000 of these people were taken away in the dead of winter in freight cars to labor in the mines of Russia. The ACC issued the orders but the American Representative was not consulted. He was told later that the action was necessary to protect Soviet lines of communication.

Second phase: the Soviet overt help

Then, with the period of preparation finished, and that of covert help carried as far as possible, the second phase, that of Soviet overt help to the Left, swiftly developed. Soviet officials said that General Radescu no longer had the backing of the people, that only a truly democratic government would be acceptable, and that only the Left parties could form such a government.

On February 25, 1945, the Left parties made their bid for power.[**] A group of some 20,000 people, carrying flags, slogans, and pictures, marched through the center of town. Someone fired a revolver shot into the air; the people dispersed, some reassembled, and they were addressed by Communist Minister Patrascanu. He said, "They have shot without shame the peoples' masses. Those who ordered this, those who carried out the orders, those who are really responsible, will pay. General Radescu must go. A Left government must come, for it alone is capable of weeding out the Fascists. Death to the Fascists."

Later in the evening there was more shooting and a few casualties. At ten o'clock General Radescu addressed the nation by radio. He said that a handful of individuals led by two foreigners, "Anna Pauker and Luca, the Hungarian," were attempting to subdue through terror. Two hours later the General was called to task by the Soviet head of the ACC.

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[*] *Supra*, January 10 and 12, 1945.

[**] *Supra*, February 25, 1945.

The show-down

We know then that we were approaching a showdown. The public had responded strongly in favor of General Radescu but, as his position with the people improved, the Communist Party reacted by increasing its demands, distorting facts, and leveling more charges.

On February 27 Mr. Vyshinski arrived in Bucharest for the second time[*] and using the same tactics he used on his November visit, requested an immediate audience with the King. In a high voice and while hammering the table with his fist, he demanded the immediate dismissal of General Radescu, and then terminated the audience abruptly by leaving the room and slamming the door after him. A day later Vyshinski returned to the Palace to demand that Dr. Groza be appointed Prime Minister, and Mr. Tatarescu Vice-Prime Minister. He added that, unless the King agreed, he could not be responsible for the continuance of Romania as an independent state. Soviet Marshal Malinowski came to Bucharest and Soviet troops patrolled the streets.

The King's dilemma

The King told me later that he could do one of two things, abdicate and save himself at the price of letting his people down, or stay on and do what he could for his people. He stayed, assuming, as he put it, "one of the risks of his profession,"[**] and accepted the Groza Government.

The Groza Government and Soviet projects

These events, placed in relation to the general scheme of events in Romania since the country was occupied by Soviet armies, gave perfect clarity to the definition of Soviet projects.[***] We realized that the power of the former governing classes would be destroyed. We expected the Groza Government in the near future to accomplish this by (1) expropriating all estates and farm lands and distributing the expropriated lands among the peasants, (2) strengthening relations by every means between Romania and the Soviet Union, and (3) purging from military and civilian services all non-democratic (conservative) elements. The Mission reported in the following months how each point of the program was made.

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[*] *Supra*, February 2 sqq., 1945.

[**] *Supra*, March 7, 1945.

[***] *Supra*, March 16 sq., 1945.

The program of the Communist Party

Concurrently, the forces which were set in motion by the Communists when they were still a minority element in the Government were expected to continue their activities. These forces were to find expression through (1) vigilance committees to preserve order, (2) peasant committees that expropriated and distributed land without legal authority, and (3) working men's committees which assumed the functions of management. The program of these forces was the program of the Communist Party, and it included, besides an agrarian reform which had moved up to an official level since the installation of the Groza Government, destruction of the National Peasant and National Liberal parties, elimination of foreign trade except with the Soviet Union, dissolution of the private banking institutions, and eventually the disappearance of the monarchy.

The Soviet pressure

The installation of the Groza Government gave the Soviet authorities the possibility of exerting pressure as required directly upon the Government, or indirectly through the ACC, or through the people (labor unions, etc.).

"No need to examine the Romanian situation..."

In March, 1945 I telegraphed that, at this stage, it was by no means certain that the forces set in motion could be controlled — they certainly could no longer be controlled by the Romanians themselves — but if they could, it would be through an immediate examination of the situation in Romania on the highest level, among the Allies, in the spirit of the published Declaration of Yalta, such an examination to be followed by the setting up of a truly tri-partite commission under a revised Allied Control Commission. But Russia, after some delay, replied that it saw no need to examine the Romanian situation. This gave the men Vyshinski had installed as Ministers of Justice, War, and Interior, through the control of the law courts, the army, and the police, the opportunity to place men of confidence in all key administrative positions.

June 1945: Chief Soviet officers' new statements

Before leaving in mid-June* for consultation at home, I had long talks with the chief Soviet officers in Romania. It is interesting to note that, whereas in November, 1944 the Russians said their only interest in Romania was in seeing the fulfillment of the terms of the Armistice, they now said that the primary interest of their Government in Romania was in security, and that the actions that they had taken had been dictated by the compelling need for security. They added that they had a secondary interest in Romania and that was in stability. Thus, I reported from this time we could expect the Russian theme song for Romania to be built around security and stability.

Strengthening of Soviet-Romanian relations... as anticipated

The summer was a period of consolidation for the Groza Government. As we anticipated, there was a strengthening of relations between the Groza Government and the Soviet authorities. Groza himself made a trip to Moscow. His Government authorized the creation of a Soviet-Romanian oil company.** This was followed by negotiations for a Soviet-Romanian marine, air, and land transport company, a banking institution, and a lumber industry. The Soviet Government, true to its promises, began to return Romanian prisoners of war, but those that were returned were carefully screened and reeducated soldiers, regrouped into two new divisions whose function it was to educate all Romanian soldiers "in the new democratic ways." And, all the while, the Groza Government attempted by every possible maneuver to share in the great personal popularity of the King by attempting to show that an unshakable solidarity existed between King and Government.

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* *Supra*, June 14, 1945.

** *Supra*, July 8, 1945.

The King and Governement after the Potsdam Communique

The Potsdam Communique contained the statement that peace treaties could be concluded only with "recognized democratic government." As America and Great Britain did not consider the Groza Government a democratic government, the next move was for Bucharest.* The King acted by consulting the four party leaders with whom he had prepared the coup d'etat. All but the Communist advised him to request the immediate resignation of the Groza Government. The King asked, but Groza and his Government refused to resign. Dr. Groza, in his conversation with the King, stated that the Anglo-American position really had little significance as the Soviet Government would sooner or later secure Anglo-American agreement to a peace treaty that would protect Romanian interests. In the meantime, he added, Romania could conclude peace treaties with her neighbors and she could count upon the firm friendship of her great protector, the Soviet Union. The King repeated his request for Groza's resignation, and when it was again refused, he addressed identical letters to the American, British, and Soviet representatives on the ACC asking the assistance of the Three Allied Powers in forming a more representative government in Romania as provided by the Crimea Declaration on Liberated Europe. The Soviet Government replied by affirming its confidence in the Groza Government.

"The Royal strike..."

The King, however, not hearing from the American or British governments, persisted in his attitude and declined as from August 19, 1945, the date that Groza refused to resign, to have further contact with the members of the Groza Government. From these events the Mission reported two significant conclusions, (1) that the Russians were not desirous to see the conclusion of an early peace treaty between the Romanians and the Anglo-Americans, and (2) that where the Soviet Government had to choose between unity with the Great Powers or the continued application of its unilateral control of neighboring states, it would choose the latter.

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* *Supra*, August 7_1, 7_2, 1945.

Trumped up trials

The Government tried to divert the public's attention from its issue with the King by trumping up into a serious affair a trial of members of two youth organizations said to be aiming at the violent overthrow of the Government.[*] The Government used their trial for implicating its opponents at home, the organizations of the National Peasant and National Liberal parties, and abroad, the Western democracies. The illegal farce finally came to an end with sentences of prison terms for the defendents, in spite of the Government failure to disclose a connection between the organizations and the Peasant and Liberal parties or the Anglo-American Missions. Nevertheless, as expected, the Communist Party drummed away on its established propaganda line, ignoring all facts to the contrary.

After the Council of Foreign Ministers in London

The termination of the Council of Foreign Ministers in London[**] created confusion in Government circles until the Communists had heard from Moscow. They didn't know how to use the communique. On the other hand, well-informed democratic circles of Bucharest felt that, although nothing had been gained, certainly nothing was lost, nor would be lost, as long as America and England maintained firmly their attitude.

Demonstration of November the 8th 1945

November the 8th, the King's name day, gave the next opportunity for the Government to spotlight the "sinister influences" at work in the country.[***] Shortly before a planned demonstration it withdrew permission for the Peasants and the Liberals to assemble publicly and shout for the King. It suspected that they would demonstrate anyway, as citizens rather than as party members. It prepared for this and, when crowds of people waving banners and shouting "for King and Country" assembled in the Palace

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[*] *Supra*, August 29; September 10, 11, $12_{(1, 2, 3)}$, 13, 14, 1945.

[**] *Supra*, October 4, 1945.

[***] *Supra*, November 9, 10, 12, 27, 1945.

Square and nearby streets, including the streets before this Mission as well as the American Military Mission and the British headquarters, the Government sent into the square several trucks loaded with Communist workers who taunted the crowd. The people reacted by upsetting and burning two trucks. Then Government officials "to preserve order" directed the gendarmes stationed at the nearby Ministry of Interior to fire into the air, but some of the bullets ricocheted, wounding several people. After this a cordon of soldiers cut off a group of some 150 people and took them into the Ministry. Thoroughly aroused, the free crowd stormed the Ministry, but were stopped 50 yards short of the building by shots from soldiers. Not being able to reach the building, the crowd gave vent to its anger by tearing from the wooden fence before the Ministry all government posters.

Position of the Soviet Chairman of the ACC

The American Representative on the Allied Control Commission asked the Soviet Chairman for an immediate meeting to examine all the aspects of the situation and establish the true facts through a tri-partite investigation. We hoped the Soviets would accept this suggestion, but we were not surprised when they replied that a tri-partite board would be an infringement upon Romanian sovereignty, and anyway the Russian High Command, not the ACC, was responsible for the maintenance of order within Romania. Nor were we surprised when Soviet General Susaikov later said that the demonstrations had an anti-Soviet turn, basing his statement upon shreds of paper taken from the debris near the Ministry of Interior, that had been parts of posters on the fence publicizing the Groza-Soviet friendship. Again, we remarked that an objective set of facts was not desired, but rather an incident about which facts could be created to help along the Communist cause. It was in character, therefore, that "two days later the word went out that all workers in factories, employees in private businesses, and Government officer, nurses in hospitals, etc., must appear upon the streets on the occasion of the funeral of those killed on November the 8th, to demand that Maniu and Bratianu (leader of National Liberal Party) be punished for their responsibility for the sorrowful events of that day. The facts were thus "established" for Government newspapers to say that the demonstration was organized by the Peasants and Liberals, that it had an anti-Soviet character, and to hint that it was encouraged by the Anglo-Americans.

19 November 1945. Mark Ethridge's mission

On November the 19th Mr. Ethridge arrived in Bucharest. During ten days of intense activity* in which he met and talked with every political leader of importance, including Soviet and British representative, leading members of the parties of the Groza coalition Government, leaders of the opposition, and numerous persons representing labor and industrial groups, he confirmed in every detail the facts and conclusions that this Mission had reported to the Department. In his report he said that he was convinced that the Groza Government was in no sense representative, that the two political groups, the National Peasant and National Liberal parties, which had the support of the vast majority of the Romanian people, not only were out of the Government, but their leaders were being harassed by the Government, arrested without cause, their political clubs requisitioned, their newspapers suppressed, and their public meetings banned. Mr. Ethridge reported that, of the parties within the Government, the Communist Party is almost wholly a Russian creation, led by persons of non-Romanian origin (Anna Pauker, Vasile Luca, Emil Bodnaras), and was pursuing a policy that has no basis in Romanian traditions, a policy that was daily increasing tension and resistance in Romania. He stated the Plowmen's Front (Groza's organization) and the Patriotic Union (Communist affiliate) were groups sustained by the Communists to appeal to the peasant and artisan classes. Tatarescu, who leads the Dissident Liberal Group, has been so discredited by his past conduct that he is dependent upon the Russians for protection and may be counted upon to do their bidding. Only the Socialists among the parties in the Government were directly independent of Russian domination, and there were indications that this condition would not last for long. The policy of the Groza Government, completely dominated by the Communists, who receive their orders from Moscow, furthers the Soviet exploitation of Romania.

Mr. Ethridge reported that the prestige of the King was higher than it had ever been, probably because he has become a symbol to his people of Romanian sovereignty.

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* *Supra*, November 26, 29, 1945.

The pulse of public opinion

Three free communal elections quietly held in November took a poll of public opinion.[*] At the first, the Peasants received 2,961 votes, the Liberals 2,163, the Socialists 568, and the Communists 33. At the second, the Peasants received 2,163 votes, the Liberals 1,216, the Socialists 326 and the Communists 7. At the third, the Peasants received 643 votes, the Liberals had no candidate, the Socialists 21, and the Communists had no candidate. The Government permitted no public statement concerning these elections or their results.

Ambassadorial Commission came to Bucharest

The announcement of the Moscow Decisions concerning Romania relieved everyone in so far as the decisions suggested a solution of the constitutional crisis. But the people, bearing in mind how the Armistice terms were warped under Soviet pressure to meet Soviet demands, accepted the assurances of free elections with considerable skepticism, particularly when it became known that the Groza Government would remain in power during the pre-election period. The Ambassadorial Commission came to Bucharest[**] to inform the King of the decision, to receive the Government's assurances, and to secure the collaboration of the Peasant and Liberal parties. It had not been here many days, however, before it was clear to the American Ambassador that Mr. Vyshinski's maneuvers gave little hope that the Soviets intended to carry out the Moscow Agreement in good faith. Soon thereafter I reported that the Decisions had changed nothing fundamental, as the Communist Party in Romania would continue to run the country behind the familiar facade of the Groza Government.

From January 1946 on

It is true that a member of the Peasant and a member of the Liberal parties were incorporated into the Government,[***] but it was apparent that they would be rarely consulted. Each of these parties was authorized to publish a newspaper in Bucharest and one in the province of Transylvania, but they encountered difficulties in finding newsprint and presses. Requisitioned party club-house were not returned, and political meetings scheduled to be held in rented halls were usually banned or, if permitted to be held, were broken up by boisterous elements while the police stood meekly by. This situation developed until by mid-August the breaking up of opposition party meetings by armed thugs (Communist) had increased so in violence that death to some and severe injuries to others of the party members who had the courage to meet had become the order of the day. But I had been forewarned by a Communist source who said in March that, while Groza would give lip service to the Agreement, he had no intention of implementing it in practice, and that no progress would be made without further discussion and agreement among the Big Three. He added that when you buy a horse from the Russians, you must always pay for it twice, first when you make the agreement, and second when you take delivery.

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[*] *Supra*, December 7, 1945.

[**] *Supra*, December 31, 1945; January 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 1946.

[***] *Supra*, January 9, 1946.

5 Feb. 1946: United States recognized of the Groza Government

On February 5th our Government recognized the Groza Government.* The Peasant and Liberal leaders thought that we had acted prematurely, for they claimed that only those freedoms had been given which, if denied, would have been clear evidence of sabotage of the Moscow Decisions. They pointed out that the Government censors continued to work overtime. In early March the censors even refused to authorize publication of the texts of recent speeches by President Truman, Secretary Byrnes, and Senator Vandenberg.** Meanwhile the Communist Party program of "creating a vacuum" went on apace. The Socialist Party, as Mr. Ethridge foresaw, split into Government and opposition fractions. The National Bank was pressed by the Government to accept three Communists on its board of directors.

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* *Supra*, February 5, 7, 1946.

** *Supra*, March 2, 4, 9, 1946.

The trials of Marshal Antonescu and his collaborators...

The trials of Marshal Antonescu and his principal collaborators in custody were made the occasion, as in the trials of the youths, to discredit National Peasant and National Liberal party leaders, the Government again coming out second-best in the fray.[*]

On Victory-Day, passing mention of the United States & Britain contributions to victory

In a public speech on the celebration V-Day, Prime Minister Groza heaped praise upon the Soviet forces, but made only passing mention of the contribution of the American and British forces.[**] Other speakers omitted any reference to American or British contributions to victory. I mentioned my surprise to Tatarescu and Groza that American contributions should be so lightly considered at an official Romanian celebration of victory over Fascism. Tatarescu apologized profusely, Groza was embarrassed and the King sent his regrets for the lack of consideration of his ministers. The unchecked arrogance of the Romanian Government knows no limits, but I am convinced that when they overstep the line it is the best practice to call them immediately and firmly, in which case they frequently withdraw in confusion.

After a press attack in the Romanian language Red Army newspaper, Reuben Markham,[***] the hard-working correspondent of the *Christian Science Monitor*, was ordered expelled. In spite of strenuous efforts in Bucharest and urgent representations in Moscow, the order was not rescinded. As Frank O'Brien, the AP representative,[****] was due to be recalled shortly, we foresaw the time when the American new blackout on Romania would be complete. Of course, this was just what the Groza Government wanted during the pre-election period.

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[*] *Supra*, May 3, 4, 8, 14, 15, 18, 28, 31, 1946.

[**] *Supra*, May 11, 1946.

[***] *Supra*, May 23, 26, 1946.

[****] *Supra*, May 31, 1946.

On Groza's inability to influence Government Policy

In personal conversations, Groza became increasingly frank. He complained of his inability to influence Government policy,[*] claiming that the persons closer "to quarters where political instructions are made decide everything." When an employee of this Mission and another of the Military Mission were arrested, he regretted that he could do nothing about it, as the matter was in the hands of his Secretary General, Mr. Bodnaras, important member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party. But, as Petru Groza was being "a good boy" in the words of Mr. Vyshinski, the Soviets saw that he got his reward.

Groza "decorated by the King!"

They suggested that the King give him a high decoration and a citation.[**] After some hesitation, Mihai agreed, to the consternation of many of his closest advisers. When I asked him why he had given the decoration, and particularly the unprecedented citation, as he must have known it would affect adversely his popularity, he replied that a monarch, unlike a movie star, must not gauge his public actions by any reaction to his popularity, but must act in the interests of his country. In the present instance, he said, the loss of some popularity was a small price to pay for the reduction of political violence and for keeping the Peasant and Liberal parties in the field for the coming elections.

Berry's sharp Note to the Romanian Foreign Ministry

On May 27, 1946 I delivered to the Foreign Office a sharp note[***] expressing our discontent at the execution of the assurances given by the Groza Government concerning the carrying out of the Moscow Agreement. The note caused a resurgence of hope among Romanians, and had the beneficial effect of prodding the Government into publishing two days later the text of a draft election law, signed by the King on July 12th.

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[*] *Supra*, May 27, 1946.

[**] *Supra*, June 1, 1946.

[***] *Supra*, May 24, 1946: "I shall deliver to Foreign Office note addressed to Tatarescu Monday morning May 27. Text of note follows."

Exchange of notes

Officially the Government sent a weasely-worded reply, which we were able to attack vigorously. This we did by our note of June 14th, in which we described the Romanian response as "unsatisfactory" because it "presents a wholly inaccurate account of the actual situation, and contains a number of inaccuracies." To this the Romanians answered on June 18th that the "Soviet Government had not made any objection of observation regarding the implementation of the Moscow Decisions" and, as the Decisions were the result of negotiations among the Big Three, any act destined to control the implementation of them must be the collective work of the Big Three.

Conclusion

There could be no clearer admission that Romania was a Russian satellite state, and that the Groza Government was a puppet government. The note placed the Romanian problem back where it was prior to the Moscow Conference. It tied up a Romanian settlement with a general settlement among the Big Three and it meant that, if there is no general settlement, the United States cannot expect to implement effectively the commitments it made at Yalta, Potsdam, and Moscow.

V

LAST MONTHS IN BUCHAREST

1. 1946, October 16-November 10

October 16 *"Persons accused of activity in subversive organizations"*

Bill of indictment against 66 persons accused of activity in subversive organizations, including Miss Olteanu of this Mission and Mr. Manicatide of Military Representation, was signed October 15 and transmitted to Military Court. Trial expected to begin shortly. Articles of Penal Code under which accused will be tried provide for solitary confinement from 3 years to life.

Indictment not yet available officially but lawyer engaged by Mission for Olteanu, through well-placed contact, able see it and make notations. Indictment states scope subversive organizations was preparation for civil war and insurrection of army with object overthrow Government, agitate population against the Soviet State, Red Army, coinhabitants of Romania such as the Hungarians, and to revive racial pogroms. (Printed leaflets Government will introduce as evidence are anti-Russian, anti-Hungarian, anti-Semitic, and anti-Government in character.) Means at disposal of organizations described as mouth to mouth propaganda, leaflets, deposits of arms and munitions. Four organizations described as linked under single command headed by General Aldea. General Radescu, former Premier, also included in the indictment.

National Liberal and Peasant parties are directly accused of supporting subversive organizations. Inferences also made King Mihai had knowledge of subversive organizations. Accusations against Olteanu, Manicatide, and Valsanescu, latter private Secretary Dinu Bratianu, head of Liberal Party, provide frequent mention of United States Missions and indirect inferences latter interested in subversive movement.

Olteanu indictment advances as evidence her guilt statements of two defendants (believed to be Interior Ministry agents) who visited her in Mission several times on behalf of her uncle, Gavrila Olteanu, leader of one subversive group; that they gave her leaflets for distribution to Mission; that she promised to distribute them; gave them 50,000 lei (equivalent of one dollar) for the organization; and that she arranged through sisters for interview. Olteanu admits under questioning having received letters from uncle; that she received leaflets; that she promised to distribute them, but claims in reality to have burned them.

It is clear, trial will be directed primarily against historical parties to discredit them before elections. Sentences are expected to be heavy. It is unknown how Government intends to exploit inferences that the United States Missions are interested in the organizations.

Based on knowledge of similar trials and similar tactics of the Government, I feel latter cleverly utilized blood relationship of Mission employee Olteanu with Gavrila Olteanu, recognized hot-head leader of chauvinistic group, and sent agents to her to plant damaging evidence in her possession. Nevertheless, her alleged statement in indictment says she received leaflets and search of cabinets in her office by officer of this Mission revealed package of about fifty leaflets. Mission has no knowledge of her actually distributing leaflets, with the possible exception of one found on desk of clerk handling incoming mail sometime previous to her arrest. Upon questioning employees all deny having received leaflets from Olteanu or that she ever mentioned subject of subversive organizations.

At his request and as indication of Mission's continuing interest in its employee, I intend to provide lawyer with letter explaining Mission never consulted in connection Olteanu's arrest; that no evidence of her guilt ever submitted to Mission; that she had been loyal employee; and consequently request him to undertake her defense in trial. I have informed lawyer that Mission does not wish to provide witnesses from Mission staff. However, if Government should subpoena alien employees I do not see how Mission could prevent them from appearing.

Representatives of this and General Schuyler's Missions will be present during trial as observers.

October 17 *Re: the conduct of the Romanian Government "in preparing for elections"*

British Embassy in Washington on instructions has asked views regarding proposed demarche to Romanian Government concerning elections, text of which was contained in UK Delegation Paris telegram to Washington, repeated to my British colleague here.[*] After consulting him regarding these proposals, Department has requested my comments.

October 18[**] *A note to the Romanian Government is mandatory*

My British colleague has shown me Foreign Office draft note to Romanian Government and his suggestions for alteration of note. He believes such note is mandatory, as Romanian reply to last British note on subject of implementation of Moscow Agreement was unsatisfactory and subsequent conduct of Romanian Government in preparing for elections has shown gross irregularities.

I am convinced that pre-election treatment of opposition parties has been anything but what we anticipated, in Moscow Decision. Romanian Government admits that opposition is denied use of radio. It is common knowledge that members of opposition parties do not have freedom of public assembly. In brief, Government's pre-election policy is designed to stifle opposition. Intimidation has been widely used. Oppressive means are generally applied. No registration of voters known to be members of the opposition parties is the general rule. This policy has been applied with such ruthless thoroughness that actual polling on November 19th may be quite fair. That day may even mark quietest national election ever held in Romania. At same time it will mark most unrepresentative election.

The British and American obligations to Romanian nation...

The British obligations to Romanian nation based upon Yalta and Moscow are no greater than our own. In past we have taken leadership in attempt to fulfill these obligations. We have not succeeded fully because Soviet Government has not shown good faith that we had right to expect of it, nevertheless, by our actions in Romania as pointed up in our notes of May 27 and June 14, we have secured grudging respect of Government and gratitude of opposition. Consistency on our part requires us at this time to reaffirm our principles and demand of Romanian Government fulfillment of obligation it assumed as condition to receiving our recognition.

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[*] Adrian Holman had become British Political Representative in Romania in March 1946. Cf. *FRUS 1946*. VI, p. 638n.

[**] Cf. *FRUS 1946*. VI, pp. 638-639: Berry to the Secretary of State. Telegram 981, Secret. Urgent. Oct. 19.

"Note will reaffirm"

But before embarking upon that course we must foresee its consequences. First, in practical field, note from the American Government is unlikely to bring any material change in policy of Soviet Government as it is applied through the Romanian Government to win the forthcoming elections by heavy majority. Nevertheless, note will reaffirm to Government seriousness with which American Government regards obligation once undertaken. It will bolster morale of opposition and will strengthen bond between us and great mass of Romanian people who, though helplessness, are unable now to give expression to their democratic principles. It will confirm the faith of those Romanian nationalists who later on may become nucleus of movement which we may need particularly.

*At the same time, "I [*Berry*] recommend"*

At same time note will put us in position where we cannot, without losing immense prestige, recognize results of forthcoming elections. It follows that we cannot appoint Minister to Romania while an unrepresentative government remains in office. Therefore, I recommend decision not be taken upon what present circumstances in Romania require, but rather upon line Department desires to take in future toward this country. If it wishes to maintain fighting diplomatic front a firm note is required now. If, however, it is going to recognize the validity of most fraudulent elections ever perpetrated in Romania, and confirm that recognition by appointment of a Minister, the least said publicly at the present time about Romanian elections, the less bad is our position. If this course is chosen, I plan in private conversations with Government officials and party leaders to repeat position we took in our notes to the Romanian

Government, and which Secretary took in his conversation with Mr. Tatarescu. Honesty requires me to say, however, that such private conversations will not bluff the Romanian Government, nor sustain the ebbing strength of our staunch Romanian friends.

October 19

Soviet ACC refused to grant clearance extension to Theodore Andrica

Today Theodore Andrica,[*] correspondent for newspaper *Cleveland Press*, a Scripps-Howard journal, is leaving Romania since Soviet ACC refuses to extend the originally granted clearance period. At meeting of October 15 of Chiefs of Staff of three ACC representations, Russian member gave two reasons for refusing to grant extension: (1) Andrica had not registered at the Soviet Bureau of Censorship as a correspondent and (2) he had not filed any telegrams since his arrival in Romania.

While Andrica had not registered since he was filling no telegraphic stories and needed no telegraphic press rates, this refusal reason is considered minor pretext for which another would have been found if suiting Soviet convenience. As for second reason, Andrica's work in Romania has been human interest material for his newspaper read by Americans of Romanian ancestry in the Cleveland area. He sends his stories by mail and states he showed copies of them to Soviets as evidence for activity here.

Two weeks ago Andrica wired his paper whether he should remain in Romania for coming elections. To date he has received no reply and is certain local officials stopped message. Prior to departure Andrica registered written protest with this Mission against Soviet refusal asserting "such action endangers freedom of press and freedom of information." He asked that his editor, Louis B. Seltzer of *Cleveland Press*, be notified.

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[*] Theodore Andrica (9 Aug. 1900 — 1 Mar. 1990) was born in Radna, Romania. He emigrated to the US in 1920. Chronicled the affairs of Cleveland's diverse ethnic population for 46 years as Nationalities editor of the *Cleveland Press*. With the encouragement of the editor of the *Press*, Louis B. Seltzer, Andrica literally invented the field of "ethnic journalism." He conversed in 6 languages. — Retiring from the *Press* in 1973, he edited a Romanian quarterly (*American Romanian Review*) and authored *Romanian American and Their Communities of Cleveland* in 1977. — I would like to thank Radu Ceaușu (Wayne State University, Detroit, Mich.) for his persistent labors in locating the Andrica Papers at Cleveland State University Library, Special Collections.

Andrica has Transylvanian background, speaks Romanian, and while traveling extensively in his own jeep during period of stay has behaved very circumspectly. Case apparently verifies Mission's fears of Soviet attitude toward presence of American journalists during all-important pre-electoral period.

October 20 *Re: Anglo-American reaction to electoral preparations*

Communist circles are anxiously awaiting Anglo-American reaction to Government electoral preparations. One Communist contact said last evening to a member of the Mission staff, "No reaction now by the United States Government to election preparations will be unmistakeable evidence that the United States has abandoned Romania to Soviet Union."

October 21 *Note to the Romanian Foreign Minister regarding the forthcoming elections*

When my British colleague receives definite instructions on UK note regarding Romanian elections, I am authorized to deliver to the Foreign Minister a parallel note along following lines:

"I have been instructed to inform you that, subsequent to its notes of May 27 and June 14, and the Romanian Government's replies thereto, my Government has taken cognizance of the promulgation by the Romanian Government of an electoral law, of the steps taken for registration of the Romanian electorate, and of the announcement of a firm date for general legislative elections.

It is, however, a matter of concern to my Government that, according to information at its disposal which it regards as reliable, certain aspects of the electoral preparations in Romania suggest that these elections may not be of the free and equitable character assured by the Romanian Government in its acceptance of the Moscow Conference Decisions nor result in the choice of Government responsive to the will of the people as envisaged in the Crimea Conference Agreement.

Specifically, my Government observes the following apparent contraventions of the assurances which it received in January, 1946, from the Romanian Council of Ministers and its President:

(1) The freedom of participation in the elections promised in January (to all parties then represented in the Government) appears to be seriously endangered in the case of those outside the present Governmental bloc, by various acts of discrimination involving restrictions on registration and by the intimidation of individuals.

(2) As the provisions of the electoral law are at present being implemented, these parties outside the bloc will be excluded from observing the final determination of the vote, although examination of the balloting as well as counting of the ballots was assured them.

(3) The participation parties outside the bloc have been wholly denied the use of broadcasting facilities, although they were promised equitable use of such facilities to present their views and although they are subject to constant attack by the bloc parties through this medium.

(4) The rights assured to all parties (represented in the Government in January) to print, publish, and distribute their political publications is still greatly restricted in the case of parties outside the Government by direct and indirect means.

(5) Participating parties outside the bloc continue to encounter major impediments and violent opposition to right which was assured them to organize associations, hold meetings, and be allowed premises for this purpose.

(6) It was promised that the Council of Ministers would consult with the representatives of all political parties represented in the Government when the assurances were given to reach agreement concerning the granting of freedom of the press and of speech as well as on questions relating to the conduct of the elections. My Government is not satisfied that these assurances as yet have been fulfilled.

Mindful of its undertakings under the Yalta and Moscow Conference agreements, the Government of the United States takes this occasion, in anticipation of the announced elections, to recall the assurances, indicated to it by the written declaration of the Council of Ministers and by the oral statement of the President of the Council, which formed a basis for recognition of the Romanian Government by the Government of the United States."

October 22 *Modifications to the proposed note at Berry's suggestion*

For clarity I suggest insertion of word "electoral" between word "Government" and "bloc" in numbered paragraph one of the suggested note to the Romanian Government; inclusion of words "Government electoral" before "bloc" in paragraph numbered three; and inclusion of words "Government electoral" before "bloc" in numbered paragraph five.

From numbered paragraph one I desire to eliminate phrase "to all parties then represented in the Government." From numbered paragraph four I desire to eliminate same phrase. These eliminations seem to me to be necessary: (1) to give support to Independent Social Democratic Party headed by Titel Petrescu; (2) for consistency in preserving spirit if not exactly phraseology of our note of May 27, namely "that all democratic parties may put forward their candidates with," etc.; and (3) to avoid being maneuvered into position whereby, should Peasant and Liberal parties be absorbed or replaced, strict interpretation of our language would be used locally to impede our support of successor democratic parties.

Numbered paragraph two is correct, but in my opinion not suitable for use at this time. Should we use it, Government will likely reply we are biased, citing this statement as proof, because in it we are judging Government guilty of crime which it will say has taken place only in our own imagination. I suggest therefore elimination of numbered paragraph two from this note.

In my record of meetings between Government and Ambassadorial Commission, I find no record of promise mentioned in paragraph six in any meeting which Government regards as official. I suggest therefore elimination of numbered paragraph six as the general features are included in final paragraph of note.

I urge addition to final paragraph of sentence confirming the Secretary's oral remarks to Mr. Tatarescu. I suggest: "The future relations of my Government with the Romanian Government are bound to be affected by the manner in which the Romanian elections are held."

In delivering the note I propose to say that my Government has no objection to its immediate publication in Romania, as it will give the note to the press immediately in America.

October 23 *"Modifications... have been approved"*

The modifications on the proposed note to the Romanian Government which I suggested to Washington have been approved except for addition to final paragraph. The Department feels the contents and implications in presentation of note at this time should make sufficiently clear to the Romanian Government that future United States position reserved and prefers to avoid public statement that sense which could be interpreted in the United States as a commitment to sever diplomatic relations in event as seems probable elections are not in fact free and unfettered.

The electoral agreement made by NP, NL, and Independent Socialist parties

Opposition press of today published text of electoral agreement made by National Peasant, National Liberal, and Independent Socialist parties, signed by Maniu, Dinu Bratianu, and Petrescu, to be implemented by direct committee of two members from each party. Statement stresses importance "to defend together freedom of elections" despite ideological differences between parties and thus "prevent electoral abuses and stealing of ballot boxes which Government is planning for coming elections."

Document calls participants representative of the "overwhelming majority in country" and including three of four parties which united to overthrow Antonescu regime. After referring to conditions under which Peasants and Liberals entered Government after Moscow Agreement, declaration says Groza Government "has not fulfilled single one of promises made to country or to our great Allies." "Millions of citizens entitled to vote" were stated to be struck from electoral lists, while censorship suppressed freedom of press, denied opposition right of meeting and subjected it to violence.

October 24 *Private agreement between NP and NL parties*

Private agreement between National Peasants and National Liberals envisages single electoral slate in Transylvania with candidates of both parties appearing under National Peasant electoral sign. In Old Kingdom, National Peasant Vice-President Mihalache has agreed to procedure whereby district leaders of both parties will make arrangements concerning candidates.

To show solidarity within opposition, each party as symbol will permit within one of its political strongholds candidates of other party to run with its backing. For example ostensibly Liberal citadel of Bucharest will have only National Peasant candidates and Transylvanian Alba district solely National Liberals.

Additional leading members on accused list

Government intention to use subversive trials as means to eliminate leadership National Peasant and National Liberal parties as political factor is becoming clear.

In addition to Ilie Lazar, leading member of the National Peasant Party now under arrest, Government has included Ionel Pop, nephew of Maniu, likewise prominent party member, on list those accused. Pop is at present in hiding to avoid arrest. Also hidden are Vintila Bratianu, nephew Dinu Bratianu, and Mihael Farcasanu, leading members younger National Liberal Party group, likewise on accused list. To date five leaders of the National Liberal Party and eight leaders of the National Peasant Party, believed innocent of any complicity, are under arrest or under cover.

No definite date has been set for trial, but appointment announced October 22 of Court Martial tribunal of five Government puppet generals. Whether trial takes place before or following election responsible Communist states depends on instruction from Moscow. Instead of sending dossiers of accused to Military Tribunal for trial October 29, as announced in Bucharest newspapers, Minister of War has ordered new indictment be drawn up by Army general in place of that prepared by Interior Ministry. This means probable decision delay trial and possibly indication evidence against accused members National Liberal and National Peasant parties considered too flimsy for convictions. By postponing trial, Government would achieve object of eliminating important members opposition parties from taking any part in elections.

More arrests may follow

At present eighty-six persons are accused, and more may follow. For example, today Maniu's Cabinet Chief, Coposu, was arrested. So far as Mission able ascertain, half or more of accused appear to have some connection with secret organizations. About twenty, probably innocent, are members opposition parties or Army Generals Government wishes eliminate and the rest are Government agents whose trial mere subterfuge to introduce their statements as evidence against those actually innocent.

Basis for trial does exist. It is generally known secret organizations, small in number, composed of remnants Iron Guard and extreme nationalists, existed in mountains. Their clandestine leaflets appeared as early as summer 1945. Unverified report claims one group accused Army officers stationed at Sinaia was apprehended in attempt transport truckload munitions and arms to mountain hide-outs. However, except for Government's desire to exploit affair to utmost, those actually guilty could have been tried seven months ago when arrested.

October 25 *"Election campaign is in full swing"*

Although we have reported it frequently in the past, we wish to emphasize now that election campaign is in full swing, opposition parties are still prevented from using radio facilities for campaigning. This despite fact there now are four radio stations operating here, namely Radio Bucharest, Radio Romania, Radio Dacia, and Radio Romania Libera, the last just completed especially for the campaign and operated by Communist newspaper *Romania Libera*.

October 26 *"Concerning Romanian purchases of corn in the United States"*

In the course of a conversation concerning Romanian purchases of corn in the United States, three government Ministers who are members of delegation still scheduled to leave for Moscow in a day or so for economic talks requested specific terms under which Department through Romanian Legation Washington would be willing to sell corn to Romania. Minister of Foreign Trade stated at time Soviets suspended Armistice grain deliveries, they gave Romanians indication USSR would be agreeable suspension all Armistice deliveries for period of one year. If this is done, Romanians hope to realize at least $100,000,000 from exports to free currency markets.

October 27* *Statement of the three opposition parties*

I have received signed statement from National Peasant, National Liberal, and Independent Socialist parties addressed to American, British, and Soviet Foreign Ministers. Statement refers to Yalta and Moscow agreements as justification for calling attention to international question of manner Groza Government executes promise of free elections. Original document will be forwarded by pouch.

In detailing Government abuses in electoral preparations statement covers ground previously reported by Mission. It states fifty per cent of those asking to be registered have been omitted from electoral lists and registration tactics of regime already have compromised validity of elections. It recounts measures used to force public and army into line to vote for Government bloc ticket, outlines Government's restrictions on press freedom and opposition electoral publicity, and reiterates practical Government suppression of right of assembly and its terroristic campaign. Communists are stated as temporarily mobilized for army and *gendarmerie* to be available during elections. Opposition also said to be systematically impeded in registration of its candidates.

Statement concludes Government actions indicate strong measures will be taken during elections which will involve suppression of personal liberties of candidates and their adherents. Three opposition parties thus make five requests: (1) revision under international control of all electoral lists; (2) reestablishment of press liberty, electoral propaganda, right of meeting under equal conditions for all parties in elections as well as their equal surveillance of elections; (3) guarantee of personal liberties of electors and candidates; (4) impartiality of army, police, and public anthorities during election operations; (5) whatever election results no reprisals against any electors for their political attitude during campaign.

Government circles privately admit to this Mission between six hundred to two thousand men in uniform from Communist controlled strong-arm squads will be stationed in each Prefecture during elections and plans are being perfected to place blame on opposition for any outbursts or violence on election day.

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* See *FRUS, 1946*, VI, pp. 643-644: Berry to the Secretary of State. Telegram 1008, Confidential Priority, Oct. 26.

October 28 *Secret compact made by Dr. Filderman with the Government*

Dr. Filderman, President of the Union of Romanian Jews, called to give me a copy of a secret compact he had made with the Government,* throwing support of his organization to Government for elections, and receiving in return promise of Government to perform certain acts specified in compact for rehabilitation of Jews in Romania. Later, communique will be published stating Jewish Community decided to support Government in elections but reasons for support will remain secret. Dr. Filderman said Jewish vote would amount to about two per cent of total vote.

Dr. Filderman admitted action was nothing short of capitulation in face of Government pressure and an about-face of democratic attitude that he has maintained through forty years. He said he regretted beyond words necessity of capitulation and particularly to this Government which is most despotic and most undemocratic Romania has ever had. Whereas all former governments had recognized rights of their adversaries, Groza Government recognized its adversaries only as enemies that must be destroyed.

Dr. Filderman's reasons for signing compact

Dr. Filderman gave as his reasons for signing compact:

(1) As number of Jewish votes will not affect one way or other results of elections he didn't have right to sacrifice Jews for principle in view of lessening possibility of peaceful international solution of Eastern European problem within next few months. He added he was convinced Russia was not working for solution but on contrary for domination in this area – domination that would only be ended by war between Western democracies and Russia;

(2) If he had not gone along, Government would have considered his group center of reaction and proceeded to destruction of community and violence towards members;

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* Cf. *FRUS, 1946*, VI, pp. 643-644: Berry to Secretary of State. Telegram 1013, Top Secret, Oct. 29 (No distribution except to Division of Southern European Affairs, Department of State).

(3) Soon after election, Soviet Government would deport thousands of Romanian Jews to Siberia as it deported thousands from Bessarabia after acquiring that territory in 1941;

(4) With Jews voting with Government in elections there was hope Government would keep some of its oft-repeated promises to restore to Jews all that was taken from them during Antonescu regime.

October 29

Press reports Swiss credit has been ratified. Swiss Charge states he received same information from Romanian Government as that twice given Mission that ACC (Soviet) had given written permission for this transaction. He has asked Schuyler whether United States branch of ACC has any objections and on receiving affirmative reply, wished to know whether action allegedly taken by Soviets was binding non-Soviet representation on ACC.

October 30 *Swiss — Romanian agreement*

A telegram from Bern reports the following information obtained from competent official of the Swiss Government:

Swiss-Romanian agreement which not yet ratified by Romania allows: (1.) Extension Swiss Bank credit 30 million francs through goods clearing account and repayment thereby within three years and (2) setting aside 20% import payments over period five years for repayment additional Swiss Bank Credit for financial transfers totalling 30 to 40 million francs. Agreement otherwise contains no stipulations regarding credit.

Contract between Swiss banks and Romanian Government for credit 75 million francs provides Romanian Gold deposited Switzerland be used as collateral but requires ACC approval thereof which banks requested Romanian delegation obtain. This approval not yet received.

Swiss Government knows of no stipulations by banks regarding liquidation Romania's prewar obligations to Swiss although banks may have stated such action by Romania would be welcomed.

They also report the following, likewise obtained from a competent official of the Swiss Government:

Neither Swiss Government nor banks informed officially regarding ratification agreement by Romania or ACC approval credit contract. Inasmuch as agreement technically not contingent upon granting of credit, it is possible that agreement has been ratified by Romania without credit having been aproved by ACC.

October 31 *Schuyler wrote Susaikov re: Romanian — Swiss credit agreement*

Schuyler wrote Susaikov October 31 requesting clarification Soviet attitude ratification by Romanian Government — Swiss credit agreement involving use of Romanian gold on basis of numerous reports definite clearance given by Soviets in name of ACC. Mission subsequently learned such clearance had been given. Schuyler has informed Swiss representative here of United States position on use of Romanian gold but British have, on basis of earlier instructions from London, stated they have no objections to use of untainted gold.

Since it is manifestly impossible for Romania to fulfill export obligations under agreement, reasons for ratification at this time appear political. It has been reported Romanians will endeavor to make token purchase grain from Argentina prior to elections with credit obtained from Swiss.

November 1

Now three full days since the release of the text of our note of October 28, the Government is still refusing authorization to let it be printed.

November 2 *"Unofficial English translation of Romanian text of note signed by Tatarescu"*

Following is unofficial English translation of Romanian text of note signed by Tatarescu[1] delivered to me by Secretary General of Foreign

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[1] Cf. *FRUS 1946*, VI, pp. 646-647: Berry to the Secretary of State. Telegram 1024. Urgent. Nov. 2.

Office at 2 p.m. today. Secretary said note will be publicized tomorrow by Romanian press along with our note:

"I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of Your Note of October 28th, 1946, and hasten to communicate to you the Romanian Government's reply.

The Romanian Government is glad to be able to interpret the contents of this Note as a manifestation of the interest that the United States Government is showing Romania in general and for her internal evolution in particular, and to express to it its entire gratitude.

On examining the contents of this note, however, the Romanian Government much regrets that the views expressed in its reply of June 8, 1946, are not shared by the Unite States Government.

Through Your Note of October 28th, 1946, the United States Government indeed expresses its concern that the Romanian Government has failed to implement the obligations assumed on the basis of the Moscow Decisions.

Yet in its Note of June 18th, 1946, in reply to an intervention made by the United States Government by virtue of the Moscow Decisions, the Romanian Government stated:

'On the other hand, the Romanian Government in receiving this new note of the United States Government cannot refrain from observing that the Moscow decisions have been the result of discussions and of decisions arrived at jointly by the Governments of the USSR, the United States, and Great Britain. Therefore, the Romanian Government must assume that any observatory act destined to control and to direct the implementation of the Moscow Decisions cannot be the work of signatory governments individually but the collective work of these governments.

The Romanian Government, however, has not received from the Government of the USSR any objection or any observation regarding the implementation of the Moscow Decisions and they cannot therefore disregard this situation.'

The Romanian Government still holds the same position today.

On principle, it is unable to take into consideration any observations in connection with the obligations it had assumed as a result of the Moscow Conference Agreement unless such observations proceed from all the three signatory Powers of the Agreement.

On principle, furthermore, it cannot take into consideration any observations or recommendations that would constitute acts of interference in its internal policy and which would thus be incompatible with the attributes of a free and sovereign State.

Therefore, it much regrets to find itself unable to retain or discuss the observations in the United States Government's Note of October 28th, 1946.

Desiring, however, to respond to the interest manifested by the United States Government towards Romania, the Romanian Government hastens to inform You that by the steps taken and steps to be taken yet, all the obligations which it has assumed following the Moscow Conference Agreement, will be fully implemented so that the free expression of the Romanian people's vote, on November 19th, 1946, will represent its will and its aspirations.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurances of my highest consideration."

In conclusion

Romanian reply to our Note of October 28 does little more than confirm by word position Groza Government recently has been confirming through actions. The conclusion to be drawn differs from conclusion I drew regarding Romanian note of June 18 only in that then my conclusion was a prediction while now we face a proven reality.

November 3* *On opposition leaders,*
and on personalities of Government:

This week Maniu,** Bratianu, Petrescu, and several other leading politicians of opposition called at the Mission. Members of staff have seen

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* Cf. *FRUS 1946*, VI, pp. 647-649: Berry to the Secretary of State. Telegram 1026. Secret US. Urgent. Nov. 4.

** Maniu did not have a good command of English. Therefore his meetingss were attended by a transslator. Usually this was Vasile Serdici, and when he was not available it could have been Nicolae Penescu, Șerban (Bani) Ghica, etc. On Nov. 2, 1946 this was Ghica, as confirmed by the following Securitate Note, dated Nov. 8, at other places Groza, Gheorghiu-Dej, Maurer, and other leading personalities of Government.

Their trend of thinking

This telegram gives trend of thinking of each of two groups.

Opposition leaders are convinced their true strength is increasing steadily. Titel Petrescu said 80% of workers have indicated their desire to be with his party. For first time in party's history Peasants are contributing money to sustain party organization. Maniu confirmed this, adding he had never been so strong and never so impotent.

These men expressed gratitude for our note and recent Voice of America broadcasts to Romania. Petrescu was particularly pleased, claiming many workers have said to him, "See, our friends have not forgotten us."

All opposition leaders agree election will be quite opposite of "free and unfettered." They said representation of their parties in Parliament would be limited to number determined prior to election day by the Communist Party. Only change they noticed since delivery of our note is intensification by Government of its terrorist tactics.

Chief complaints against Government

Summarized chief complaints against Government are:

(1) Crossing from registration lists names of thousands Liberal and Peasant Party members and sympathizers.

(2) Placing obstructions to point of physical violence to the deposit of lists of names of candidates.

1946: [Editor's translation]: "On Nov. 2, this year, *Iuliu Maniu*, the president of the NPP, had an interview with *Burton Berry*, the US Minister in Romania, at which *Serban Ghica* participated as translator. On this occasion — according to Şerban Ghica — Berry told Maniu that the USA will raise, at the Conference of the (Big) Four, the problem of Romania, both in regard to general elections and the Govt's behavior" (SRI Archives, Fond P, File 40.004, Vol. 50, f. 154). — I record my thanks to Dr. Gh. Onişoru for sharing this document with me.

(3) Arresting candidates on hastily trumped-up charges.

(4) Changing of normal voting places so voters in heavily peasant communities must travel 30 miles or more to vote, with no transportation available other than oxen or horse-drawn carts.

(5) Continuing preparations for temporary induction into *gendarmerie* of several hundred Communist Party members in each voting district "to preserve order during the elections."

Bratianu with Maniu* concurring stressed tightening grip Russia is securing in Southeastern Europe while pretending she is assisting area towards return to normal living. He recalled Bulgaria has just had "free" election,** Romania is scheduled to have one soon, and with Yugoslavia already in line, Russia soon will be able to present to the world a structure based on "freely expressed will" of Balkan peoples, which will be used as powerful robot for pressing for Russian solutions of such international problems as Danube and Straits. Bratianu said his party, by participating in elections and assisting in giving appearance of orderly return to normal living, was becoming unwilling tool of the Russians. He wondered in view of absence of freedoms if opposition couldn't do more for democratic cause by withdrawing Ministers from Government and withdrawing candidates from elections, thereby showing world that all was not progressing in Balkans as the Russians claimed. I said any such unadvised action would be a blunder as it would increase rather than diminish our difficulties on larger plane during next few months. If Department disagrees please instruct urgently.

Communist leaders position

Gheorghiu-Dej, Communist Minister of Communications, explained election was a battle in which opposition were enemies that must be defeated. He said Government had exploited every weakness of opposition and would continue to do so. He added Soviet Government expected Romanian Government to win election, and win it it would. Although Government privately admitted numerical weakness of Communist Party, he insisted it formed most active element of population and therefore deserved to have leadership. As illustration he used agrarian reform, claiming people desired it in spite of opposition of reactionary Radescu Government, and that Communists seeing trend brought it to a head through characteristic leadership and tactics. In this he said the party proved correctness of maxim "might makes right." Other Government leaders followed same line, all insisting Russia trusted present Government and therefore country could be saved only by returning present Government to power. All said a government formed by opposition would bring Russian occupation and loss of Romanian independence.

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* The tenor of Maniu's separate complaints, requests, and proposals are not covered in Berry's present report. *Teroarea. Documente ale procesului Iuliu Maniu, Ion Mihalache*, pp. 242–246, records in full, but does not date, the Maniu-Berry interview; see also pp. 130, 427, 428: Serdici statements.

** October 27, 1946.

We see Communist Party in Romania is still wearing national cloak, but in election it is out to win regardless of what that costs in broken pledges and dead peasants. After election it can throw off its cloak or continue to wear it according to the needs of the moment.

November 4 *On Secret meeting Groza — Tito*

Groza in expansive mood recently told of secret meeting with Tito.* Tito assured him as long as Moscow was satisfied with Romanian Government he had nothing to ask from Romania, adding if there were Government in Romania with which Moscow was not satisfied he would reverse his attitude. Groza cited this conversation as evidence that happy future of Romania was closely tied to continuation of his Government. In same conversation he said his Government planned to strengthen the church in Romania as it was weapon that would be used against the imperialism of the Vatican. In this connection he is drafting law arranging for retirement of some independent-thinking bishops in Transylvania and replacement by men more in sympathy with the new democratic order.

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* Cf. *FRUS 1946*, VI, p. 647; Berry to the Secretary of State. Telegram 1027. Secret, Nov. 3.

November 5 *Court Martial confirmed mandates for all defendants, except...*

October 31 Court Martial composed of five Army Generals presided over by General Atanasiu opened hearing to permit lawyers defending those accused complicity subversive organizations to present cause as to whether mandates of arrest were valid and whether there was cause to hold defendants under arrest pending trial. A member of the Mission staff was present throughout hearing.

General Nicolau, prosecuting attorney, requested Court to confirm mandates for arrest in interest of State security for all defendants except Ionel Pop and Lapusneanu. Defending lawyers, basing themselves on provisions of Civil and Military Penal Codes, advanced very convincing arguments to prove mandates of arrest had not been legally drawn. They argued a chief fault as mandates did not specify factual basis of defendants' guilt called for by pertinent laws. Another fault was the mandates, which according to law must be presented to Court for review within twenty-four hours, were not presented until three days following their issuance. On basis of their illegality lawyers requested Court to cancel mandates for arrest.

Lawyers likewise advanced very convincing arguments to prove basis of charges against defendants, insofar as lawyers had been allowed to have cognizance of them in indictment, in many cases including Olteanu of this Mission and other political personages, presented no legal justification for these defendants to be arrested pending trial and that injustice had already been committed by the State in holding them under preventive arrest for period of six months without trial.

In spite of lawyer's many sound arguments Court, after ten minutes deliberation, handed down decision confirming mandates for all defendants except Messrs. Pop and Lapusneanu.

November 8 *A British point of view*

British have been considering whether any action could usefully be taken connection appeal by opposition parties concerning Romanian Government's maneuvers to prevent holding free elections and while admitting recent experience Bulgaria does not encourage hope that tripartite action possible have concluded there would be advantage in attempting obtain consideration of Romanian electoral preparations by ACC as measure reinforcement, US and UK notes to Romanian Government October 28. Accordingly they suggest that if we agree, it be proposed to Soviet Government that opposition memo be considered by ACC which should be asked make recommendations as to action to be taken in light of situation revealed by memo.

Department has requested my comments on foregoing suggestion.

November 9 *Memorandum signed by Maniu, Brătianu, and Titel Petrescu, concerning the falsified results of election*

Today I received memorandum dated November 7 signed by Iuliu Maniu, C.I. Bratianu, and C. Titel Petrescu, addressed to the Foreign Ministers of the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union as a sequel to that of October 24 reported in previous telegram concerning methods used by Government to falsify results of election.

Abuses described are briefly as following:

(1) Electoral registers are still in hands of administrative authorities although electoral law provides for their return upon completion to the Justices of Peace of respective electoral districts. Memorandum points out registers in hands of administrative authorities can be continuously modified as has happened with lists of National Peasants and Petrescu Socialists in Caracal and Constantza.

(2) Some lists of opposition party candidates have been annulled. For example, in Campulung, Bucovina, district of Communist Emil Bodnaras, lists of all three opposition parties annulled on pretext candidates had not paid fixed fees for depositing lists. In reality sum was paid but at last minute parties requested arbitrarily pay additional sum so large they could not comply. Lists of one or other opposition parties annulled on various pretexts in districts of Bistritza, Caras, Cluj, Pitesti, Radautzi, and Nasaud.

(3) Government bloc has deposited in each electoral district four to six camouflaged lists to entitle them to register delegates to observe election and more specifically intimidate opposition and make impossible opposition control of voting.

(4) On November 3 Government published throughout country the prescribed polling districts. Again electoral laws violated because Government designation of voting centers forces inhabitants of many villages to go to factories in nearest cities to vote. This provides excellent means of intimidating voters. Also, in many instances voting centers changed in districts known to be favorable to opposition force peasants go on foot or oxcart 40-50 kilometers to vote.

(5) In many instances presidents of voting sections are minor Government functionaries recently appointed instead of judges or high ranking officials as provided by electoral law.

"Reign of terror throughout country"

Second section of memorandum describes reign of terror throughout country. It states most trustworthy and cruel members paramilitary shock troops have been placed in the gendarmerie and dispersed throughout the village to intimidate opposition members and sympathizers. In many districts with strong opposition following, the leaders of the opposition have been arrested, homes subjected to repeated searches, and populace intimidated. Memorandum states candidates of one or other opposition parties have been arrested at Ramnicu-Valcea, Cluj, Pitesti, Dolj, Nasaud, Targoviste, and Satu Mare. In Bucharest more than forty prominent Liberal and National Peasant Party members including Maniu have had homes searched. Memorandum annexes reports from district party organizations reporting daily arrests of young and old peasant party members for distributing their party election propaganda leaflets.

In conclusion

Memorandum concludes by stating through fraud and terror Government trying to manufacture parliamentary majority so great that it can proceed rapidly to change form of Govemment and install Communist regime. Accordingly, three opposition party leaders call on Three Allied Governments to fulfill decisions taken by them at Crimea, Potsdam, and Moscow asking them to come to aid of Romania and establish control of pre-electoral and election proceedings.

Berry's opinion: "A reply should be available to the Romanian People"

As forthcoming Romanian election is being cut to a Moscow pattern, I hold no hope[*] for securing Soviet agreement to ACC consideration of opposition memorandum or to impartial consideration of any aspect of electoral problem by ACC. Nevertheless, for the good that it will have outside Romania, now as well as within this country when democratic methods are finally restored, I favor making the effort.

Since acts of past cannot be undone, it seems undesirable at this stage to emphasize in ACC discussion of abuses of freedoms and perjuring of electoral lists but I believe many projected abuses may be prevented if we can assure opposition parties of their right to have representatives at all polling places throughout November 19. This would do something to restore situation of which opposition leaders complain in second memorandum.

Whether we succeed in bringing electoral problem before ACC as means to reinforce our notes, I think we cannot let the Romanian Note of November 2 stand as last document of this exchange. That note calls for reply. Moreover, a reply should be available to the Romanian people before they go to polls. In view of impediments to news distribution in Romania, November 15 is our deadline.

November 10 *Gheorghiu Dej's private conversations with members of the United States Mission*

In two recent private conversations with members of my staff, Gheorghiu-Dej, Communist Minister of Communications, has intimated Government faces serious situation as a result of drouth. He also stressed point that Romania needs help of foreign capital to exploit country's numerous resources which must be exploited to raise local standard of living. He stated Romania wished to establish economic relations with the United States and he was convinced, after discussions in Moscow with leading Soviet officials, that a formula could be worked out whereby

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[*] Cf. *FRUS 1946*. VI, pp. 650-651: Berry to the Secretary of State. Telegram 1047. Secret. US Urgent. Nov. 9.

American capital could be gainfully invested in Romania together with Soviet and Romanian capital.

In second conversation, Gheorghiu-Dej spoke of an official Romanian delegation, possibly including himself, going to United States to discuss ways and means of obtaining a loan of grain to meet country's immediate needs and also general question of American capital being invested in Romania. He put out feelers as to whether our Government would look favorably upon idea of such a delegation, stating that at later date he would present more precisely plans of his Government now under discussion in this connection.

Feeling Department would not desire to have such an official delegation come to US at this time, I have shown no enthusiasm toward the suggestion and would be pleased to have an expression of Department's views so that I can take steps to ward off a formal request from the Romanian Government.

2. Political Trials: 1946, November 11-23

November 11 *Eighty five accused of activity in subversive organizations. First day of trial*

On November 11 trial of Mission employee Elvira Olteanu and Teodor Manicatide of Schuyler's Mission together with 83 accused of activity in subversive organizations was opened before Court Martial presided over by Army General Vasile Atanasiu, assisted by Army Generals Mihail Lascar, Constantin Argeseanu, Radu Cociu Niculescu, and Division General Cretulescu.

After formalities of roll call of accused and over hundred witnesses, defending attorneys raised question of legality of composition of court. Among accused are Army Generals Radescu and Aurel Aldea. According to Romanian Military Penal Code it is mandatory Court be composed of Generals of equal rank with that of accused. Lawyers pointed out General Cretulescu was grade lower in rank than General Aldea and General Codreanu who carried out investigation for indictment was likewise grade lower. Court however upheld claim of Prosecuting Attorney, General Nicolau, that Court was legally composed.

November 12 *Second day of trial*

In second day of trial Court Clerk read Government's Bill of Indictment against each of 85 accused actively in subversive organizations majority of whom including Olteanu and Manicatide were accused of direct complicity in plot to overthrow Government and instigate insurrection of Army. In State's evidence against at least 15 of accused, mention is made of one or the other of the United States Missions in Bucharest or officers thereof with intimations missions or officers had knowledge of, showed interest in, and desire to support financially the subversive organizations, particularly "Black Cloaks." The indictment was read so fast Mission will be unable to report precisely upon this aspect of indictment until permission is given its observers to take notes directly from indictment.

The Prosecuting Attorney and President of the Court were thrown into considerable confusion when two of the most important witnesses for prosecution, Dumitru Steanta alias Oprea and Nicolae Paliacu alias Moldoveanu who are among the accused and suspected of being *Agents Provocateurs* decided to plead not guilty of charges and came to the defense of many of accused.

Under questioning of Prosecuting Attorney and President of Court, defending lawyers and many of accused, Steanta and Paliacu declared in determined and categorical manner organizations "Haiducii lui Avram Iancu" and "Sumanele Negre" which were one and the same consisted only of its leader Gavrila Olteanu, Steanta, Paliacu, and Ghezesanu and that none of other accused charged with having been members in State's indictment were actually members of aforementioned organization. They denied the organization had as its goal disruption of unity of State or insurrection of Army; planning bloody revolt, said they were patriotic Romanians who wished to fight with ideas through word of mouth and printed propaganda rather than arms against foreign influence of Hungarians, Jews, and Communists, particularly in Transylvania, who had no respect for rights and duties of Romanian citizens.

"Manner in which trial is being held"

As indicative of manner in which trial is being held, many of defending lawyers were forbidden entrance to courtroom during morning session. During same morning session President of Court announced decision that each accused could have but one lawyer when defending lawyer protested that Military Penal Code specifically provided that accused could have unlimited number of lawyers, President of Court answered heatedly that laws had been disregarded before and that "we" (meaning the Court) are going to disregard laws in this trial. He evidently had twinge of conscience later for when opening afternoon session he attempted to apologize to courtroom for his statement, stating he had meant it to be taken in jocular vein.

Berry's Nota Bene

As trial of those accused activity in subversive organizations is public, I shall cable daily reports of proceedings in clear language. Since Government and Communist-controlled press has already started sensational front page coverage of trial giving completely one-sided picture emphasizing only those statements which support Government's charges against accused and in view probability Soviet press will do likewise, I consider it most important that Department make Mission's daily reportorial telegrams available for transmission to Romania on Voice of America programs.

Information included in confidential telegrams commenting on certain aspects of trial should not be repeated by Voice of America since this information might endanger lives of lawyers and other opposition party members and could lead Government to refuse admittance of Mission observers to sessions of trial.

November 13 *Concerning "indictment against accused"*

So that Department may follow with facility subsequent daily reports on proceedings of trial there follows a brief résumé of indictment against accused.

Indictment charges that four separate subversive organizations, namely "Haiducii lui Avram Iancu" — "Sumanele Negre" (Black Cloaks), "Organizatia de Resistenta Sinaia" (Resistance Organization Sinaia), "Miscarea Nationala de Resistenta" (National Resistance Movement), and "Graiul Sangelui" (Call of the Blood) were linked with the objective of disrupting the unity of the State, insurrection of the Army, and overthrow of the Government by force.

The indictment implies that the organizations particularly the "Black Cloaks" had numerous members including important officials of National Liberal and National Peasant parties and that these parties actively supported subversive organizations. The State's evidence in the indictment against the majority of those accused of complicity in the organization "Black Cloaks" is based almost entirely on declarations obtained from Dumitru Steanta alias Oprea, Nicolae Paliacu alias Moldoveanu, and Captain Dumitrescu alias Dr. Gherman.

In indictment read by Court Clerk November 12, Mission employee Olteanu charged with having direct contact with leaders of organization "Haiducii lui Avram Iancu" which is one and same with "Black Cloaks;" that she had received manifests for distribution; and that she had indicated to Dumitru Steanta that the American Mission was interested in aforementioned organization.

Elvira Olteanu's statement

In morning session of trial November 13 in answer to questions of President of Court, Olteanu stated she had not taken part in activity of "Black Cloaks" organization of which her uncle Gavrila Olteanu was a leader; that first time she met Dumitru Steanta alias Oprea, acknowledged Secretary General aforementioned organization, was in April 1945 when he brought her personal letter from uncle. She stated she did not maintain close relations with her uncle and did not therefore send him a reply through Steanta. She admitted that on second and last occasion when she saw Steanta in March 1946 at her home he gave her one leaflet which she later tore and burned. She stated that Steanta never discussed with her activity of "Black Cloaks" organization and never asked if Mission was interested in organization. Upon questioning of Court President, Steanta confirmed her statement. Olteanu stated she had never given Steanta or Paliacu money for her uncle or "Black Cloaks" organization. Steanta likewise confirmed this statement. Through President of Court Miss Olteanu asked Steanta whether he had ever visited her at Mission or at her home. Steanta replied that he had never been at Mission and only saw her at her home.

Prosecuting Attorney did not cross-examine Olteanu.

November 14 *Lawyer Georoceanu "have been arrested?"*

Lawyer Georoceanu defending Ilie Lazar, prominent National Peasant Party official, in trial of subversive organization, is reliably reported to have been arrested evening November 12 and he did not appear at trial today. Other lawyers at trial informed officer my staff observing trial that Georoceanu had half dozen very important documents which he intended to introduce in defense his client; that these documents were very damaging to prosecution; and that he was obviously arrested for this reason. Other lawyers afraid to make use of these documents for fear they also will be arrested.

Lawyer Stelian Ionescu's position

Lawyer Stelian Ionescu engaged to defend Mission employee and who likewise defending prominent members Liberal Party appearing as accused in trial was warned today that he was to be arrested at the request of the Soviet authorities. Mission's reporting officer noticed during trial session of November 12 when lawyer Ionescu addressed a few words to Court about liberty and freedom Soviet observer asked person beside him for name of the lawyer and made a notation. Ionescu is known as excellent and famous for his courage in speaking out fearlessly at trials regarding democratic liberties. It is quite likely prosecution and possibly Soviet authorities would like to see him eliminated. He will attempt avoid arrest by sleeping in different homes and proceeding to trial each day together with Mission's official observer.

Conclusions... after first three days of sessions

From individual charges in indictment of those charged with activity in subversive organizations and from statements made by accused during first three days of Court sessions, it is becoming obvious that Ministry of Interior has been working since September, 1945, if not before, to build up evidence that would prove (1) Historical Parties were planning overthrow of Government through subversive and terroristic actions thus meriting dissolution and (2) American and English missions here had knowledge of these plans, supported them, and were thus directly interfering in internal affairs of Romania. It is in this light Department should read Mission's telegrams reporting statements of accused in trial.

November 15 *Interrogation of Captain Dumitrescu ("Dr. Gherman")*

Highlight of November 13th trial session was interrogation of Captain Dumitrescu alias Dr. Gherman. Answering question of Court President, he stated he took part in activity of "Black Cloaks" organization. His position was that of First Counsellor. At same time he was Commander of Gendarmerie in district of Nasaud in Transylvania. After discussion with leader of "Black Cloaks," Gavrila Olteanu, Steanta, and Paliacu, he followed their suggestion to use name of Dr. Gherman.

Since in answer to question on previous day, Dumitrescu stated categorically he had not been member of organization. President of Court asked him why he now stated with equal insistence he was member. President was obviously suspicious of Dumitrescu and gave impression he didn't trust him to tell truth. In reality throughout his interrogation of several hours duration, Dumitrescu contradicted himself repeatedly and made many broad and confusing statements, many of which if true were damaging for cases many of those accused of "Black Cloaks" activity. President of Court gave impression that he was trying to get at real truth and determine for Court's information whether "Black Cloaks" was really sizeable subversive organization and whether those charged in indictment and in Dumitrescu's testimony were actually members thereof.

In answer to President's question, Dumitrescu stated program of organization was as described previously in testimony of Steanta and Paliacu; that he adhered to patriotic ideas of organization and was willing to risk his career, family, and all by joining Gavrila Olteanu, Steanta, and Paliacu in their ideological fight for return of Northern Transylvania and its purification of unhealthy elements who had entered illegally. He informed Steanta and Paliacu he was working for Secret Service of Interior Ministry and would use his position to protect them from arrest. He informed Court that until May 3, 1946, he considered himself member of organization. On this date he told Court Steanta told him he had political discussion with Lt. Hamilton of American Military Mission and he therefore concluded organization was digressing from plan and ideas for which he willing to risk career; that he felt security of State now being involved, intimating that US Mission was actively supporting organization, and that he decided to denounce organization to Ministry of Interior. He claimed he gave his colleagues fair warning so that they could hide. Steanta and Paliacu immediately denied to Court that he had warned them and that until ten minutes before arrest they still had full confidence in him.

President obviously doubted veracity Dumitrescu's statement and gave clear impression he considered him low character. He asked Dumitrescu if he did this with full knowledge of heavy punishment in store for him for his past activity with "Black Cloaks" and whether he considered himself hero. President gave the impression he thought Dumitrescu was agent provocateur and knew he would not be punished. President said "let us review the heavy charges against you" intimating he doubted Dumitrescu willing to accept heavy punishment. At this point Prosecuting Attorney, obviously upset at President's initiative in cross-examination of Dumitrescu, requested recess of Court. When Court reconvened, President, evidently thoroughly chastised and instructed not to embarrass prosecution, did not continue with his pointed tactic of exposing Dumitrescu's role.

Dumitrescu confirmed that "Black Cloaks" organization consisted of only four members when he joined, but that he had been told of Ghezesanu that the organization had eleven generals and twenty-five officers as members. Under cross-examination by President of Paliacu, Dumitrescu forced to admit that latter had told him this story of generals and officers was pure fantasy on part of Ghezesanu. President asked Dumitrescu to tell Court everything he knew about "Black Cloaks" and its members, requesting him to be as frank and truthful as Paliacu. Thereupon Dumitrescu began speaking loosely about what Steanta had told him about the organization's activity progressing; that they were beginning to plan contact with other important political persons; that Steanta had visited Maniu who told him he considered "Black Cloaks" a serious organization and, although he could not personally associate himself with it, was in favor of it, and that on second visit with Maniu, latter had told Steanta to guard carefully the archives of the so-called Maniu guards which could be very compromising if they landed in the wrong hands. He stated that Ionel Pop and Stefan Boeriu had received manifests and organizational plans of "Black Cloaks," etc. President immediately asked Steanta if this statement was true and later denied that any of it was truthful.

Captain Dumitrescu thrown into confusion

At this point many of accused, their lawyers, and President of Court began cross-examining Captain Dumitrescu at the same time. It became clear that Dumitrescu was having difficult time describing convincingly his double role of fellow conspirator with "Black Cloaks" and secret agent of the Interior Ministry. The President of the Court and defending lawyers indicated their conviction that Dumitrescu had been agent of secret police from very beginning. President asked Paliacu and Steanta if they had confidence in Dumitrescu right to the end. They answered in affirmative and Paliacu explained that ten minutes prior to his arrest Dumitrescu had called him on phone and told him to meet at home of Cornel Pop, National Peasant Party member, for important discussion in connection with "Black Cloaks" organization. Paliacu stated that he was subsequently arrested at Cornel Pop home. President of Court and defense lawyers immediately asked Dumitrescu why he picked on home of Cornel Pop for arrest of Paliacu, thus compromising Pop. Dumitrescu was thrown into confusion, stating that this was system of his superiors. Under further questioning he admitted that Pop had been arrested at same time and it thus became clear that Paliacu had been sent there simply to create an excuse for Pop's arrest.

President of Court then pressed Dumitrescu again for information as to who were actually members of "Black Cloaks." Dumitrescu had to admit that there was no register of members but attempted to uphold thesis that all of those arrested in connection therewith did have definite activity in organization. He was immediately bombarded with questions from defense lawyers and President of Court, which resulted in his admitting that he had submitted the list of names of all those arrested as implicated in "Black Cloaks" and that he had not controlled in any way truthfulness of statements concerning activity of the individuals whose names he submitted to Interior Ministry. In other words, no definite evidence existed for their arrest.

November 15 *Statements of two witnesses: General Anton and Mrs. Timica*

Statements of two witnesses in late night session of trial November 15 support comments above.

General Anton, Chief of Gendarmerie under Ministry of Interior appearing as witness for General Aldea, stated in answer Aldea's question that he had received report as early as September, 1945, from Captain Dumitrescu alias Dr. Gherman concerning the "Black Cloaks" activity. He added he had received reports and copies of organization's manifest not only from Dumitrescu but from various provinces in September, 1945.

Most sensational revelation, however, was brought to light in cross-examination of Mrs. Timica, witness for the accused Elena Penescu.

In morning session Penescu withdrew her request for Mrs. Timica to appear as witness. Other accused immediately suspected something wrong, requesting her presence as witness for questioning. Prosecuting Attorney immediately objected and Court decided she would not be called. In evening session for unknown reason witness appeared, was sworn in and the accused Penescu evidently reconsidered on spur of moment her request in morning and addressed question to witness. Witness answering, began to explain that she and Elena Penescu were active in political party. Penescu immediately requested witness not to say too much but only to answer her question. A veritable pandemonium broke loose, defense lawyers demanding that she must remain in witness box until she had been cross-examined, the Prosecuting Attorney demanding she be removed from Court on basis Penescu had withdrawn request for her appearance. President of Court obviously interested himself ordered questioning of witness be continued.

Serving Secret Police

Under ensuing cross-examination by President of Court and lawyers, witness Timica stated she and Elena Penescu were active members of Patriotic Union Party (appendage of Communist Party) serving gratuitously Secret Service of Interior Ministry; that she had met Steanta and Ungureanu in summer of 1945; that she had received from Mr. Zaharia, an official of the Presidency of Council of Ministers, two rubber stamps for delivery to Steanta; that in June, 1945, Steanta visited her, on which occasion she delivered rubber stamps; that he had left briefcase with manifests and sketch of region in Transylvania and he then departed stating he would return in half hour. She stated she and Penescu were suspicious of him and considered "he was not one of ours." She said they then denounced him and Ungureanu to the Police through an American friend, Viorica Flaseriu, then working with the Police in Bucharest, now repatriated to America. At lawyer's request, President of Court asked witness and Steanta to confirm whether rubber stamp on manifests of "Black Cloaks" organization introduced by prosecution as evidence against accused was identical with rubber stamps sent by officials of Presidency to Steanta through witness. Witness stated she was not certain but it looked similar. Steanta however confirmed that it was the stamp. At this point Court was in uproar.

Prosecution, lawyers, accused, and Court President were all speaking at once, lawyers claiming Steanta was thus proven to be agent of Secret Service from very beginning. Steanta shouted he would send to trial the lawyer for this unwarranted charge. Lawyer was standing near Steanta at time and when Court quieted down he announced to Court that Steanta had threatened him, stating, "you will see what I am going to do to you when I get out of here." Lawyer requested Court to take note of this, protesting against such a threat being made by a person on trial for charges calling for 25 years imprisonment and under considerable suspicion of being agent of Secret Police who maltreated and tortured their prisoners as was revealed in trial. President of Court, as emotionally tense as lawyer, informed Steanta that he had heard first statement directed at lawyer, that it was unheard of and inadmissible for an accused person to threaten a lawyer.

Witness then was requested by many of accused to inform Court whether she recognized any other agents of the Secret Police among the accused. Over-ruling objection of Prosecution, Court President ordered witness to answer and she replied she had heard Captain Dumitrescu was likewise an agent of Secret Police.

November 16 *Additional conclusions: "among the accused are at least four agents of Secret Police;" and . . .*

Summarizing evidence resulting from statements thus far made by accused and witnesses in trial, it is clear many of accused were forced while in detention by police commissars to sign dictated false compromising declarations after being tortured morally and physically in manner reminiscent of Spanish Inquisition; that Interior Ministry knew of or created fictitious "Black Cloaks" organization as early as June, 1945; that no arrests were made until May 27, 1946; that among the accused are at least four agents of Secret Police; that there existed in June, 1945, direct connection between one of accused, Dumitru Steanta, agent of Secret Police and Cabinet of Emil Bodnaras, Secretary-General of Presidency and Romanian Communist Politburo member recognized hear of Secret Police; and that one of purposes of trial was to compromise seriously American Missions with charge of direct interference in internal Romanian affairs in manner hostile to Soviet Russia.

At lunch today, Gheorghiu-Dej said some aspects of the trial had been handled in a deplorable manner, that Elvira Olteanu was being considered apart from the others (perhaps explaining why prosecutor did not examine her), and that she will be released soon, perhaps today.

November 17 *Vasile Suteu, Director of State Forestry at Năsăud, cross-examined*

In evening session of trial November 16, Prosecution presented further confirmation my thesis my yesterday's analysis when Prosecution's one and only witness, Vasile Suteu, Director of State Forestry at Nasaud, was cross-examined. Prosecuting Attorney asked witness to tell Court what he knew about subversive organization "Black Cloaks." Witness stated in February, 1945, he received through Marius Pop (National Peasant Party) order from Prefect Stefan Pop to make a certain Muresanu Brigadier of Forestry office at Cosna upon written recommendation of Ionel Pop (nephew of Maniu); on this occasion he met Muresanu at home of Marius Pop at Cosna where he also met for first time Steanta and Paliacu; Muresanu stated he was not Muresanu but Gavrila Olteanu hiding from police and he, together with Steanta and Paliacu, were organizing group called "Black Cloaks" to overthrow Government. He stated Olteanu gave him ten manifests and asked him to join their organization. He did not join but told them if they stayed where they were he would make no trouble for them. He claimed he didn't see them again until April, 1946.

Ionel Pop immediately arose and informed Court he had never made any such recommendation concerning Olteanu alias Muresanu and witness told deliberate lie.

Witness continued testimony stating he met Malin Bocsa together with Steanta; Bocsa informed him organizations "Black Cloaks" and "Haiducii lui Avram Iancu" had fused and Steanta requested him on behalf of Lt. Hamilton and Colonel Hall of American Mission to make some sketches of mountainous regions near Cosna to be used as invasion plans. According to his testimony he then returned to Nasaud where he was visited by Captain Dumitrescu, Commander of Gendarmerie, who told him he noticed "Black Cloaks" organization had changed their original ideas and were working as espionage organization and they discussed what they should do to warn authorities. He said he saw Olteanu, Steanta, and Paliacu again shortly after Easter and Steanta asked him for invasion plans he had promised Bocsa to have ready by June 15, 1946. Steanta immediately denied categorically he had ever spoken to witness about invasion plans. He informed Court that Sutcu had been arrested together with him and demanded explanation why he was not in box with other accused.

At this point witness was bombarded with questions from lawyers, President of Court, and accused requesting him to give precise dates and further clarifications. Witness's answers were so confused and contradictory that President of Court indicated he distrusted truthfulness witness's statements and reminded him of solemn oath to tell truth. Lawyers indignantly described him to Court as agent provocateur of Secret Police and declared it was an insult to the judges and disrespect of most elementary principles of justice for prosecution to introduce such an individual as one and only witness, particularly in view of other agents provocateur uncovered in course of trial.

Atmosphere became so tense in Court that President ordered five minute adjournment so that order and calm could be reestablished. Upon reconvening Court, President requested witness to tell everything he knew from very beginning about "Black Cloaks" organization. Witness reviewed what he had said making changes in certain dates admitting he had agreed to make invasion plans, claiming however he did not actually make them, and sometime after Easter, 1946, following discussion with Captain Dumitrescu, decided to report organization to Interior Ministry. This statement, however, was in obvious conflict with previously established fact during trial that Captain Dumitrescu had denounced organization as early as June, 1945.

President of Court clearly indicating he shared lawyers' indignation, asked witness why he didn't report whereabouts of Olteanu when he first saw him, stating many of accused were being tried for this very same charge of neglecting to report to proper authorities existence of subversive organization.

Ionel Pop and lawyers returning to question of alleged recommendation of giving Olteanu position as forester, stated if Prefect Stefan Pop had issued to witness any such instruction on basis of letter from Ionel Pop, instruction and letter would be in the archives of Prefecture. They demanded Court to bring Prefect to trial together with archives to disprove witness's statement and to have witness tried for perjury. Court refused defense's request, but ordered witness's statement concerning Ionel Pop stricken from records and that witness be held for trial in second lot of thirty-seven people to be tried for activity in subversive organizations.

Berry's inference

Obviously, prosecution's witness Suteu knew only what Secret Police told him to say to involve American Mission and members Historical Parties. However, instead of strengthening Prosecution's case, on contrary this move clearly showed prosecution lacked substantial evidence of guilt of those accused activity in "Black Cloaks," aside from Gavrila Olteanu, Steanta, and Paliacu, and agents of the Secret Police. It also served as support for veracity of declarations of many accused that during their detention agents of Secret Police dictated declarations implicating them in activity of non-existent subversive organizations which they were forced to sign under moral and physical pressure.

To illustrate how local newspapers present picture of trial, I quote *Romania Libera*'s version of Suteu's cross-examination: "Witness Vasile Suteu revealed that Gavrila Olteanu remained hidden under false name of Muresanu at State Forestry of Cosna, appointed Brigadier, thanks to intervention of the accused Ionel Pop. In his hideout, Olteanu together with Paliacu and Steanta began action of organization of "Black Cloaks." Likewise the witness stated, in connection with this action, Malin Bocsa asked him to make detailed map of his region. Recognizing through this request real scope of the conspirators, which included destruction of Romanian State, the witness revealed that he denounced them to authorities."

In his address to Court in evening session of November 16, Public Prosecutor stated in connection with Mission employee Olteanu he was unable, after exhaustive study of available evidence, to find proof of either guilt or innocence and accordingly requested she be tried by another Court.

November 18 *Elvira Olteanu and the Mission's final effort...*

In case of Elvira Olteanu, Court granted Prosecution's request she be tried by another Court but at defending lawyer's request ordered she be placed at liberty until verdict reached in her case.

This decision is result of Mission's final effort just prior commencement trial to obtain her release. Member my staff reviewed all aspects of case with Secretary General Communist Party, Gheorghiu-Dej, who admitted case badly handled by Government and promised use his influence to arrive at satisfactory solution.

In private conversation November 16 Premier Groza and Gheorghiu-Dej assured me Olteanu would be set free. Groza stated this was proof his good faith when he promised me some months ago to do all in his power to release Olteanu.

In reality Court's decision is totally unsatisfactory both for Olteanu and Mission. It means she remains charged of complicity in plot to overthrow Government, promote insurrection of Army, and destroy unit of State and will be under constant surveillance Secret Police subject to arrest at any time on other trumped up charges or for trial with second lot on same charges.

During trial recess yesterday, Olteanu told member my staff, Mr. Bodnaras, Secretary General Presidency, on two occasions during her detention sent personal emissary to her promising her release if she would return to Mission as a member his Secret Service for espionage. She twice refused. The Court's verdict is Mr. Bodnaras' personal verdict with a diabolical twist to keep Olteanu under permanent moral pressure.

Through lawyer, Mission will exert all legal means of appeal to have Olteanu's case reviewed as soon as possible so that decision of guilt or innocence be pronounced.

November 19 *Verdicts pronounced*
Sentences were extremely heavy

On morning of November 18 at end of 23-hour session of trial, verdicts were pronounced. Since trial was rushed through with morning, afternoon and evening sessions to meet deadline of pronouncing verdicts prior to election day, it has been physically impossible to be present and prepare telegrams as planned. Since reports covering important phases of trial not yet covered would be anti-climax now for Voice of America, they will be transmitted by dispatch.

Attorneys Stelian Ionescu and Aurelian Bentoiu

Before a hushed audience and attentive though exhausted Court, Romania's foremost attorneys Stelian Ionescu and Aurelian Bentoiu made courageous, stirring attacks against illegality of trial and utter lack of factual evidence. They exposed what they described as despicable manner in which whole affair organized with synthetic evidence as political attack against Historical Parties and Anglo-Americans at expense of innocent Romanians including some outstanding patriots. They described trial as unprecedented splurge on character and honor of Romanian people and begged court to think of younger generation and to salvage Romania's prestige by delivering a verdict of not guilty for all accused.

General Atanasiu, President of Court

General Atanasiu, showing extreme patience and indicating how heavy his assigned task weighed upon him, conducted a fair trial, granting defense ample time to plead their case, for which lawyers expressed their gratitude.

Prominent accused... and acquittals

For most part, sentences, definitely known to have been dictated in advance, were extremely heavy, 23 verdicts were imprisonments and hard labor for life, most prominent of accused receiving this sentence being: General Aurel Aldea, General Eftimiu, Colonel Plesnila, Lt. Col. Evolceanu, Vintila Bratianu, Mihai Farcasanu, Manicatide, and the suspected agents Steanta and Paliacu. There were ten acquittals, most important being: Ionel Pop, Radu Valsanescu, and agent Secret Police, Captain Dumitrescu. Other sentences ranged from six months to twenty years imprisonment.

Concluding Commentary on General Atanasiu

By way of concluding commentary on trial I relate General Atanasiu's action in trial when he chastised Army officers among the accused, all of whom stated they were tortured to sign false statements and had no qualms about signing them after threats were made their wives would be given Gestapo treatment. They stated, knowing they would finally appear before a high impartial military court, they preferred to sign false statements than to allow civilians commissars to insult them and the uniforms they wore. General Atanasiu asked them how they expected him to believe that officers with decorations for bravery could be quailed by commissars to sign false statements. I have no doubt Atanasiu was subjected to the same moral pressure as were condemned officers to force him to render the previously dictated sentences, but on his conscience rests the knowledge that he allowed himself to be used to condemn innocent fellow-officers and civilians.

November 23 *D. Șteanță and N. Paliacu*

Reliable official source has informed member of staff that Dumitru Steanta and Nicolae Paliacu, condemned to imprisonment and hard labor for life, were actually covered agents of Secret Police. He stated that after a short period of detention they would be allowed to escape from prison and would again roam about the country with subversive material to produce evidence for a new trial against innocent political enemies of the Communists.*

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* For the extensive report — *Romania's First Mass Trial Proclaims Open War to Liquidate Historical Parties* — prepared by Charles E. Hulick Jr., on the Staff of the Representative in Romania, November 26, 1946. Approved by Burton Y. Berry; received by the Division of Foreign Reporting Services of the Department of States on Dec. 11, 1946. See *FRUS 1946*, VI, pp. 658-662.

3. General Developments: 1946, November 9-December 31

November 9 *Regarding continuance "for protection United States property in Romania"*

War Department has informed Department of State that General Schuyler reported by telegram October 23 the request of Soviet Representative ACC that certificates issued by US military representative for protection US property in Romania be withdrawn.

Schuyler suggests that, although he would prefer certificates be retained throughout armistice period he be authorized comply Susaikov's request since no great need now exists retention these certificates.

Before responding War's request for guidance in instructing Schuyler, Department would appreciate your comments regarding advisability continuance protection certificates.

November 10 *"General Schuyler and I agree" that...*

General Schuyler discussed with me question of protection certificates before reporting to War Department. I was in general agreement with him.

As Department knows, protection certificates have been issued by Military Mission to American citizens or companies in which Americans own majority stock. Some people to whom certificates were issued have left country and Romania being what it is there is probability that some certificates have been misused. Russians may have come across such.

General Schuyler and I agree we could contest Soviet request and continue to issue certificates for duration of ACC. However, from practical point of view, we believe that such action in the end would give our friends more trouble than protection. We decided, therefore, subject to

Washington approval that (1) no further certificates will be issued by Military Mission, (2) to check upon outstanding certificates and make effort to take up those which can be located, and (3) certificates will be issued by this Mission to its American employees and by the Military Mission to its American employees.

November 11 *A survey of public opinion... made by a University Professor*

One of Mission's contacts who is member of no political party but professor of social studies in university and counselor of social psychological problems to several large industries,* told me this morning of survey of public opinion he has discreetly made and recently finished.

In three villages near Cluj he found one family out of 24 supporting Government, in five villages near Alba Iulia he found one family in 23 supporting Government, in five villages in Banat he found one family in 27 supporting Government, and in three villages near Brasov, one family in 19 supporting Government.

Among workers in two of Romania's largest industries he found thirty percent of technical workers to be supporting Government, and 5% of non-skilled workers to be supporting Government. He said that as of today opposition had been permitted to file no lists in Hunedoara where is located Petrosani Mines and at Caras where is located Resita works, as this Government, which claims it is based on workers, wished to avoid unpleasant revelation that heavy majority of industrial workers, as well as peasants are against it.

In peasant communities he said Government is trying to inflate its 5% true following into majority through following tactics:

1. Removing opponents from electoral registers,

2. Not distributing bulletins to opponents that are upon registers, and

3. Preventing actual voting of the opponents who do receive bulletins by removing voting places to great distances.

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* Univ. Prof. Nicolae Mărgineanu.

November 12 *Whether supporting the Romanian opposition's* Memo *or not*

The Department has notified me that they are informing the British Government through Embassy in Washington of US agreement to proposal that appeal by Romanian opposition parties to Three Powers be referred to ACC.

Department agrees opinions in my telegram (see page 24).[*] Accordingly when my British colleague has received instructions take parallel or supporting action, I am to request General Schuyler to ask that ACC consider opposition's *Memo* with view to recommending such action as appears warranted in circumstances. In particular, he is authorized request that Commission take steps necessary to ensure all parties right to have representatives at polling places throughout election day and at counting of ballots.

Schuyler is authorized to recall renewed assurances of Romanian Government in note of November 2 that obligations which it assumed pursuant to Moscow Agreement will be fully implemented. Despite possible reply from Soviet Representative that matter is internal affair not properly ACC concern, Schuyler should request issuance to Romanian Government whatever directives requisite to promote free conduct of elections.

Consequently... "no action on ACC"

(November 16): British Embassy Washington has informed Department of State that British Government no longer contemplates ACC action on opposition *Memo* regarding elections. — Consequently General Schuyler, lacking British support, has been instructed not to take action in this regard. (November 17): General Schuyler will take no action on ACC.

November 14 *United States Govt reply-note for delivery to the Romanian Government*

Department's immediately following telegram contains text note for delivery Romanian Government which will be released for publication eleven a.m. Washington time November 16.

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[*] This refers to Berry's original Part III, page 24 corresponding to the present *supra*, p. 512.

Text also communicated British who may wish take similar action.

"I have been instructed to express to you my Government's disappointment with the Romanian Government's reply of November 2 to its Note of October 28 concerning the forthcoming elections in Romania. My Government deeply regrets that the Romanian Government did not see fit to consider the substance of its comments on the electoral preparations but instead sought to avoid a discussion of these observations on the excuse that they did not represent the collective views of the Powers signatory to the Moscow Conference Agreement. My Government has taken note, however, that the Romanian Government has again expressed an intention to implement fully all the obligations which it assumed following the Moscow Conference Agreement to the end that the election may freely express the will and aspirations of the Romanian people and must therefore assume that the Romanian Government shares the view expressed in my Note of October 28 that all parties represented in these elections should participate on equal terms because of the obligations which my Government assumed at Yalta to assist in bringing about the establishment of a government of free men in Romania. Any suggestion that my recent note 'was incompatible with the attributes of a free and sovereign state' is in my Government's view wholly inadmissible. I am constrained to believe that the Romanian people if they could freely express themselves would regard my Government's interest in this matter as a compliance with its obligations under the Yalta Agreement and a welcome manifestation of general American interest in Romania's welfare and progress. My Government desires to assure the Romanian Government that it will not fail in its support for the democratic principles of liberty, freedom, and justice by which the United States endeavors to live and upon which it is convinced the future peace and welfare of the world depend."

November 15: Note delivered at Foreign Office at eight p.m. this evening.

November 16 *"Question of German-looted gold."*

Romanian press November 16 announced formation Anglo-French-American commission to deal with question of German-looted gold.

British Legation has received instructions from London to make joint approach with Mission to Romanian Government concerning return looted gold now in Romanian possession. In view of fact that question is now receiving publicity, Mission would appreciate early instructions if Department contemplates any approach to Romanian Government at this time.

"observing election"

General Schuyler's telegram of November 13 concerns deployment of his men for purpose of observing election. The British Military Mission is coordinating its deployment with General Schuyler's plan.

The Soviet press

After describing strength of Democratic Bloc united in coalition Government, *Pravda*, November 15, major article by V. Soiru is quoted below as received from Moscow:

"Reactionary parties are faithful servants of international cartels, principally Anglo-American Oil Syndicates, and enjoy their political and moral support.

Maniu and Bratianu are openly supporting thesis of 'equal opportunity' in Romania advanced by Anglo-American Bloc at Peace Conference. They are for payment of reparations in dollars or pounds sterling, for complete compensation to Anglo-American companies, for limitation on National Sovereignty in commercial policy and in regard to Danube navigation.

'Historic' Parties have long been accustomed to guarantee thereby of bribery, falsifications, and terror. They do not wish to renounce these methods even now. In many places in province the followers Maniu have sought to prepare falsified lists of voters and ballots.

Electoral campaign cannot be conducted easily under such conditions of friction between progress and reaction between the new which is steadily gaining ground in Romania, and the old which is clinging to its positions with all its strength."

Izvestia features similar article by I. Constantinovski describing "historic" parties as "agents of foreign capital, mouthpiece of 'dollar democracy' in Romania."

November 17 *The American note "as a real atom bomb"*

Department's excellent note to Romanian Government has stiffened morale of all democratic elements. According to Groza, Tatarescu, who had assured his colleagues diplomatic exchange had finished with Romanians having last word, described note as a real American atom bomb. Understand privately Government agreed this morning upon reply which will not be delivered until Monday. It will simply confirm position taken in last Romanian note reaffirming principles of liberty on election day.

November 18 *Text of the Romanian Note signed by Tătărescu*

There follows unofficial Foreign Office translation of note in Romanian signed by Tatarescu delivered to me at 7 p.m. this evening:

"I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your Note of November the 15th, 1946.

The Romanian Government, after having examined its contents most carefully, considers necessary to reassert, in reply, its view set forth in its note of November the 7th, and wishes to assure the United States Government that the democratic principles of freedom and justice invoked in your note are and will remain the constant guidance of its action in the present general elections as well as in the achievement of the great reforms destined to reorganize the basic establishments of the Romanian State.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to you the assurances of my highest consideration."

"Every measure that a totalitarian Government can take has been taken"

The Romanian election will be held tomorrow in an atmosphere carefully prepared by Groza Government to assure for itself an overwhelming victory.

As Department has been informed every measure that a totalitarian government can take has been taken to prevent parties led by Maniu, Bratianu, and Titel Petrescu from registering in elections their true strength.

"fear, fraud, moral and physical oppression"

The weapons of fear, fraud, moral and physical oppression have been used by the Groza Government in pre-election period to a degree beyond what we were capable of imagining a year ago. The commitments taken by Groza Government in accepting the Moscow Conference Agreement have been carried out as a grim parody.

The Government has announced a preliminary report upon elections for noon November 20 and a final report on November 22. I shall transmit a preliminary report as soon as facts are available, and a comprehensive report upon return to Bucharest of the British and American military observers who are scheduled to return on November 22.

Hațieganu and Romniceanu will withdraw

Hatieganu and Romniceanu, representatives of Peasant and Liberal parties in Groza Government will withdraw from Government tomorrow evening or Wednesday morning as protest against failure of Government to make good on obligations it assumed under Moscow Agreement.

Groza told me Saturday some people expected him, win, lose, or draw, to submit collective resignation of his Government after election, but he had no intention to do this as he was a simple man and resignations were complex matters with which simple men should not play.

November 19 *"All employees were instructed to vote for Government..."*

From sources within Foreign Office I learn that at time Romanian latest note was being drafted, all employees were directed to stop their work to hear statement from Director-General. Under orders from Tatarescu, he said all employees were instructed to vote for Government, that it would be easy for Government to determine which employees did not vote for Government, that such employees would be purged immediately after election. Thus, within Tatarescu's own Ministry, we observe how he respects his fine words.

The Department will remark in words "as well as in the achievement of great reforms destined to reorganize the basic establishments of the Romanian State," a new and ominous tone. This will come as no surprise in view of my telegraphic reports, but seeing it in cold print for first time does make a shiver run down one's spine for future of all Romanian democratic elements.

November 20 *Romanian election*... "a travesty"

A "travesty" is the only word I can think of that will even hint at what occurred on the day of Romania's "free and unfettered" elections.*

For all practical purposes, the town yesterday was taken over by the Communist Party. From my windows overlooking Royal Square, I could see from early morning cordons of shabby civilians, with right hands thrust deep into pockets that ill conceal firearm, directing people. Around the corner, the Central headquarters of the National Peasant Party was isolated by a group of these men. And the National Liberal headquarters a few blocks away was similarly isolated.

Groups of Communists with right hands always deep in their pockets stopped and questioned pedestrians. If any of these people indicated other than a Government choice in balloting, the blood flowed immediately. Twice I left my breakfast attracted to window by the screams of men being beaten by gangs.

Through the streets roamed trucks crowded with men and women shouting taunts to Peasants and Liberals. There was little other traffic. The crowds on the sidewalks were tense but restless. Considering the Government's tight election preparations in Bucharest, we were all astonished at the show of force it thought necessary to make.

Throughout the day hundreds of persons called at this Mission and asked to vote, saying local authorities in refusing them voting cards, with mocking seriousness said, "Go to the Americans and vote." After more than two thousand such people quietly formed in line to inscribe their names as protest at American Military Mission, cordon of soldiers from Communist Tudor Vladimirescu Division was thrown around building, effectively isolating it.

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* See also the report prepared by Roy M. Melbourne, "approved by Burton Y. Berry" (*FRUS 1946*, VI, pp. 662-666: Berry to the Secretary of State. No. 1265. Restricted, Nov. 27).

American newspapermen reported seeing official watchers for Peasant Party bodily ejected by Government bloc from one voting place, and instances where ballot boxes were stuffed by Government supporters before permitting watchers for Historic Parties to enter voting premises. A correspondent told me of seeing all voters from one entire village start on foot to its designated voting place fifteen miles away.

Crowning absurdity of day came at ten in evening when John Pittman, correspondent of the *New York Daily Worker*, who arrived in Bucharest yesterday afternoon without benefit of American ACC clearance, broadcast that Romania had just finished the first free election in its history. The fact that the polls could legally remain open for ten hours after he spoke apparently was regarded by Mr. Pittman as inconsequential.

The Soviet press highlights follow:

Moscow reports that *Red Fleet*, November 17, carried major article by I. Konstantinovski, "Romanian Elections and Dollar Diplomacy," highlights follow:

"Elections hiatus certain internal circles are clearly seeking to intervene in Romanian internal affairs. Diplomatic notes are despatched to Romanian Government containing insulting and completely unfounded demands; idea is advanced of sending foreign observers to elections. Reactionary press of British are conducting slander campaign to effect that not all parties in Romania are guaranteed freedom of pre-electoral agitation. This coincides with direct economic pressure hiatus.

Obviously at issue is new display of "dollar diplomacy" policy pursued by those imperialist circles which seek to obtain opportunity 'to dictate their will unimpeded to other states prescribing right and left what they desire' Molotov" (hiatus).

(Article proceeds with detailed account of American and British capital investments in Romania.)

"Naturally, Romania in its present form pleases these circles very little hiatus Romanian masses have resolutely turned away from bankrupt leaders of so-called Historical Parties hiatus.

International finance and industrial circles trusts and cartels which once derived no little profit from Romania have hastened to take 'Historical Parties' under their protection. At Paris Peace Conference representatives of British and United States America sought to impose severe economic terms on Romania. As is known they demanded 100% compensation for damage sustained by foreign firms during war, control over Danube navigation, full realization of principle of 'equal opportunity' for foreign capital, etc. and all these demands were supported by representatives of Romanian historical parties which fostered storm activities in corridor of Luxembourg Palace."

"Foreign circles... latest attempt to impose their will on Romania"

"In connection with forthcoming elections, foreign circles are now making latest attempt to impose their will on Romania. Reactionary Anglo-American press wages unbridled campaign against Romanian capital seeking to smear forthcoming elections in advance by asserting that Maniu and Bratianu are only democrats in Romania. But it is well-known in Romania what sort of 'democracy' is meant. Its inspirers are foreign banks, financial organizations which in past had controlled Romanian finances and now are not loathe to seize upon country's economic hiatus."

November 21 *"Maniu's unexpected show of strength"*

Government's preliminary report on election returns was retarded by Maniu's unexpected show of strength even in the very heart of Government's own organization. From source worthy of confidence, I am told in General Staff Maniu received majority votes, in Communist Teohari Georgescu's own Ministry of Interior, one of every three civil servants dared to vote for Maniu, and in Communist Gheorghiu-Dej Ministry of Communications, Maniu received majority. This situation required considerable reshuffling.

Government had expected that by its tactics of stuffing ballot boxes before opposition poll watchers were permitted in premises, and general use of repeaters, it could afford to let the few opposition supporters that had received voters bulletins vote more or less freely. Apparently, though many of Government's trusted adherents, seeing that they could vote freely, did so, and against Government.

Official returns

Press this morning announced returns from 22 of Romania's 59 counties show Government Bloc had 115 parliamentary seats; the Hungarian Union 12 seats; Maniu's National Peasants nine seats; Dr. Lupu's Democratic Peasants two seats; the Bratianu Liberals no seats, and the Petrescu Socialists no seats.

King Michael's personal advisers... concerning the King's predicament:

This morning King Michael sent me an urgent personal message* asking me to meet privately his Marshal of the Court, his personal Secretary, and an intimate personal adviser. Accompanied by Mr. Melbourne, I dined privately with these three.

All three agreed preparations for elections were undemocratic and results were attained fraudulently. The question that was giving them serious concern was, what should the King do under these circumstances? All agreed in recent months King's popularity had dwindled; that Soviets would continue to tolerate King as long as he remains a political force; that King's acceptance of election results would further seriously undermine his prestige; that when his prestige nears exhaustion, Soviets will lose no time in ridding themselves of him. They reminded me Parliament opens December 1, that custom requires King to read speech from throne at opening. By this act he will commit himself to acceptance of results of fraudulent election and acts of Parliament thereby constituted.

Beyond this point the three were not in agreement.

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* See *FRUS 1946* VI, pp. 653-655: Berry to the Secretary of State. Telegram 1097. Secret, Urgent, Nov. 22.

The King's personal Secretary

The private Secretary stated his view that King had an obligation to Romanian people to refuse to accept results of fraudulent election regardless of any action by Americans and British. He said he realized if King took this stand it would again bring him into open conflict with Government and Soviets, it would increase personal danger, and it might mean his abdication. It would mean, however, that until end of his reign, he had acted in accordance with will of his people. But, if he accepts results of elections, he will be tolerated yet a little longer by Russians, but in the end he would go anyway, and perhaps not much later as he would become at once a King without popular support.

The Marshal of the Court

The Marshal took view it was necessary to continue to play for time. He admitted acceptance of elections by King would very seriously undermine his popularity, but he felt if King could outlast Russian occupation he had even chance of reestablishing his position in minds of his people. He felt King therefore should accept elections and open Parliament unless we and British advised him otherwise. In such case, King would be accepting American-British-Historic Parties' reports on election rather than Government-Soviet reports, and we would have obligation to see matter through as last year we had seen it through by bringing about Moscow Decision after King's attempt to implement Potsdam Agreement had been thwarted. The Marshal felt if we could not guarantee an ultimate arrangement of situation, King irrespective of our action should accept the situation.

An intimate personal adviser

The third Romanian reminded us King by his act of August 23, 1944, made himself symbol of national sovereignty and by his act of August 20, 1945, symbol of national resistance. Since latter date he has lost popularity by decorating Groza, confirming death sentence of Antonescus, cashiering hundreds of career officers from army, accepting electoral law, and publicly associating himself with Soviets. The Romanian said if King now accepts results of elections he would destroy last vestiges of his hold on people and his reason for being. He couldn't be a traitor to himself. He had to refuse to accept elections. At same time Americans and British had no choice but to refuse to accept. Eight notes had been sent to Romanian Government asking fulfillment of promises made and Government had told Anglo-Americans to mind their own business. In view of obligations assumed toward Romania in Yalta, Potsdam, and Moscow, Anglo-Americans could not accept this treatment, and ever again in Eastern Europe champion democratic principles. He concluded King, Americans, and British are in same boat and had to refuse to accept results of election.

Berry's position

I told them I had not yet received full reports upon elections and had made no recommendations to Washington, and had, of course, received no instructions. I said I could not, therefore, make any statement but I hoped within a few days to know attitude of my Government upon elections and I felt sure King's position would receive serious consideration at same time that my report on elections is being considered.

Official censorship

Day prior to elections despite official censorship *Dreptatea* published American Note of November 15 to Romanian Government. To date no other Romanian newspapers have published latest exchange of notes between American and Romanian Governments.

Election Day *Dreptatea* presses were sabotaged although *Liberalul* appeared. Day after elections both unpublished because of censorship and refusal of printers to set type. Immediate future of both papers uncertain with *Dreptatea* threatened with 15 day suspension for printing US note.

Opposition protests and communiques of fraudulent Government election tactics have been refused publication by Interior Ministry. *Liberalul* and *Dreptatea* have been refused right to criticize electoral results or to publish any but official election returns.

American correspondents here have received word cables being delayed at least 24 hours in transmission despite constant prodding of Bucharest by radio company.

November 22 *Official Government figures upon final voting results*

Press today reported official Government figures upon final voting results, giving allocations of the 414 seats in Chamber of Deputies. Democratic Parties' Bloc gained 348 seats, divided among component parties as follows: Social Democrats 78, Tatarescu Liberals 75, Plowmen's Front 70, Communists 68, National Popular Party 27, Dissident National Peasant 21, Independents 7, Jewish Party 2. Hungarian Popular Union, Hungarian nationalist party cooperating with Government Bloc, received 29 seats, and Dr. Lupu's Democratic Peasants 2. The opposition parties received 35 seats, with National Peasants allotted 32 and Bratianu Liberals 3. Petrescu Socialists gained no seats.

Press carries declaration signed by certain foreign press correspondents in Bucharest, including Joseph Klarman of Jewish Telegraph Agency, New York and John Pittman of *Chicago Defender*, alleging voting took place in atmosphere of order, that voters were not submitted to pressure, that watchers from all parties were present at polls and that the secrecy of ballot was observed.

According to the British Mission: "elections were 'a complete fake'"

London Embassy reports that a Foreign Office official today commented as follows on Romania:*

"Reports from British Mission in Bucharest** make it clear that elections were 'a complete fake.' By well-known manipulations of electoral rolls, balloting, and counting of votes, Government has obtained results which in no way accurately reflect sentiments of Romanian people.

Insofar as memberships in new Romanian Parliament is concerned, there is now confidence that Government's seats will be distributed in equal quarters between Communists, Plowmen's Front, Social Democrats, and Tatarescu Liberals. Communists will probably not dare play a dominating role in the membership as they are too unpopular; it would therefore appear that some limits will be set upon any attempts at communization. However, Communists undoubtedly will control Foreign Policy and Police.

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* This text corresponds to "Telegram 2706, Nov. 22, from London to Washington, *non printed*," as it results from *FRUS 1946*, VI, p. 655, n. 48.

** Berry refers to "Mr. Holman's telegram of November 22 to London, repeated to Washington." See *infra*, November 23.

With respect to Monarchy, Communists wish to eliminate King Michael would be extremely difficult of attainment by legal methods or forced abdication because of his personal popularity.

Groza Government has shown considerable vision in its treatment of social problems, land reform, and treatment of minorities. However, this last has been partly a political move by the Government with a view to keeping down its political Romanian-blooded opponents. A great many of the administrative officials in Romania are Hungarian not only in the Hungarian Districts but also in the Romanian. Furthermore, there has been a large enrollment of Jews in the Police force and the reputation of these forces is one of oppression and cruelty.

Jewish position

As regards Jewish position in general, Jews apparently are storing up trouble for themselves in future. Anti-Semitism has never been stronger in Romania than now, largely due to the police methods.

It is difficult to estimate number of Jews in Romania, but it is believed that despite oppression of Iron Guard and Antonescu regime, numbers probably have not decreased because of infiltration, either voluntary or compulsory, from Poland and Russia.

November 23* *Analysis of the elections — Previous reports*

Before considering recommendations which follow, Department should be familiar with General Schuyler's carefully documented reported telegraphed on November 23, based on observation of American officers throughout Romania on election day; Mr. Holman's telegram of November 22 to London repeated to Washington, based upon British observations on election day; the press reports of American correspondents in Romania; my preliminary reports, including Romanian press reports of Government statements, notably my telegrams November 20 through 22, particularly one of November 22 concerning King Michael's predicament.

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* Cf. *FRUS 1946*, VI, pp. 655-657: Berry to the Secretary of State. Telegram 1101. Secret. US Urgent, Nov. 23.

"Such action makes it impossible for us to accept election results"

I feel it would only be tedious to summarize here what has already been reported. Suffice to say Groza Government carried through elections in same spirit as it prepared for elections – in utter disregard for promises given and for elementary decency. In fact Government established new low level for Balkan elections. It blatantly falsified returns, mocking the carefully phrased suggestions of Anglo-American notes. Such action makes it impossible for us to accept election results. We are forced to modify our attitude toward Romanian Government to meet new conditions. In view of this I offer the following minimum recommendations based on what I believe we can do rather than what I would like to see done.

Berry's "minimum recommendations"

(1) American Government, preferably with parallel British action, should state that it considers Romanian elections were not the free and unfettered elections anticipated by Moscow Decision and promised by Groza Government. Such statement will be given widest local circulation if it is a part of our note to Romanian Government. I suggest such a note include no statement about recognition of Government, leaving it understood by fact that we address note to Government that we will continue normal business with it. Since new Parliament meets on December 1 our note should be delivered not later than Friday, November 29.

"I believe effort must be made"

(2) As elections, normal final step in implementation of Moscow Decision, ended in fiasco, I recommend Romanian question be discussed again as early as possible on same level as that which produced Moscow Decision. Because of Soviet attitude, I am no longer hopeful this will bring much improvement locally, unless there is general improvement in American relations with Soviet Union, but I believe effort must be made. We then will have supported Romanian democratic elements by all means

presently within our grasp, and record will show that we exhausted every such means to fulfill commitments we assumed towards Romania at Yalta, Potsdam, and Moscow. Responsibility for failure then in Soviet. Nevertheless, they secure all their Romanian objectives and can realize their further plans such as break-up of opposition in present form and elimination of monarchy.

"I recommend... I be transferred"

(3) I recommend before end of calendar year I be transferred. Although my relations with all political leaders have never been better, I am convinced they will begin to bring a diminishing return. Having been so active politically during the past two years, it will be impossible, with elections what they were, for me to be close to Government without incurring enmity of opposition, or close to opposition without incurring enmity of Government. Because of important political implications, I am making transfers subject of my next following telegram.

"I suggest..."

(4) I suggest officer Department has in mind to become chief of Mission in Romania proceed in near future to Bucharest. Whether he arrives at end of December or early in January, shortly before or shortly after my departure, is immaterial. Upon his taking over, I suggest Mission assume status of Legation, inasmuch as there is now Romanian Legation in Washington, and by that time treaty should be initialed. I feel we could indicate disapproval of Government by making that officer Chargé d'Affaires with personal rank of Minister. The Romanians would be sensitive to such move and at same time flow of our information will not be interrupted nor will it be difficult to name officer Minister Plenipotentiary at more propitious moment. I believe this will require no change in Article 35 of draft Romanian treaty.

In regard to "King Michael's predicament"

(5) I have given very much thought to King Michael's predicament, discussing it thoroughly with members of my staff, and have come to

conclusion that we should offer him no advice as we are not in position to back our advice with other than perhaps last opportunity to proclaim his position and to rally national sentiment before becoming engulfed, since question of changing "basic establishments of state" is unlikely to be presented publicly to him as clearcut issue.

I expect he will ask me to come and see him late in week, at which time he will certainly wish to know American Government's attitude towards elections. I propose to limit myself to stating our attitude and, if asked, say General Schuyler and I will not be present at opening of Parliament as that would give impression American Government had accepted results of elections.

November 24 *Acting Secretary of State Acheson's comments*

Following summary November 22 press conference comments on Romanian elections carried by *Radio Bulletins*:

"Acting Secretary of State Acheson today in commenting on November 19 Romanian election at press conference said that US Government does not view elections as having been free an unfettered. Acheson pointed out that Department does not have complete reports on the elections now but preliminary reports seem to justify US fears of what would occur. Official US notes to Romanian Government on elections have been answered with assurances they would be free. Latest news reports on results show about 5 to 1 lead for Government Bloc. Acting Secretary Acheson would not speculate on what if anything US would do. A newsman pointed out that British Foreign Office spokesman gave press in London grounds for speculation of possibility of withdrawing recognition of Romanian Government but Acheson would not comment on this."

November 25 *NL and NP Cabinet members presented their Cabinet resignation*

Saturday, November 23, National Liberal Cabinet Representative Romniceanu presented his Cabinet resignation to the King, and today Emil Hatieganu, National Peasant Cabinet member, did likewise. Delay of two ministers in returning to Bucharest following elections had deferred actual resignations until now.

British attitude... re: Romanian elections:

London Embassy reports that Foreign Office official today remarked that information from British Representative in Bucharest confirms press accounts of crude manipulations and false results of Romanian elections. Official characterized those as "corrupt in every way."

With respect to British attitude it was expected to continue along present lines. He then remarked that any expression of disapproval in form of breaking relation with Romania would be disadvantageous as it would play into hands of Russians who would like to see departure of British and American Missions from Romania and also from Bulgaria. "It is to our advantage to maintain diplomatic and military missions there for a variety of reasons." He said that diplomatic representation may possibly only act as a brake on Communist and Soviet machinations but it has the positive advantage of keeping the opposition and the King informed of what is going on outside Romania and of strengthening their morale which might collapse if we pulled out. Official added that our Military Mission (not only in Romania but also in Bulgaria) furnish valuable intelligence reports regarding Soviet troop dispositions and conditions in those countries.

November 26

With exception *Dreptatea* which published without submitting censorship and which faces heavy penalties, no paper has yet published either American, British notes of November 15 or Romanian replies.

November 27* *United States Government's views regarding Romanian elections*

Text of Department's press release on Romanian elections issued today and carried by Voice of America is being transmitted to us. I am to inform King of this statement US Government's views regarding those elections if it has not already come to his attention.

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* Cf. *FRUS 1946*, VI, pp. 657-658: The Acting Secretary of State, Acheson, to the Representative in Romania, Berry. Washington, Nov. 26, Telegram 745. Secret. Urgent.

As further step Department is considering sending notes to Soviet and British governments substantially as follows:

(1) Reur reports concerning conduct Romanian elections indicate flagrant abuses despite our previous expressions of apprehension to Romanian Government and receipt of reiterated assurances by that Government. Evidently Groza Government was unable or not disposed abide by assurances.

(2) Consequently US Government cannot consider that Romanian Government has fulfilled promises given Three Powers in implementation Moscow Decisions and does not regard election results as reelecting free and unfettered expression will Romanian people.

(3) Hence US Government conscious of obligations assumed in light subsequent tripartite agreement, urges Soviet and British governments concert with US to formulate joint steps regarding Romanian situation, particularly with view to holding of new elections without delay under condition at present in fact implementation guarantees given by Romanian Government.

(4) US Government will appreciate early response and suggests proposed consultations take place in Moscow between US and UK ambassadors and appropriate representative of Soviet Government. We have informed British Embassy here informally with request Embassy ascertain Foreign Office views in matter. If British Government agrees we would contemplate transmitting notes immediately and publishing them.

While we cannot assume responsibility advising King as to course he should pursue, we have no objection your acquainting him our thinking along foregoing lines if you consider desirable."

"Consequently..."

Text of proposed note follows:

"At the Crimea Conference in 1945 the Governments of the USSR, UK, and US agreed jointly to assist the people of liberated Europe with a view to the earliest possible establishment through free elections of governments responsive to the will of those people; subsequently, pursuant to agreement reached at Moscow in December, 1945, between the same powers, representatives of the Three Governments met in

Romania and obtained assurances from the Romanian Government that the latter would hold free and unfettered elections as soon as possible on the basis of universal and secret ballot. The Romanian Government held elections on November 19, 1946. The Department of State has now received extensive reports concerning the conduct of those elections and the information contained therein makes it abundantly clear that as a result of manipulations of the electoral registers the procedures followed in conducting the balloting and counting of votes as well as by intimidation through terrorism of large democratic elements of the electorate. The franchise was on that occasion effectively denied to important sections of the populations. Consequently the United States Government cannot regard those elections as a compliance by the Romanian Government with the assurances it gave the US, UK, and USSR governments in implementation of the Moscow Decision."

November 27 *Soviet views on Romanian elections*

Izvestiya November 24, reports Embassy Moscow, carries following on Romanian elections:

"First free elections to Romanian Parliament on November 19 will doubtless go down in Romanian history as important landmark on road to country's democratic transformation. Results of Romanian people's expression of free will are logical consequence of celebrated events that have taken place in country in past two years following accession to power of Groza Government.

First thing that was evident to any somewhat impartial observer was unusual activity of Romanian voters. It must be considered that not less than half of them voted for first time.

Second thing to be noted was Romanian people's unanimity in support of Bloc of Democratic Parties.

Elections reveal strengthening of friendship between nationalities inhabiting Romania.

Overwhelming defeat of 'Historical' Parties despite ideological and even diplomatic support from abroad indicates that Romanian people has resolutely entered on path of democratic development."

Pravda and other papers commenting on elections likewise stress three points here mentioned.

November 28* *"Long and frank talk" Berry – King Michael – Queen-Mother*

King Michael asked me to come and see him late this afternoon. Present were King, Queen-Mother, and myself. In course of long and frank talk in which events following coup d'etat were reviewed in detail, King inquired:

"Do you want me to explode a bomb now like I did on August 20 last year? If I do that, I will be a hero to Mr. Maniu and those around him, but that means little to me as I have learned that my popularity with politicians is high only when I do exactly what they want me to do. What truly matters to me, will I be helping the Romanian peasant and will my action help towards an international solution of our problem. It is the peasant I think about first. My mother tells me that wherever she goes, in clinics, dispensaries, workrooms, the little people, sensing something is up, whisper 'Whatever you do, don't let the King leave us.' Now I ask you, will I be helping these people by taking some action that will make my position untenable?

My friends tell me there is no place for Kings in the Soviet system, and this is the last clear-cut issue upon which I can make a stand. They may be right about no place for a person of my profession in the Soviet system, but I think there will be other issues upon which I can provoke a crisis. As I told you, I am not concerned with my popularity, but only with my desire to do the right thing by the Romanian people. You well know my whole inclination is towards the Anglo-American point of view." The King then reviewed events illustrating that circumstances have made Anglo-American efforts for Romania ineffectual. He continued:

"If you can tell me now that your Government will give me more than moral support if I go out on a limb again I will think very seriously about doing so."

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* Cf. *FRUS 1946*, VI, pp. 666-667: Berry's Telegram 1111, Secret, Urgent, Nov. 29.

At this point I asked the King if he had seen Mr. Acheson's statement to the press about the Romanian elections and he replied that he had read it carefully. I then read him the pertinent sections of Department's instruction (see pages 60-61).* He asked me to expand a bit on these statements but I said in reading the telegram I had given him all the information that I had, and therefore any interpretation he wanted to put upon it should be his rather than mine. He then continued:

"It should not come as a suggestion from me, but when your Government asks the British and the Soviets to review the Romanian situation, why don't you three agree to have the opening of Parliament postponed until your talks are held.

Under the Constitution, I am not a judge of the validity of elections. I can postpone the opening of an elected Parliament for 30 days, and then it opens automatically. I must appear in Parliament on the opening day and read a message from the throne. I can dissolve Parliament after it is assembled. I can't constitutionally do more."

"I have no choice but to stay by my people..." "However..."

"Romniceanu (Liberal Minister of State) has suggested that I take an injection to provoke fever so that I cannot be present at the opening of Parliament and hence cannot be accused of sponsoring it. I am not going to do this, as it seems to me a cheap evasion. If your Government delivers a note to the Romanian Government before Parliament opens, I shall ask Tatarescu (Minister of Foreign Affairs) to inquire of you and the British and Soviets if you are satisfied with the Groza implementation of the Moscow Agreement. If the Soviets say 'yes' and you and the British 'no' I shall insist upon Susaikov telling me so himself. If Susaikov acts as Vyshinski did in February, 1944 [1945] it seems to me under the circumstances in which we in Romania live today I have no choice but to stay by my people and that means opening the Parliament in person. I repeat however that if you can say on behalf of your Government that you are in a position to give me more than moral support, I may very well act differently."

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[*] These pages 60–61 refer to Berry's original Part III, November 27. They correspond to the present *supra*, pp. 550–552.

November 29 *Personal interview Maniu — Berry*

Mr. Maniu told me this evening in personal interview[*] he had advised the King not to open Parliament December 1 in view of completely fraudulent nature of elections. As leader of most popular political party in country he suggested to King that latter defer Parliament opening until he could inquire of Three Moscow Agreement signatories or United Nations as to their views upon elections.

As protest against manner in which elections were held, Maniu said to me members of Peasant and Liberal parties elected to Parliament were not expected to take their seats. Liberals already have issued formal communique on subject and his party would shortly follow.

If the King opens Parliament

Reverting to King's position, Maniu said he personally was monarchist, that twice in his life he had opportunity to abolish Monarchy but did not do so. Today the King by agreeing to acts of Groza Government has given the Army and State administration to Communists and that if he opens Parliament he will give the legislature as well, thus forfeiting every prop to the continuance of constitutional regime. By doing so, Maniu felt King would create great chasm between himself and people, since he would be of further use to no one but the Russians.

On Berry's potential successor

Bucharest newspapers published quotation from November 4 *Newsweek* stating I shall soon be recalled and Rudolf Schoenfeld[**] will be nominated American Minister here.

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[*] According to Serdici statement at the interview dated, 28 or 29 Nov. 1946: at the American Mission Maniu came with Nicolae Penescu and Berry was together with Melbourne. Maniu's interpreter was Vasile Serdici. Cf. *Teroarea. Documente ale procesului*... pp. 132-133.

[**] For the matter of that, events were postponed as follows: 1. "At his press conference on July 23 (1947), the Secretary of State — George C. Marshall — isued a statement regarding the nomination of Rudolph E. Schoenfeld to be Minister to Romania" (*FRUS 1947*, IV, p. 492); 2. The Senate confirmed nomination on July 29 (*Ibid.* p. 493); 3. "On Sept. 25 Minister Rudolf E. Schoenfeld presented his credentials to King Mihai and assumed charge of the Legation in Romania" (*Ibid.* p. 499).

November 30 *"Reconstructed Romanian Cabinet"*

Reconstructed Romanian Cabinet announced by today's press through communique issued by Political Board of Democratic Parties Bloc. Newly appointed Ministers took oath of office before King last evening and Undersecretaries were to do so before Premier today. Communists, Dissident Liberals, Plowmen's Front, and Social Democrats were each to receive four ministerial posts and three under-secretaryships, excepting Social Democrats who receive four ministries and two under-secretaryships. Among under-secretary appointments, Emil Bodnaras, Communist, is named to post in Prime Minister's Executive office. National Popular Party and Alexandrescu Dissident National Peasants reported refusing to accept ministerial posts offered them, would continue their support for DPB program.

List of Groza Cabinet

List of Ministers follows: Prime Minister, Petre Groza, Plowmen's Front; Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, Gheorghe Tatarescu, Dissident National Liberal; Interior, Teohari Georgescu, Communist; Communications, N. Profiri, Communist; Justice, Lucretiu Patrascanu, Communist; Trade and Industry, Gheorghiu-Dej, Communist; Education, Stefan Voitec, Social Democrat; Labor and Social Insurance, Lotar Radaceanu, Social Democrat; Oil and Mines, Tudor Ionescu, Social Democrat; Finance, Al. Alexandrini, Dissident Liberal; Public Works, Gheorghe Vantu, Dissident Liberal; Arts, Ion Pas, Social Democrat; Agriculture, Traian Savulescu, Plowmen's Front; Cooperation, Romulus Zaroni, Plowmen's Front; Information, Octav Livezeanu, Plowmen's Front; Cults, Radu Roscule, Dissident Liberal; Public Health, Florica Bagdasar, no party; technician, but formerly of National Popular Party; War, General Lascar Mihail, organizer with Ana Pauker of Tudor Vladimirescu Division, unaffiliated.

December 1 *"Prospect of Anglo-American prestige..."*

French Minister informs me Romanian Foreign Office received from its representative in Washington Mr. Acheson's statement on Romanian elections. Expecting this statement to be followed by a stern note it stood by until late the evening of October 29th awaiting note. When none came Government sighed with relief and went ahead with its plans believing American attitude had softened in face of Soviet pressure.

British Minister tells me he has informed his Government he sees no reason for him to remain here in view of negative British post-election attitude. He believes Groza Government now is in position to promise us anything, and get by with it. Certainly today prospect of Anglo-American prestige and influence in Romania is darker than I have ever seen it.

UK Foreign Office does not favor
US Depart. of State November 27 proposal

British Embassy here has informed United States Department of State that Foreign Office does not favor proposal set forth in Department telegram (see pages 60-61)* on grounds that (1) it would achieve no practical effect; (2) result of probable Soviet response would only augment impression of United States, United Kingdom impotence.

Department has decided not to proceed contemplated course.

December 2 *The King "celebrating anniversary of union of Transylvania"... and opening of Parliament*

After morning Te Deum celebrating anniversary of union of Transylvania with Old Kingdom attended by King and members of Government, the King proceeded to Chamber of Deputies at noon where he delivered traditional message from throne.

After stating pleasure at being present, Sovereign expressed sentiments for Romanian Army and Red Army. King made repeated references to bills "my Government will submit" to Parliament, notably economic measures. Emphasizing that Romania desires closest understanding with Soviet Union, King stated Government also will seek friendliest relations with other United Nations and neighboring countries. He concluded that following Peace Treaty Romania will be able to claim admittance to UNO by accepting its principles.

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* See *supra*, pp. 550–552.

December 3* *Government "severely disillusioned by paucity of support received"*

From political hubbub of election aftermath certain facts have emerged. Government was severely disillusioned by paucity of support received from what it had considered to be most trusted elements, while being rudely shocked by strength of political outcry against regime. Opposition, on other hand, was very surprised and gratified by surge of country support in face of every conceivable Government-imposed pressure. Strong national feeling demonstrated by elections may eliminate future constituent assembly election, with constitutional changes now likely to be work of existing Parliament.

Private sources, basing estimates on reliable information, assert Government received only 8% of votes cast, aside from Hungarian Popular Union which will work with Government and which received about 9% of vote total. It should not be forgotten immense support for political opposition, with National Peasants alone receiving estimated 70% of total vote cast, was compiled despite elimination 30 to 50% of electorate through non-inclusion in electoral lists and withholding of voting cards. Balance was somewhat redressed by multiple votes of ostensibly staunch Government contingents who in secrecy of voting booth went for Maniu. Most striking instance reported was that of Bucharest gendarmerie, whose 3,000 personnel voted at headquarters after political harangue by commanding general. Actual polling results showed not single vote for DPB, so Commanding General and staff officers were obliged to rectify in slight fashion this evidence of their unanimous defection.

"Instructions from Moscow to falsify results"

So stunned were Romanian Communists by true poll figures reaching Bucharest that they felt it inconceivable disaster could be concealed. Comintern group of Ana Pauker, Laszlo Luca, and Bodnaras heartened their Romanian comrades and asked for and received instructions from Moscow to falsify results at all costs on basis of pre-determined policy. Although press reports have been published concerning popular vote by districts, no authoritative count has even yet been published in *Official Gazette*. Communist circles in viewing state of public mind consider unless substantial new factors arise to change picture, it will be needlessly difficult to hold subsequent election for constituent assembly to revise constitution as originally envisaged in Communist time schedule. Present Chamber of Deputies is expected later to shoulder that function.

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* See *FRUS 1946*, VI, pp. 668-669: Berry to Secretary of State, Telegram 1124, Secret.

December 4 *Puppet and Dissident parties*

To meet problem of no Parliamentary opposition since National Peasant and National Liberal deputies have abstained from attendance, Government has created own sponsored loyal opposition. Puppet National Popular and Dissident National Peasant parties following Cabinet reorganization issued statements of inability to accept posts offered since they felt they deserved better. Statements added parties expected to collaborate with regime upon DPB program but would offer constructive criticism of Government's action.

December 5 *Romanian present gold holdings*

On December 3 the Department advised me to inform my British, French colleagues United States desires and is prepared participate tripartite program urging Romanian Government fully comply without further delay request complete gold investigation, abstention by Romania from use its present gold holdings, and the ultimate disposition of looted gold acquired by Romania in accordance with Paris reparations act, Part III.

I am to inform Swiss Representative that, as explained in Schuyler's letter, no ACC approval was obtained by Romanian Government for use of gold as collateral Swiss loan and United States therefore must reiterate its position opposing use gold, prior conclusion satisfactory gold agreement, by any nation which has acquired tainted gold.

However, United Kingdom, French representatives should be requested delay approach Romanian Government pending final arrangements for joint intervention. Matter being discussed with British, French delegations CFM New York. I will receive instructions as soon as decision is made.

December 6 *"upon methods used in recent Romanian elections..."*

Polish Minister has been urgently recalled to Warsaw to give his Government details upon methods used in recent Romanian elections. Details have been furnished by Interior Minister and other Romanian Communist officials.

December 7 *British remarks regarding King Michael's opening of Parliament*

London reports that a Foreign Office official on December 4 made following remarks to Embassy regarding King Michael's opening of Parliament:

"British Representative in Bucharest is of opinion that King made tactical error in opening Parliament because his action would seem to indicate his acceptance of the false electoral returns and lessen his popularity. Foreign Office, however, believes that Michael took correct step. Had he not reopened Parliament there would have been an impasse and he might well have been dethroned with result that he would have been as impotent as King Peter with no chance of returning. As long as Michael remains his popularity will remain very considerable, and he will be in position to render service to his country and indeed to circumvent extreme Communist and Russian plans for Romania."

December 9 *Re: Maniu's statement, November 30*

Dreptatea December 7 printed speech by Maniu made before Peasant Party Executive Committee November 30 which stated he had advised King not to open Parliament December 1. Contrary to official results, Maniu declared elections showed overwhelming popularity his party, and asked that it be "entrusted with the direction of Public Affairs."

For future Maniu added party knew how to deal with men and states. "It fears no adversary and it is not impressed by their force... The Romanian nation has always had adversaries. The power of adversaries does not frighten us. Great and powerful states have invaded our country in the past. Their strength was terrifying and it seemed as if they would last forever. Nevertheless, they fell and the Romanian nation survived the oppression."

Government press commenting upon published statement treated it as Fascist in spirit and made comparisons of Maniu with Marshal Antonescu and Hitler.

December 16* *Long conversation with Gheorghiu-Dej and the latter's intention to go to US*

From three hour general conversation with Minister of National Economy Gheorghiu-Dej and his Under-secretary, Maurer, it was evident Government is extremely disturbed over prospects of wide-spread famine this winter. The Minister said enough food exists by severe rationing to last through January. Unless adequate help arrives then, starvation will be general. He said there has already been trouble in Moldavia and he anticipated growing unrest. He hinted opposition leaders are stirring up trouble and indicated he was by no means certain Government could maintain order.

Minister again said he would like to go to United States to try to negotiate purchase or loan of sufficient amount of corn to tide Romania over until next cereal harvest (see page 25).** I suggested it might be better to postpone consideration of such trip until after signing of peace treaty. He replied that normally such was true but because of grave emergency one couldn't wait for normal processes.

As Department knows, Gheorghiu-Dej is Secretary-General of Romanian Communist Party. He is unassuming acting, sincere appearing person whose education has been limited to his experience and what books he could read while in prison. He has an open mind and is impressed by material achievement. Taking long view, I am inclined to think we would benefit more than lose by his educational trip to United States. I shall appreciate Department's views.

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* See *FRUS 1946*, VI, pp. 669-670: Berry to the Secretary of State. Telegram 1148. Secret, Dec. 16.

** This corresponds to the present *supra*, pp. 514–515 (1946, November 10).

December 17* *Private conversation with Premier Groza.*

Prime Minister Groza asked me to call at his house last evening for private talk. He opened conversation saying he had been informed I was leaving Romania soon and he wished private talk before the formal farewell. Circumstances, he said, had made me his adversary for more time than I had been his supporter; that I had delivered him some hard blows, but no foul ones, therefore I left Romania with his respect and my successor would take over in favorable atmosphere. He concluded subject by saying we had been through much together, and he was sincerely sorry I was going. I replied I had no instruction concerning my departure but I assumed my mission was nearing completion as Armistice period was ending.

Prime Minister in best form launched into two hour performance of now celebrated Groza act in which he touched upon most of Romania's problems. Most significant was his discussion of economic problems.

"His discussion of economic problems:"

He said in recent reallotment of Ministries, he had maneuvered Liberals out of their traditional stronghold in Ministries of Finance and National Economy and had substituted Communists. He claimed Communists had required persuasion before agreeing to take over these Ministries. He explained Liberals, Peasants, and even he himself could not succeed in economics at this time, where Communists might. Success required importation of large quantities of cereals. To get funds to pay for cereals it is necessary to export large quantities of petroleum. Only Romanian Communists could persuade Moscow to relax Armistice deliveries and permit exportation of sufficient oil products. His politics, therefore, had been directed toward involving prestige of Romanian Communist Party, feeling Soviets couldn't let down local Communists without ruining Communist position in Romania.

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* *FRUS 1946*. VI, pp. 670-671: Berry to the Secretary of State. Telegram 1153, Top Secret. Urgent. Dec. 17.

Prime Minister said there were Swiss and Swedish projects to finance purchase of grain in America but he favored none of these, as they would only increase cost to Romania. Moreover, if they succeeded, deliveries would be so delayed Communists might claim America was sabotaging deliveries. His own plan was for Gheorghiu-Dej to go to Moscow at once to get relaxation of Armistice deliveries so Romania might export petroleum products to Mediterranean area. These would be sold for dollars which would be used to purchase American grain. He asked my opinion. I said we desired resumption of normal trade and in addition to his plan I thought progress might be made if Government would facilitate granting of clearances to American businessmen.

And his declaration of principles

Mr. Groza affirmed his loyalty to Monarchy, his respect for Mr. Maniu as great historical character and described the preoccupation of Romanian peasant to be (1) preservation of Monarchy, (2) securing food for winter, (3) avoidance of Kolhoz, and (4) resentment against Jews.

December 18 *Gaston Marin sent to ask advice re: loan of corn*

Gaston Marin, Cabinet Chief of Minister Gheorghiu-Dej, called, being sent by his Minister to ask advice. He said there was no use hiding facts. The fact is Romanian Government is at end of its rope in trying to obtain necessary cereals to provide minimum food ration to population. He said matter couldn't wait, as I had suggested to Gheorghiu-Dej on Saturday, and be handled in normal way after signature of treaty. He asked if it was advisable to address formal note to American Government requesting loan of corn, saying Minister was disturbed formal note would bring flat refusal which would be embarrassing and undesirable.

Berry's suggestions

I said I had informed Department of conversations but had no instructions and therefore couldn't inform him officially of attitude of my Government, but I felt Minister could learn American attitude if he would ask Romanian Legation Washington to have conversation in Department and frankly expose problem. It seemed to me precedent for solution of present problem was to be found in Romanian action last year. Department will recall Romanian Government then secured relaxation of grain deliveries to Soviet Union under Armistice on promise to repay grain loan later with interest. I inquired why not this year secure relaxation of petroleum deliveries under Armistice, export this petroleum to Mediterranean area and, with cash obtained, purchase grain in US. This would further our desire to reopen trade and Romania will get needed grain. I said Department would likely inquire if Romanian Government had explored such possibilities. It would likely inquire why American businessmen desiring to come to Romania met excessive delays in clearances and sometimes were refused admission, as such tactics prevented the normal movement of business and aggravated solution of abnormal conditions such as presently exist. I suggested too Romanian Government bear in mind it knew as early as last August of needs of this winter and yet only today, December 18, it makes preliminary direct approaches looking towards solution.

December 19 *"One million tons of corn"*

From Agricullture. Romanian representatives in Washington have requested from IEFC an allocation of one million tons of corn and possibly other grains based on short domestic crop due to drought and reported inability of USSR to furnish any relief. Advise us of your appraisal of cereal situation, including estimate December 1, 1946, stocks. Mostly indigenous collections rural and urban population. Daily cereal rations by categories of consumers and number of consumers in each category, including allowance for self suppliers. Comment on ability of Romanian Government to effectuate orderly distribution to needy areas of any imports and position regarding use of indigenous supplies by occupying forces. Similar request for appraisal being made by united reply desired by December 27 for use in further discussions with Romanians here. World available cereal supplies are so inadequate to meet world demand especially during next few months that only the most fully justified and supported requests can be given serious consideration. Romanian representatives are requesting Bucharest to collaborate fully in making all information freely available to you.

December 20* *Gheorghiu Dej proposed official visit...*

Concerning approach of Gheorghiu-Dej, the Department informs me that it views with misgiving proposed visit US this time by him or official Romanian economic mission for purpose stated (see pages 25 and 70).** Because possible repercussions from revolts such a visit whether averse or to some extent successful, Department is reluctant to give proposal indication of encouragement.

(1) Official Romanian request for corn has been made through Legation here to International Emergency Food Council and question allocation will be considered by this international body of experts on basic need and supply in relation all other applications for which available shippable supply apparently will not suffice.

"No purpose Romanian officials coming to discuss..."

Malaxa and Ausnit have pressed corn question in official and commercial circles here and have received above information. We see no purpose Romanian officials coming to discuss corn since questions of overseas needs, supply, and transportation will be determinative. Matter is not one of negotiation. Romanian authorities should be so informed. If any corn should be allocated Romania subsequent proposed official visit, Groza Government and/or Communists would claim credit. If we extend Romanian authorities any hope in connection visit for this purpose and no corn should be allocated they would probably employ failure against US.

"Suggested purpose...
seems hardly practicable"

(2) Suggested purpose of discussing ways to attract investment American capital in Romania seems hardly practicable in view current treatment American interests there. You may in your discretion advise Romanian

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* See *FRUS 1946*, VI, pp. 671-672: The Secretary of State, Byrnes, to Berry. Telegram 786. Secret. US Urgent, Washington, Dec. 20.

** See *supra*, pp. 514–515: 1946 Nov. 10 (Gheorghiu Dej private conversation with members of the US Mission); and pp. 561-562: 1946, Dec. 16 (long conversation with Gheorghiu Dej).

officials that before expressing our views regard visit Romanian Economic Mission for this purpose we would like some indication what they are prepared to suggest of interest to American capital which for obvious reasons is skeptical. Fruitful discussion further American investments in Romania depends on satisfactory settlement present Romanian obligations regarding American investors. Romanian officials should be informed that there can be no expectation at this time official US loans. We are not disposed discourage trip undertaken by Romanians on own initiative provided no implication sponsorship by US Government and provided purposes limited to negotiations with private business interests here.

(3) Department will follow with interest developments in plan (see page 72)[*] for Moscow trip by Gheorghiu-Dej to obtain Soviet permission for exports.

December 21 Dreptatea *suspended indefinitely*

National Peasant paper *Dreptatea* was suspended for three days beginning December 18 in view of publication December 17 of National Peasant appeal to nation which was strong attack upon Groza Government. Authorities objected to last portion of appeal which they considered couched in terms inciting public to disorder. Today *Dreptatea* was informed that it has been indefinitely suspended and authorities are considering its permanent suppression.

December 22 *Survey of people's reaction*

The same contact who furnished Mission with professional pre-election survey of Government's popularity I asked to make survey of people's reaction to election and food shortages. He reports: both in villages and in industrial plants people consider elections triumph of popular will in mass demonstration which Government found itself hard put to conceal. In some aspects people are cocky in considering they managed to defy Government and show up its complete weakness.

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[*] *Supra*, p. 563 (December 17).

With difficulties surging to fore is economic field Transylvanians are resigned to growing economic chaos which they hope will result in corresponding political bankruptcy of Government. Much talk is heard of what may happen to authorities if the present downward trend economically and politically continues. Among peasants criticism is confirmed to Communists and among workers to General Confederation of Labor. If offers rising possibility of violence and anti-Government outbreaks. With this in mind these people at present would not greet any American food aid to Romania as complete blessing, feeling such was American act to bolster present Government. This remarkable viewpoint is explained as deriving from fact peasants in Transylvania are eating fairly well and will easily have enough to last through lean months, while city workers, at least 80 percent of whom are of peasant stock, if there are food difficulties with commissaries, can secure food from their land-dwelling relatives. In fact, informant maintains he heard of food difficulties, only in part of Moldavia and in Bucharest. He believes peasants throughout country will be able very well to take care of themselves this winter and spring, since they have sold comparatively little of their food supplies to Government agencies.

Government's lack of support

Informant states Government today is in much weaker position than before elections. Its lack of support is known to entire public and administratively there is growing disrespect for its decrees. With increasing economic difficulties source expects Government will continue to lose support to point where by Easter it can count on barely one percent of public.

With such progressing dim prospects Government is facing greatest crisis. Informant said he did not overlook fact Communist leaders, abandoning all hope since elections of establishing smooth-running Romanian regime, were really not as seriously concerned about general prospect as they give impression, feeling elections showed presence of Red Army was absolutely necessary to maintain facade of existing regime. Moreover, forthcoming possibility of outbreaks would furnish needed pretext to maintain numerous Soviet troops in Romania.

December 23 *Re: Mihalache's request*

I suggested to General Schuyler he transmit Mr. Mihalache's request without recommendation inasmuch as I was not acquainted with present thinking of Department upon this subject and I felt decision should be made by State rather than War Department as to whether American services assist Mihalache.

December 24 *Romanian Government request for corn*

Following report from Westley in answer to Department's request (see page 73)* from Agriculture should be studied in connection with General Schuyler's and my reports.

Governmental collections of cereals wholly inadequate for cities and drought area. Famine reported serious in 30 percent of country. Attempted reduction of cereals December 15 from 350 grams to 250 grams wheat and corn with potatoes to be substituted cannot be enforced by present Government. Workers divided into categories by factory committees and hard workers to receive supplemental rations.

Orderly distribution by present Government absolutely impossible and only trial shipment with definite instructions and restrictions should be made. Adequate supervision cannot be given. Local supervision may be better than national supervision. There is no guarantee against diversion of shipments nor black market operations.

Fairly adequate internal transportation by rail, army trucks, and requisitioned trucks believed possible unless heavy snows block roads. Estimated 200,000 occupational forces using approximately six pounds of food per person per day.

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* *Supra*, p. 564 (December 19).

December 26 *Department's views regarding Romania's request for corn, and official delegation*

Today in talk with Minister Gheorghiu-Dej, I appraised him of Department's views regarding Romania's request for corn and his desire to send official commercial delegation to the United States.

In reply to my question as to what progress he was making, Soviet authorities with respect to reduction of Armistice deliveries to permit Romania to export petroleum products, Dej stated Moscow had not yet agreed to receive Romanian economic delegation.

Dej explained Romanian Government had twice followed up its original request and reply probably had been delayed because of absence from Moscow of Molotov and Vyshinski. Soon now he expects favorable reply and thought delegation would go to Moscow sometime during January. He told me delegation intended to put all cards on table at Moscow concerning Romania's difficult economic and financial situation and he was optimistic Moscow would make necessary concessions to permit Romania to export oil products. He promised to keep me informed of development of plans.

December 27 *Restitution of Danubian craft... postponed*

Concerning restitution of Danubian craft owned by former satellites of Germany, it is interesting that Romanians when pressed to take action, told General Schuyler's Executive Officer that due to advanced season they considered it undesirable to initiate restitution before spring. The spokesman added an illuminating off-the-record comment that Romanians didn't want their craft now as they would only be taken by Soviet forces of occupation.

December 28 *Concerning nationalization of National Bank*

Department drafting press release calling attention to nationalization National Bank and requirement that shareholders register their interest for purpose of receiving compensation. Please advise urgently whether (1) 10 day period for registration runs from date of passage bill for nationalization or from effective date of nationalization which Department understands is January 1, and (2) registration by American shareholders if any resident in United States may be made with Romanian Legation here. If no provision made for latter you should request Romanian Government to permit registration of such holdings with Romanian Mission here instead of in Romania.

Department will take up question of protection of any American interest informally with Romanian Legation. You should, however, also inform appropriate Romanian authorities that United States reserves all rights respecting compensation being made to any American interests which may hold shares in National Bank.

December 30 *Edouard Worms' financial influence*

Mission informed by Edouard Worms while on visit here expected sail on "Queen Mary" on December 28 for business visit to US. Worms is French citizen of Hebrew faith who owns "La grande Maison Le Blanc" at Paris, the Titan cement works in Romania, largest of its kind in Europe, and has heavy investments in French Morocco.

Worms is frank admirer of Groza Government, particularly Communist elements thereof, during Peace Conference in Paris he used his financial influence to promote favorable press for Romania. While in Romania he requested and was granted interview with officer of Mission. Purpose his interview was to convince Mission of sound qualities Communist members Groza Government and to act as their spokesman to persuade Mission great opportunities existed for profitable investment of American capital in Romania under stable regime of Communist-controlled Government. He based his arguments on his experience, as heavy industrial investor in Romania, with Liberal and Peasant governments of past twenty-five years.

Worms frankly stated he planned while in US to discuss with American financial and commercial circles investment opportunities in Romania. He even hinted he would try reach high Government circles in effort prove present Romanian Government was misunderstood, was truly democratic, and great improvement over past governments, and deserving of support and confidence of American Government.

He mentioned making contact at Paris with representative of former Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau[*] and will undoubtedly make contact with latter in US.

Although Mission has no evidence Worms is member of Communist Party, his relations with Communists here are intimate, and he is certainly "fellow traveler." Strictly confidentially it is known he has been negotiating to sell all or half his interest in Titan Cement Works to Romanian Communist Party. Worms indicated he maintains close relations with French Secret Service and informed member of Mission young Frenchman he left behind as administrative delegate is member French Secret Service.

It is believed Department may wish to obtain reports upon activities of Worms while in the US.

December 31 *Intentions after signing of Peace Treaty on February 10*

General Schuyler reported by his telegram of December 26 that General Susaikov had informed AVM Stevenson he was drastically cutting his ACC personnel preparatory to moving out on short notice after signing of Peace Treaty on February 10.

From the political point of view it is important American delegation on ACC not linger after Soviet departure. I hope therefore Department will come to early decision with War Department as to date of American withdrawal and give General Schuyler at least one month notice for liquidating his command.

Special problems for this Mission arising through withdrawal of American delegation of ACC will be submitted to Department by separate messages.

Captain Karpe who I understand is Naval Attache designate tells me his assistant Lt. Sivess stationed at Constanza will soon be reassigned. He warned me we can expect heavy pilferage on all shipments passing through Constanza unless Lt. Sivess remains or is replaced. He said Navy Department likely will feel it is unnecessary to maintain officer at

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[*] Morgenthau, Henry, Jr., Secretary of the Treasury to July 22, 1945.

Constanza after Armistice period ends and if State Department did not expect to establish Consulate there we should at least rent Sivess house to have place for State officer sent there temporarily for shipments, as practically entire town is used by Soviet authorities.

My French colleague inquired today if there were any developments on Romanian gold situation.

4. Food, Oil, and Gold Problems: 1947* January 1-May 20

January 1 *In search of a new Counselor of Embassy to New Delhi*

["]We are seeking highly qualified political officer for Counselor of Embassy recently established New Delhi. We regard this as one of most dynamic assignments in Foreign Service at this time. Emergence this potential great power of 400 million from status dependency to one of complete self government, with consequent necessity orienting its entire foreign policy toward rest of word, affords unique opportunity for constructive work to Senior FSO.

Your background and experience, in particular knowledge you have recently gained of various great political and social world currents, which are sweeping around, and to an extent through India, qualify you in our opinion for this important assignment and we hope you would be willing accept it as real challenge. We are approaching you thus informally before submitting your name to FP and hope you will give us your reaction soon as possible.["]

January 2 *Berry's negative reply*

["]I deeply appreciate your generous remarks and the manner in which you have approached me. I hope you will read my telegrams of

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* Year corresponding to "Efforts by the United States to secure the implementation of the Treaties of Peace with Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania;" "Efforts by the United States to assist in the establishment of a democratic and independent Romania and to assure fulfillment of war time and postwar agreements." Cf. *FRUS 1947*, IV: *Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union*, pp. 1-50, 471-513.

November 23. In writing recommendation for my own next assignment, I was moved by desire to go into an area which will not require learning my ABC's. This was the first consideration, which remains valid as well for India, that caused me to ask Mr. Byrnes in Paris not to send me to Korea as Minister.[”]

January 3 *The "Sovrompetrol... privileged position"*

Romanian Government has replied to Soviet petroleum demarche substantially meeting all demands although it has made sufficient number or reservations to cause probable Soviet rejection of note. Romanians are reported to have given in since Soviets would not receive oft-postponed Romanian economic delegation to Moscow until terms were met.

It seems certain final agreement will not vary greatly from original Soviet demand and Sovrompetrol will thus gain extremely privileged position in the Romanian oil industry at expense of other companies, including American.

The NP Party's concern over the US Government supporting Groza regime

In interview today Mihai Popovici, acting head of National Peasant Party in absence of Maniu, stated he had seen telegram from Romanian Minister at Washington that latter had secured general concurrence of proper authorities to allocate one million four hundred thousand tons of grain for Romanian food relief.

Popovici in name of party expressed great concern over any such development if grain is allocated without clearly announced minimum concessions by Groza Government such as (1) suspension of all grain deliveries to Soviet Union under Armistice for at least one year and (2) agreement to suspend oil deliveries under Armistice to Russia in order to permit petroleum export surplus sufficient to pay for imported grain.

Unless agreement was concluded at least upon above lines Popovici maintained arrangement would be serious domestic setback for opposition which would see Western democracies maintaining Communist regime without securing clear concessions from that regime. It should be noted Peasant leader's arguments parallel opinion survey of reliable observer as I reported by telegram on December 24.

Groza Government's "desperate efforts to solve pressing economic problems..."

To gain time in its desperate efforts to solve pressing economic problems, to quiet rising angry voices of hungry citizens, and to place ultimately on its adversaries responsibility for its own failures, the Groza Government is using its well-known tactics of building publicity on half-truths, or where half-truths are unavailable, upon complete falsehoods.

I have informed Department of Government's loss of face through its clumsy falsification of elections. I have reported difficult food situation and Government's failure to this date to secure direct or indirect assistance from Government of USSR. It remains here to tell how Mr. Groza and his colleagues, when left to their own devices to lighten hunger of Romanian masses seek solution by conjuring up visions of help from America through direct falsehoods and lying inferences.

The Groza Government knows if it promised aid from Russia its promises would not be credited by Romanian people and, what is more important, the forces hostile to it would continue to grow in strength and numbers. However, if aid is promised from America, people will hope it is true and hostile elements will be less successful in their activities. So the plan is formed, use the name of America. If adequate help comes, Groza Government gets credit for preventing famine. If too little help comes or if it comes too late, then reactionary America has sabotaged efforts of new democratic Romania.

The application of plan now is taking form. I saw Gheorghiu-Dej on December 26 and told him: (1) there was no point in sending official Romanian delegation to America for grains as question will not be settled by negotiation; (2) there was no point in sending official Romanian delegation to encourage investment of capital in Romania until satisfactory settlement of present Romanian obligations towards American capital interests is reached; and (3) there could be no expectation at this time of official American loan to Romania. On December 28 all newspapers reported in headlines fact of my interview and implied in news stories important discussions took place leading to greater American interest in Romania's economic problems.

Romanian Government censor's complete fabricated story

Not content with this, Government censor passed story which was carried by all Bucharest papers dated January 5 of important discussion between Prime Minister and myself on December 30. That was complete fabrication, as I had not seen Mr. Groza on that day, or any day, since he bid me a fond farewell. Yesterday's news features built up impression that important talks were going on in Bucharest between Cabinet Ministers and myself which would result in greatly improved conditions in Romania.

I have authorized our press office to say when asked by local newspapermen that I have not seen Mr. Groza on December 30 or since. I doubt if such news will be printed, but it will get around and do some good. I will not go further and issue statement myself denying interview, unless Department so instructs me, as such would be signal for opening of anti-American campaign with disagreeable consequences to pro-American political leaders whose popular strength was so impressively shown in recent elections.

January 4 *Suggestions for intermediary period after withdrawal of American representation on ACC*

I understand from Military Attache designate he proposes to continue operating an army post office in Bucharest after withdrawal of American representation on Allied Control Commission.

In my opinion we will run into trouble immediately if we attempt, after entering into force of treaty, to operate an army post office on territory of sovereign state in competition to state's own postal monopoly. Moreover, such action will justly be interpreted as an attempt to operate smuggling service whereby Americans resident in this country for private affairs, and through them aliens, avoid customs duties and other controls imposed by Romanian Government.

I recommend therefore...

I recommend, therefore, first, War Department instruct General Schuyler to inform now all private American citizens in Romania being serviced by Army Post that effective date of signing of treaty, they will have to choose between having their mail returned to sender or delivered to Romanian post office for delivery. Second, with withdrawal of American delegation on ACC an army post office cease to operate. This will work no real hardship on Americans entitled to free entry, as small parcels may be sent by pouch and larger parcels through commercial channels consigned to Legation.

Since this Mission was established it has depended upon army air transport service to bring in diplomatic couriers. Department knows this service at best has proven only satisfactory. Mission is now in its third consecutive week without courier; last year at this season it was five weeks without courier service and year before last seven week. Moreover, as army air transport service to Romania will end with Armistice period, it is appropriate at this time to reconsider courier routes.

The ultimate and only practical year-round solution is for courier serving Vienna from Paris to continue by train to Bucharest. But I cannot recommend this until a through sleeping car service to Bucharest is available upon which travelers can ride with reasonable assurance of safe arrival at destination for themselves and luggage. Such assurances do not exist today.

"extensison to Bucharest of courier service"

For intermediary period I suggest extension to Bucharest of courier service now making Sofia from Istanbul. Barnes tells me this service in speed and regularity is big improvement over army air transported service from Italy formerly used. Suggest Department can arrange courier use sleeping car from Sofia to maritime station at Rousse and cross Danube on American-owned oil company boat. At maritime station, Giurgiu, he normally can be met by Mission car and employee, otherwise proceed by train. Transit time Sofia to Bucharest using these means is 12 hours.

January 5 *Gheorghiu-Dej economic delegation leaving for Moscow*

Romanian delegation headed by Gheorghiu-Dej is leaving for Moscow for economic discussions on January 10 according to reports of Romanian press of January 5. This has been confirmed by Cabinet Chief of Minister Dej who stated long awaited invitation from Moscow had been received.

It seems very unlikely that the Soviets will make Gheorghiu-Dej any important concessions on his Moscow trip. His bargaining power is limited by fact (1) he goes to Moscow as representative of local Communist Party which has failed politically in Romania, (2) his visit has been three times postponed and is now taking place when Romanians economically are using their last resources, and (3) Soviets expect to obtain all economic objectives, such as extension of Sovrom-Petrol activities and infiltration into natural gas monopoly, before actual departure of Gheorghiu-Dej.

January 6 *Concerning (Berry's) presumed tranfer*

I have sent the following telegram to Matthews:*

When my transfer orders are written it is very important for summation of my work here and reorientation before proceeding to next post to return to Department. Will greatly appreciate your interest in so drafting my orders.

January 7 *When ACC withdraws*

Currently General Schuyler is furnishing two guards for this Mission; telegrams for Department go from our cipher machines to his Signal Office without retyping; some of our work in connection with changing of money and accounts is done in his office; and much work concerning protection of citizens and their property. When ACC withdraws all this work must necessarily be taken over by Mission employees. Department therefore is urged to take immediate action upon Mission's repeated recommendation for personnel. In this connection Mission has been unable to make personnel shifts recommended by Inspector Cochran in his report last August due to fact personnel recommended by him for assignment to Bucharest have not been assigned.

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* Matthews, H. Freeman, Director of European Affairs, Depart. of State.

Colonel Lovell who, in post-Armistice period will head joint military naval intelligence setup, seems to be an exceptionally happy choice. Through temperament, experience, and training, he should be able to transmit as full and accurate reports as is possible from this post. Table of organization for Military Attache's office includes seven officers, two non-commissioned officers, and five American civilians. Table of organization for Naval Attache's office includes two officers and one American civilian.

This general setup has been known to me for some time, as I understand it has been known to Department, but I have abstained from commenting as its carrying into effect was not planned for Armistice period, hence not during period of my tenure as Chief of this Mission. However, as end of Armistice period is rapidly approaching, I now feel obliged to make following comment.

Prior to 1941, our Government had no Naval Attache at Bucharest Legation, and one Military Attache with one American clerk. By terms of Treaty Romanian naval and military organizations are drastically reduced from their pre-war level. Under such circumstances, the reason for our military expansion at this post will be quite obvious to anyone. Soviet-Romanian reaction may take form of refusing agreement, or request for reciprocal representation in US. Whether we wish to lay ourselves open to either of these reactions is matter that should be decided in Washington before end of Armistice period.

January 14 *A "long confidential talk" relative to possible forthcoming change in Romanian Government:*

Romanian official in long confidential talk with member of my staff stated yesterday:

(1) Central Committee of Romanian Communist Party met and threshed out pros and cons as to whether party should remain in Government. It was decided party could not afford to continue assuming responsibility for governing country in view of tremendous difficulties brought on by successive drouths and hostile attitude of Romanian population. In near future, therefore, probably soon after return of Gheorghiu-Dej from Moscow, party will withdraw from Government, emphasizing difficulties arising from drouths rather than strength of Maniu as negating its efforts.

(2) Communists hope to see formed new puppet government in which they theoretically will be in opposition. Such status will give them opportunity to avoid responsibility for economic disaster and at same time free hand to create public disorders through trade unions for purpose of making propaganda to effect that when they are in power there is public order and when not in power there is public disorder. Informant believes King can avoid accepting such second puppet government, his course being to dissolve Parliament, consult political leaders, and then form government to carry on until new elections are held.

(3) Informant said during past few months a change has come in thinking of man in the street towards Soviets.

He no longer fears them. He believes they are retreating throughout world. He cites Iran as example of major Soviet diplomatic defeat. He feels secret conference between Secretary Byrnes and Mr. Molotov in New York on November 25 marks change in Soviet tactics on world front from which Romania will benefit.

(4) Informant believes there is enough grain in Romania to provide subsistence diet to population until next harvest. Peasants are withholding this grain because of their lack of confidence in Government. They fear if it is given up it will be sent to Russia. Their attitude could change overnight with formation of popular government. However, such government will also have to solve two major problems: lack of adequate transportation facilities, including freight cars and motor trucks, and resurgence of strong anti-Semitic movement.

Berry's comments on foregoing

My comments on foregoing follow: for several weeks we have been hearing persistent rumors of forthcoming change in government. In running each of these down, I have found them to be based on wishful thinking. Nevertheless, it is important as evidence of popular desire that rumors persist and gain strength.

Return of Mr. Argetoianu from his self-imposed exile in Switzerland, his announcement he has formed new political party, and warm reception given him by the Soviet authorities gives some basis for belief they at some future time may plan shift of personalities in government, without relaxing any of their control over it. At such time, Peasant and Liberal leaders agree with informant, King's attitude can be decisive factor.

Not much credence to Communists' stories

Personally I do not give much credence to story Communists will voluntarily step from power. They have tried to attain popularity through persuasion in Romania and have failed utterly. If they give up government positions they hold, because Mr. Vyshinski was able to impose his will on country torn by crisis when its armies were fighting in Germany, they are unlikely to get them again. Therefore, I expect them, if left to their own initiative, to hold tenaciously gains they have in hand, even if necessary keeping the Red Army nearby for their physical and moral support.

Since Groza Government so clumsily falsified elections, man in the street has manifested toward its administrative measures passive resistance against which Government is powerless as the resistance is backed by knowledge that Government was not elected by Romanian masses. Personally, I doubt if this popular self-assurance vis-à-vis Romanian authority has grown to point that it is felt toward Russian authority.

Romania is short of freight cars and trucks and therefore distribution is grave problem. However, with trains running upon reduced schedules due to shortage of fuel oil and available trucks operating only part-time because of closed factories, it must be admitted that more cars and trucks will not solve problem of distribution unless fuel is available to run them.

Concerning Romanian anti-Semitism

With all expression of popular feeling now strait-jacketed, there is little evidence of anti-Semitism. It is agreed, however, that at return of democratic ways with free press this will flare up, due in large measure to excesses of Jews who served as instruments of Ministry of Interior to inflict terror upon population. But it will be due also to reasons beyond control of Romanian Jews. As one observer puts it, "there will be several hundred thousand deaths from starvation this winter in Moldavia, but in that heavily Jewish province there won't be a single Jew to die from hunger." Popular reaction to such situations may take form of anti-Semitic movement.

January 17 *Effort to protect Mission personnel during present inflationary period*

In effort to assure regular supply of local currency following departure Military Mission and to regularize ex-change practices in accordance with Inspector Cochran's recommendations, Mission has made informal approach to Ministry Finance in effort to work out arrangement suitable to Romanian Government and at same time protect Mission personnel during present inflationary period in Romania.

Mission believes Inspector's suggestion of basing exchange on price differences barrels gasoline Gulf and Black Sea ports is not desirable in view artificially low price placed on Romanian petroleum which has been exported recently only to Russia or her satellites.

Ministry suggests rate be worked out on basis of monthly index retail prices prepared by Government Statistical Bureau provided Government at no time will pay Mission more than open market rate. On this basis rate for December would have been very near free market rate.

Mission feels proposal merits serious consideration since basing exchange rate on retail prices would be essentially fair and since Mission's funds would go into legal channels. However, it is believed suggested ceiling on rate must be rejected and Mission must insist on rate based solely on retail price index without any consideration free market rate of dollar. Once Government is assured of purchasing Mission's dollars, it could all but wipe out free market which it is now using for its dollar needs, and by refusing to pay Mission more than artificial free market rate, could force an exchange at something near present official rate.

I consider it inadvisable as long as ACC remains in Romania to modify our present manner of paying American personnel. I believe though before ACC withdraws, it is essential to work out uniform procedure whereby all American Government offices in Romania will be financed by sale of drafts and treasury checks rather than dollar currency. As our alien personnel has different status I propose in view of recent Romanian laws to revert on next payday to paying them in lei at open market rate existing on day of payment.

January 18 *Concerning Romanian requirement of grain from United States*

The Department has sent the following message:

"No basis exists for belief that 1,400,000 tons corn or anything approaching this quantity can be obtained from United States. In view great demand placed upon United States on exportable supply. Last week Romanian Minister requested IEFC allocation 1,000,000 tons corn, about 600,000 of which is to be delivered February-June. Executive Committee of IEFC has not yet completed study of Romanian requirement nor made definite recommendation as to shipments. A decision in this committee is expected soon.

Romania has now officially requested of IEFC additional quantities for seed, namely 15,000 tons of oats and 40,000 tons of corn for delivery by March 10.

For your information question as to how payment for any grains shipped can be effected in manner acceptable to United States Government has not yet been solved. Romanians placed monthly import need for consumption at 122,000 tons. Department would appreciate your comment this regard.

Department is informed that Romania received grain from Yugoslavia last November repayment of which is sought by April, 1947. If United States now ships grain to Romania the replacement to Yugoslavia would in effect be made by United States and it is foreseen that this would not be acceptable.

Romanian representatives here have stated Romania itself will not make grain replacement to Yugoslavia before the new crop. They also report that shipments in replacement or reparation to USSR will not be made before next October. Department would like to have facts established regarding these repayments.

What is lowest figure believed essential for shipment to Romania from all sources by June? Does Mission feel Romanian Government has thoroughly explored possibility secure grain from USSR, Bulgaria, Turkey, Czechoslovakia, and other nearby countries?"

I replied:

Interpreting Romanian food situation
and grain imports from United States

While Mission will endeavor to continue to keep Department currently informed on Romanian food situation, I am reluctant to make any direct inquiries locally of Romanian Government since all requests for information on this subject are given interpretation that US will assure Romania ample grain supplies. In recent weeks, totally fallacious articles have appeared in local press along these lines in seemingly deliberate attempt on part of government to divert to United States any blame resulting from famine in Romania. I recommend therefore all requests for information be made to Romanian representatives Washington with answers forwarded to this mission for comment when necessary.

Possibility of exporting lumber products to United States

As regards financing grain imports from United States, Romanian Government has not abandoned hopes for loan of some sort despite repeated indications this is impossible. Failing loan in cash or in kind, Government hopes to obtain sufficient concessions from Soviets in course of current economic conversations in Moscow to be able to export products to free currency markets and obtain exchange with which to pay for food imports in cash. Failing this it proposes to use some of its gold. Some talk has been heard locally concerning possibility of exporting lumber products to United States directly in return for grain in view of reported shortage building materials in United States.

While approaches have been made to neighboring countries, Mission feels Government has not fully exhausted possibilities, preferring make request directly to United States to meet all country's cereal requirements. Government officials have informed Mission on several occasions that whereas grain could be obtained nearby countries in small amounts, total could not possibly cover Romania's needs. Moreover, her neighbors usually drive hard bargain and insist on receiving Romanian products which are currently very difficult to supply or gold. Mission does not believe there is any chance Romania obtaining grain from USSR except as possible Soviet propaganda gesture. Soviets reportedly believe enough grain exists in Romania to feed country if proper collection methods were taken and are therefore unwilling to assist. There may be some basis this belief since it is known peasants in non-drought areas have hoarded considerable supplies but will refuse to surrender them to present Government. Forcible collection on large scale seems impossible.

"Grain continues to be shipped into USSR"

Soviets in October suspended armistice deliveries of grain for period of one year. However, it is extremely difficult to estimate benefits accruing Romania since it is widely reported that grain continues to be shipped into USSR in appreciable quantities. Only yesterday I received reports from usually reliable sources of departure to Russia on January 17 of seven thousand tons of grain. Yugoslavia has loaned Romania 20,000 tons corn to be repaid in kind reportedly from next harvest. Mission will investigate report repayment must be made in April. Only part of this has been delivered and remainder must await opening of Danube in spring. Small amounts have also been received from Hungary and Bulgaria, the former in exchange for Romanian exports such as salt and latter for gold. None of these imports have appreciably relieved situation.

Mission does not feel 1,400,000 ton figure necessary and believes 500,000 tons could tide country over until next harvest with monthly shipments not exceeding 80,000 tons. 400,000 required by June as collection 1947 crops will not materialize in appreciable quantities until July.

"There is real suffering in Romania"

There is unquestionably real suffering in Romania as result 1946 crop failure and definite need for importation of food and civil relief program exists. However Mission does not believe Government has dealt with problem in realistic manner and has allowed matters to drift to point where no matter what may be imported in next few months, there will be extreme hardship prevailing throughout drought areas and there will be deaths from starvation in underprivileged class.

January 21 *"Concerted (tripartite) action aiming complete gold investigation"*

The Department telegraphed:

"Conversations held Washington members British French Embassies for concerted action aiming complete gold investigation Romanian National Bank and possible recovery looted gold. Following plan tentatively agreed provided British French Foreign Offices approve:"

Plan tentatively agreed

"1. General Schuyler be instructed make presentation in ACC for Romania along following lines:

On March 5, 1946, US, British, French representatives Bucharest separately presented notes to Romanian Ministry Foreign Affairs pointing out fact that Romanian National Bank received during war considerable amounts gold from Germany, possibly including looted gold, requesting full investigation records RNB with respect gold transactions during war and assurances that no alternation would occur in gold transferred to Romania during war until complete examination. Request was based upon Allied Gold Declaration February 22, 1944, United Nations Declaration January 5, 1943, Bretton Woods Resolution No. 6, July, 1944, final act Paris Conference reparations concerning restitution monetary gold. On March 30, 1946, Romanian Foreign Minister, in reply aforementioned note, submitted letter of Governor RNB, March 28, giving breakdown gold transactions gold position of RNB in over-all figures indicating acquisitions of 65.5 million dollars worth gold from Germany during war, but otherwise evading requested investigation.

It was indicated in fall 1946 that Romanian Government intended use gold reserve of its National Bank as collateral for certain commercial transactions with Switzerland in spite aforementioned tripartite request March 5. In ACC meeting October 25, US Representative brought up this question, repeating on behalf US Government request that ACC take necessary steps insure that Romanian Government not permitted use its gold reserve in Switzerland for this purpose. US Representative was substantially supported by UK Representative. Russian element promised report this matter Moscow for statement. No such statement obtained yet. Meantime, additional reports have come attention US Government about use gold as collateral Romanian International Commercial transactions.

In order implement aforementioned declarations on one hand, and normalize Romanian National Bank relations to UN banking institutions in UN countries other hand by sorting out and making available looted gold for apportionment rightful owners, US Representative requests ACC direct Romanian Government (A) get in touch representatives US, UK, French governments within 30 days for joint investigation gold transactions gold holdings in question, and (B) to reach appropriate agreement with them regarding return such gold as proved looted by Germany from other countries.

2. British element ACC to be instructed support US presentation under (1).

3. French Ambassador Moscow be instructed present this Government with note stating that French Government is informed US-UK presentation ACC and fully supports position taken mindful of moral obligation assumed by nations which announced to world Gold Declaration of 1944.

You are instructed request Schuyler make presentation paragraph No. 1 soon as you receive confirmation by UK colleague that British element will support your presentation in ACC and by French colleague that French instructing Moscow as indicated paragraph No. 3."

Berry's and General Schuyler's reaction

I cabled my own and General Schuyler's reaction as follows:

General Schuyler will make presentation at special meeting of ACC along lines set forth in paragraph 1 of Department instruction telegraphed on January 21, as soon as he receives word from me that my British colleague has received instructions to support us in ACC and my French colleague has been informed of French support in Moscow.

General Schuyler comments upon proposal:

"Judging from attitude of Soviet ACC Representative during previous discussions of this Romanian gold problem, it would appear Soviet Russia is reluctant to have matter acted upon within ACC. You may consider it desirable to advise State Dept of this in order that we may be prepared for further delay or for direct refusal on part of Soviet Representative to take desired action. Since gold question is not specifically mentioned in Articles of Armistice Convention, Soviet Representative might well base his refusal on ground that proposed action would be beyond authority of ACC."

I agree with General Schuyler that it is unlikely that Soviet authorities on ACC will support our project. As Department knows, Soviets rather than using ACC as an instrument to secure compliance of Romanian Government with demands of the United Nations have used it as shield to protect Romanian Government against such demands. Nevertheless, at this stage in development of our post-war relations with Romania, it seems to me that ACC is agency through which we should press for solution of looted gold question. If, during life of ACC we have no reply or an unsatisfactory reply, as General Schuyler foresees, our legal position in bringing matter again directly before Romanian Government will be stronger and our opportunity to assert direct pressure will be greater.

January 23 *D. Bratianu and I. Maniu considering resuming protests*

Yesterday Dinu Bratianu indicated that he and Maniu shortly before or after peace treaty signature were considering addressing general political recapitulation protest either to UNO or Yalta signatories. Under circumstances, Bratianu inquired which was more suitable course without asking Mission's views upon advisability of document.

Department's guidance is requested in replying (1) whether UNO can receive complaints directly from a political party against its national government and (2) whether by peace treaty signature US considers its political commitment toward Romania under Yalta, Potsdam, and Moscow agreements as fulfilled thus barring receipt of formal political communications from individual Romanian political parties on this basis.

January 24 *Other comments*

After signing of Romanian Treaty Department must expect USSR to wage a major diplomatic struggle to preserve the preponderant economic position it has acquired in Romania during Armistice period.

Just as USSR used statutes of Allied Control Commission first to acquire and then to confirm its stranglehold on Romania at expense of Romanian nation and interests of Western democracies in Romania, we may expect to see Soviet Government use the issue of Article 35 of Romanian Treaty to further its ends.

I agree with Barnes* that primary merit of treaty relationship is we regain our freedom of diplomatic action. It should be our immediate concern to preserve this freedom. We can accomplish much in this direction by deferring to Bucharest level next series of discussions of matters emanating from Peace Treaty.

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* Maynard B. Barnes, US Representative in Bulgaria.

January 25 *On Soviet – United States Oil Commission*

Final action on Soviet – United States Oil Commission awaiting agreement on minutes eighth meeting. Mission is pressing Soviets for early action on minutes and hopes to have this question settled at an early date. Following this, Mission intends informing Soviets it considers Commission terminated and that no need exists for further meetings unless, as stated in Department's telegram, Soviets react favorably to material submitted at last meeting and show definite desire to cooperate. From experience of British, however, it is most unlikely that this will be the case and Mission will, therefore, wind up Commission in accordance Department's instructions.

January 26 *Grain "shipped clandestinely to Soviet Union from Romania"*

Further reports continue to be received of quantities of cereals shipped clandestinely to Soviet Union from Romania. Quantities reported are now known to have been labeled by Romanian Government for bookkeeping purposes as allocated Red Army under Armistice Article 10. Yesterday well-placed Communist gave what he termed reliable information that from September 1 to December 1, 1946, fifty thousand carloads of cereals had been shipped from Romanian province of Wallachia via Moldavia ostensibly for Poland. Many railroad cars returned with Polish coal but indications were Romanian grain trans-shipped to Russia. This statement would appear to be confirmed by General Schuyler's information that foodstuffs collected in Romania for use of Red Occupation Army are used by Red Army wherever needed, that is, inside or outside of Romania.

Collecting hidden cereal stoks... by force

Following Interior Ministry conference with Prefects last week efforts have intensified to collect hidden cereal stocks in known surplus districts by force through use of gendarmerie and Tudor Vladimirescu units. Reports are coming with more frequency of village search expeditions from as far afield as Oradea Mare in Transylvania to Caracal in Old Kingdom. Interior Ministry records allegedly show one thousand tons of cereals daily are being collected from country by this means.

Local reaction in political circles to manner of Romanian Government's belated approach to IEFC is that vagueness of Minister Ralea's delayed request closely follows Soviet orders, and that evidence of need and manner of payment were consciously left inconclusive. No responsible Romanian politician speaking privately believes Soviets intend to permit Romania to enjoy unhindered any IEFC food allocations without substantial drainage of such or other supplies toward Soviet Union. Furthermore, any offer made by Ralea will depend upon ultimate Soviet consent, which as far as Mission is aware, had not been received.

"'Hand in glove' cooperation between Soviet and Romanian authorities"

Evidence of the "hand in glove" cooperation between Soviet and Romanian authorities in using famine conditions in this country for political purposes is borne out by ACC proceedings. On November 3 General Schuyler asked General Susaikov to include in agenda of next ACC meeting an official report by appropriate agency of Romanian Government as to extent of famine in Romania, the means available within country for meeting situation, and steps taken or contemplated by Government to secure aid from outside sources. General Schuyler reported in his telegram of December 24 that on one pretext or another General Susaikov postponed all discussion of subject and at meeting of December 13 stated question would not be discussed in open meeting but full report from Romanian Government would be made available within next few days. To this date, January 25, such report has not been made available to General Schuyler.

January 29 *More information from Foreign Minister Tătărescu*

Foreign Minister Tatarescu asked me to call this afternoon. He said American Government had allocated to Romania for seed twelve thousand tons of barley from stocks of American Military Government in Munich. He asked me to inquire, to save time, at what depot this grain was held and what means of transportation to Romania. As General Schuyler has direct communication to Germany, I asked him to make inquiries.

The Foreign Minister informed me he is leaving by train on February 2 for Paris to sign Peace Treaty. He will be accompanied by Voitec and Patrascanu or Gheorghiu-Dej. He will remain in Paris one week, leaving February 15 by train for Bucharest.

I inquired what progress was being made by Romanian Economic Delegation in Moscow. Tatarescu replied negotiations were going very, very slowly. In fact he had personally received no news of positive progress along lines of Romanian aspirations.

The Foreign Minister volunteered statement that within next six months there would be head-on collision between Western and Eastern ideas that in intensity would eclipse arguments brought about by preparation Balkan peace treaties. He thought discussion of question of Straits and Danube would bring this collision. He recalled no less than eighteen international conferences had been held to regulate statutes of Danube, and that difficulties had not been decreased by recent events. He said he presumed the Americans were giving as much study to these problems now as are Russians.

I inquired if there was any truth in story of approaches being made Romania to join customs union with certain of her neighbors. Tatarescu replied this was one of Groza's pet ideas and deserved to be classified with other bits of Groza folklore. When I pressed for definite answer and he said no official approach had been made and if made, plan would not be welcomed by Romanians.

January 30 *Yugoslavia no longer source of grain for Romania*

Report that Romania must repay Yugoslavia for grain out of stocks imported from elsewhere by April, or at latest, May, is correct. In view of this, Government reportedly no longer considers Yugoslavia practicable source of grain.

Total corn for food from United States and elsewhere

The Department telegraphed the following:

IEFC has approved shipment from United States in February 17,000 tons corn for Romania. Total corn for food to Romania during remainder crop year still to be considered in IEFC, but it is general view no such quantity as 500,000 tons mentioned in Mission telegram can be sent from United States within critical period before June 30.

Also agreed by IEFC Cereals Executive Committee effort might be made provide following for Romania: 17,000 tons seed corn from United States; 6,580 tons seed corn to be acquired in Canada where reported available; 7,500 tons seed oats from United States; 5,000 tons seed oats understood available in Canada; 10,000 tons seed barley to be sought from Bavaria through Army on promise of replacement from United States.

These are all recommendations of IEFC concerning which no decisions yet taken on implementation by United States Government. Pending are questions of possible conditions and controls re (1) drain on Romanian grain supply by Soviet occupation forces and by exports for reparations, repayment of grain loans from other countries, or trade; (2) proper use of grain as food for starving on basis equitable distribution; (3) actual use of seed for intended purpose. Unresolved also but presently under consideration in Department are questions involving financing of purchase.

Whatever outcome all foregoing questions, we could expect Romanian Government exhaust all possibilities (1) obtain additional quantities of grain elsewhere (2) distribute supplies within Romania itself to help cover minimum consumption in drought area.

It is thought advisable to base Voice of America explanation, as suggested by Mission telegrams on January 22 and January 25 on public release IEFC recommendations and/or decisions of United States Government regarding implementation.

January 31 *Dr. Schwartz' visit to Bucharest*

Dr. Schwartz, European Representative of Joint Distribution Committee, left Bucharest today after ten-day visit. He said to combat anti-Semitic feeling he is arranging to present to Government for distribution for needy Romanians regardless of religion considerable quantity of wheat, corn, and used clothing.

February 1 *Concerning "any grain made available from United States"*

During call at Department today Romanian Minister was informally furnished draft of assurances we would like embodied in official communication from Romanian Legation to Department concerning any grain made available from United States. Romanian Minister is telegraphing his Government for authorization make this declaration which as proposed is substantially following:

Minister Ralea asking for his Government permission

During discussion with United States Representatives to obtain grain urgently needed by Romania to relieve food shortage, the many other previous demands on United States resources were indicated and it was emphasized that limited facilities for exporting additional grain made it imperative such export be made only for most urgent needs. Romanian Minister understands this and on behalf his Government wishes assure United States Government that in order grain from United States sources be utilized to maximum for relief Romanian people, Romania (1) will not while famine persists employ any grain for reparations (2) will not export or permit export any grain to repay grain loans, for trade or any other reason (3) will use United States grain as food for starving on basis equitable distribution irrespective political, etc., considerations (4) will use seed grains from United States for intended purpose, and (5) will accord United States reasonable freedom observe as they see fit distribution of grain from United States.

Foreign Minister Tatarescu told me at luncheon instructions would be sent Ralea February 3 to accept conditions under which grain is offered.

He added information Ralea said payment for grain would be effected through American loan.

Berry's opinion

I recommend that conditions of allocation be made part of public announcement of grain allocations.

February 3 *Minister Tătărescu's statement at Paris re: "two onerous conditions"*

Minister Foreign Affairs Tatarescu informed me yesterday he intends to make public statement at Paris on occasion signing Peace Treaty, saying Romanian Government has no revisionist ideas, but it does hope through bi-lateral negotiations to alter two onerous conditions, namely, return of all gold which we considered tainted, and delivery to USSR of Romanian credit balances in Germany. He claims that no more than six tons of Romanian gold are really tainted, remaining 54 tons from Germany having been acquired in good faith in normal commercial manner.

Tatarescu stated Government has brought 70 tons of its gold stock to Bucharest for possible use in purchase of grain. He denied widespread rumors to effect that entire gold stock was being shipped to USSR but admitted it might be necessary to ship some there in future.

In view these developments it would seem advisable press matter urgently and Department may wish ask British to expedite instruction to their representative in Bucharest as to date they have not received instructions regarding joint approach on ACC and Mission therefore has been unable to take any action.

February 4 *Instructions regarding joint approach on Allied Control Commission*

The Department telegraphed:

"You will have received by this time word from British colleague that he has received instruction support our presentation in ACC and from French colleague that French Ambassador Moscow will take suggestion action. Department therefore assumes that presentation by Schuyler and British element ACC imminent.

Concerning "loan to Romanians involving gold as security"

Following paragraphs two, three, five (D) for United States Mission's information only:

Paragraph two. Meantime, representatives of Swiss-American Banking Group approached Department concerning fifty million dollar loan to

Romanians involving gold as security. Representatives mentioned Romanian delegation after six months negotiations Switzerland returned Romania empty-handed.

Paragraph three. Romanian Government also applied here allocation of grain to be paid for from proceeds future Romanian exports, payment to be secured by gold collateral.

Our discussing above issues in Department Romanian Minister and Romanian unofficial finance representatives stated Romanian Government recognized obligation restitute looted gold.

Paragraph five. Department stated to Romanian Minister that (A) United States was interested in recovery of looted gold from Romania as signatory international declaration agreements; (B) United States, United Kingdom presentation will be made in ACC Bucharest supported by French Moscow; (C) Romanian Minister might wish inform his Government of above and Romanian Government would wish approach United States, United Kingdom, France on methods for restitution such gold; (D) although Department considers subject allocation grain separate from gold issue, settlement gold issue would clear way for Romanian ability obtain loans from banks, particularly gold offered as security; (E) Upon Romanian Minister's request he was given informally outline of declaration which we would like have from Romanian Government of official communication through its Washington Legation.

Salient points of outline

Paragraph six. Salient points of outline follow: (A) Romanian Government recognizes and adheres to principles declarations January 5, 1943, February 22, 1944; (B) will give full information gold transactions plus detailed description gold acquired since January 1, 1939; (C) Romania will restitute looted gold acquired; (D) Romanian Government will request permission ACC make aforementioned restitution to United States, United Kingdom, and France representing claimant nations.

Please inform Schuyler completely and British, French colleagues with omission designated above.

British, French embassies Washington informed accordingly."

I replied as follows:

"Romanian dollar loan against gold security..."

In any discussion of possibility of extending Romania dollar loan against gold security, it might be well to keep in mind fact that Romania's gold stock is one of few certain assets still available to Government and Government for some time past has been making heavy gold commitments in its clearing and credit agreements abroad. Furthermore each successive foreign credit in which Romania's gold is involved tends to accelerate collapse of the lei and competent officials of pre-nationalization National Bank were firmly opposed to all further gold commitments.

Sweeping economic demands made by Soviet economic delegation upon Romanian Government

Recent economic developments have clearly indicated definite intention on part of Soviet Union to achieve dominant, if not controlling, position in Romanian economy. Information has come to Mission from very reliable source to effect that last night sweeping economic demands, whose nature is not yet known, were made upon Prime Minister by Soviet economic delegation. While Prime Minister is reported to have refused to sign document granting these new concessions, it seems difficult to believe his resistance can be continued for very long. In immediate past Romanian Government has shown little or no inclination to resist demands of this nature and it is doubtful that it will do so in present instance.

With Soviets apparently endeavoring successfully to obtain, as their own private preserve, entire economy of Romania, and with Communist-dominated Government in power here whose respect for foreign capital and international obligations in general is open to serious doubts, Romania would not seem to be a good credit risk for United States at moment. It should be remembered that country's banking and credit system has been brought under control of present Government through nationalization of National Bank. Report all banks will be forced into some sort of central Government agency are current, although it seems even more likely that country's banking system may become "Sovromized" in not too distant future. The whole banking structure must, therefore, be regarded as suspect.

Conclusion: ... any United States loan to Romania
"should not be considered at moment"

For above reasons, it seems any American loan to Romania should not be considered at moment. Should Romanian economic delegation now in Moscow be successful in obtaining sufficient concessions from Soviets to enable Romania to export to free currency markets, a loan might not be necessary. Should reverse be the case, which seems likely, the present dreary economic picture will deteriorate even further to point where foreign loans would be insufficient to bring material help and would be risky in the extreme for creditor. Until it is definitely established Romania has free hand in handling its economic life and has Government officials who can be trusted, an American loan is not good policy.

February 5 *Renewed Soviet pressure*

Hatieganu, former National Peasant Cabinet Representative, reports Groza in serious interview last evening expressed greatest concern at present course of events and indications of renewed Soviet pressure on political and economic fronts. Groza said he had sought to impede extremism of Soviet and Romanian Communists but apparently with diminishing success, adding under existing circumstances he yearned to leave premiership but could not do so except by Soviet order.

Most recent instance of Soviet economic pressure mentioned by Groza is given in my telegram of February 4 (see page 104)* while politically Prime Minister affirmed Romanian Communists are making plans to capitalize upon any popular outbreaks caused by current distressing living conditions in order to request continued presence of Red Army following Peace Treaty.

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* This corresponds to the present *supra*, p. 596.

February 6 *On United States — Romanian relations following coming into force of Peace Treaty*

The Department telegraphed:

"With regard to US — Romanian relations following coming into force of Peace Treaty, Department feels that for both political and practical reasons US should proceed with exchange diplomatic representatives as we indicated our willingness to do in Note last February 5, from practical standpoint effect treaty is to terminate state of war and armistice period, thus concluding legal basis existence informal official missions. Politically treaty while not affecting Yalta, Potsdam, or Moscow agreements adds factor to situation in that it obliges Romanian Government with respect to human rights of inhabitants.

We do not wish take any action or make any statements before Senate consent to ratification is given. After granting of such consent, however, and before exchange of ratifications, we would ask for Romanian agreement appointment Minister. At same time in a separate communication to Romanian Government referring to request for agreement we could take occasion to point to obligations which Romania has assumed under Article II of Treaty in regard to human rights and the fact that the implementation of treaty would not only improve political social economic life Romanian people but enable Romania to take its place as a member of United Nations. This communication could then be made public. It is our feeling that this course will make clear to democratic elements in Romania and to world our continued interest in democratic political development Romania.

Action contemplated believed generally in line with your thinking and is comparable to steps we anticipate taking in Bulgaria. Your comments are invited."

I replied:*

"In November and today:" development of Berry's thinking

Following paragraphs summarize development of my thinking in interval between making my recommendations following Romanian election and eve before Paris signing of Romanian Treaty.* The numbered paragraphs correspond in subject matter to those in my telegram of November 23.**

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* See *FRUS 1947*, IV (*Eastern Europe; Soviet Union*), pp. 473-476: Berry to the Secretary of State. Telegram 100. Secret. Urgent. Feb. 5, 1947.

1. Acting Secretary in Press Conference of November 28 commented that Romanian elections were not free and unfettered elections anticipated by Moscow Decision and promised by Groza Government.

Department expected then to send notes to Romanian and British Governments stating Romanian Government had not fulfilled its promises given in connection with acceptance of Moscow Decisions. At that time I considered such move essential, as I believed coming into force of Peace Treaty would terminate wartime agreements of Yalta, Potsdam, and Moscow, except for those provisions of agreements that are incorporated in texts of treaties. I am now pleased to learn Department holds treaties will not invalidate Yalta, Potsdam, and Moscow agreements and that way continues open for us to take direct interest in Romanian affairs.

I believe Romanians will contest this point of view. Groza, after staging a crudely manipulated election and winning our tolerance of heavily falsified returns, has let it be understood that in affairs with Western democracies, he is in position to promise anything, to do exactly what he pleases about his promises, and to get by with what he does.

I believe Soviets will also contest our point of view. Even during Armistice period they worked persistently to develop fiction that Romania was sovereign state and decisions of Romanian political leaders were Romanian decisions. Rather than govern, they preferred to pull strings of the governors. The reasons for this attitude is more valid under treaty than under armistice. Nevertheless, if our point of view is otherwise, and we are determined to stick to it, we will by implementation of our attitude continue to give courage to Romanian democratic elements.

"Keeping Romanian problems
a live issue remains important"

2. In November and today I believe the only real solution of Romanian problem is possible after agreement through discussion of problem on same level that produced Moscow Decisions. I am not hopeful that such a

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* The Treaty of Peace with Romania was signed in Paris on Feb. 10.

** See *supra*, Nov. 23, pp. 546–549.

discussion will bring about an agreement. In November I considered such discussion urgent, thinking it would be barred by coming into effect of peace treaty. Now that I learn treaty does not supersede Moscow Agreement, discussion is not so urgent, but keeping Romanian problems a live issue remains important. Therefore, Department's plan is good to send Romanian Government communication, which will be made public before exchange of ratifications, pointing out its treaty obligations in regard to human rights and that implementation of treaty would not only improve political, social, and economic life of Romanian people, but enable Romania to take its place as member of United Nations. In this connection, that our statement not have a hollow ring in Romania, I urge we include reference to continuing validity of Yalta, Potsdam, and Moscow decisions and that US Government believes new elections are in order.

"I am now of opinion my transfer should take place after"

3. In November I recommended my early transfer as at that time I thought in view of Acting Secretary's Romanian election statement, my activities would bring a diminishing return, particularly in Government circles. But time showed election was boomerang that came back to cripple government. In fact position of Government leaders deteriorated faster with Romanian people than my position did with those leaders, with result that I was stronger relatively than I expected to find myself. Consequently, I am now of opinion my transfer should take place after agreement for American Minister is asked and received. His arrival then for reasons stated in next paragraph should not be long delayed. I repeat my recommendations that Melbourne and Hulick be transferred.

"But Romania is not a special case"

4. I agree with Department that Treaty ratification concludes legal basis for existence in Romania of an informal official mission. I agree too that for both political and practical reasons, US should, after obtaining Senate consent of ratification, proceed with exchange of diplomatic representatives.

If we could view Romania as an isolated case, I would repeat my recommendation that we indicate disapproval of Groza Government by making our representative Charge d'Affaires with personal rank of Minister. But Romania is not a special case. It is an integral part of Western border area of Soviet Union. It, like each of other states in that area, has been dominated militarily, economically, and politically by Soviet Union. Unless Romanian Government requests otherwise, military domination after effective date of Romanian Treaty should diminish and finally disappear after effective date of Austrian Treaty. But threat of military domination will remain, and political and economic domination will be intensified. Department is well aware from my and other reports of extent of this political domination. Reports of economic domination are also impressive. I need only to mention Sovrom companies which give Soviets dominant position in air, ocean, and river transport, and in lumber, banking, and oil industries. I understand Soviets have recently obtained an eighty percent control of Petrosani coal mines and are negotiating for acquisition of controlling interest in Romanian railways. Moreover Soviet economic policy is directed towards maintaining an indefinite open account on reparations which means an indefinite absolute control over Romanian economy.

"If we have an ambassador in Poland and Yugoslavia, we should have a minister in Romania"

From all I can learn Soviets are consolidating their authority in all border states before withdrawing Red Army. I expect them to wage fierce diplomatic battle to preserve political and economic position they acquired during immediate post war period in these states. I now believe, therefore that if we have an ambassador in Poland and Yugoslavia, we should have a minister in Romania.

I believe that our Minister will be faced in first year of peace with problems that will challenge his best efforts. I am gratified from announcements of recent assignments, the Department realizes Legation Bucharest will be faced with difficult task and therefore is making assignments of experienced men of proven ability. As period has now ended when Missions of Western democracies can serve their purpose by acting as brake on Communist machinations and supporting morale of opposition by keeping it informed of what is going on in outside world, Department must be prepared to give its Minister full and prompt support in carrying through of its directives. It must be prepared to take active counter measures against a government that only half conceals its contempt for our strength; a government that builds its foreign relations upon basis of half-truths or, when they are unavoidable, on complete falsehoods.

As long as the King remains there
"he will be an influence for the country"

5. The King's prestige has not been irrevocably lost by his actions since elections. Although Romanian people generally regret that he has had to follow course he has, there is so little for them to hold on to that they grasp at that little. Thus, the Monarchy in Romania today, while not being very strong, does furnish vehicle to which people can attach their hopes. King Michael still is on his throne and as long as he remains there he will be an influence in the country. The foundation has been laid during Armistice period for this influence to regard favorably American interests in Romania.

February 7 *Minister Ralea authorized to give US Government certain requested assurances*

Romanian Foreign Office has handed me translation of telegram despatched to Ralea authorizing him to give US Government certain requested assurances. Statement appears to meet first and second of our conditions. It glosses over third unsatisfactorily, taking no commitment for an equitable distribution, irrespective of political, etc., considerations. It ignores fourth and fifth conditions.

As regards payment it offers guarantee from stocks of untainted gold. I am of opinion we should proceed very cautiously on this line, in view of attitude we have taken with Swiss towards Romanian gold. In this connection Foreign Office this morning asked me to secure passage for two locomotives and seven freight cars through American zone of Austria to transport gold to Switzerland in connection with American loan. I replied verbally request was premature.

"Romanian reply... is most unsatisfactory"

It seems to me Romanian reply to our conditions is most unsatisfactory. I think it is made so purposely, as Romanians and local Communists are at least as much interested in political consequences of famine conditions, and blaming the rest of the democracies for failing to bring timely aid, as they are in relieving those conditions.

Reliable source presents following metric tonnage figures of Romanian cereal deliveries to Soviets under Armistice Article Ten during period January 8 to 28: corn 12,618.7; wheat 8,263.5; rye 133.9; barley 488.1; oats 118.1; giving total of 21,974.8 tons.

February 8 *Former President Hoover would like to visit Romania… But…*

General Schuyler on February 6 brought over Captain Winick, here temporarily from Germany, because the Captain had said that he understood former President Hoover, if time permits, would like to include Romania on his present European tour.

I said I understood former President was visiting parts of Germany and Austria where we have primary responsibilities for feeding civilian population. We do not have such responsibility in Romania. Moreover, for an American of former President's prominence to come to Romania now on food mission would add confusion to present situation from which American prestige could only suffer. I said if I were asked to comment on proposal for extension of Mr. Hoover's itinerary to include Romania, my comment would have to be along these lines.

General Schuyler said that he heartily agreed with my statement.

February 9 *"One million dollar to credit of Romanian Government"*

Representative of Joint Distribution Committee Jacobson told me this morning discussions had reached advanced stage with Ministry of Finance for procurement of JDC's lei needs in Romania.

Ministry proposed JDC place one million dollars irrevocably to credit of Romanian Government in New York for purpose of buying grain. In return Ministry would pay JDC Representative in Bucharest counter value in lei in twelve equal installments on first and fifteenth of each month.

The lei value of dollar would be that fixed by CAFA (Casa Autonome Financier et Amortization) less ten percent. CAFA rate is, in fact, existing free market rate.

As Government was unwilling to sign contract incorporating these clauses, because of their illegal nature, it proposed signing a protocol. Jacobson will ask instructions as under such arrangement he has no recourse if this or successor government should not keep "gentleman's agreement."

February 10 *"Department's conditions regarding shipments of grain"*

The Department telegraphed:

"One of conditions for grain shipments from United States included in memorandum to Ralea here is following: Romania will not, while present famine conditions persist, export or permit the export of any grain from Romania for the repayment of grain loans from other countries, for trade purposes, or for any other reasons."

In view of Mission's telegram of January 29 stating Romania must repay grain loaned by Yugoslavia out of stocks of imported grain by March or April, and statement in Mission telegram of February 2 that Romanian Government has taken steps have repayment grain Yugoslavia postponed until after 1947 harvest, your comments without consulting Romanian Government this regard are invited."

"Political considerations involved in (Romanian) Government's handling of food problems"

I replied:

Romanian respect for Department's conditions regarding shipments of grain will depend largely on political conditions as indicated in Mission's telegram of February 6. If repayment 20,000 ton corn to Yugoslavia could be deferred or defaulted without political consequences, Government would probably endeavor carry out any pledge it makes us, especially since greater immediate political advantages will accrue to Government by distribution American grain to factory workers and commissaries than by repaying foreign commitments. If, however, Soviet displeasure will be incurred by failure to repay Yugoslavia, it seems certain repayment will be made regardless of any promises made Department.

Government might invoke technicality of repayment from corn it has obtained from its own limited stocks and from imports from foreign sources such as Hungary in order to claim American corn has not been reexported Yugoslavia disregarding fact that such repayment would be impossible without American imports.

In either case, it seems only too possible that most needy portion of population, namely Moldavian peasants whose support Government reportedly considers inessential, will not be the major benefactors from grain imports from US. Minister Agriculture recently gave striking evidence of political considerations involved in Government's handling of food problems. He informed an officer of Mission that of presently allocated 17,000 tons from US, about 7,000 would be for city of Bucharest, 6,000 for industrial commissaries, and remainder would go to famine areas. Disproportionate distribution is result of importance of distributing grain to elements most likely to cause political disturbances.

February 11 *Discussions regarding "looted gold demarche"*

British Mission has just received instructions to support Mission in looted gold demarche but with reservation that gold produced in Romania will be exempt from investigation. Mission feels that such a reservation is not compatible with instructions it received from Department and is therefore delaying action pending clarification. British Mission is querying London and Department may wish consult British further so that properly coordinated approach may be made. French Minister informed me today that French Ambassador Moscow will deliver his note when we inform him of the date we will take action in Bucharest.

The Department telegraphed as follows:

"Discussions were held in Department with attorneys for Romanian Government February 6 and Romanian Minister February 7 on question looted gold.

1. Attorney suggested Romanian Government hand United States statement that Romania accepted principles gold declaration, that all gold removed from countries occupied by Germans would be considered to have been looted and that books and records would be freely available for purpose ascertaining actual amount looted gold. Romanian Government also to set aside sufficient amount gold to cover possible claims with respect looted gold. On this basis United States would, presumably together with other gold declaration signatories, state to interested persons that there was no objection to pledge by Romania of sufficient gold secure loan of $ 5,000,000 which would suffice to finance first and immediate shipment of grain to Romania.

2. Romanian Minister on February 7 made proposal that Romania earmark contents several cars gold against possible claims, and that on this basis Romania be permitted borrow to finance first shipment grain against pledge of gold. At this meeting Romanian Minister, however, stated suggested declaration described paragraph one above went beyond terms Treaty of Peace and might require long negotiations. In view urgency food situation Romania, he asked consent to pledge of gold in manner described on basis Romanian Government adherence to Peace Treaty and its restitution provisions and on basis earmark of gold in Romania manner described.

3. In meeting with attorneys February 6, Department and Treasury suggested, in addition to declaration described paragraph one, that Romania place in escrow in Swiss banks approximately 48 million dollars worth of gold, this gold to be held subject joint disposition of Romania on one side and either United States, United Kingdom, and France, or United States alone on other. Such gold would be disposed of in manner consistent with outcome investigation, simultaneously to be pushed forward, of amount looted gold acquired by Romania. Amount of dollars 48 million suggested because it is believed that 75% all gold disposed of by Germany during war was looted, and Romania acquired a total of $ 65,000,000 from Germany during war.

4. In conversation Romanian Minister February 7 Department officials made same proposal explaining this would require escrow of $ 33,000,000 already in Switzerland, plus shipment $ 15,000,000 more. It was also stated that this method would provide expeditious means clearing other gold for use in financing Romanian requirements while at same time

protecting interest gold claimant countries in recovery should acquisition looted gold by Romania be proved. Romanian Minister stated he would consult his Government on this matter. He stressed however that declaration mentioned paragraph one went beyond terms Treaty of Peace, although reaffirming that Romania intended to restitute looted gold. He therefore thought discussion declaration might take considerable period and that Romania's necessities demanded immediate action, particularly for seed, as well as consumption requirements. In this connection he stated Romania was prepared to give guarantees grain would be consumed in Romania and not used for repayment grain loans to other countries, etc.

He stressed urgency this matter, in reply to which Department pointed out: (a) that gold declaration was joint declaration of almost all United Nations and could not be merely unilaterally waived by United States; (b) that United States was making proposal designed to expedite clearance of gold for Romanian requirements; and (C) that matter had been under discussion with Romanians for almost a year.

5. Matter left that Romanian Minister to communicate with his Government then communicate further with Department."

February 12 *"On Romanian maneuvres in cereal negotiations..." and "anti-US propaganda campaign"*

(1) My general political deductions on Romanian maneuvers in cereal negotiations I confirm. From here Romanian Government's recent actions appear to be nothing but deliberate attempt to sabotage success of negotiations. Although we can expect more variants towards countering modest US conditions, I believe we can expect no real show of good faith.

(2) I earnestly recommend Voice of America be authorized broadcast immediately full statement on negotiations. To be most effective, this must be done before Romanian Government has occasion to utilize public ignorance of negotiations and begin anti-US propaganda campaign. This is sure to come and to be built on familiar pattern of false and misleading accounts.

(3) Aside from political and economic considerations paramount in Romania jockeying for position there is reality of frightful famine with heaviest mortality in full course in Moldavia. Hence on humanitarian level I am in full accord with General Schuyler's telegram of February 13

urging US Government through American Red Cross to make immediate outright gift to Romania of foodstuffs. Here speed is of the essence. Several planes arriving next week as a start with cargos of concentrated foodstuffs will have greater value than promise of several shiploads of foodstuffs arriving in May.

February 13 *Groza and Bodnăraş statements regarding the Jewish relief organization*

Prime Minister Groza has given following statement for publication to Reuters correspondent:

"As the Jewish relief organization is rich and effective, Jews of the famished region are better fed and better clad than the Christians. This, of course, provokes discontent and anti-Semitic feeling...

If the Jews of America would want to contribute, with say one hundred million dollars — which is nothing for them — in order to enable the Romanian Jewish relief organization to feed and clothe the Christians as well, this fact would put an end not only to famine, but also to the anti-Semitic movement, and not only for a few months but for always.

It is the only chance for the Jews to take preventive measures... because, if we are going to have a good crop, this chance is lost."

Commenting upon statement Bucharest representative of JDC says it is blackmail like of which never existed in Romania in darkest days of anti-Semitic pogroms during Iron Guard regime.

Emil Bodnaras has given to same correspondent for publication the following statement:

"We need help from outside. This year, the Soviet Union cannot help us as it did in the past two years, for it has to bear the consequences of drought in Europe and innundations in Asia. America is the only other power in the world which can help us by allowing us to buy cereals."

Mr. Bodnaras bitterly criticized those "who hope to force us into submission by offering the most humiliating purchasing conditions."

He asserted that certain circles in America "which seem all-powerful at the present moment" are offering such conditions in exchange of grain, that Romania cannot accept them.

The timing and the tenor of these two statements indicate to me that they are the opening guns in the Government's offensive to win the battle of the peace. They serve notice upon us that part two of Peace Treaty is stillborn. They confirm the Government's attitude expressed so clearly in its replies to our pre-election notes, that America's help in Romania's affairs is acceptable only on Romanian conditions.

"Fifty tons of Romanian gold to Switzerland"

I also telegraphed the following:

"I have just received Note Verbale from Foreign Office asking for transit authorization through Austria of special train and personnel transporting fifty tons of gold to Switzerland. The note states this gold originates from mines in Romania and is to be deposited as security in connection with eventual loan to pay for cereal imports.

Romanians by this move hope to secure results where they formerly failed. Please instruct urgently if I should pass this request on to our military authorities."

February 14 *Schuyler and his personnel*

General Schuyler has reported in his Telegram of February 12 that effective immediately he is reducing his personnel and reduction will reach skeleton strength on March 6. As I will be unable to call upon him for assistance after March 1, Department is requested to expedite assignment of help requested in my telegram of January 8.

February 15 *"Legion of Merit... to King Mihai"*

By presentation of Legion of Merit, Degree of Chief Commander, to King Mihai, in recognition of his services to United Nations in their struggle against Hitlerism, I expect to add another reason for King's continuing friendly attitude towards American interests.

Now it seems to me that appropriate moment to present award will be immediately following ratification of Romanian Treaty by US Senate.

To present award earlier, at time when Armistice is still in force, and Romania does not have sovereign status, would diminish some of its luster, as presentation could not be stripped entirely from condescending quality.

To present it later, in the last days of the ACC, could be taken as signal for general exchange of decorations with Romanians. This would put General Schuyler in embarrassing position as we wish to avoid such an exchange.

Considering the King's "attitude towards American interests"

I may add that I shall take personal satisfaction in being present at presentation ceremony, for King's attitude helped me considerably when I was directing Istanbul reporting unit to bring about defection in Nazi cause in Balkans. Though he, unlike Bulgarian regents, did not instruct his Armistice delegates to ask surrender terms of me, his agents kept my office well-informed of changing situation.

February 16 *On the Romanian request for cereals and the resulting conference at the American Mission*

The Department telegraphed the following:

"Romanian Charge presented Note October 20 to Department with request forward Secretary Agriculture. Note refers to appeal ACC to forward to Governments concerned Romanian request for cereals and to resulting conference August at American Mission where Berry, Dodd, and Kekich present. Mention also made inability Romanian businessmen purchase corn American markets since Romania 'not considered to be among the countries supposed to receive corn from the USA.' Request accordingly made have Romania included in such list 'is from August 1946 when Romanian Government informed USA regarding urgent need of corn for Romania.'

Submission requirement Secretary General IEFC made by Romanian Charge in letter dated November 29. Mention made again application August ACC for relief as well as of Note October 20. Statement also made this application Secretary General attached date in justification of request is presented accordance suggestion Agriculture.

IEFC Secretariat found data submitted November 29 not basic or complete enough admit any final evaluation requirement and requested additional information. At meeting IEFC Cereals Committee December 8 Secretary referred to fact Romanian requirement coming in but information incomplete.

January 3 another letter submitted IEFC Secretariat giving some information. Romanian request for seed presented IEFC January 15 and 17. Last week Romanian representatives called attention IEFC Secretariat some information written partly in Romanian language which they were requested have translated and presented systematically to Secretariat."

Legion of Merit to King Michael

The Department also informed us:

"Issue *Newsweek* Magazine distributed yesterday states President expected announce shortly award Legion of Merit King Michael in recognition services Allied cause, award to be made shortly after Treaty signature.

Department sees no reason alter your plan for presentation, with which we agree."

February 17 *Economist Ion Christu and commercial negotiations at Moscow*

One of Romania's foremost economists, Ion Christu, has just returned from Moscow and in interview discussed trend of negotiations which were still proceeding on his departure. Significantly, they are being held in serious atmosphere with Romanian delegates for first time being treated by Soviets on basis of equality.

First document negotiated was Romanian-Soviet commercial treaty to replace prewar instrument, which is to be valid for two years subject to renewal. It was eventually drafted in format similar to Romania's existing commercial treaties without any special advantages for Soviets indicated. Christu was satisfied treaty conforms to letter and spirit of Peace Treaty Article 31.

While above constitutes victory second document negotiated, supplementary one year commercial agreement with Soviets, accomplishes little to relieve grave strain upon Romania. Romanians did not succeed in getting Soviet agreement even to discuss important Peace Treaty problems such as German debt to Romania. Likewise, no reduction of or moratorium on reparations was secured. A token Soviet credit may be forthcoming of about fifteen million dollars probably for use in transactions with Sovrom companies.

Informant considers three factors noteworthy in negotiations:

(1) Romanian Communist ministers aware of their precarious domestic position are too hesitant in discussions with Soviet leaders to press true difficulties of country and offer constructive criticism of Soviet economic demands.

(2) Soviet good will to assist Romania economically was apparent, but because of its own precarious situation, drought in Ukraine, magnitude of its own reconstruction program, Russia unable to supply needed materials or loans from its inadequate stocks.

(3) USSR did not dare help Romania even if it could fearing similar requests from the former satellite states such as Hungary which USSR certainly does not desire to assist economically to get on its feet.

February 18 *"Strong labor dissatisfaction with Government"*

With increased frequency Mission receives credible reports of strong labor dissatisfaction with Government. From beginning of February union leaders tried to organize workers' demonstrations at many points including Bucharest, Brasov, and Timisoara for purpose of urging continued stay of Red Army following Peace Treaty. Project ignominiously failed through wholesale labor desertions. Annual union election scheduled for recent past were postponed by General Confederation of Labor directive and Executive Committee members in all unions were ordered to retain their places for another year.

Grivitza workers' meeting

Communist bulwark hitherto has been organized railway workers who are source of Government terrorist bands. Last week in Bucharest Grivitza rail repair shop general meeting was called attended by three thousand men. Communist Party Executive Committee was informed it would show strongest criticism of Government because of real hardships experienced by workers. Committee thus sought to control meeting through chairman but GCL President Apostol and Vice-President Chivu Stoica, both railway unionists and latter now director of railways administration, through fear of consequences refused Communist request to preside. Committee member Doncea finally was selected and after personally hurling most hostile speaker from platform with difficulty prevented openly critical speeches from turning workers' meeting into physical anti-Government demonstration. Incident obliged Government to cancel politically important commemoration anniversary scheduled for February 16 of famous 1933 Grivitza strike.

February 19 *Communist-trained Tudor Vladimirescu Division... with Tito's guerrilas*

On excellent authority I learn efforts are being made secretly to encourage officers of Communist-trained Tudor Vladimirescu Division to volunteer to serve with Tito's guerrillas in Greece.

February 20 *Regarding retirement of Soviet troops from Romania*

Well-placed, hitherto accurate source, affirms yesterday Soviet orders were received in Romania to begin organizational preparations for the retirement of Soviet troops from Romania in conformity with Peace Treaty by April 15. Four divisions, whose strength is not yet fixed, will remain here under Soviet military command located Constanza. Unknown general commanding these divisions expected to arrive shortly from Moscow accompanying Soviet ACC deputy chairman Susaikov. At same time formidable civil organization of large number of Soviet operators will be placed under his command in pursuance of formulated plans administratively to control country though in civilian guise. Communist circles interpret Soviet troop retirement move as attempt to show ostensible good faith during course of Moscow Conference.

February 21 *United States ship with rations and beans "for the starving people of Moldavia"*

The Department has telegraphed: that the President is releasing to press February 17 statement contained in immediately following telegram and you should make copies available press Romania. Ship with rations and beans referred to is now off Gibraltar and is being diverted to Constanza. Further details will be furnished you and Schuyler urgently. For your and Schuyler's information War Department states in present circumstances flying food Romania less expeditious than diversion this vessel.

Meanwhile, please communicate Romanian Minister Foreign Affairs along line of note delivered Romanian Minister here today, text of which follows, and request written reply containing desired assurances within 48 hours.

"Concerning emergency famine conditions in Romania..."

Following is the text of the note delivered to the Romanian Minister at Washington February 18:

"The Secretary of State presents his compliments to the Honorable the Minister of Romania, and, with reference to recent conversations between the Minister and various officials of the US Government, concerning emergency famine conditions in Romania, has the honor to transmit herewith a copy of a statement which has been released to the press by the President of the US.

The US Representative in Bucharest is being instructed to inform the Romanian Government of this action and to request that, in view of the urgency of the matter the Romanian Government furnish the assurances desired by the US Government within 48 hours. The nature of the assurances the US seeks, some of which have already been made known to the Minister orally, may be recapitulated as follows:

In the first instance, the US Government wishes an expression of the willingness of the Romanian Government to furnish to the Romanian Red

Cross such facilities and assistance as that organization will require in effecting immediate handling and distribution, under supervision of the American Red Cross, of 4,500 tons of rations and 2,500 tons of beans to the starving people of Moldavia without delay and without political, racial, social, or religious discrimination. Secondly, with regard to allocations of cereal grains for purchase by Romania and in order that such allocations, as well as remaining indigenous food, may be utilized effectively to prevent the recurrence of the present emergency situation, the US Government requests that it be assured, with equal urgency, that, so long as the existing famine continues,

(1) Romania will not employ any grain for the payment of reparations;

(2) Romania will not export or permit the export of any grain from Romania for the repayment of grain loans from other countries, for trade purposes, or for any other reasons;

(3) US Representatives in Romania will be free to observe, in such manner as they see fit, the distribution within Romania of grain from US sources, which distribution will likewise be effected without political, racial, religious, or social discrimination, and

(4) Any seed grains from US sources shall be used for their intended purpose within Romania.

If these assurances are forthcoming, the US contemplates supplementing the allocations of 17,000 tons of corn and 24,500 tons of seed grains already granted by the IEFC for March with additional quantities of 17,000 tons monthly of corn for succeeding months until conditions in Romania ameliorated."

American Red Cross requirements

The Department also telegraphed the following:

"American Red Cross will require guarantee of Romanian Government to furnish immediate and adequate handling at port and furnish any other facilities including warehousing, protection, all transportation essential to distribution to be made available through Romanian Red Cross. All these expenses to be borne by Romanian Government. American Red Cross would also require from Romanian Government waiver customs duties on relief supplies on question and approval immediate entry of small additional staff members American Red Cross to aid in supervision. Please share information fully with American Red Cross Sigerist."

February 22 *Foreign Minister Tătărescu "with respect to the guarantees that the US Govt demands"*

At Foreign Office 11 a.m. today, Foreign Minister Tatarescu gave following note:

"The Royal Ministry for Foreign Affairs presents its compliments to the United States Mission, and in reference to its Note of February 20, 1947, has the honor to inform it that the Romanian Government wishes in the first place to express all its gratitude to the US Government for the assistance which the American people are unhesitatingly lending to the Romanian people at one of their most difficult hours.

With respect to the guarantees that the United States Government demands of the Romanian Government the Royal Ministry for Foreign Affairs informs the US Mission that already on February 20, 1947, it has authorized the Romanian Minister in Washington to make the following statement to the Department of State:

'Romania undertakes not to export or to permit the export from Romania of any quantity of cereal grain in payment of reparations or of grain loans procured from any other country for commercial purposes or toward any other end, as long as the present famine continues.

The Romanian Government will hold at the disposal of the United States representatives in Romania all data of information as well as an up-to-date survey of distributions of grain originating in the United States, under a procedure settled by mutual agreement. Such distribution will be effected without any political, social, racial or religious discrimination.

Any seed grain originating from the United States will be used within Romania.

With a view to obtaining the necessary credit for the purchase of cereal grain and for the final liquidation of claims to German gold of any of the nations concerned, the Romanian Government agrees to cede to the United States, as mandatory of such States, a quantity of 15 tons of gold of German origin.'"

In accordance with the specifications contained in the Note of February 20:

In response to Mission note Foreign Minister Tatarescu today delivered Government' reply:

"The Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs presents its compliments to the United States Mission and in relation to its Note of February 20, 1947, regarding the Statement of February 17, of the President of the United States, and the sending of relief for the population in Moldavia, has the honor to inform it that as soon as it had taken note of the assistance of the United States Government, that has been organized through the American Red Cross, the Romanian Government has not failed to take urgent steps in order that the mission in Romania of the American Red Cross may be accomplished in accordance with the specifications contained in the Note of February 20.

The Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs wishes to mention that the President of the Council of Ministers has attended personally to the solution of this matter."

February 27 *Note dated February 25 concerning Government assistance to American Red Cross"*

Following is text of Foreign Office Note dated February 25 but just received which supplements its Note of February 22 concerning Government assistance to American Red Cross:

"The Royal Ministry for Foreign Affairs presents its compliments to the US Mission and in connection with its verbal Note of February the 22, 1947, has the honor to inform it that all necessary measures have been taken in order that the unloading, the stowing in port, the loading on trains, as well as the transport of the foodstuffs may take place under conditions as perfect as possible.

The foodstuffs received from the American Relief will be free of import duty and the entry into Romania of the American Red Cross Representatives is authorized.

In consequence of the agreement between the American Red Cross Representative, the Romanian Red Cross Representative, and the Ministry for Public Health, a plan of action has been established so that the American relief may be distributed under the most perfect conditions.

The Romanian Government appreciates the gesture of the United States and will employ all endeavors in order that this relief action by the United States may take its course under most satisfactory conditions."

Romanian Government "has not yet published any local statement on the matter"

I also telegraphed the Department as follows:

Romanian Government, despite Washington announcement of its acceptance of conditions of famine relief, has maintained secrecy regarding contents of Romanian reply and has not yet published any local statement on the matter. Communist Central Committee reportedly blocked attempt to pass vote of thanks to US in Chamber of Deputies.

The opposition party leaders' statement

Yesterday afternoon statement was presented to Premier Groza signed by three opposition party leaders, Maniu, Bratianu, and Petrescu, calling attention to generous American aid, lack of Government public announcement of its intentions, and censoring of opposition newspaper requests for clarification of Government stand. Statement urged Government acceptance of US offer especially in view recent statement by Agriculture Minister that country's food reserves will be exhausted by early March.

February 28 *Shipment of fifty tons monetary gold held by the Rom. National Bank to Switzerland*

The Department telegraphed:

"Department felt advisable interpose no obstacles shipment fifty tons monetary gold held by Romanian National Bank to Switzerland by special train after Romanian Foreign Office request for transit permit through United States zone of Austria was received by American Representative Bucharest February 14.

This in no way changes United States position regarding use of such gold and position will be maintained that such gold, like gold already in Switzerland, cannot be accepted by United States Treasury, United States being a signatory to Gold Declaration of February 22, 1944 prior to settlement looted gold question. Accordingly we expect Swiss Government and National Bank not to purchase gold without having been assured by United States, British, and French representatives that gold is not tainted or that settlement has been reached with Romania on looted gold. Also express United States Government's appreciation for Swiss Charge D'Affaires Bucharest advance information given American Representative Bucharest.

Please informally present above statement to Swiss Foreign Office and inform British, French colleagues leaving it up to them to repeat similar policy statements Swiss Foreign Office. Department informed British, French Embassies Washington suggesting appropriate instructions be sent by British, French Foreign Offices to their missions Bern."

February 29 [28! 1947] *Concerning Romano-Americana, and the "Sovrom demands"*

Romano-Americana reports it has received technical information from returning members Romanian economic delegation to Moscow to effect "Sovrom demands" have been met and will be incorporated in new commercial treaty. Should treaty be ratified by Romanian Parliament provisions in conflict with Petroleum Law of 1942 would supersede that act and Sovrom would be on firm legal ground. Following provisions were agreed upon:

1. List of lands annexed to Constitutional Act setting up Sovrom are increased to include majority of lands reverting to state under present and future extension structure;

2. 23,000 hectares of present Arad structures will be granted to present exploration group, which included Romano-Americana, with 75% remaining going to Sovrom. Of this 23,000 companies making up Sovrom are major partners.

3. ACEX (Romanian Government Oil Company) will conclude with Sovrom a working agreement for three Timisoara structures on fifty-fifty basis.

4. Sovrom will participate in natural gas monopoly in Odorheiu region on fifty-fifty basis.

5. Exploration quotas renounced by Astra-Romana will be given to Sovrom (rather than to other participants as provided by law).

6. Sovrom will be named by Government as operator of Arad structure.

7. To compensate for inadequate price paid Sovrom for processing royalties, Government will pay sum of $ 1,500,000.

8. Soviet group to receive for compensation amortization company installations forfeitary sum of $ 600,000 plus 27,000,000,000 lei.

9. To compensate for lack of profits, Sovrom will receive sum of $ 1,000,000.

Conclusions:

It seems clear from above Soviets intend secure as complete monopoly as possible on unexploited oil lands in Romania, thus leaving nothing for Government to grant American and British interests if they should claim equal treatment under terms of Peace Treaty. It is believed Government company ACEX will be used henceforth entirely as agency through which Soviets will obtain more and more exploration rights. Participation of Soviets in natural gas monopoly viewed with considerable concern locally since this is Romania's last great natural resource with possibilities extensive future development.

Informants report similar concessions will be made other Sovrom companies including financial assistance on part Romanian Government but details are not known as yet.

Complete text will be forwarded as soon as possible.

Please bring numbered paragraphs of foregoing urgently to attention Standard Oil Company on New Jersey.

March 1 *The "complete text Soviet-Romanian economic agreement"*

Mission in possession complete text Soviet-Romanian economic agreement, including secret annex and is translating documents as urgently as possible but will not be able to make complete analysis for several days. Preliminary examination reveals some salient points in addition to those listed.

1. "Sovrompetrol" Agreement confirmed;

2. 400,000 tons petroleum products to be exported 1947 under commercial agreement;

3. Further "Sovrom" companies envisaged;

4. Profits accruing to Soviet partner from operations joint Soviet-Romanian companies will be transferred to USSR in merchandise, free currency, or gold;

5. Most favored nation clause to apply to all products of Romanian or Soviet factories no matter where they were actually produced;

6. Prices for goods exchanged under agreement to be world prices in dollars at official rate of exchange (30,600 lei);

7. 19,000 tons raw cotton to be sent to Romania for conversion into thread and return to Russia.

Remarks: "Agreement places country further under Soviet economic domination"

Observers here feel agreement brings no material benefits to Romania and places country further under economic domination of USSR. Agreement reveals no possibility appreciable imports to revive oil and other industry other than Sovrom or to assist Romanian currency and food situations.

March 2 *Romanian gold problem*

Statement that there can be no expectation at this time official United States loan to Romania still describes situation regarding possibility extension credit to Romania by United States Government or agencies.

So far as Department aware only discussions regarding possible loan to Romania in which private United States groups have taken part have been those referred to before. As Mission knows, all United States Government restrictions on current transactions with Romania were lifted by Treasury General License Number 94, December 7, 1945. Department therefore reluctant to take position with respect to any particular private transaction except in unusual circumstances where policy considerations of overriding importance present. Mission will further appreciate that considerations determining decision by private groups whether to extend credits to Romania are different from those shaping United States Government lending policy.

Informal discussions between Department and legal representatives of Banking Group and of Romanian Government have been concerned with use of Romanian-held gold as loan security and whether Romanian Government competent to enter into necessary contracts with or without Allied approval. Regarding latter question, Department indicated that ACC approval probably necessary at this time although the question had not been fully explored here. Regarding use of gold by Romania as collateral for private credit discussions centered on Gold Declaration of February 1944 and its possible effect on proposed loan transaction. Representatives of banking groups appeared fully aware implications United States treasury policy of not buying gold held by or obtained from any country suspected of holding looted gold and effect of such refusal to buy if they should come into possession of Romanian gold through Romania defaulting on gold secured loan.

In subsequent informal conversations between Department and Romanian Government representatives on gold problem, question was raised regarding Department's position on general question of American banks or business concerns doing business with Romania. Department indicated that any exchange of notes between United States and Romania which settled gold question might contain statement that this Government had no objections to American banks or businessmen doing business with Romania, although Department could not, of course, sponsor or urge any particular transaction.

March 3 *"Bill for creation industrial offices... on verge of enactment..."*

Bill for creation industrial offices is reported by most reliable sources to be on verge of enactment possibly by March 10 despite reported opposition on part of Socialists and Tatarescu Liberals. Final draft will be modified to some extent to appease non-Communist members of Government but whatever ultimate form may be, bill will enable Government to disrupt, control, or take over any industry at any moment it desires. Briefly, bill envisages rigid Government direction of all activities of each major industry including production prices, distribution, trade practices, personnel, capital investment, etc.

Technically no grounds for protest appear to exist since measure is internal concern of Romania for alleged purpose of reviving country's economy. However American and other interests here are gravely concerned over bill which they feel will be used by Communists, who prepared it, to drive foreign capital out of Romania by using law in such a way as to ensure repeated losses and eventual liquidation. Swiss Legation has approached Mission with suggestion that I informally indicate to Romanian Government that passage of such legislation would have effect of removing all opportunities for further investment of American capital in Romania and make credits out of the question. Swiss are taking this line themselves and are also approaching British and French Missions with similar suggestions.

This bill..."appears to make any consideration of American credits to Romania... unwise"

While Mission inclined to doubt effectiveness any such approach since law appears further Soviet attempt to control Romanian economy and Government is not free agent in matter, it feels threat to American business interests is serious. This bill when considered along with "Sovrom" developments appears to make any consideration of American credits to Romania, public or private, unwise.

Mr. V.C. Georgescu, Managing Director Romano-Americana now in US is familiar with technical details this development and Department may wish discuss with him effect enactment would have on American investments.

Early indication Departments view would be appreciated.

March 4 *About "an impending Government change..." Causes for situation*

Bucharest rumormongers and local newspapers have been repeating with such persistency of late stories of an impending Government change that it may be well briefly to examine causes for situation.

The unhappy... partners

Tatarescu Liberals and Radaceanu Socialists within Government are unhappy. They see growing chaos in national economy and waning of their own influence in national politics. They are attempting to postpone their eclipse by calling attention noisily to their pretended strength.

Tatarescu recently told my French colleague that Communists in charge of Ministry of National Economy were failing miserably and he intended to regain control of Ministry for his party. Failing he would withdraw from Cabinet as Foreign Minister and perhaps withdraw his party from Government Bloc. He added present stage of deterioration could not last much longer and as it was final stage he did not wish to be in the same boat with Groza when debacle comes.

The King's opinion

Yesterday afternoon I asked King Michael if he thought any of rumors of change would materialize into fact. He said in his opinion none would. In his words Tatarescu was simply maneuvering to feel out degree of his importance with Communists. By blustering he hoped to get something but if he got nothing he would at least hang on to what he has. Radaceanu, the King said, was making a fuss in order to keep his group from being swallowed up by Communist Party. The King characterized the whole show as a late-winter flurry which in no way would shake Communist dominance of Government and country.

March 5 *General Susaikov "attempting to show extensive corruption in Romanian economy"*

Returning from Moscow Soviet Deputy ACC Chairman Susaikov launched investigation now in full course attempting to show extensive corruption in Romanian economy and in Armistice deliveries.

Expose of corruption in national economy will be used as argument to justify passage of Government's pending industrial offices bill. In one of first steps heads of ORAP, leather control organization, have been arrested as result of alleged National Economy Ministry investigation.

On Armistice Soviets are expected, according to well-informed source, to advance thesis not more than half of reparations actually were received by Soviet Union and missing amounts are still in Romania through acts of alleged profiteers and grafters. These can include any elements Russians find it expedient to name including even Romanian Communists such as Simeon Oeriu, head of Romanian Armistice Commission, and some Soviet officials.

One responsible report not confirmed from any other source has Russians considering removal of number of future accused persons to Soviet Union for trial on basis some would be Soviet nationals, others would be witnesses, while rest would have injured Soviet Union through chicanery in Armistice dealings. If move is employed it would be warning gesture to secure sobering of public opinion toward Government and Soviet Union.

March 6 *"American relief supplies arrived in Moldavia"*

This morning the first train of American relief supplies arrived in Moldavia. This afternoon at the palace King Michael asked me to telegraph an expression of his own deep gratitude to President Truman for his humanitarian action in aiding the Romanian people at a time of great need.

March 7 *"Toward effective nationalization of country's economy"*

Directive brought from Moscow by recently returned Communist leaders is to effect party should maintain firmest policy. With Communist political control established through Government and Chamber of Deputies next great effort is to be directed toward effective nationalization of country's economy. Leaders such as DPB Secretary General Luca speaking March 6 on completion second year of Groza Government emphasized every care should be taken that "monopolistic capitalism" should not control Romania and that all DPB parties should observe not only letter of bloc political platform but its "spirit." Issue is now being posed in imminent Parliament consideration of industrial offices bill which without so stating gives Government means to Romanian economy.

Several sources claim within week discussion on floor of above bill will be accompanied by all-out Government organized popular demonstration in its behalf. This will give Tatarescu Liberals and Radaceanu Socialists opportunity to tumble into Communist line. Soviets are reported by one reliable informant as being somewhat apprehensive of international reaction and as wishing to be in complete command to forestall (1) American economic intervention in Romania through granting of large private or public credits and (2) any international demarche upon nationalization issue during Moscow Conference by being able to point to "spontaneous popular desire" for measure.

March 7 *More about the "Soviet-Romanian commercial agreements"*

Text Soviet-Romanian commercial agreements will be sent Department next pouch. Agreements are comprehensive and rather complicated, especially secret annex regarding "Sovrompetrol." Latter is basically same as previously reported with more details concerning means whereby Sovrom will acquire exploitation lands at serious detriment to and in clear violation of legal rights of Romano-Americana. Romanian Government is to make up its failure to contribute its share of Sovrompetrol capital by ceding further lands reportedly at prices to be determined by Soviets. This can put Government in position of never meeting its commitments and thus make Sovrom eventually an entirely Russian enterprise with vast exploration and exploitation rights throughout Romania. This portion of agreement is vaguely worded and subject to varying interpretations possibly deliberately. Reliable source reports full Cabinet will not be given working details of secret annex which will be known only to Groza, Bodnaras, and Gheorghiu-Dej. Report of technicians left behind in Moscow to finish work on details such as prices not yet known but source states it will "furnish more surprises and they will not be pleasant."

Romania secures two substantial benefits by agreements, reduction of Article 12 payments from 300 to 100 billion lei, and $10,000,000 four year credit for goods exported by Russia. Former concession reportedly was obtained by personal plea of Gheorghiu-Dej to Stalin and it has not been released to public although Government states it has obtained "important alleviations" of reparations burden. Government source, however, has admitted to Mission question of prices can mar any great benefit accruing to Romania by these concessions.

Only fraction of agreements has been made public although Government propaganda to effect Romania has obtained great material assistance is both heavy and noisy. Mission does not believe benefits obtained by Romania in any way compensate for cession of its natural resources which "Sovromization" of country's economy will eventually mean. While whole question of Sovrompetrol has been commented upon before Mission wishes to emphasize again serious position of foreign capital here. Payment of forfeits and amortization to Sovrom will make further advances to other companies difficult and terms of commercial agreement and annexes seem to make any export by non-Sovrom companies to free currency market out of question during 1947. Sovrom will be permitted to export around 70,000 tons in order to obtain equipment and it has been reported they have already approached American and British manufacturers.

Conclusion seems incapable that Soviets and Romanian Communists by secret annexes commercial treaty and by bill for industrial offices intend to force all non-Soviet foreign economic interests out of Romania and to make country Soviet economic reservation.

March 8 *The gold situation and food matters*

On March 5 Department delivered to Romanian Legation note along following lines:

1. Department took note of previous Romanian Note which in part dealt with gold situation and offered 17 thousand kilograms. Department also took note of informal discussions in which offer was raised to 18 thousand kilograms.
2. Department had not wished to connect gold and food matters but these had come together only because of Romanian desire to pledge gold for loans. United States had to be mindful of its obligations as one of many nations signatory to gold declaration and as one trustee together with British and French under Paris Reparation Agreement. Department had therefore arranged meetings not only between Departmental officials and Romanian Legation officials but also officials of French and British embassies in Washington.

3. In interest of expedition and because determination by Three Allied Powers had not been possible in time available Department offered following solution for pressing problems:

a) Romanians to deposit 18 thousand kilograms fine gold to account American Legation Bern;

b) Department thereafter to clear transactions in which Romanians pledged as security for loans gold certified by Romania not (repeat not) to have been acquired from Germany during course of war;

c) Department to continue discussions with British and French and to advise Romanians within 90 days whether deposit of 18 thousand kilograms was final settlement or not;

d) If settlement was final Three Allied Powers to require all other interested countries participating in gold delivered by Romania to relinquish their claims against Romania with respect to gold transactions between Germany and Romania during the war;

e) If deposit not considered sufficient for final settlement deposit to be returned and negotiations to continue;

f) In this event Romanians to make books and records available and otherwise cooperate with Allied Nations in full investigations. In any event Romania to adhere to principles of gold declaration.

4. Copies of note sent British and French embassies Washington. American Legation Bern also appraised contents of note in order work out mechanics of deposit.

5. Romanian Minister delivered March 6 to Department note stating agreement with note and stating Department would be advised when deposit in Bern had been made.

6. This solution makes unnecessary further discussion gold question in Allied Council at least for present. For your information British have indicated willingness accept 18 thousand kilograms as final settlement but French have indicated desire to obtain amount of 22 thousand kilograms. Department believes possibility increasing amount already agreed to be deposited very slight and would be disposed to go along with British although it is not desired to press French on this.

7. Please report any steps taken by Romanians looking toward deposit mentioned above.

8. Text notes mentioned follows by dispatch.

Sent Bucharest and repeated Paris and London for information.

March 9 *Labor troubles of Groza Government mounting to serious proportions*

Labor troubles of Groza Government have been mounting to serious proportions because of workers suffering from great economic misery under inflationary conditions and Government's rigid policy pegging wages. While peasants even in starving Moldavia refrain from disturbances that might furnish Soviet pretext for troops to remain, industrial workers are showing open hostility toward Communists. Meanwhile Government continues to follow Marxist dogma by alleging it has industrial proletariat support.

At Reshitza industrial works:

To great Reshitza industrial works after unsuccessful Bucharest trip of its factory committee for purpose of urging General Confederation of Labor to authorize large wage increases, GCL sent two representatives to explain Government's whole wage line policy. Entire Reshitza assemblage of thousands of workers accused representatives of being delegates of completely crooked and fraudulent regime and held them as hostages until GCL agreed to wage increases. Certain accidents to Reshitza plant are being investigated by Soviet civilian NKVD squad for possible sabotage.

In Bucharest

In Bucharest trolley company's employees demanded wage increases which provoked open conflict among Communist directors. One proposed mass demonstration to force wage demands on Government and accused latter of great frauds resulting in increased workers hardships. He later was arrested, beaten, and died in Interior Ministry. Other party line Communist directors have fled company and dare not return.

Government now feels impelled to meet in part labor wage demands by increases of several times existing salaries. GCL has given in and National Economy Ministry's assent is shortly expected. Revised Communist strategy reportedly will be to go along with country's inflation for next few months, attempting to retard it through National Bank means while preparing permanent stabilization program jointly with campaign to secure complete control of country's economy.

March 10 *Berry's interview with Maniu (March 9)*

During interview yesterday Maniu asked Mission to transmit prepared documentation addressed to Secretary General of UNO showing suppression of popular liberties and persecution of three opposition parties. Covering statement is signed by Maniu, Bratianu, and Petrescu.* Maniu was informed that while treaty ratification does not nullify Yalta and Moscow agreements inquiry of Department was necessary before accepting role of UNO communication channel. My telegram of day before yesterday makes identical inquiry in behalf Independent Socialists.

March 11 *Eighth meeting United States — Soviet Oil Commission*

Minutes of eighth meeting United States — Soviet Oil Commission have at last been signed and Mission feels firm steps must now be taken terminate commission. Last request of Mission for information concerning progress of Soviet study of previously submitted documents met with usual procrastinating reply and it is obvious delaying tactics will continue to be Soviet reply to all our requests for winding up commission. Accordingly Mission suggests final written communication to Soviets pointing out time that has elapsed since submission of documents and suggesting immediate reference of whole matter to diplomatic level if (1) study not complete or (2) Soviets desire further documents or information.

Conclusion: Russians intend to drag discussions out

From our own and British experience, it is clear Russians intend to drag discussions out interminably and Mission is not inclined to have another meeting (involving another lengthy delay in agreeing on minutes) even should Soviets have completed their work on documents. However, since Soviets will in all probability accuse us of unilateral termination of commission Department's instructions will be appreciated before any further action is taken.

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* See *infra*, March 13, pp. 634–635 and March 14, p. 636.

March 12 *Soviet directive to Romanian Foreign Minister*

Moscow has given directive to Romanian Foreign Minister that he outline to each Government Ministry its peace treaty responsibilities, thus to avoid organization of Government liaison committee with three heads of Mission and consequent Government responsibility for unsatisfactory execution of treaty. Material compiled by Foreign Office for use during peace negotiations being made available to relevant ministries to justify future sabotage of treaty articles. Most favored nation provisions already effectively jammed by 1947 Sov-Rum Commercial Agreement. Existing Romanian ACC liaison commission being rapidly liquidated to forestall any informational requests by mission heads of operations under Armistice.

March 13 *Maniu's memoire for the Secretary of State in the name of the National Peasant Party*

Yesterday Maniu presented memoire to me for Secstate in name of National Peasant Party outlining past and present difficulties of party through persecution by Government and Communists since Moscow Agreement and broadening of Groza Government. Identical memoire given British and Soviet missions.

Its main points are summarized below and document will be forwarded by pouch.

the Communisst Party extensibly accused

Statement reviews regime's acts against public liberties and fraudulent tactics employed in national elections, but document is significant in that for first time Communist Party is extensively accused as directing force behind Government moves. Communists accused of being power behind those lightly camouflaged parties which Government labels as independent within DPB, and of being directed "by three persons who have sufficiently vague connections with Romanian people." Further, Communist Party "seeks Communization of country" and for this reason popular liberties have been completely suppressed. In economic field statement claims "Communist Party pursues pauperization of all social classes" and that Government economic policy has been directed in this sense.

Current arrests under Interior Ministry orders chiefly of Peasant Party members having liaison with Labor movement, notably recently appointed Party Labor Section Chief, Dr. Virgil Veniamin, are remarked as motivated by desire to frame National Peasants as plotting against regime. Referring to long National Peasant record in Labor movement, document does not understand why field should be "exclusively monopoly of Communist Party" adding latter employs "all methods and means of totalitarian parties of Fascist and Hitlerite structure."

Government allegedly has ignored its international commitments because British and American protesting notes "were not followed by adequate measures of all signatories" of these accords. Maintaining validity of Moscow Accord continues despite November elections memoire repeats there must be new free elections to attain aims of Yalta and Moscow agreements and three foreign ministers are asked to work toward this end.

March 14 *Protest to be presented to Romanian Government on behalf of the American Oil Companies*

Request you present protest Foreign Office along following lines:

"My Government seriously concerned Romanian Government granting (in Article 2 of July 16, 1945 Convention with Soviet Government) to Sovrompetrol 'domestic' legal status which under 1942 Mining Law places Company in preferential position compared foreign firms (defined in 1942 Law as firms in which foreign capital participation amounts to more than 25 percent). Position thus accorded Sovrompetrol in Romania by Romanian Government represents both obvious discrimination against American Companies and violation 1942 law which defines 'oil enterprises as those by which 75 percent or more of capital is owned by Romanian Nationals.' In these circumstances my Government must request that Romanian Government rescind classification Sovrompetrol as Romanian enterprise and place Company in same category other foreign (as defined Romanian 1942 law) including American Oil Companies.

In addition, my Government is informed that whereas Romanian Government has repeatedly failed over an extended period to relieve the acute financial condition of American Oil Companies resulting from inadequate oil prices, Romanian Government has promptly agreed to certain demands made by Soviets on behalf of Sovrompetrol and its Soviet share holders including (1) special treatment in the granting of oil exploration concessions, (2) compensation for inadequate prices paid for oil products delivered by Sovrompetrol Companies, (3) payment at world prices for future oil deliveries, and (4) right to export oil products.

With respect foregoing demands I have been instructed by my Government to point out that compliance by Romanian Government with Soviet request for special consideration in the granting of oil exploration concessions would appear to require Romanian Government not only to violate provisions 1942 Mining Law governing granting of concessions but also to discriminate against other companies including American. I must point out also that the reported reason given by Soviets for requesting special treatment in matter of concessions, namely, that Sovrompetrol has no concession areas, has no basis in fact as several Sovrompetrol Companies hold, and are operating various concessions. My Government has been informed that Romanian Government has already discriminated against the American-owned Oil Company Romano-Americana by granting to another company exploration permits for certain areas in the Banat and Timisoara regions to which Romano-Americana is reported to be entitled on basis of (A) prospecting work already carried out and (B) priority of application for exploration permits. Romanian Government's comments will be appreciated as discrimination in matter of concessions seriously prejudices the future of American-owned Oil Companies operating in Romania. With respect to Romanian Government agreement to compensate Sovrompetrol for difference between world oil prices and prices actually paid to Sovrompetrol Companies, US Government expects Romanian Government to extend no less favorable treatment to corresponding claims of American companies. Similarly US Government will expect Romanian Government to extend to American Companies treatment no less favorable than that accorded to Sovrompetrol in any other respects, including the right (A) to export part of their out put in order obtain needed foreign exchange and (B) to be paid at world prices for future deliveries of oil to Romanian Government.

I have been instructed to make clear to Romanian Government that US Government considers the views set forth above consistent with the rights of American companies operating in Romania under the 1942 Mining Law, the Armistice, and the Treaty of Peace. Although treaty not yet ratified Romanian Government has signed it and US Government expects nothing will be done to prejudice fulfillment its provision particularly those set forth Articles 31 and 33.

My Government would appreciate Romanian Government's assurance that American Petroleum property interest's in Romania will receive most-favored-nation or national treatment and no less favorable treatment than that accorded Sovrompetrol or its constituent companies."

British Government's similar position

You may wish consult British colleague who has presented similar position to Romanian Government on behalf British Oil companies understand British companies are preparing claims against Romanian Government for compensation for inadequate prices on basis Treaty Article 33 and Romanian Government's obligation to extend no less favorable treatment British companies than is accorded Sovrompetrol. Suggest you inform American companies take similar action.

You are authorized use your discretion in contents and form of note to Foreign Office suggested above, in view of possible developments or details not available Department. Suggest that note be presented soonest possible however in view expanding Soviet activities. Situation has been fully discussed Georgescu and Standard New Jersey.

March 13* *On Maniu's plan to overthrow Groza Government:*

Maniu in conversation yesterday said his party desired to overthrow present Romanian dictatorial minority Government that was bringing ruin to country. His plan was not revolution but it might entail bloodshed. Ousting of Groza Government could be accomplished successfully only with concurrence of three political elements, Romanian people, King, and Great Powers. The people had spoken in recent election by voting heavily against Government. The King, according to Maniu, is willing. The attitude of American and British governments remains to be learned. This was the reason for his visit.

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* *FRUS 1947*, IV, p. 477: Berry to the Secretary of State. Telegram 219, Top Secret, March 13.

I replied basic attitude of American Government was well known to him from American participation in Crimean Declaration and subsequent attempts to implement that declaration in notes to Romanian Government. I added I must refer his statement to Washington for study* as I could not take responsibility of endorsing action which he said might entail bloodshed and in case of failure certainly would bring severest retaliation by Communists against Peasant Party.

March 14 *"Moscow instructions to Romanian Communists… to forestall growing Government unpopularity"*

In early March Mission received report of Moscow instructions to Romanian Communists that they take firmer measures to forestall growing Government unpopularity. Evidence accumulated of Communist effort to allege widespread reactionary conspiracy among three opposition parties against Romanian Government. These reports claimed those arrested would be detained indefinitely at concentration camps used during Antonescu regime which were being readied for influx of new inmates.

Official policy gave credence that open hostility to opposition would begin. Groza in speech March 3 said "we shall not try again to make our peace with reaction, for every such attempt has met with no positive response." Interior Minister at private meeting of police inspectors reportedly declared "time has arrived when opposition may no longer speak." Soviet Deputy ACC Chairman Susaikov in speech March 9 openly assailed those "who try to masquerade as friends of Soviet Union but in fact are enemies of Soviet-Romanian friendship. This is reactionary caste which trying to avert its inevitable doom furiously attacks young Romanian democracy."

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* For Departments' reply see *infra*, March 22, p. 640.

Arrests "throughout country"

Arrests began March 10 throughout country and besides opposition members with Labor affiliations grew to include many party district officials. List of arrested grows daily, with most being from National Peasants, followed by Independent Socialists and Bratianu Liberals. One group of 28 arrested in Cluj was brought to Bucharest and reportedly is destined for Pitesti concentration camp. Former Liberal Cabinet Minister Romniceanu yesterday saw Bodnaras, Communist, Director of Prime Minister's office, to protest but was given no response but a smile.

Signed memoire: "Maniu — Petrescu — Bratianu"

This morning Mission received its copy of signed memoire from Maniu, Petrescu, and Bratianu addressed to four Allies at Moscow Conference* which was personally brought by Bratianu.

Statement described mass arrests without warrant or opportunity of legal defense as directed against opposition parties by Government as means to maintain its regime. Document terms present situation flagrant violation of Yalta, Potsdam, Moscow agreements and spirit of recently signed Peace Treaty.

March 15 *Romanian Government's thanks... for the American aid*

Tatarescu said he personally wished to express to me his thanks for American aid to stricken regions in Moldavia adding "of course we could have managed from our own resources but we are grateful for the friendly gestures which have come from abroad."

I judge from this that official Romanian line will be that Government had means to solve its own problems but tolerated our charitable action in interest of friendly relations between two countries. Recent editorial in Government press appear to bear out this deduction.

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* See *FRUS 1947*, IV, pp. 477-479. Copies of this memoire dated March 13, 1947, were sent by Berry to the Embassy in Moscow: "At this time, the Secretary of State was in Moscow for the Fourth Session of the Council of Foreign Ministers, March 10-April 24" (*Ibid*, footnote 1).

March 16 *Opposition's gratitude for President Truman's speech on March 12*

In past few days, Maniu, Bratianu, and Petrescu, leaders of the three opposition parties in Romania have personally asked that their deep appreciation be conveyed to the President for the manner in which he mentioned Romanian conditions in his speech before Congress on March 12.

March 17 *Stormy secret meeting of the DPB delegations*

Confronted by mutters of discontent from Tatarescu Liberals and Socialists in DPB Bloc over industrial offices bill Communists have been seeking to compose differences.

Climax came March 14 at secret meeting of bloc parliamentary delegations when Premier Groza spoke strongly to effect no party could leave the ship and expressed determination together they would execute DPB program. Anna Pauker followed with very aggressive speech to parties that "none will leave" and gave listeners intimation if necessary Communists would proceed alone. Iordachescu* speaking for Socialists said they would stand by coalition while Tatarescu in behalf his party thanked them for speeches.

Original form industrial offices bill has been extensively modified reportedly to be applicable only to heavy industry, giving legal form to present practice, but disquiet concerning measure still remains. While it may not be necessary Communists have not repeat not renounced popular demonstration idea if any bloc party shows ultimate opposition to projected bill. Communists then would employ demonstration tactic on day bill introduced in Parliament.

March 18 *"Upon distribution of Red Cross relief supplies"*

I believe Department will be interested in General Schuyler's R-411 of March 19 reporting his own observations and summing up those of his officers upon distribution in Moldavia of Red Cross relief supplies.

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* Theodor Ion Iordachescu, Secretary-General of SDP (Rădăceanu-Voitec) after March 1946.

Distribution of supplies was for all practical purposes finished within 12 days after arrival in Romania. Rapidity of distribution, thoroughness of American observation, and cooperation of all interested persons has set record locally for this type of transaction. The fears of many Romanians here and abroad happily were proven groundless.

Distribution of this shipment was made under ideal circumstances. Situation required rapid dispersal within limited geographical area. We had available a score of American officials to observe it.

Distribution of subsequent shipments presents different problem. These cereals are purchases not gifts. Their distribution will continue from their arrival until next harvest. The distribution will extend over entire country. It will be accomplished largely after withdrawal of American representation on ACC. As Mission is charged to report upon distribution it will appreciate guidance as to plan Department had in mind when it made American observation one of conditions of allocation.

March 19 *"Increasingly serious offensive against opposition"*

As yet Communists have received no Moscow orders to revise immediate program as result of President Truman's March 12 speech. This program from evidence reliable source envisages large number opposition members to be held in Pitesti concentration camp, strong attempt to link purported Romanian plot with so-called Hungarian conspiracy, and finally employment of deportations to Soviet Union. Widespread labor troubles cause Government to prepare opposition as scapegoat thus justifying arrests. At same time there are arrests among Hungarian minority in attempt, reportedly not going well, to show Romanian-Hungarian reactionary liaison.

Last evening Maniu described to Mission officer this increasingly serious offensive against opposition. His latest figures give 300 National Peasants arrested and proportionally smaller number of Liberals and Independent Socialists. This does not show true situation since those arrested to date are only fraction of number sought by police, others being in hiding. Situation creates great tension throughout opposition and has serious effects upon livelihoods of those who for principles are persecuted by Government.

Virgil Veniamin among those arrested...

Chief Maniu concern among those arrested thus far is Professor Virgil Veniamin, who is an Assistant Secretary of Peasant Party. Maniu states confidential information available to him shows Government having absolutely no repeat no success in fabricating alleged subversive activity case against Veniamin. However his arrest has had appreciable effect upon opposition morale. Maniu after drawing the inevitable parallel between this arrest and that of Kovacs in Hungary,* as well as pointing to overwhelming Romanian popular support for National Peasant Party, then appealed to United States to take identical action in Veniamin's behalf. With opposition leadership object of extended Government repressive program I would recommend Department give careful thought to Maniu's request.

March 20 *Tătărescu's position*

Tatarescu at lunch today told me that if Communists insist on forcing through Parliament industrial offices bill with original objectional features he would lead his party to break openly with Government Bloc. He added he thought Communists would modify their stand before pushing him to this extreme. In my opinion if any group has to give in it will be Tatarescu's.

I was instructed to state concern of United States Government regarding bill to create industrial offices which in effect threatens nationalization without compensation to investors. United States Government reserves all rights on behalf American interests in enterprises affected adversely. Prompt, adequate, and effective compensation expected if American management unable continue.

Your suggestion approved to point out passage of bill would remove further opportunities for investment American capital. Also at your discretion call attention to Peace Treaty, Article 24, Paragraph two.

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* Bela Kovacs, "Early in 1947, Communists implicated Bela Kovacs, the Smallholders' popular Secretary General, in a so-called antidemocratic conspiracy, and the major political crisis they created that summer brought down the Smallholderled government of Ferenc Nagy" (Charles Gati, *Hungary and Soviet Bloc*, Duke University Press, Durham, 1986, p. 118).

You may state Department reviewed report on bill from company operation in Romania. (For your information only ITT).

Please keep Department informed developments regarding proposed law.

For your information Department now considering note on general economic and commercial relations.

March 21 *Greeks repatriated from Soviet German zone*

Ten Greeks sent to Germany during occupation of Greece are being repatriated from Soviet German zone and leave here March 26 on steamer "Transylvania" for Istanbul en route Greece. Of group seven arrived here illegally and reported having been held in Yugoslav concentration camps where they were trained for future action as guerrillas in Greece. They are first Greek repatriates to pass through Bucharest in several months. Previously several hundred monthly reportedly traveled to Salonika through Bucharest.

March 22 *United States Government cannot support Maniu's plan to overthrow Groza Government*

Department instructed me to inform Maniu that while United States Government does not condone dictatorial minority rule of Groza Government contrary to democratic principles to which United States firmly adheres, United States Government cannot support or advocate attempt violent overthrow with probable attendant consequences for Romanian people.*

March 23 *President Truman's March speech large echo*

The President's March 12 Speech in Congress has set in motion in Romania a great ground swell. To many fellow travelers in Government it heralds the dawn of a new day.

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* *FRUS 1947*, IV, p. 479. The Acting Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, to Berry. Telegram 179, Top Secret. Washington, March 19. For documentation regarding Maniu's position, see also *Teroarea. Documente ale procesului... Inter alia*, pp. 86, 135-136, 304-305, 450-451, 627, 645, 714, 733, 748, 754.

The speech came when first signs of restlessness on part of opposition parties within DPB was manifesting itself within Parliament. It encouraged and strengthened more sincere people in that group and spurred opportunists to get in position to straddle the fence politically.

Tatarescu Liberals who were ousted from their lucrative position in Ministry of National Economy after November elections redoubled their efforts to make their influence felt again in economic and financial matters. The prospect of Turkey and Greece getting American loans fairly made their mouths water. They dream that they too might benefit if things were a little different in Romania. Tatarescu among his friends speaks of urgent need to create politically a milder climate. He even hints of merger of two branches of Liberal Party.

Similarly Radaceanu Socialists seeing themselves increasingly tagged as Communist stooges by Socialist rank and file are looking for opportunity to justify their independent existence or to reunite with Petrescu group. Latter, however, is far from ready to forgive and reaccept all defectionist leaders.

The Communists also are affected but they continue to carry through on their established line as though no speech had been given and no American aid was in prospect for Greece and Turkey. They still insist upon their project of economic offices law. They continue to bring about the arrest of supporters of Maniu, Bratianu, and Petrescu for reasons ranging from a suspected deep laid plot to overthrow Groza Government to alleged opposition project to impede spring sowings.

March 24 *On exchange problem*

Romanian Government has informally offered Mission same exchange rate as that given AJDC namely free market rate less ten percent premium for Government exchange to be effected at regular intervals at rate on particular day transaction is made as published by autonomous Office of Finance and Amortization.

Government appears adamant in declining to grant us full free market rate. While Mission, should Department perceive no objection, intends to press for rate of at least ninety-five percent, Romanian Government's offer appears most practicable suggestion yet advanced for solution our exchange problem. Objection raised to such a plan previously suggested that Government, once assured of dollars could proceed against free market is still remote possibility, but observers here now believe continued deterioration currency and lack of any prospect of stabilization make such a development most unlikely.

In accordance with instructions, Mission will continue present system of obtaining lei until withdrawal American representation on ACC. It is understood that any arrangement made with Romanian Government will be of temporary nature until currency is stabilized and normal financial conditions return.

Department's instructions would be appreciated.

March 25 *On Bulgarian Communist leader Georgi Dimitrov and his associates*

Communist source asserts Comintern policy for Balkans being directed from Sofia by Dimitrov.

Supposedly for tactical reasons greatest prominence given Tito of Yugoslavia by virtue of carry-over record from war as Partisan leader and to disguise role of Dimitrov who is responsible for conduct of Communist parties in Southeastern Europe.

Signs of Romanian Communist deferment to Dimitrov include sending of Romanian Communists to Sofia for disciplining or instructions and operation in Romania of several alleged close Dimitrov associates such as Boris Stefanov, agrarian expert, and new Bulgarian Minister to Bucharest, Demetri Ganev.

March 26 *Imminent new deportations to Soviet Union*

Lavish Government employment of arrest weapon during the past two years culminated in recent roundup which is reported continuing. However, with disturbing frequency, information comes from responsible sources that supplementary terrorist means, deportations to Soviet Union, shortly will be used to cripple opposition by sweep in three directions.

(1) Indications are deportations impend for selected elements of those now arrested and any higher opposition officials that can eventually be gathered in all-inclusive net of charges. (2) Likewise threatened ostensibly under Peace Treaty Article 6 area hundreds of Romanians who believed themselves cleared of accusations arising from their activities during Antonescu regime who may be tried in Soviet Union or called there as witnesses. (3) Last aspect is deportation drive against Bessarabians living in Romania and German ethnic minority.

Secret order has been issued by Tatarescu as Vice-President Council of Ministers ordering Romanian police to assist (1) Soviet authorities in arranging for repatriation of Bessarabians arrived in Romania since 1940 and (2) local authorities in arranging displacement of Romanians of German ethnic origin excepting those of American nationality as the Romanian Government does not wish to be the cause of trouble between Romania and the United States.

March 27 *"Government's efforts to expose new reactionary conspiracy"*

In several recent telegrams I referred to Government's efforts to expose new plot. These activities are directed toward (1) uncovering widespread reactionary conspiracy among members of opposition parties (2) linking this conspiracy with the conspiracy recently uncovered in Hungary (3) discrediting this Mission by alleging existence of direct connection between conspirators and Mission employees.

Department will recognize this as substantially same pattern as used last autumn in "Black Cloak" trials. In fact at conclusion of those trials I reported we could expect other groups to be brought to trial on similar charges. Government apparently now feels international situation has evolved to point where it can proceed more boldly to eliminate in Romania influence of native and foreign elements who oppose it.

Efforts to involve United States Mission in the plot

In efforts to involve Mission Government is resorting to its usual means of agents provocateurs. A police agent who knew Miss Olteanu in prison called at Mission recently and asked to see her. One of Mission's officers has been addressed letters from two organizations whose avowed purpose is overthrow of Groza Government. Two other officers have received visits from persons who declared themselves desirous of joining an American led movement to overthrow Government. I am convinced that these visits and letters are not unrelated with Government's plans.

I propose therefore if Department approves to call informally on Tatarescu, give him letters Mission has received and inform him of visits. Although I realize this procedure may entail risk to some people, and particularly to writers of letters if such should happen to be genuine, I believe it will prevent Government from using this brand of evidence against the Mission at public trials.

March 28 *A Romanian Government's note destined for Council of Foreign Ministers*

Note dated March 31 destined for Council of Foreign Ministers from Tatarescu received by Mission today requests that Romanian Government be permitted to present its viewpoint and claims to Council of Foreign Ministers or organization they will create for elaboration of German Peace Treaty. Foreign Office states copies of note were addressed to Soviet, British, French missions in Romania. Note will be despatched to Department with copy to Moscow by next courier.

March 29 *Statistics of arrests of the opposition members*

Since April 1 opposition has received no repeat no news of further arrests. On April 2 six National Peasants, including Assistant Secretary Veniamin, and several Liberals and Socialists were released. However, today emissaries of each opposition party gave estimates of following number still imprisoned: National Peasants 250, National Liberals 100, Independent Socialists 20. This number includes many opposition party district leaders.

On March 30 Maniu, Bratianu, and Petrescu addressed memoranda to Soviet, British, French, and American missions describing arbitrary and unlawful arrests of their party members and asserting Government tactics show disregard for all its international commitments to recognize public liberties. Statement asked each Allied government to take necessary measures to stop such activities. About seventy arrested persons have addressed petition to King demanding their release, describing imprisonment under intolerable physical conditions and detention for past seventeen days without any police questioning.

Maniu's statement

Today in press conference Maniu again described tragic condition of country dwelling upon recent arrests and intimidation of opposition as offering additional evidence of Government incapacity. He claimed people do not understand reason why Allies retain present Government and asserted his party makes every effort to prevent public from openly manifesting against regime while Government has "audacity to accuse opposition of inciting population."

Discouragement among opposition members

Opposition greatly discouraged at lack American recognition of its present plight. Those imprisoned realize impossibility of assistance from their parties and firmly believe only hope their eventual release is in strong American demarche. They state US has taken such action in Hungary. They hear conditions in Yugoslavia and Poland are being extensively publicized through former American ambassadors to those countries but they believe Romanian situation is neglected.

Berry asking for forthright formal action

I agree with Department's views that informal approach is undesirable. I recommend however that publicity at home and locally through Voice of America be given to situation. Then a forthright formal action on our part will offer only real possibility of reducing internal pressure against opposition.

March 29 *Concerning instructions for US and UK representatives' formal action*

British Embassy has informed Department of suggestion by your British colleague that as measure counteract recent intensification Romanian Government's persecution democratic elements reported before and previous United States and United Kingdom representatives Bucharest might approach Romanian Government and in making clear that they were acting on instructions point out that such action contrary guarantees provided Article 3 Treaty of Peace and that if persecution not discontinued it might be necessary for United States and United Kingdom Government to consider action similar to recent demarche in Hungary. British Representative feels formal demand for ACC investigation not advisable on basis information available to date particularly as we might have difficulty proving Soviet responsibility situation.

We doubt effectiveness suggested informal representations and inclined to believe such action subject interpretation an evidence Western interest in democratic elements Romania less than in similar forces to the countries where we have taken forthright formal action. We are also dubious desirability formal protest at this time. Your comments will be appreciated.

March 30* *British Political Representative in favor of "status quo" preservation*

My British colleague** who has just resumed his duties after an absence of four months telegraphed his Government today that just as past year was one of attack and protest to secure from Romanian Government implementation of its commitments he foresaw that coming year would be one of waiting and patience. He thought it desirable to work for preservation of "status quo," however unpopular and unrepresentative Groza Government might be, until its appropriate modification could be brought about through democratic processes without fear of Soviet interference or aggression.

Berry insists for immediate and strong reaction

Much as I agree with my British colleague in general upon undesirability of making futile protests I feel we should react immediately and strongly to any action on part of Romanian Government which infringes upon American rights or our international commitments.

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* See *FRUS 1947*, IV, p. 481: Berry to the Secretary of State. Telegram 279. Confidential. Urgent. Bucharest, April 27.

** Adrian Holman.

Again I agree that it would be unwise to overthrow Groza Government as long as Soviet troops occupy Romania yet I believe we must do what we can to prevent Communists from increasing their control. Above all else we must not let the opposition parties feel that they have been abandoned. Their patience and restraint is based upon certainty that Soviet troops at a definite date will all leave Romania. Should Moscow Conference adjourn without making such provisions a wave of pessimism will sweep Romania which will be at least as strong as wave of optimism that followed President Truman's March 12 speech.

March 31 *Director of Romano-Americana arrested*

Government on March 31 arrested Aleco Ionescu, Director of Romano-Americana and has held him in secrecy to date except for a brief visit he was permitted to make to his home April 2. At request of his wife who is an American citizen Romano-Americana has taken no steps to inquire into circumstances of arrest nor to effect his release.

Ionescu is prominent member of Government Socialist Party and in absence of Georgescu served as company's principal contact with Government. In view of his political connections it was hoped that Ionescu would serve as protection for company against any unfavorable actions Romanian Government. Romano-Americana believes and Mission concurs that arrest may be retaliation on part of Government against activities in United States of Georgescu in connection with contemplated loan. Groza is reportedly highly incensed at arrangements made by Georgescu and Ausnit with American financial circles independently of Romanian Legation.

April 1 *British Representative, Holman, suggesting that a meeting be held*

My British colleague has addressed letters to Soviet Representative* and myself suggesting meeting late next week to come to understanding regarding machinery for implementation of treaty. He sets forth nine underlining principles which are those reported Department by London. If Soviet representative agrees to meeting I will attend and agree to these points upon which we are already in agreement with British.

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* The Soviet Ambassador in Romania, Sergei Ivanovich Kavtaradze (1945-1952). Former Assistant People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs.

April 2 *Hesitations*

If I bring up subject of receipt of letters to Tatarescu and then decline on demand to give them to him, my action will be proving to his mind that Mission is sheltering and encouraging reactionaries. Therefore in view of Department's desire I shall not bring up subject. However if Tatarescu in course of general conversation should touch upon subject I shall say Mission has received letters which were disposed of as we dispose of frank letters.

April 4 *Remarks regarding ratification of the Soviet – Romanian trade agreement*

Parliament ratified Soviet — Romanian Trade Agreement April 4. Department may wish give consideration making representations against formal parliamentary action while Romania still under Armistice. Communists reportedly doubt legality such formal ratification at this time but party desires confront Western Powers with fait accompli upon end of Armistice period and accordingly rushed ratification.

April 5 *Counselor Riposanu and Minister Stoica recalled*

Romanian Legation Counselor Riposanu at Washington and Minister Vasile Stoica at the Hague have been recalled, the former for seeking associations with Americans and latter for reporting Western views concerning Romanian Communism.

The sole job of recent Romanian diplomats being only propaganda

Recent ministers named to posts abroad including Brabetzianu, Minister to Denmark, have been instructed to keep in close touch with Soviet colleagues for "supplementary instructions." They have been told Government is completely uninterested in their analyses of political and social conditions in country to which accredited and that their sole job will be to act as propagandists and apologists for Groza regime.

April 6 *George Cretzianu's case... reopened*

George Cretzianu, former National Bank Director and Finance Minister at National Liberal Party request in early days of Antonescu regime, was cleared of any political charges and case dismissed by qualified tribunal in 1945. Now he is one of cases Soviet investigation commission privately recommended for review. Cretzianu today is in virtual hiding.

Political opposition quarters consider him loading financial technician in their ranks and believe sole reason for Soviets re-opening case is to have hostage for conduct of brother Alexandru Cretzianu. Inquiry was made of mission if US could aid George Cretzianu's departure from Romania and Mission replied that US Mission could not under existing instructions be party to such action.

Citing President Truman's March 12 speech as evidence of direct American interest in them opposition elements also inquired if there was any change in existing directions to Mission upon political sanctuary. They were told no new instructions received.

Any Department observations on above matters would be useful.

April 7 *Romanian currency about to collapse. Its causes*

Romanian currency in past three days has given evidence that it is about to collapse completely. Dollar rate on free market rose to 900,000 on April 10 as compared with 415,000 on April 1. National Bank has informed officers of Military Mission that 500,000 and 1,000,000 lei notes had been printed and would be issued April 21, if not sooner. Government is dumping gold on market and endeavoring to tighten loan policy in effort to halt course of inflation but at best such measures can only bring temporary alleviation. In opinion of most observers inflation is

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BURTON Y. BERRY

ROMANIAN DIARIES

1944-1947

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THE CENTER FOR ROMANIAN STUDIES

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BURTON Y. BERRY

ROMANIAN DIARIES
1944-1947

EDITED BY CORNELIA BODEA

THE CENTER FOR ROMANIAN STUDIES

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1901-1985

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Preface

On 29 September 1944 Secretary of State Cordell Hull informed the US Ambassador to the Soviet Union, Averell Harriman, that, "although the question of formal diplomatic relations with the Romanian Government does not arise, the Department desires to have during the Armistice period full liberty of informal contact with the Romanian Government, as well as the means of ensuring the protection of American interests."

"We should like," the note continued, "the American representation to function as a unit, and we attach considerable importance to the civilian part of the development." Taking into account that the statutes set up for the Control Commission envisaged largely military functions, the United States Government preferred to avoid setting up a separate establishment for political representation, at least initially.

Consequently, although the military representation on the Commission had yet to be designated, the Department decided that the American political representatives on the Commission should consist of a senior political representative (viz.: Burton Yost Berry, then at Istanbul) and two Foreign Service Officers (Roy M. Melbourne and Charles E. Hulick, one coming from Caserta, the other from Cairo).[1] The political representative was designated as head of the American delegation with the personal rank of Minister.

Who was Burton Yost Berry? — The only published source of information providing his general biographical data is in volume 32 of *Who's Who in America* for 1962-1963. Nothing prior to this, nothing more afterwards. We glean from his c.v. that he was born at Fowler, Indiana on 31

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[1] See *Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers 1944*. Vol. IV *Europe*, Washington, D.C., 1966, pp. 241-243.

August 1901; obtained his B.A. at Indiana University in 1923; his M.A. in 1925; and his LL.D. in 1957. After two years spent at the University of Paris, 1925-1927, he was admitted to the Indiana Bar. Almost immediately thereafter he joined the Foreign Service and, within a year, was posted to Istanbul. Between 1928 and 1934 he occupied different diplomatic posts at Istanbul. From October 1934 he was secretary of Legation at Teheran; then consul at Athens from January 1936, during which he held other concurrent postings. In 1938 he was appointed successively consul and secretary of Legation in Egypt, returning to Istanbul in December 1942, first as consul then as consul general.

Istanbul, at the time the primary center for diplomatic talks, intelligence collection, and espionage for the region, offered Berry the opportunity to keep rather well-informed on the political and military developments in the country he was assigned to in the autumn of 1944. After Romania, Berry spent two years as special assistant to the chief of the American Mission for Aid in Greece. From 1949 to 1950 he was in the Department of State, Office for African and Near Eastern Affairs. During the final part of his diplomatic career, in 1952-1954, Berry was Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to Iraq.

Perhaps the most incisive description of Berry and his activities during his tenure in Bucharest from November 1944 to July 1947 is given by Brigadier General Cortlandt Van R. Schuyler, the Chief of the US military representation on the Allied Control Commission for Romania. Schuyler, himself appreciated as a "highly competent, intelligent, and reasonable officer,"[2] wrote:

"I soon discovered that Burton Berry was an indispensable source of encouragement and support. He was not accredited to the Allied Control Commission. Rather, he was the State Department's representative, working out of the former US Legation in Bucharest. His primary task was to establish and maintain informed channels with the king and the Romanian Government, thus facilitating a post-peace treaty transition to full diplomatic recognition. An experienced diplomat, he was friendly, congenial, highly intelligent, and extremely articulate. His messages were a joy to read. During our early meetings, we both came to realize that the question of precedence between us required prompt resolution. His channel was, of course, direct to the State Department, mine to the Pentagon. Assuming reasonable coordination at the Washington end, we needed a corresponding allocation of responsibilities at our level in Romania. Accordingly, we agreed that all official approaches to the king and the Romanian Government should be Berry's primary responsibility, while all dealings with the Control Commission and with the Russian delegation would be chiefly my concern. We would each be free to discuss matters of any nature with any individual we might see, keeping each other fully informed of such discussions. We would meet frequently and would have access to each others' incoming and outgoing cables and directives. Our staffs, of course, followed the same procedure. The arrangement worked well throughout our tour in Romania. We never found ourselves at cross-purposes, and our reports to Washington reflected the full understanding and collaboration established between us."[3]

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[2] George F. Kennan, *Memoirs 1925-1950*, Boston, 1967, p. 383.

Both Schuyler and Berry kept diaries which, although differing in style and writing, complement each other well — one is tempted to see Schuyler as the literary narrator and Berry as the chronicler and the recorder. I have compared the texts of both diaries and noted the strikingly complementary parts in Schuyler's *Diary* associated with details omitted from Berry's *Diary*.[4] At the same time, although a direct participant, there are important events which are not recorded by Schuyler.

In regard to the period covered by the two documentary sources, Berry started his notes on the day of his arrival in Romania, 9 November 1944, and continued up to 20 May 1947, the day he physically left Bucharest. Schuyler arrived in Romania on 25 November 1944. Yet he began to write his journal only on 28 January 1945, ending them in September 1946. In sum, Berry's diaries provide an additional year's coverage, starting earlier and ending later than Schuyler's journal.

To preserve continuity in his notes, Berry inserted information obtained from the Foreign Service Officers in charge during his absences. For example, between 18 June and 28 August 1945, when he was in Washington for the purpose of assisting in the preparation of the work for the Berlin/Potsdam Conference, he was replaced by Melbourne. Likewise, Hulick filled in for him during 14-26 September 1945, when Berry was summoned to London where Romania was under discussion, and Melbourne was on leave in Italy.

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[3] Cortlandt V.R. Schuyler, "The View from Romania" in *Witnesses to the Origins of the Cold War*, edited by Thomas T. Hammond, 1982, p. 131.

[4] Prof. Paul D. Quinlan kindly provided me with a copy of Schuyler's diaries. They have since been published in Romanian as C.V.R. Schuyler, *Misiune dificilă: Jurnal (20 ianuarie 1945-20 septembrie 1946)*, edited by Alexandru Oşca and Mircea Chirițoiu. Bucharest: Editura Enciclopedică, 1997. The original English language copy is publicly available at the United States Library of Congress.

A third interruption occurred when he was in Paris and Washington during 1946 (28 August-16 October). This time, the gap in his text is left blank. I have taken the liberty of filling in the interval with the Top Secret Report that Berry presented to the President of the United States in September 1946 in Washington.

Preceded by Mark Ethridge's Special Report on Soviet Tactics in Romania and Bulgaria of November-December 1945, and bracketed chronologically between George Kennan's Long Telegram of February 1946, which warned of the error of treating with the Soviet Union as if it shared common perspectives and goals with the United States, and Kennan's "X" article of July 1947, which presented a broad strategy for the United States to counter Soviet expansionism,[5] Berry's *Top Secret Report Romania*[6] is a significant marker of the beginning of the Cold War. In it, he presented President Harry Truman with solid documentation of Soviet methods at work in Romania, predicting their employment in the other foreign lands under Soviet military occupation. The report summarized step by step the points at which the policies of the United States had failed and the Soviets had gained ascendancy. It synthesized Berry's reports and observations in a conscious attempt to influence US foreign policy towards adopting a more protective attitude with regard to Romania.

I do not discuss the political developments witnessed by Berry. Nor do I discuss his personal perceptions against the general historical setting which, I judge, is most interesting. I have intentionally avoided entering into the lions' den of issues which not only require much more serious study but which are already ably addressed by a host of veteran Romanian, American, and other specialists.[7]

In the meantime, while omitting the foregoing, I offer the reader and historical researcher the coherent testimony of an astute eyewitness, commentator, and actor.

Berry himself had destined his *Romanian Diaries* for printing. One clear testimony to this intention consists of the cross-references he used between some chapters of his book-to-be. I have therefore kept methodological interventions to a minimum; for instance, in adopting the present spelling of the name of the country and its people, i.e. Romania, Romanian, and Romanians, and not Rumania, Rumanian, Rumanians, in the interest of uniformity in Berry's text and in the citations. Interventions in regard to missing diacritical marks have also been minimal. Names such as Sănătescu, Bodnăraş, Tătărescu, etc. remain in Berry's spelling in his text, but are given in the Romanian orthography in the notes. I have left Berry's otherwise incorrect spellings of personal names as they appear in the original text.

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[5] For the Ethridge Report see *Foreign Relations of the United States 1945*, Vol. V, 1967, pp. 627-631, 633-637; also *infra*, pp. 306-312. For Kennan's Long Telegram and his X Article see his *Memoirs*, 1967, pp. 271-297, 354-366 and 547-559.

[6] See *infra*, pp. 467-496.

[7] See *infra*, the bibliographic guide, pp. 683-685.

I have, however, divided the whole material into five chronological sections: I, *On Post in Romania*, begins with the day of Berry's arrival in Bucharest, November 9, 1944, and ends with June 14, 1945; II, *In and Out of Romania*, includes three subdivisions: 1. "While in Washington," June 18 to August 26, 1945; 2. "Resuming charge," in Bucharest, August 26-Sept. 13; and 3. "While in London," Sept. 14-26; III, *Back on Post*, extends from September 27, 1945 to August 28, 1946; IV, *In Paris and Washington*, is devoted exclusively to Berry's "Top Secret Report upon Romania" presented to President Harry S. Truman in September 1946. Here I have added a brief editor's note on the circumstances surrounding the drafting of this report; V, *Last Months in Bucharest*, covers the interval between October 16, 1946 and May 20, 1947.

Berry's *Diaries* provide the opportunity to understand the social and political milieu in which he operated as well as the extremely harsh historical circumstances in which Romania found herself — circumstances which let us hope will remain only historical...

Cornelia Bodea
Romanian Academy, Bucharest

Acknowledgments

I first stumbled across Berry's *Romanian Diaries* at Indiana University in Bloomington, Indiana, in April 1996 during a lecture-visit arranged by Dr. Maria Bucur at this most cherished campus — the first of the many American campuses which I had the privilege to visit over the past three decades as a Fulbright visiting-professor, researcher, and academic participant. It was during one of the last days of my sojourn at Bloomington, while undertaking research in the special Manuscript Collection and Rare Books Section of the University's library, that I 'discovered' the three bound volumes registered as *Rumanian Diaries* by Burton Y. Berry, along with a separate item entitled the "Top Secret" Report presented by Berry to the United States President. I gratefully acknowledge the Lilly Library for granting me permission to publish Berry's *Diaries* and to reproduce his picture on the frontispiece of this book.

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The authors and editors of the works included in the bibliographic guide confirm and expand upon Berry's testimony regarding events, ideas, and trends connected with Romania's destiny during this complex period.

C.B.

I

ON POST IN ROMANIA

1. 1944, November 9-December 31[*]

November 9 *Arrival at Bucharest*

At noon today[**] I arrived at the Popesti Airport at Bucharest. With me were clerk Simon Rad, who had been an OSS employee in Istanbul, and typists Nelson and Magnusson, who had been in the Consulate General there. Roy Melbourne came to the field to meet us. He and Charlie Hulick had come to Bucharest on October 29. With this staff the Mission shall begin work.

November 10 *First visits:*

Accompanied by Melbourne I called today at the Headquarters of the Allied Control Commission. General Vinogradov, the Chairman, and Rear Admiral Bogdenko, the Chief of Staff, received me cordially. The General chided me a bit for the lateness of my arrival upon the scene. He offered his assistance in securing accommodations, transportations, and other necessities.

I introduced Lieutenant Colonel McGlasson, the first member of the American delegation to the ACC to arrive in Bucharest. I explained his and my status. The General told Colonel McGlasson that he should expect

to receive a call next week to a meeting of the Commission at which he would have an opportunity to present in writing any inquiries he might have concerning the past work of the Commission.

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[*] Interval corresponding to "Post-armistice problems of occupation and control of Romania; setting up of Allied Control Commission. Cf. *Foreign Relations of the United States. Diplomatic Papers 1944*. Vol. IV *Europe*. 1966, pp. 233-289. (Hereinafter *FRUS*.)

[**] See *FRUS 1944*. IV, p. 242: Secretary of State, C. Hull, to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union, Harriman, 1944, Sept. 29.

November 11 *At the Romanian Foreign Ministry:*

This afternoon I called at the Foreign Office to pay my respects to the Foreign Minister, Mr. Visoianu, and to inform him of my status.[*]

on the Armistice Agreement...

He said that he warmly welcomed the arrival in Bucharest of a representative of the American Government. He then kept me for an hour describing Romania's present administrative and economic difficulties, particularly as these are affected by the application of the terms of the Armistice Agreement. He spoke without bitterness and even with considerable tolerance of the untraditional approach of the Soviet Command to local problems and of the spontaneous actions of some of the Soviet officers and soldiers. Again and again he said that his Government sincerely desired to fulfill the obligations assumed under the Armistice Agreement but that this might prove impossible if it were denied the means of fulfilling them.

The Minister said that his government had agreed to ensure free movement as required by military authorities, but it was incapable of this as in fact the control of all communications was in Soviet hands. It had agreed to compensate for losses caused the Soviet Union to the amount of fifty million dollars yearly for six years payable in oil products, grain, and other commodities. However, the means of producing oil products were being seized and transported from Romania, and grain next year would be lacking as only fifteen percent of the land normally planted with wheat had been sown this autumn. This was due in part to the fact that fuel for tractors was not transported and distributed on Soviet-controlled Romanian railways and in part to a fear born of experience among the peasants that their animals and tractors would be requisitioned by the

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[*] See *FRUS 1944*, IV, pp. 260-261; Berry to the Secretary of State, Telegram 3, Nov. 12, 1944.

Soviets if exposed. The Minister added that Deputy Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Vishinsky, had come to Romania, carrying a long verbal message for the King, for the purpose of arranging for the better execution of the terms of the Armistice.

On the way to the door the Minister stopped and once again emphasized the desire of the Romanian Government to fulfill conscientiously the terms of the Armistice, stressing the fact that the Government found no fault with the terms, but did object to the way in which they had been executed until the present time. It was also unable to understand some requests made by the Soviets in the name of the Armistice Commission which he said would be humorous if the situation were not so tragic. To illustrate his point the Minister drew from his pocket a request just received from the Soviets which, according to him, called for the immediate delivery of large quantities of silk of the finest quality for underwear for soldiers, cacao, and other articles not produced in the country or available in reserve stocks.

November 12 *Call on Air Vice-Marshal Stevenson*

With Colonel McGlasson I called on Air Vice-Marshal Stevenson, Chief of the British delegation to the ACC. I explained the nature of my Mission* and introduced Colonel McGlasson.

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* "The American political Mission opened in Bucharest on 29 October 1944... The Mission, after hard tugging with the Russians, was, like its British counterpart, to be independent of the Allied Control Commission administering the military armistice and to have the right of direct contact with Romanians and of communication with Washington. Its officials on their arrival carried into their local environment a picture of the war from the American standpoint in which they sought to place their experience." Cf. Dr. Roy M. Melbourne, "Witness to the Start of the Cold War: The View from Romania," in *The United States and Romania. American-Romanian Relations during the Twentieth Century*. Paul D. Quinlan Editor. Woodland Hills, California, 1988, p. 97.

"For since the main body of the British Mission arrived in early October, and the Americans a month later, they had taken no effective share in the Armistice Control, even on action sometimes ordered by Vinogradov in the name of the whole Allied Commission..." (See, under Stevenson's pen-name: Arthur Gould Lee Air Vice-Marshal retired, *Crown against Sickle. The Story of King Michael of Romania*. Hutchinson & Co Publishers, London, New York, 1950, p. 100)

In the course of his remarks the Air Vice-Marshal referred to Romania as "the easterly bastion of the democracies" and implied that American and British interests require a similar approach to meet present problems. He mentioned the seizure of oil industry equipment by the Soviets from American and English properties as indicative of the nature of the problems that will arise. He attributed them to the lack of reliable information and organized effort for implementing the terms of the armistice.

On the organization of the Armistice Commission

The Vice Marshal then outlined a plan of organization for the Armistice Commission which he had submitted to London and to the British Embassy in Moscow with strong recommendations for its immediate adoption. He instructed his aide to give Colonel McGlasson a copy of the organization chart set up under his plan.

This calls for a commission under the chairmanship of Marshal Malinovsky. It suggests Rear Admiral Bogdenko and Colonel Sidorov as Assistants to the Chairman, and a Commissioners Committee composed of the Deputy Chairman, General Vinogradov, Air Vice-Marshal Stevenson, and the ranking American officer. Immediately under this Committee there is a Secretariat headed by Chief of Staff, General Vasiliev, with a Soviet aide and a British and American assistant. Immediately under the level of the Secretariat are five committees: Inspectorate, Liaison, Signals, Supply, and Information, each with a Soviet officer as chairman and each including at least one British and one American officer. Subordinate to this level are six subcommittees: Military, Naval, Air, Chief Economic Officers, Administrative, and Political. Each of these committees has a direct responsibility for the fulfillment of the pertinent clauses of the armistice. At a subordinate level are eleven additional subcommittees to deal with specific articles of the armistice, namely: oil, food and agriculture, transport, general trade and inquiries, finance and property, all under Article thirteen; POW, united nationals and displaced persons, civil administration, under Article seventeen; censors, war criminals, anti-Fascists under Article sixteen; and finally, the subcommittee on transport functioning under Article thirteen is designed as well to function under Articles three, seven, and nine. In addition to these control committees the chart foresees the appointment of regional representatives.

The British official personnel in Romania has been increased to provide representation on a scale provided by the Air Vice-Marshal's chart. I understand confidentially the official staff numbers now two hundred fifty and it may be further increased by some forty men. Apparently anticipating a reluctance to increase the American delegation to something like the size of the British, the Vice-Marshal suggested that each American official might serve on several committees. He stated that he considered our Soviet Allies "decent chaps" and felt that he could "sell them" upon his plan's practicability, particularly in view of a satisfactory conversation that he had just had with Deputy Commissar Vishinsky.

At the conclusion of our call the Air Vice-Marshal promised Colonel McGlasson every aid in commencing his operations and arranged to give him full paper details upon the British delegation's organizational plan.

Recommendations

In reporting the conversation to the Department I said that the stepping-up of the size of the American delegation on the ACC to anything like the size of the British delegation would certainly offend the Soviet authorities and at the same time mislead the Romanians into believing that we anticipate playing a greater role in this area than our natural interests really demand. I therefore recommended, irrespective of the plan of organization finally accepted, that the size of our military delegation be kept small and within it the officers be used only on those committees where they could most effectively promote American interests in this country.

November 14 *Conversation with A.I. Vishinsky*

Mr. Vishinsky asked me to call this afternoon at the Soviet Legation. At his suggestion Commander Wisner and Colonel McGlasson came along.

Mr. Vishinsky received us cordially and, speaking through his interpreter, said that he wished to welcome the arrival of the Americans in Romania where we could assist him in the task which he came to Romania to accomplish. In the broadest sense this was to see that the terms of the armistice were carried out, but the immediate object of his trip was to come to an agreement with the Romanians for the payment of the agreed indemnity. He desired to reach an agreement in principle for the full six year period and in detail for the first year. Unfortunately his negotiations had reached an impasse, having failed until now to reach an agreement on three points: the sort of merchandise to be delivered, the quantities, and the prices. The last point was proving the most troublesome as the Romanians insisted on calculating their values on the basis of present day inflated prices and the Soviet authorities insisted on using pre-war prices as the basis.

Mr. Vishinsky attributed the poor Romanian showing to (1) the attitude of Mr. Christu, the President of the Romanian delegation to the Armistice Commission, who constantly foresaw difficulties and created delays, (2) the attitude of the Romanian officers which is more inclined to political discussions than to work, and (3) the fact that the Romanian authorities have been very slow in cleaning the Fascist elements from the administration. He cited the example of the present Prefect of Police who was in office during the Antonescu regime, and said that if the Romanians did not take action soon, he would be obliged to present them with a list of officers to be dismissed.

In closing the conversation Mr. Vishinsky repeated that he wanted to keep the Americans informed of the developments of his conversations in order that we might assist him toward our common goal in Romania, the fulfillment of the terms of the armistice agreement.

November 15 *AVM Stevenson on the disturbances in the oil fields*

Air Vice-Marshal Stevenson called, accompanied by Colonel Masterson, his petroleum expert. The Colonel said that trouble had been fomenting in the oil fields for several weeks. It was his opinion that those who were responsible for making this trouble hoped to have the situation in their hands before the new government had been formed. In this they failed as the government had been quickly formed. The new government on the other hand felt that the disturbances would soon quiet down, but this has not proven the case.

On November eleventh the companies had agreed to an average wage increase of one hundred twenty-five percent but the new government, instead of accepting this agreement between the workers and the companies, approved a provisional decree granting an increase based on the wages existing in December 1940 of roughly one thousand percent. This government wage scale is about double that the workmen had themselves agreed to a few days before. However, today the workmen are not satisfied and demand in addition that the increase be made retroactive to September first, that an additional month's salary be paid each man as winter relief, that money be furnished each man for firewood, sixty percent of the cost of which is reimbursable by the man and forty percent by the company for which he works. To illustrate the extent of the government's increase the Colonel quoted these figures: value of monthly production, one milliard eight hundred million Lei; payroll cost of October, one milliard five hundred million Lei; monthly payroll cost as now seen, three milliard five hundred thousand Lei. (Figures for one British Oil Company.)

Colonel Masterson's further information

The Colonel said that the critical labor situation in the refineries was spreading to the fields. Men in some fields have turned out the company engineers. In others they recognize only men of their own choice. For example, Astra which refines one half of the total present output in Romania, is now managed by a field engineer and at Unirea the workmen recognize only a former chauffeur as manager. All senior officials are terrified and refuse to go to the refineries for fear of being arrested by the workmen.

The Colonel added that according to reports just received the loading of equipment by the Soviets was still continuing. In addition to despoiling the fields by the carring away of essential equipment, he deplored the ignorant use of valuable articles. He cited an instance where nine thousand feet of haliburton line was used as binding wire.

Stevenson's point of view

The Air Vice-Marshal summarized the situation in saying that it appeared to him that continued production was threatened by (1) a complete lack of supervision within the refineries, (2) the activities of some group who were fomenting trouble among the workmen, (3) the continued loading by the Soviets of equipment. He said that if production came to a standstill, it would then be too late to take remedial measures, but, as the situation was developing rapidly, he proposed to take those measures now. He would attempt to see General Vinogradov on the subject at the same time informing London and requesting the British Embassy in Moscow to make strong representations. He said the presence of Mr. Vishinsky offered an unique opportunity to express our points of view here while our Embassies in Moscow concentrate on Molotov.

Alexander Ionescu's opinion

After the Air Vice-Marshal and his aide left I asked Mr. Alexander Ionescu, the acting Director of Romano-Americana, to call. Mr. Ionescu said that the situation in the American fields was considerably better than generally throughout the industry. He admitted that the working men's wages had been grossly inadequate, and he thought that the increases agreed on November 11th were fully justified. He said that the loading of machinery by the Soviet authorities had not been recommenced from the Romano-Americana warehouses. In view of the fact that our interests are not directly affected and as the Air Vice-Marshal's statement may be an exaggeration, I telegraphed that I shall await the Department's instructions before bringing up the matter with Mr. Vishinsky.

November 15 *Dinner at Stevenson's residence*

Tonight at dinner at the AVM's residence Mr.Vishinsky said that there were plenty of indications that the Soviet armies would play a part in the defeat of Japan. General Vinogradov added to me, "We remember Port Arthur like you remember Pearl Harbor. We do not forget our enemies nor our friends."

November 16 *With the King on "present conditions in Romania:"*

The King arranged a private luncheon today at the Villa of Princess Elizabeth where he has been staying when in Bucharest since his Palace was bombed. He asked me to bring whomever I wished and so I sent word that I would bring Melbourne, Hulick, and Colonel McGlasson.

...in Transylvania;

After luncheon he asked me to go with him to his study "to provide me with some information concerning present conditions in Romania." He began with Transylvania, saying that the promise to return the greater part of Transylvania to Romania had been a strong incentive for the Romanians to fight the Nazis and the Hungarians. Lately Romanian enthusiasm had been cooled by the action of the Soviet authorities in obliging Romanian administrative officers and civilians to leave Transylvania. The King said that neither he nor his people understood the reason for this inasmuch as the battle line had moved far beyond the areas where the Romanians had reestablished civil administration.

situation in Moldavia;

Next he discussed Moldavia. He said that as the Soviet armies advanced into this province most Romanian civil servants had retired with the Romanian army. With the Soviet army came large numbers of people form Transnistria. They settled in the homes and on the land of some one hundred thousand people that the Soviets sent away. The new arrivals set up their own administration. After the Armistice the King had sent to Moldavia prefects and other local officials, but without exception these had either been arrested or sent back. The result is that there is no centralized administration existing in the province. The King fears the consequence of this situation. He says the new settlers are intriguing against the State. The old population is so terrified that it dares not react to these intrigues in accordance with its sentiments. His informers say that the situation may develop to the point where a small minority purporting to speak in the name of the people will demand that Moldavia either declare its independence or attach itself to the USSR.

local political situation,
local Communists;

Turning to the local political situation the King said the local Communists were trying to make him nominate an officer as Minister of War that would be completely unacceptable to the army. Until now he had resisted, but he had not really made up his mind whether he would yield to the Communists and appoint General Rascanu or appoint an honest man of his own choice and likely be faced with a crisis provoked by the withdrawal from the government of the Communists and perhaps the Socialists. He said that the Communists in the country numbered not more than one hundred thousand, and it would be a simple matter to deal with this small minority if it were not for two factors, first, the likelihood that local Soviet officials would show their strong displeasure, and secondly, the possibility that the Communists would resist with arms. Of course, the Communists are the only political group that is armed. A small number were armed to assist on the twenty-third of August, the others have been armed secretly since with confiscated German equipment. They had agreed to disarm within six days after the formation of the new government, but they have not kept their agreement. Although forcible disarmament of them is desired by all parties, it is difficult during a Soviet occupation.

other disturbing elements

He added that another disturbing element in the country was the eighty thousand Soviet deserters. An element that would have to be counted upon in the future would come from the workers that would gravitate to the cities upon the closing of many factories throughout the country through the inability of the management to meet increased wage demands or furnish the necessary raw materials to keep the factories operating.

The King's conclusions...

The King said that the Soviets complained that the armistice terms were not being fulfilled, and in some particulars they had reason to complain. However, his reports showed that the Romanian Government had made available vast resources to the Soviets, perhaps enough to meet the reparation requirements for the first year. He said that he foresaw a slowing-down of future deliveries until and unless authority over communications was returned to the Romanians. He called my attention to the fact that one main railway line had been widened to the Soviet gauge and as a result Romanian rolling stock could not be used on this line. He said that every railroad station had its group of Soviet officials whose orders often were contradictory. To illustrate the resulting confusion he said that beginning today there is only sufficient cereals in the capital to last five days though there is an abundant stock of cereals nearby. Trains had been loaded with cereals and started for Bucharest, but Soviet officials along the right of way had diverted them. Under such conditions it is impossible to ensure the necessary deliveries for the Romanian population and equally impossible to make reparation deliveries to the Soviet authorities.

November 17 *Meeting between the British & Soviet representatives*

I have just seen the minutes drawn up by the aides of the AVM following a meeting between the AVM, Mr. Vishinsky, and General Vinogradov where the removal of oil equipment was debated. The principal discussion developed around the question of the title to the equipment. The British argued that they as well as the Soviets are fighting to reestablish their rights. As their armies advance and liberate territories their commercial interests, which have been working under duress for the Germans during the period of occupation and therefore for such time were a part of the German war economy, again become free and must be reestablished as British interests in accordance with treaty rights agreed among United Nations. The parts and machinery which are the property of the companies must be considered British property and should not be moved without previous British agreement. The Commissioner formally requested that loading be stopped and that what had been sent away be returned.

Mr.Vishinsky stated that it was established that the Germans brought pipe to Romania in exchange for oil they had received. The oil produced was used to fight against the United Nations, and the British companies that had helped the enemy were traitorous and should be branded as war criminals. Moreover, the pipe, parts, and equipment that had been delivered by the Germans in exchange for oil should be considered as war trophies. As no progress was made each party registered his complete disagreement with the point of view of the other on the question of title, and the discussion was terminated.

Throughout the discussion the problem of maintaining production was introduced from time to time. Both groups proclaimed the desirability of producing more oil than when the Germans were in Romania. The British said that the removal of the parts would result in the decline and in some instances a stoppage of production. Mr.Vishinsky on the other hand claimed there was still an adequate supply of pipe and parts to meet the industry's needs for a year and a half. As on this topic too the point of view of the two groups was in complete variance, the AVM suggested a joint committee of investigation.

November 21 *Japanese nationals in Romania*

This morning I called upon the Foreign Minister following the receipt of the Department's telegraphic instructions to suggest that the Romanian Government may desire to turn over to the United States for custody the fourteen Japanese nationals in Romania. I informed him that the Japanese would be suitably accommodated in Italy pending satisfactory arrangements for their repatriation.

The Minister replied that if the American Government insisted, he would turn over to us the fourteen Japanese now held here. He asked us in coming to a decision to bear in mind two considerations: One) Such procedure would prevent the return of several key men, notably Edmond Ciuntu, a Romanian citizen who took refuge in Japan during the Antonescu regime, whom the Romanian Government wishes to appoint as Minister to Moscow when he is released. Two) It would invalidate the Romanian argument for the return of German and Hungarian diplomats that were arrested in Bucharest by Soviet authorities and transported to Soviet Russia.

Romanian armed forces.
Soviet troops to be stationed in Romania!

Later in the same conversation with the Foreign Minister he said that his government was concerned over two announcements of the Soviet High

Command: one, that the Romanian armed forces in Romania must henceforth be limited to three divisions of peace strength (five thousand men each) and two, that three Soviet divisions will be stationed in Romania, in main industrial areas, one near Bucharest, a second near Ploesti, and a third near Timisoara.

The Romanians believe that the presence of the Soviet troops will increase the audacity of the local Communists and that the weak and thinly spread Romanian forces will be unable to check the disorders the local Communists create. Pessimistically they interpret these two announcements as two further steps toward the point where the Soviet authorities will say that the Romanian Government is unable to maintain order throughout the country and insist upon replacing it by a purely puppet government or a direct Soviet control.

November 22 *News from Constantza: 1. Soviet officials. 2. Local Communists*

The Swedish Minister, Patrik de Reutersward, told me that his Consul from Constantza had just arrived in Bucharest. He reported to the Minister that: One) Soviet officials have examined shipping records in the Consul's office to determine the amount of German imports through the port of Constantza during the war. They say that all such imports came from Russia and therefore the Romanian Government must compensate the Soviets for them regardless of whether or not they were reshipped abroad. Two) A third of the town has been evacuated by the Romanians in order to make place for Soviet officials who are bringing their families to Constantza. They are creating a naval port and arsenal and give every indication that they have come to stay. Three) Local Communists arrested the constitutionally appointed Mayor. The Minister of Interior instructed Romanian troops to release the Mayor and return him to the seat of his authority. Soviet officials informed the Romanian officers that their troops were not to leave their barracks. To see that they did not, Soviet troops armed with machine guns surrounded the barracks. The new Mayor designated by the local Communists remains in office.

Vishinsky on the Soviet removals of Romanian oil equipment as "war booty;"

By appointment I called upon Mr.Vishinsky and presented to him the Department's point of view[1] on the problem created by the action of the Soviet authorities in removing some twenty-three thousand tons of tubes, parts, turbines, and other equipment from the warehouses of various oil companies in Romania.

Mr.Vishinsky listened intently to my statement. When I finished he replied that he agreed that the quick rehabilitation of the Romanian oil industry was important. He said that the Soviet Command had removed only equipment that was in excess to the needs of the Romanian industry and so the removals would not retard the rehabilitation of the industry. He added that the Baku and Maicop fields were in great need of equipment and that the shipment there of Romanian equipment would serve our common effort.

Mr.Vishinsky argued that the equipment sent to Russia was not purchased by the oil companies prior to the war. It was all German equipment sent to Romania during the war, not as payment for Romanian oil, but for reshipment to the Soviet fields as soon as they were captured by the Germans. Under such circumstances the Soviet Command regarded the equipment as war booty.

I said that I understood that the tubes and equipment in warehouses of the American Company could in no sense be called war booty.

Mr.Vishinsky answered that there might be room for discussion on the question of title if one took the formal point of view. But he preferred a broader point of view. He suggested that the amount of equipment was so small that it might be written off as a minor lend lease shipment.

To this I said that the point at issue was not the value of the equipment taken away but the designation of the property of an American company as war booty and the removal of such property without the prior consent of the American Government.

In concluding the discussion of the topic Mr.Vishinsky said that he could not agree as the Soviet authorities held the equipment to be war booty, but he was in agreement that the Romanian oil industry should be quickly rehabilitated and he could assure me that the necessary parts were in stock for at least a year. He said finally that he would inform Moscow immediately of the State Department's interest in reviewing the whole question.

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[1] *FRUS 1944*, IV, pp. 263-264: Berry to the Secretary of State. Telegram 9, Nov. 23.

"Soviet – Romanian negotiations regarding reparation payments"

Having completed this part of our discussion Mr.Vishinsky turned to a discussion of the status of the Soviet-Romanian negotiations regarding reparation payments. He stated that in general, satisfactory progress had been achieved since his arrival, particularly with reference to the quantities of oil, grains, timber, and cattle desired by the Soviet Union. He was optimistic that an agreement would be signed within a few days. He informed me that some difficulties were being encountered with respect to the quantities of machinery desired by the Soviet Government and their request for seventeen million dollars of shipping over a six year period as part of the three hundred million dollars reparation.

In answer to my query he stated he was satisfied that Romanian transportation facilities were in a position to make scheduled deliveries of material, since it was planned to use the Danube, sending shipments to Constantza, Odessa, and Nikolaiev for the rehabilitation of the Crimea and Southern Ukraine. He also expressed his confidence that within several months they could draw upon Germany to ease the transportation problem.

November 23 *On Romanian representatives to Washington & London*

Meeting the Foreign Minister yesterday he took the occasion to say that political representatives from America, England, France, Belgium, and Holland had either reached Bucharest or were on their way here. He said that he would like very much to send representatives to Washington and London. If they would be received, he would give each the same title as that borne by the representative of Washington and London here. He would choose his representatives from among Romanians who have been in Romania throughout the war and are thus better informed concerning present conditions than those who have resided abroad the past few years.

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